Alternatives in a World of Crisis by Lang, Miriam, ed. et al.
EN
      ALTERNATIVES  
    IN A WORLD  
  OF CRISIS  
GLOBAL WORKING GROUP BEYOND DEVELOPMENT 
MIRIAM LANG,  CLAUS-DIETER KÖNIG 
AND ADA-CHARLOTTE REGELMANN (EDS)
ALTERNATIVES  
IN A WORLD OF CRISIS
  GLOBAL WORKING GROUP BEYOND DEVELOPMENT 
Miriam Lang,  Claus-Dieter König and Ada-Charlotte Regelmann (eds.)
 2ND REVISED EDITION BRUSSELS, MAY 2019 
 GLOBAL WORKING GROUP BEYOND DEVELOPMENT 
 Miriam Lang,  Claus-Dieter König and Ada-Charlotte Regelmann (eds.)
SEEKING ALTERNATIVES BEYOND DEVELOPMENT 
INTRODUCTION 3 
Miriam Lang and Raphael Hoetmer
I NIGERIA 
NIGER DELTA: COMMUNITY AND RESISTANCE 16 
Isaac ‘Asume’ Osuoka
II VENEZUELA 
THE BOLIVARIAN EXPERIENCE:  A STRUGGLE TO TRANSCEND CAPITALISM  46 
Edgardo Lander
III ECUADOR 
NABÓN COUNTY: BUILDING LIVING WELL FROM THE BOTTOM UP  90 
Miriam Lang and Mabrouka M’Barek
IV  INDIA 
MENDHA-LEKHA: FOREST RIGHTS AND SELF-EMPOWERMENT  134 
Neema Pathak Broome
V  SPAIN 
BARCELONA EN COMÚ: THE MUNICIPALIST MOVEMENT TO SEIZE THE INSTITUTIONS  180 
Mauro Castro
VI  GREECE 
222 
256 
ATHENS AND THESSALONIKI: BOTTOM-UP SOLIDARITY ALTERNATIVES IN TIMES OF CRISIS  
Giorgos Velegrakis, Aliki Kosyfologou
BEYOND DEVELOPMENT: STOPPING THE MACHINES  
OF SOCIO-ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION  AND BUILDING ALTERNATIVE WORLDS 
COLLECTIVE REFLECTIONS
Global Working Group Beyond Development
AUTHORS’ BIOGRAPHIES 307
TABLE OF CONTENTS  
~ 4 ~
SEEKING ALTERNATIVES  
BEYOND DEVELOPMENT 























This book is the result of a collective effort. In fact, it has been written by many contribu-
tors from all over the world – women, men, activists, and scholars from very different 
socio-cultural contexts and political horizons, who give testimony to an even greater 
scope of social change. Their common concern is to show not only that alternatives 
do exist, despite the neoliberal mantra of the “end of history”, but that many of these 
alternatives are currently unfolding – even if in many cases they remain invisible to us. 
This book brings together a selection of texts portraying transformative processes 
around the world that are emblematic in that they been able to change their situated 
social realities in multiple ways, addressing different axes of domination simultaneously, 
and anticipating forms of social organization that configure alternatives to the commodi-
fying, patriarchal, colonial, and destructive logics of modern capitalism. These processes 
of course have faced a series of challenges and contradictions, both internally and from 
the outside, which have resulted in a diversity of landscapes of transformatory achieve-
ments in practice. Nevertheless, and maybe precisely because of their partial failures, 
they have all produced a range of insights. In this sense, this book does not intend to 
romanticize the social struggles it presents. It seeks instead to portray their contexts, 
conditions, and complex evolution through honest analysis and in solidarity with those 
affected in order to contribute to the knowledges of social movements, peoples, and 
collectives that promote emancipatory, multidimensional change.
As Boaventura de Sousa Santos states (2017, p. 239), at the beginning of the 21st 
century we are left with no convincing model of progressive social transformation. Both 
revolution and reformism, the overall concepts that marked two distinct transformative 
paths toward a better society in the 19th and 20th centuries, have proven insufficient, 
as have the theoretical and political instruments that nourished them. In this sense, 
the changing global political context we are currently living in is marked by the end of 
short-term cycles, such as the cycle of progressive governments in Latin America, but 
also by the end of a long-term cycle that started centuries ago. Western dominance 
in the global geopolitical system is being reconfigured, whilst the Nation-State as the 
principal institution of our societies, associated with the modern capitalist economy, 
might become outdated. 
Our world is facing a multidimensional crisis arising from the very civilizational founda-
tions that capitalist modernity is built on: on its firm belief that science and technology 
are the privileged means of solving social problems, and accordingly, on the scientific 
and technological domination of Nature, conceived only as a pool of “natural resources”; 
on the assumption that well-being depends on the accumulation of material goods; on 
its framing of humankind according to the ontology of homo oeconomicus, an overall 
rational, profit-maximizing, and individualistic being; on the enshrinement of unlimited 
economic growth as the axis of social and economic organization; and on the tendency 
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to commodify all aspects of life. These bases have not only produced a specific set of 
problems, they also shape the possible solutions that are envisioned, but often only 
aggravate the status quo – which explains why the current crisis is often characterized 
as a civilizational crisis. In the following, we will describe some of its features.
CIVILIZATIONAL CRISIS
Firstly, our world is facing an unprecedented level of accelerated ecological destruction 
that is in many ways related to modern capitalist civilization. It includes climate change, 
the destruction of existing water sources, the degradation of livelihoods, contamination, 
deforestation, the dramatic reduction of biodiversity, etc. While the future of humankind 
itself is at risk due to these forms of ecological destruction, extractivism1 is threatening 
livelihoods around the world, Nature is being more and more commodified, and global 
institutions and negotiations are busy promoting technocratic pseudo-solutions to these 
problems. 
As a consequence, ecological problems are increasingly framed as security issues 
requiring military solutions. Continuous wars, the ecological destruction of livelihoods, 
and the growing number of natural disasters have generated the most important migra-
tion crisis in history – but again, this is an issue that Western societies mainly address 
by building walls and increasing securitization. 
Secondly, technologization, automatization, and digitalization are reshaping the labor 
market, the organization of our political and cultural systems, our subjectivities, and, 
actually, most of contemporary human life. Our world is more connected and technolo-
gized than ever before, allowing decision-making and communication to take place at 
higher speeds than ever before. Most technology production takes place under corpo-
rate conditions exclusively for profit, and thus produces technologies which we, as user 
communities, control less and less. Instead of serving practical community needs, new 
technologies often nourish artificial needs, which are inflated by the media. Artificial 
intelligence and robotics are replacing humans in more and more areas and dimensions 
of society, in ways that entrench exploitation and discrimination instead of promoting 
emancipation. The unprecedented levels of supervision and vigilance are producing a 
full-spectrum surveillance society according to the interests of governments and corpo-
rations.
Another crucial element defining the current context is the rise of right wing populism 
and nationalism, in alliance with a conservative counteroffensive against human rights, 
1 Extractivism is defined, for example, by the Grupo Permanente de Alternativas al Desarrollo  
as the large-scale extraction of raw materials, such as oil and minerals, or industrial agricultural 
monocultural products intended not for local consumption but for export, which entails many 
countries’ economic integration into and dependency on the capitalist world market.
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women’s and LGTB rights, indigenous and collective rights, and the rights of Nature 
in many parts of the world. Over the last years we have witnessed dangerous alli-
ances between sectors of big capital,2 conservative churches and lobbies, illegal capital, 
and others that launched campaigns against the peace process in Colombia, or against 
“gender ideology” in Latin America and Southern Europe. The rise of Duterte in the 
Philippines, Macri in Argentina, Orban in Hungary, Modi in India, or Trump in the US 
all reflect this. Clearly, the global conservative right has learned a lot from the progres-
sive movements of the previous decades and has, to a large extent, co-opted their 
languages and agendas. All this results in a highly aggressive new phase of capitalism 
with very little respect for rights, democracy, and existing political institutions.
Corporate power and the intense concentration of wealth in the hands of very few 
people are continuously increasing, creating new state-corporate sovereignties, either 
in economic corridors and special economic zones, or through increased corporate 
participation in government. National and international regulation of transnational 
companies largely continues to benefit free trade and private capital. Alliances between 
formal and informal, or even illegal, capital forces determine the diverse manifestations 
of capitalism today. The increasing competition over power has resulted in skyrocketing 
electoral campaign costs, blurring the thin line between governments, politics, corpo-
rate power, lobbies, and economic elites. All of this threatens the quality of democracy, 
which is – and this is another factor – increasingly conditioned by media groups related 
to the same economic powers that reinforce dominant ideas: they spread fear, inse-
curity, and the notion that people have no alternative but to embrace contemporary 
capitalist society.
The Global South and the Global North are linked to each other through a specific, 
neocolonial division of Nature and labor. Hegemonic patterns of production, distribu-
tion, and consumption, re-enforced by related social imaginaries and subjectivities, 
determine the outlines of an imperial mode of living (Brand & Wissen, 2017) that is 
deeply embedded in the day-to-day practices of the majorities in the Global North and 
is increasingly also finding its way into the upper and middle classes of countries in the 
Global South. This mode of living is imperial insofar as, in its focus on mass consump-
tion, it assumes access to all resources – space, raw materials, cheap labor, and the 
entire planet’s sinks – is unlimited, but only for a small and privileged minority of world 
society. This mode of living is only possible as long as such unlimited access is secured 
either by political and legal means, or by force. The severe social and ecological conse-
quences that it generates elsewhere, for example at resource extraction sites, remain 
2 It is true that other companies have supported some progressive agendas, for example 
on sexual diversity and women’s rights. Reacting to Trump’s conservative politics, several 
companies and their CEOs have also demanded more progressive policies.
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invisible to the consumer, who only engages in neat, abstract exchanges mediated by 
money. The imperial mode of living connects the geopolitical North and South insofar 
as it represents their shared hegemonic ideal of a good and successful life under current 
capitalist conditions, an ideal closely related to the promise of “catch-up development”. 
While most existing social security systems are still institutionally organized around 
formal employment, the globalized competition of location generated by today’s trans-
national production chains mostly creates flexibilized, underpaid, and often unhealthy 
labor, and contributes to the expansion of forms of work closely resembling slavery. 
Huge informal and illegal economies are increasingly substituting the framework of 
social security and labor protection that resulted from a long cycle of struggles in the 
20th century. This intensification of the exploitation of labor has led to a care crisis, as 
the social capacities of reproduction are finite (as are the ecological capacities of regen-
eration). While care work is still taken for granted, mostly unpaid and mostly performed 
by women, we see its burden shifted increasingly onto women from the Global South 
through global care chains, in an updated international division of labor.
WHY BEYOND DEVELOPMENT?
Since World War II, the narrative of development has been a very effective instrument 
in expanding capitalist social and economic relations into the postcolonial world. In the 
name of development and modernization, a broad variety of other modes of being in 
the world and understanding it have been labeled as poor, backward, and obsolete. 
Although development discourse appears to be a friendlier version of earlier, colonial 
“civilizing” pretensions, it nevertheless transformed two thirds of the world’s popula-
tion, who were living embedded in their own cultures and conceptions of dignity, and 
their own worldviews, into people in need of assistance. The new world map of “devel-
oped” and “underdeveloped” countries that emerged when Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) was made the universal measure of human well-being turned them from protago-
nists of their own histories into imitators of the history of others. From then on, their 
performance was evaluated by international institutions and experts according to the 
criteria set down by Western capitalist modernity (Esteva, 1996; Escobar, 1995; Esteva, 
Babones & Babcicky, 2013). 
At the same time, across the different phases of capitalist economy that reach into 
the present, the distinct roles played by the Global South and North within the world 
economy have ensured that “catching up” was a goal impossible to reach – precisely 
because the geopolitical role of “underdeveloped” regions is to absorb the externalities 
generated by the imperial mode of living, and to supply it with fresh resources.
Seeking alternatives beyond development therefore means seeking alternatives beyond 
this very civilization that capitalist modernity has shaped, beyond this civilization so 
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keenly focused on economic growth, on instrumental and destructive societal relations 
with Nature, and on a rational, profit-maximizing, and individualistic understanding of 
humanity that has led us into this crisis. It also means giving space to other forms of 
understanding dignity beyond the language of human rights, which was shaped in a very 
specific context after World War II and represents only one of the possible languages 
of dignity, from which the majority of the world’s population is excluded in practice (de 
Sousa Santos, 2017, p. 253); still, without doubt, the framework of human rights needs 
to be defended against the rise of right-wing populists and their aspirations to rule by 
means of informal power.
As a response to this situation, this book intends to contribute a number of elements 
to the urgently needed collective inquiries taking into view new theoretical and political 
paradigms of social transformation. Its point of departure is that a multidimensional crisis 
calls for multidimensional responses. Social transformation today should address simul-
taneously the complex relations between class, race, coloniality, gender, and Nature, as 
it is precisely their historical entanglements and interdependencies that configure the 
civilizational bases of the system we face. Although the debates presented here have 
much in common with a socio-ecological perspective, we believe that it is necessary 
to highlight gender, race, and coloniality as necessary dimensions of social transforma-
tion that are no less significant than relations between classes or society and Nature. 
Although the term “socio-ecological” does not necessarily exclude these dimensions, 
it does not explicitly include them either.
A GLOBAL WORKING GROUP 
The Brussels office of the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation established its Global Working 
Group Beyond Development in 2016. Its first meeting was held in Brussels in January 
2016, with a focus on resource extraction and its socio-ecological impacts in different 
parts of the world. The group set out to outline a context for its debates that would 
intentionally be global, and that as such would seek to address the colonial matrix of 
power (Quijano, 2000 and Agamben, 2009) that despite the formal dissolution of colo-
nial empires continues to effectively suggest that all solutions to the world’s problems 
have to come from metropolitan countries, as they have for centuries; in this sense, the 
Working Group attempts to overcome the systematic invisibilization of social processes 
of transformation, resilience, or innovation that, viewed from the hegemonic metropol-
itan perspective, take place “elsewhere” and are usually considered irrelevant – either 
because they do not contribute to capitalist accumulation, or because they emerge from 
contexts that are considered “underdeveloped” and backward. 
Thus, as one of its premises, the Working Group seeks to build a space where the 
Global North can learn from the South, and vice versa; where scientific knowledge is 
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considered very valuable, but also recognized as incomplete, and not as the only form of 
knowledge there is. It opens up a space for listening to other knowledges that emerge 
from experience, from organization, from social movements or communities, from 
forms of knowledge often looked down on as “local”, “partial”, or “not rigorous”, while 
modern Western scientific knowledge claims to be universal and objective, eliding its 
own limits and particular perspectives. In this sense, the group tries to overcome what 
de Sousa Santos calls the epistemology of blindness that inhibits us from seeing things 
that could be important because we simply do not have the adequate lenses through 
which to see them, and to build an ecology of knowledges, a plural dialogue between 
different systems of knowledge and between different epistemologies, without pre-
established hierarchies (de Sousa Santos, 2017). As a result, the Group brings together 
very distinct threads of critical thinking from areas as diverse as ecology, ecofeminism, 
Marxism, decolonial thinking, social movements, and academic, grassroots and indig-
enous knowledges. 
We believe that responses to the huge challenges of our times can only be found collec-
tively, in the same way as the production of knowledge, and even thinking as such, 
is the result of communication and exchange with others, and that these acts neces-
sarily must make seeing the Other and looking into different “elsewheres” their point of 
departure. This book is not only a collective effort because it has been written by many 
and because every text has been commented on by at least two more members from 
the Working Group, or because our whole Working Group has written the final chapter 
collectively in order to reflect ongoing debates. It also gives voice to those collectives 
that fight the very struggles described in the different chapters; it gives voice to people 
from all over the world by making visible their situated strategies, practices, and motives.
This text is the outcome of the second meeting of this Working Group, which took 
place in Ecuador, Latin America, from May 11–18, 2017. It opened with a three-day field 
visit to Nabón County in the southern part of the country. The six case studies that the 
book comprises have been elaborated on the basis of a common analytic framework 
based on emblematic experiences in building alternatives. The purpose behind sharing 
a common framework was to establish the comparative grounds needed to encourage 
a transversal debate across the Group that would draw on all six processes without 
blurring their particularities and yet help nurture our collective search for alternatives. 
The outcome of this debate is presented in the final chapter, which has been written 
collectively based on the notes taken during the debates in Ecuador.
The case studies assembled here were selected according to two main criteria: they 
have all generated practices regarding the material and symbolic reproduction of life that 
are radically alternative to capitalist/modern/Western civilizational patterns, and they 
have attained a more than local dimension, or served as touchstones for other actors 
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in their respective regions and contexts. Case studies presented in this book reflect 
the views of their respective authors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the 
Working Group as a whole, or of other participants.
SIX STUDIES FROM THE GLOBAL  
SOUTH AND NORTH
The six processes that were finally compiled comprise four from the Global South and 
two from metropolitan countries. 
In the first chapter, Isaac Osuoka from Nigeria looks into ethnic communities’ resist-
ance to oil exploitation in the Niger Delta, which has resonated across the globe, using 
a broad, critical, and historical approach. 
Then, Edgardo Lander from Venezuela analyses fifteen years of Bolivarian Revolution 
in his country, later also labeled as 21st Century Socialism, that has inspired processes 
across Latin America and beyond and offers manifold opportunities for learning, in spite 
of the very critical situation that it has generated under Nicolás Maduro in more recent 
times.
In chapter three, Miriam Lang and Mabrouka M’barek take us to Ecuador, another Latin 
American country, where Buen Vivir (an indigenous-based concept of Living Well which 
contrasts profoundly with capitalist notions of well-being) was constitutionalized in 
2008. This case study centers on the rural County of Nabón (the destination of the 
group’s field visit in 2017), where local practices, traditions, and policies have converged 
against many odds to make this vision a reality in progress. 
In chapter four, Neema Pathak Brome portrays a small village in the state of Maha-
rashtra in India, which promotes a self-contained and self-reliant village republic in line 
with Mahatma Gandhi’s vision of village swaraj. Mendha Lekha village set out to trans-
form itself profoundly in the first place, in order to then not only inspire many other 
villages, but also to transform central state policies, legislation and institutions, espe-
cially regarding forest management. 
Regarding current pathways of transformation in the Global North, the book looks 
at the two European countries that the recent debt crisis has affected most: Greece 
and Spain. While Giorgos Velegrakis and Aliki Kosyfologou analyze two examples of 
urban commons created by social movements in the context of the massive number of 
migrants that Greece has received in the last years, Mauro Castro describes how the 
Indignados rebellion in Spain has given rise to a new impulse to seize local state struc-
tures. He shows how Barcelona in Comú seeks to reshape political relations between 
city government and the citizens themselves; its vision of municipalismo situates city 
governments as central actors of social transformation beyond the local.
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A COMMON MULTIDIMENSIONAL 
FRAMEWORK 
The analytic framework that all those studies build on centers on eight dimensions 
of transformation; they frame the multidimensional approach the Working Group has 
agreed on. Each of these dimensions is founded on an extensive thread of debates and 
experiences that we do not have the space to retrace in detail here. Both the previous 
work of the Latin American Permanent Working Group on Alternatives to Development 
(http://www.rosalux.org.ec/grupo/), which was founded in 2011 by the Quito office of 
the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation, and of the Vikalp Sangam (alternatives confluence) 
network in India, which seeks to combine environmental sustainability with radical 
democracy and economic democracy (http://www.vikalpsangam.org/), has served as a 
basis for establishing this framework.
The first dimension involves the de-commodification, or commonization, of some 
aspects of life, which means liberating them from the predominance of marketized 
profit logics in order to re-center them on the capacity to control and reproduce life in 
both its material and symbolic dimensions. This has, for example, partly been achieved 
in Barcelona, where the new city government has not only limited the commodifica-
tion and financialization of urban land and housing in the face of mass tourism, but also 
re-municipalized certain services and venues that were privatized or outsourced. In this 
way, it has opened up possibilities to ensure their collective, cooperative, or commu-
nity-based management. In Mendha Lekha, the Indian village that chapter four focuses 
on, and that has opposed the global trend toward the privatization of common property 
resources and land grabbing, land, water, and forests have been declared a common 
property resource that is managed collectively for the benefit of all.
The second dimension looks at the transformation of instrumental and predatory soci-
etal relations with Nature, which have been constitutive of capitalist modernity and 
have intensified during neoliberal globalization. This dimension can be seen at work 
for example in Nabón in Ecuador, where in the aftermath of the so-called green revolu-
tion agro-ecological practices helped to restore soil fertility and food sovereignty. In 
Mendha Lekha, the conservation of community forests has provided ecological secu-
rity. In Nigeria, community resistance against oil extraction made visible the enormous 
environmental costs of fossil fuel extraction and was linked to calls for environmental 
justice. And presenting a case from Venezuela, Edgardo Lander describes how the 
entrenchment of the oil rentier model is a continuation of the assault on Nature.
The third dimension refers to overcoming patriarchal gender relations, i.e. the sexual 
division of all forms of labor including care work, subsistence work, informal work, 
community work, as well as in terms of the dimensions of representation and decision-
making, etc., in relation to the specific forms of patriarchy at work within the context in 
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question. With respect to patriarchal gender relations, the horizontal and rotating organi-
zation of the City Plaza Hotel and the Social Solidarity Medical Centre of Thessaloniki in 
Greece have challenged the established sexual division of labor; in Nabón in Ecuador, 
women at the top level of local government have initiated processes of de-patriarchali-
zation, both structurally and symbolically.
The fourth dimension gauges the introduction of more equitable social relations, including 
the capacity to (re)distribute, to culturally sanction accumulation and inequalities, to 
de-stabilize capital accumulation and related strategies of regulation and governance, 
and to de-legitimize former hegemonic forces. In Hugo Chavez’ Venezuela, levels of 
poverty and extreme poverty have been significantly reduced; moreover, a number of 
social policies have improved nutrition and housing, and millions of seniors have been 
included in public pension schemes. In Nigeria, both Ogoni and Ijaw community resist-
ance and urban-based anti-capitalist mobilizations have contributed to de-stabilizing 
capital accumulation and the state’s strategies for enforcing hegemony.
The fifth dimension, which looks at overcoming discriminatory/racist inter-ethnic rela-
tions, is an objective pursued in Nabón, Ecuador. Not only has the blatant racism of 
mestizos toward the indigenous population diminished, but mestizo villages are now 
also implementing mechanisms of assemblearian democracy that they have adopted 
from indigenous communities; in Greece, the two initiatives described in chapter seven 
constitute important flagship projects against racism and the rise of right-wing move-
ments in the context of massive immigration. They have also envisioned forms of 
conviviality bringing together different ethnic groups.
The sixth dimension, the generation of a specific basis of knowledge and experience 
– not restricted to Western, science-based, “objective” expert knowledge – suited to 
initiate and push for social transformation, is best reflected in the two studies engaged 
in local-level analyses in Nabón and Mendha Lekha, where concrete efforts have been 
made to generate such a knowledge basis in order to strengthen community self-
government.
The capacity to build political communities of change where existing internal power 
relations are collectively analyzed and addressed – the seventh dimension – is mani-
fest in all six case studies presented in this book. Here it is important to point out that 
we understand community in a non-essentialist, dynamic, and plural way, and thus 
consider the term to include all forms of community, be they rural or urban, territorially 
bound or virtual. 
The eighth dimension, finally, refers to the enhancement of democracy in terms of the 
decision-making and steering processes that guide transformation, which can include 
both traditional and well-known as well as new, experimental forms of democracy. We 
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do not understand democracy here as a given set of institutions and practices, but as 
an ongoing, open-ended collective process of democratization, which could be under-
stood as a process of sharing and disseminating power. This is a further dimension 
present in all case studies, from the mobile parliaments in Nigeria, to the Gram Sabha 
in Mendha Lekha, to the manifold experiments with direct or neighborhood democracy 
launched in the context of municipalismo in Barcelona. In Venezuela as well, the limits 
of representative democracy have been extended both in the popular imaginaries and 
in practice, although in tension with tendencies toward centralization and unipersonal 
charismatic leadership.
Beyond these fundamental dimensions of social transformation, the studies explore a 
shared set of questions that orient the way in which they describe the respective experi-
ences. These questions were formulated with the purpose of enhancing the possibility 
of learning from the case studies, which will inspire, we hope, other processes of 
change elsewhere. One of these questions therefore is aimed at identifying the specific 
sources of strength in a given experience, i.e. the cultural, spiritual, political, epistemic, 
or other elements that have emerged as milestones, as well as a movement’s ability 
and mechanisms to learn from its own failures or mistakes, which we consider a quality 
fundamental to advancing social transformation. Inquiring into the determinant factors 
that help achieve a certain durability of change takes us in the same direction, as does 
learning about the role that alternative paradigms or worldviews such as Ubuntu, Swaraj, 
or Buen Vivir have played for the various movements.
Another question traces the relation between resistance and alternative-building within 
a specific process, or the dimensions of alternative-building that are already included 
in processes of resistance. Social processes of resistance and change are often chal-
lenged by powerful actors, who try to de-legitimize the inherent critique by accusing 
those who protest of being unable to provide viable solutions. Nevertheless, practices 
of resistance often anticipate alternative social, and sometimes economic, relations. 
Moreover, the studies take into account the relation between transformative experi-
ences and existing institutions on the one hand and their own instituent practices on the 
other. The notion of “instituent practices” has been shaped recently in the context of 
the various Occupy movements around the world between 2010 and 2013, but also in 
the context of the debates on anti-capitalist commons. How do institutions and move-
ments relate to one another, and how can this relationship be made productive in the 
sense of an emancipatory politics, without setting up too rigorous boundaries between 
these two poles? This is a central question closely related to the challenge of making 
transformation durable (Nowotny & Raunig, 2016) (Lang & Brand, 2015). 
Michel Bauwens from the P2P Foundation has the following understanding of what 
he calls instituent praxes: To institute does not mean to institutionalise in the sense of 
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rendering official, of consecrating or of recognising a posteriori what has already existed 
for some time (for example, in the form of habit or custom), nor does it mean to create out 
of nothing. It means to create the new with – and starting from – what already exists, as 
such in conditions passed down independently of our activity. A common is instituted by 
a specific praxis that we call “instituent praxis”. There is no general method for the institu-
tion of any given common. Each praxis ought to be understood and carried out in situ or in 
loco. That is why we must speak of “instituent praxes” in plural (Bauwens, 2015).
Another important set of questions was related to the actors of transformation, their 
respective role, and their relation to each other. In which ways did the experiences of 
alternative-building relate to the State? To what extent have State regulations or State 
actions enabled, protected, or endangered them? To what extent has State interven-
tion and repression been decisive for the processes? Did they make use of electoral 
dynamics, and if yes, on what scale, and with which outcome for the process? What 
role did external actors such as NGOs or aid agencies play, and in which way did these 
social processes of change connect with discourses or concepts of the political left, or 
forge alliances with actors of the political left? What was, in general, the role that the 
left played in those processes, and which school or current across the existing plurality 
of left voices was it? And what light did the experiences shed on international or global 
relations, or on interdependencies with other transformative processes elsewhere?
Authors were also encouraged to examine the technological patterns underlying these 
emblematic processes of transformation and take into account that the technologies 
available can, for example, make social processes more or less democratic, more or 
less sustainable, more or less dependent on corporations (Illich, 1973) (Vetter, 2017). 
Although references to this issue are still scarce in the book and the Group’s debates 
about technological patterns have to be intensified, chapter six on Barcelona en Comú 
provides interesting insights into how digital platforms can be used for commoning and 
deepening democracy.
Finally, there was a set of questions revolving around the values and notions attached 
to the concept of “quality of life” that the experiences analyzed were built upon. A wide 
range of views on what a good life means, which differ from the dominant poverty indi-
cators, are often made invisible by the mainstream discourses around economic growth 
and poverty eradication. Some of them are related to achieving autonomy and self-
reliance, for example. What notions of a good life were at the forefront in each process, 
and what was achieved in these dimensions?
Of course, not all the studies included in this book address all these questions in the 
same way. Depending on each case, some dimensions of the analytic framework 
turned out to be more fertile than others, which has shaped each study in a different 
way. Moreover, time kept us from discussing all these issues in depth. Our discussions 
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ultimately focused on four big issues: The possibilities of deepening democracy, the 
role of the left and the State in multidimensional transformation, and pathways toward 
new forms of internationalism, solidarity, or inter-people relations that can respond to 
the challenges of our times.
What this shared analytic framework did achieve, however, is to help build a common 
ground for the Working Group’s debates on multidimensional transformation, in spite 
of the vastly different perspectives of its members. This common ground allowed us to 
engage in an attempt to produce collective knowledge, which we share, as mentioned 
above, in the last chapter of this book, entitled “Beyond development: Stopping the 
machines of socio-ecological destruction and building alternative worlds”.
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The implementation of World Bank- and IMF-inspired structural adjustment programs 
(SAP) in the latter half of the 1980s exacerbated economic problems in Nigeria, Afri-
ca’s largest exporter of petroleum. Massive unemployment and growing hopelessness 
under the military regimes exposed social fissures and opened up new possibilities for 
anti-hegemonic mobilizations. By the turn of the decade, a new vibrant pro-democracy 
movement had formed. This movement had as its fulcrum the students’ movement that 
had organized anti-SAP protests from 1986 onward. The student movement’s network 
included radical university teachers, new human rights organizations, and sections of 
organized labor. Working together, the organizations led waves of mass protests against 
the military regimes during the 1990s. During the same period, a different type of mobi-
lization emerged in the communities of the Niger Delta around oil and gas production 
sites. Beginning with the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and 
later the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC), community movements engaged in struggles aimed 
at restructuring the colonial state in order to restore self-determination to communities. 
In 1990, MOSOP proclaimed the Ogoni Bill of Rights, which demanded, among other 
things, political autonomy as a means to achieve environmental justice. The procla-
mation triggered mass actions that resulted in a dual-power situation, with MOSOP 
advancing a radical alternative social agenda opposing the policies of the state and its 
allied capital. Mass protests and other direct actions by the Ogoni led to the halting of 
oil and gas production in the area when Shell pulled out in 1993. 
Polluted Niger Delta aerial
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As the Ogoni struggle radiated across the region, Ijaw communities also began to 
organize and disrupt oil exploitation activities. 
The immediate targets of the Niger Delta community movements that formed in the 
1990s were the oil companies that have polluted the natural environment and compro-
mised local livelihoods. Petroleum exploitation in the Niger Delta has been causing 
massive pollution since production commenced in 1956, when Nigeria was still under 
British colonial rule. Since then, crude oil and gas production has had a deleterious 
impact on community livelihoods. Over the decades, petroleum exploitation has gener-
ated immense profits for the transnational corporations, and today accounts for over 95 
percent of foreign exchange earnings, and over 80 percent of government revenues. By 
the 1990s, Nigeria was firmly among the top ten exporting countries globally, producing 
over two million barrels of crude oil daily. Petroleum infrastructure had become a main 
feature of the geography of the Niger Delta area. However, the local communities did 
not see any tangible benefits. Even worse, environmental pollution went hand in hand 
with human rights abuses as the state gave priority to protecting its oil assets. Members 
of communities in the Niger Delta came to see the petroleum industry as representing 
the state. While their protests targeted the oil companies, the community movements 
sought to create an alternative politics to transform the colonial state rather than just 
seek accommodation. The movements mobilized communities by forging a new under-
standing of environmental justice, resource control, and self-determination of ethnic 
nationality within Nigeria (Ikelegbe, 2005; Osaghae, 2001, 1995).
This chapter examines the Niger Delta community movements in Nigeria from the 
1990s, and highlights the potentials and limitations of using ethno-communal identi-
ties to organize alternative mobilizations against neoliberal adjustment, destructive 
extraction, and other antagonistic practices of the state and transnational capital. 
In doing so, I shall depart slightly from the predominant narrative of petro-politics. 
Instead, this study is based on the recognition that the genesis of the conflict 
between the state and its allied transnational capital on the one hand and the 
communities on the other can be traced back to the pre-petroleum era when colo-
nial corporations forcefully usurped sovereignty from communities in creating the 
Nigerian state. Thus, the next section begins with a brief discussion showing how 
the impact of colonialism provides a framework for understanding contemporary 
social tensions. A focus on the structure and character of the colonial state itself will 
make clear why and how members of communities seek to recreate local sovereign-
ties. The hegemony of the state over the community has been historically amplified 
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by promises of Development.1 The colonial state attempted to legitimize its claims 
of sovereignty over communities by staging itself as the patron of Development. 
In this case, the discourses of Development can be seen as tools of control. As 
part of this scheme, a community elite, beginning with “traditional rulers”, whose 
role was established as part of indirect rule under colonialism, and warrant chiefs, 
is promoted to “represent” the community in making demands for amenities from 
the state. It is through these community elites that the state exerts control over the 
communities. The elite ensures that community members fall into line and act in 
manners acceptable to the state. As members of the community elite are privileged 
by the state through political appointments, contracts, and election participations, 
any alternative discourse and mobilization that challenges the state also represents 
a threat to the community elites.
In section three, I present the cases of the Ogoni and Ijaw communities in Nigeria, who 
were among the first to protest against environmental destruction and political marginali-
zation. While their indignation against the petroleum industry sparked the events of the 
1990s, the struggles against the state and allied transnational corporations make visible 
the ways in which communities seek to “restructure” the colonial state. These strug-
gles also challenge the authority of the traditional ethnic elites. Within the Niger Delta 
communities, new structures of mobilization emerged to dislodge those traditionally 
patronized by the state, resulting in internal contests for hegemony over the communal 
public that continue up to this day. These cases highlight how the construction of political 
communities is a dynamic process in which attempts to build alternative communities, 
ways of life, and approaches to (re)production are continuously resisted by local powers 
tied to the state, and by a “civil society” tied to Western orthodoxies. Section four 
outlines the relationship between the Niger Delta movements and the traditional left 
and the pro-democracy movements of the 1990s. While contact between movements 
existed, the traditional left did not recognize the import of community mobilizations. 
Thus, urban-based anti-capitalist mobilizations became disconnected from community 
protests even though both were relevant to the de-stabilization of capital accumulation 
and the state’s strategies for enforcing hegemony. Ultimately, the state’s interventions 
shaped the way in which the Niger Delta struggles unraveled, and they took place in 
alliance with traditional elite clusters. Following a decade of mass actions, by the turn of 
the century the community movements found themselves increasingly mainstreamed 
into the state’s scheme due mainly to counter-revolutionary actions undertaken by the 
communities’ elites. 
1 Gillian Hart (2001) distinguishes development from Development. Spelled with a lower-case “d”, the concept 
involves the contradictory and uneven processes that drive changes in societies. Written with an upper-case 
“D”, the term is a more or less precise reference to the global aid industry. In my case, the capital “D” also 
describes state and oil industry projects involving the construction of social amenities. 
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COLONIALISM, THE STATE  
AND COMMUNITIES
BEYOND MILITARY RULE: “CRUDE” TECHNOLOGY, 
DOMINATION AND RESISTANCE
The community movements of the Niger Delta are in some ways responses to the way 
in which dominant energy technologies have been developed under colonialism. The 
alliance of the petroleum industry with the colonial state produces forms of social organ-
ization through which domination, control, and consent are enforced. For example, the 
large-scale exploitation of fossil fuels – whether in the form of crude oil or coal – has been 
a response to the demands of industrial society. Fossil fuel exploitation thus requires 
huge investments that can only be made by large corporations and financial institu-
tions deploying accumulated capital. Such capital has historically been accumulated by 
dispossessing human populations and nature (the latter of its potential for regeneration). 
With profits tied to rises in the use of fossil fuels, over time the corporations involved 
in the production of the latter began to encourage general consumption patterns and 
values to increase dependence on such fuels. To feed the obsession for motorized 
vehicles and a lifestyle focused on consumerist behavior promoted by capitalist corpo-
rations, Western expeditions seeking natural resources have led to the enslavement 
and colonization of peoples. As early expressions of corporate rule, European corpora-
tions and their armed agents occupied territories in Africa and elsewhere. Colonizing 
corporations established state-like structures, including social infrastructure to facilitate 
the exploitation of minerals and other raw materials. When petroleum replaced coal as 
the primary fuel driving colonial-era industry, the state prioritized its alliance with oil 
and gas corporations over the protection of its communities, whose survival depends 
on their access to land. Via decree, the state claimed ownership of and control over 
communities’ land, handing both over to corporations. Most communities that have 
been historically disadvantaged by these patterns of land use have not benefited from 
extraction. Thus, the Niger Delta community movements from the 1990s continue the 
earlier struggles of communities to reclaim land and use it for their survival. 
Nigeria was created and ruled by a British corporation, the Royal Niger Company (RNC), 
originally the United Africa Company (UAC). Following the formal abolition of transat-
lantic slave trade, British merchants trading on other produce such as palm oil competed 
with other Europeans for control over African geographies. The fierce competition that 
characterized the “Scramble for Africa” was resolved by Europe’s major powers at 
the Berlin Conference of 1884–85, where they sat down around a map of Africa and 
divided up the continent among themselves. The boundaries were based on European 
economic interests, reflecting the demands of corporations. Among the members of 
the British delegation was George Goldie, one of the country’s most powerful traders 
and founder of the UAC (Ikime, 1977; Flint, 1960). While the boundaries of the new 
~ 24 ~
territories that were drawn up at the Berlin Conference satisfied European corporate 
power, for the African communities those boundaries were arbitrary, and disregarded 
both kinship and history. 
By the time the Berlin Conference took place, British corporations were already 
expanding their territorial claims over the area that is now Nigeria using a mixture of 
brutal military assaults on the indigenous communities and double-tongued diplomatic 
expeditions (Ikime, 1977). In 1885, the British annexed the Niger Delta area, integrating 
it into their Oil Rivers Protectorate, a name that reflected the area’s significance for the 
palm oil trade.2 Yet another cause pushing colonization was the competition coming 
from French merchants, and the Germans, who were busy hoisting their flags in Came-
roon, east of the Niger, and in Togoland, west of the Niger. It did not take long for the 
British government to grant one of its most powerful traders, George Goldie, the right 
to fly the Union Jack in the areas where his trading company was dominant. From 
that time on, Goldie’s company became the official representative of the Crown in the 
“Niger area”. There, the Company effectively became the state, assuming its new offi-
cial name, Royal Niger Company, in 1886 (Flint, 1960). In a literal case of corporate 
rule, the company united the new colony’s executive, legislative and judicial branches. 
Goldie’s team then proceeded inland from the Atlantic coast of the Gulf of Guinea with 
gunboats, forcing local communities to accept their rule over the entire area in the name 
of “free trade”, and killing anyone that resisted them. 
The state was created by taking away sovereignty from communities. Fundamentally, 
the communities’ experience of their loss of sovereignty was shaped by the fact of 
colonialism, as colonial corporate rule forcefully usurped their power to secure direct 
production. Even before formal colonial rule, under the brutal regimes of the transat-
lantic slave trade and the colonial enterprise, communal entities forged alliances to 
challenge early slave raiders, and then the invading colonial force that followed. Such 
reconfigurations of “community” continued under colonial rule and afterward, as 
communal entities resisted or made claims against the state. Crucially, even before 
the state’s civil society (and its social stratification) took on form, the ethno-communal 
sphere was already well established as the antithesis to the complex formed by the 
state and transnational corporations.
Nigeria was still under colonial rule when petroleum was discovered in commercial 
quantities in 1956 in the Niger Delta. Since then, the immediate victims have been the 
inhabitants of communities whose livelihoods are severely impacted by pollution. As 
the production and export of crude oil predated political independence, the particular 
character of petroleum exploitation, targeted solely at the export market, ensured that 
2 The British renamed the area the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1893.
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oil rents shaped the political economy of the new state, which continued to operate 
as a joint venture with oil corporations. The dispossession of the communities of the 
Niger Delta was exacerbated by the fact that “the people” in this case are part of ethnic 
minorities with historically only marginal access to state power. Colonial Native Admin-
istrations and the construction of a federal system on the eve of independence favored 
the larger ethnic groups. Many minority groups, including the Ogoni and Ijaw, continued 
to struggle against internal domination even after independence (Naanen, 1995). 
COLONIAL RULE AND KINSHIP SOCIETY
When civil society in “Africa” is examined through a Western lens, there are seeming 
incongruities, as society here appears to be very fragmented. Indeed, one of the most 
profound impacts of the creation of colonial states has been the creation of dual social 
spheres. The imposition of the colonial state via British commercial rule consolidated 
and extended kinship society into the state sphere, to contend with the state and, 
at other times to seek accommodation. To cope with the savagery of early colonial 
rule, clan ties were consolidated (Ikime, 1977; Tamuno, 2011). Clans and ethnicities 
were concretized as social forces and coalesced into different communities in order to 
confront an imposed state. 
Prior to colonial rule, the village was the institution to exercise political sovereignty in 
most of the areas of the lower Niger. In some areas, villages were agglomerated into 
clans of common ancestry and other historical ties (Green, 1964; Dike, 1956). While 
there were indigenous kingdoms elsewhere (such as the Bini west of the Niger Delta), 
in the communities that are now identified as part of the Ogoni and Ijaw, political sover-
eignty resided with the village. Order within the village was subject to a kinship system 
that established a form of citizenship. In this case, the village was (and today still is) 
defined as a confederation of extended families, or compounds, existing within a contig-
uous territory. To belong, one had to be an accepted member of a compound. Belonging 
also ensured members’ spiritual and material connection to the land, as people were 
sons or daughters of “the soil”, which communities served as guardians. Those without 
family membership were alien to the community, and disconnected from humanity and 
nature. Describing the Bantu, Placide Tempels noted how “created beings preserve a 
bond one with another, an intimate ontological relationship, comparable with the causal 
tie which binds creature with Creator. For the Bantu, there is interaction of being with 
being, that is to say of force with force.” (quoted by Kaphagawani, 2006: p. 337). A 
kinship system links the individual to the communal order through family membership. 
That is why exclusion from community membership is one of the severest punishments 
for perpetrators of serious crimes. For those whose belonging is not questioned, the 
strength of kinship bonds means that membership of the community continues even 
when such persons choose to reside outside community boundaries.
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Within the community, daily village administration was participatory, involving members 
organized around age-grades, farm co-operatives, and other cultural institutions. In 
the event of wars with other communities, it was through the age-grade system that 
communal armies and defensive measures against slave raiders were organized. In 
peacetime, communal governance focused on the family in order to sustain (re)produc-
tion. Families provided social security for their members, ensuring that all, or as much 
as possible, was provided for in periods of famine, or in times of economic hardship. 
As the colonial state enforced its rule, a new political and mercantile regime produced 
conditions for social interaction within the state’s administrative machinery, in ware-
houses, and across the entire infrastructure of colonial rule. As individuals were 
conscripted as laborers in the European enterprise, they were introduced into a colo-
nial civic sphere. This new civil society was a limited space which the colonial system 
created, with some “rights” and a “rule of law” that enabled workers to interact with 
each other and their employers. Through such interactions, groups produced represent-
atives for formal and informal collective bargaining, as well as for social exchanges. For 
many individual workers, however, this new civil society did not satisfy their yearning 
for kinship. Workers from the communities now had to operate within the new civil 
society as well as within the ethnic public sphere to which they remained connected. 
Ever since, the state’s civil society and the ethnic public spheres have had to coexist as 
what has been described as the “two publics” (Ekeh, 1990) or the “bifurcated state” 
(Mamdani, 2002). There have, of course, been attempts to obliterate cultural differ-
ences and integrate all ethnic communities into a single civic sphere, and these have 
been fashioned around an “ideology of development” (Ake, 2001). 
DEVELOPMENT AS COLONIAL “SOCIAL CONTRACT”
As shown above, the Nigerian state has not always existed. Rather, that state was 
created just over a century ago at a particular moment in history when corporations 
backed by the British crown sought to impose their power on previously existing 
communities. The state has so far succeeded in exercising its power while continuing 
its battle for hegemony over all the communities and geopolitical interests within its 
boundaries. As Gramsci explained, hegemony is not limited to dominance; the state has 
to “win the active consent of those over whom it rules” (Gramsci, 1971: p. 244). Unlike 
in the metropole, the colonial state denied its colonized subjects citizenship rights, 
and offered them Development instead. Unlike the rights that are granted to individual 
citizens within a single civic sphere, colonial Development was offered to communi-
ties that had been agglomerated into Native Authorities. As I will explain below with 
reference to the Ogoni (section three), the way in which these Native Authorities were 
imposed contributed to creating ethnonational identities that did not necessarily exist 
before: Colonialism in this way forced people to adopt new ethnic identities, sometimes 
~ 27 ~NIGERIA
reconfigured or enlarged by colonial Native Authorities, as a condition for benefiting 
from Development. Development came to form a colonial social contract. But the state 
proved unable even to deliver on this minimum promise, which provoked increasing 
resistance and “nationalist” opposition to the colonial enterprise. 
After the First World War the colonialists again drew on the discourse on poverty and 
security to justify their continued rule over colonized territories and their imperialist attach-
ment to newly independent states. With poverty now seen as a threat to their strategic 
interests, they began to focus on the goal of eradicating Third World Poverty via Interna-
tional Development (Kiely, 1999; Escobar, 1995, 1999; Mamji and O’Coill, 2002; INCITE! 
Women of Color Against Violence, 2007; Duffield, 2001, 2007). Through the prism of 
Development, “poor countries are known, specified, and intervened upon” (Escobar, 
1999: p. 384) so that they can be forever made to engage in a race to catch up with the 
West (Amin, 2009). Thus, Development discourse promotes the processes and “inter-
ventions” through which public and private institutions provide specific amenities and 
initiatives to satisfy the communities’ wants regarding different aspects of social life such 
as education and healthcare. Part of the goal of Development discourse is to increase 
both demand and expectations among project “beneficiaries” even though initiatives 
effectively serve corporations and the state. Very often, road and railway projects needed 
for the exploitation of minerals and other primary resources during the colonial period 
were promoted as Development projects. This pattern continued during and after inde-
pendence, with the entire oil and gas complex, including the roads, pipelines, and export 
terminals making Nigerian petroleum accessible to the export market in Europe and North 
America, and more recently China, presented as Development infrastructure.
In the years following “independence” from Britain in 1960, Nigeria was embroiled in polit-
ical crises as the local elites that took power were divided along ethno-national lines. As is 
common to other post-colonial states in Africa, pan-national identity was often promoted 
with the promise of Development for all. However, the way that state boundaries had been 
drawn by the colonial powers and decades of indirect rule had reinforced and created ethnic 
competition for Development benefits from the state, as state allocations under colonial 
rule were inadequate to meet demands. The ensuing political imbroglio in the newly inde-
pendent states created conditions for military coups, some of which were sponsored 
directly by the former colonizing states. By 1990, military rule had become an established 
feature of public life in Nigeria. With the state exploiting the country’s petroleum resources 
hand in hand with transnational corporations, the military elite not only backed international 
capital, but often also directly benefited from the revenues. While the exploitation of nature 
benefited transnational capital and local rulers, it effectively dispossessed the people. 
In dealing with the people, Development discourse has served as a consent and 
control mechanism. In this case, as long as community discussions and responses are 
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focused on Development, the state’s role is validated. As its “ethical content” (Gramsci 
1971: p. 20), the state constructs its hegemony through three tiers of government – 
federal, state and local. Following independence in 1960, the number of federating 
units increased from three Regions to 36 States, as the military regimes drew up new 
borders in response to local agitations. The military regimes also created a total of 774 
Local Government Areas. It is through these structures that the state implements and 
allocates Development, and reproduces the elite. 
The community elites often strengthen their control over the community by staging 
themselves as being in the best position to represent the community in demanding 
Development from the state, and to compete with other ethnic communities. The alli-
ance between the state and the community elite also serves to keep possible dissent in 
check. In the case of the Niger Delta where petroleum companies also award contracts 
for “Community Development Projects”, the elites are the beneficiaries of such 
contracts. Here, as elsewhere, the elites, being materially connected to the state appa-
ratus, often seek to protect the status quo. As members of ethnic communities, they 
seek to maintain their positions as community representatives to the state. They call for 
new local governments to be created for their communities, and call on oil companies 
to award more Community Development contracts. 
The Ogoni territory has been carved into Rivers State, with the Ogoni villages distrib-
uted across three local government areas. Ijaw communities, in contrast, are spread 
across six States (Akwa Ibom, Bayelsa, Delta, Edo, Ondo, and Rivers) and about two 
dozen local government areas. 
Women at the market, Rivers State
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The community movements that emerged in the 1990s saw these tiers of government 
as structures of oppression. They demanded the restructuring of the state and the 
introduction of a system of democratic administration that would allow communities 
to determine the way they were organized within states and local government areas, 
and the autonomy of those units to give development efforts a direction that would 
benefit the people. They proposed alternative arrangements that would re-establish 
spaces for self-rule. However, the elite in most cases sought to subvert alternative 
community agendas. Members of the traditional Ogoni elite, including individuals who 
were among the founders of MOSOP, aligned with the state and oil companies to 
oppose the radical elements seeking to instill an alternative civic ethos across the 
Nigerian state. 
COMMUNITY AND RESISTANCE  
IN THE NIGER DELTA
THE MOVEMENT FOR THE SURVIVAL OF THE OGONI 
PEOPLE (MOSOP) 
In the late 1960s, the man who would later become the leader of Ogoni resistance, 
Ken Saro-Wiwa, identified 124 Ogoni villages. Until the colonizing British forces created 
the Ogoni Native Authority in 1917, the villages were autonomous and identified as 
belonging to the six clans of the Babbe, Eleme, Gokana, Nyo-Khana, Ken-Khana, and 
Tai. Each of the clans spoke mutually intelligible dialects of what is now known as the 
Ogoni language (Saro-Wiwa, 1968). Apart from the common language, political leader-
ship was structured at the village level (Okonta, 2008). None of the dialects had a name 
for the amalgam of communities until the Ogoni Native Authority was created, initially 
as part of the Opobo Division of the Calabar Province. In 1946, the Ogoni Division was 
created and included in the Rivers Province.
The political fate of the Ogoni people would be determined above all by the way in 
which colonial boundaries shaped the later boundaries of States and local governments 
that were created as federal and administrative units under post-independence military 
rule. Beginning in the pre-independence period, a federal system of government was 
introduced that distinguished only the three largest ethnic groups in the country. The 
Hausa, the Yoruba and the Igbo were dominant in the Northern, Western and Eastern 
Regions respectively. Each of the Regions had minority ethnic groups that felt excluded 
from power. The Ogoni were included in the Eastern Region, where they felt marginal-
ized. Such feelings of exclusion only amplified when petroleum was discovered and 
exploited in the territory from 1958 onward. As the central government and Eastern 
Region shared petroleum revenues, the Ogoni were concerned that oil money was 
being used to their disadvantage to develop far-away regional and federal capitals. 
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In 1967 when the country was embroiled in ethnically motivated violence and civil 
war following the coups of 1966, the military regime increased the number of feder-
ating units by splitting the three Regions up into twelve States (with additional states 
created by subsequent regimes).3 When Igbo military officers sought to secede the 
Eastern Region (named Republic of Biafra) from Nigeria, the federal military govern-
ment, as a wartime maneuver, split the Eastern Region in three. Two of the States 
comprised minority groups mainly. The Ogoni and Ijaw were included in the Rivers 
State.4 Meanwhile, with the large regions broken up into states, the new federating 
units were stripped of their powers that became centralized in the federal capital 
(Nwajiaku, 2005; Suberu, 2001). The centralization of power in a central government 
dominated by Hausa and Fulani soldiers led to allusions to a “Northern Hegemony” 
or a rule by a “Hausa-Fulani Oligarchy” (Badmus, 2006; Ibrahim, 1999; Soyinka, 
1994). Within Rivers State, the Ijaw were dominant, with ethnic groups such as the 
Ogoni feeling marginalized. These groups later began to push for States of their own 
(Nwajiaku, 2005; Ukiwo, 2007).
Sentiments of exclusion were pronounced in the petroleum-bearing Niger Delta, 
where pollution has been exacerbating impoverishment. The first major case of 
community resistance in the 1990s was recorded in Umuechem, an Etche community 
in Rivers State. In 1990, the members of the community launched peaceful protests 
against the Shell Petroleum Development Company, the Nigerian subsidiary of Royal 
Dutch Shell, to draw the company’s attention to pending compensation claims over 
polluted farms and streams. The community members also demanded “development 
projects”, blocking the access road to Shell facilities on their lands. The transnational 
company’s response was to call in the military government, which sent the Mobile 
Police to disperse the protestors. The Mobile Police went into town and burnt down 
every building, killing everyone and all domestic animals they saw, including the 
community’s “traditional ruler”, who was killed in his home together with all his family 
members (Okonta and Douglas, 2002; Manby, 1999). Rather than deter community 
protests, the Umuechem Massacre emboldened the leaders of the Movement for the 
Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), which was formed the same year. 
In 1990, the Ogoni, under the leadership of MOSOP, issued the Ogoni Bill of Rights, 
in which they observed that “the search for oil has caused severe land and food short-
ages in Ogoni – one of the most densely populated areas of Africa (…); that neglectful 
environmental pollution laws and sub-standard inspection techniques of the Federal 
authorities have led to the complete degradation of the Ogoni environment, turning our 
3 Nigeria presently has 36 States. 
4 While the majority of Ijaw were included in Rivers State, other Ijaw 
communities were included in Bendel State and other states. 
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homeland into an ecological disaster.” While the oil companies were a major subject 
of the Ogoni narrative, their demands were addressed to the state. The Ogoni Bill of 
Rights expressed the people’s call for “political autonomy” or “self-determination”, 
which would guarantee the communities’ development. 
In the case of the Ogoni and other Niger Delta communities, calls for political 
autonomy and self-determination did not entail seceding from the Nigerian state, 
but rather envisioned an Ogoni State that would become one of the federating 
units in Nigeria, or any other political arrangement that would enable the Ogoni to: 
“participate in the affairs of the Republic as a distinct and separate unit by whatever 
name called, provided that this Autonomy guarantees the following:
> Political control of Ogoni affairs by Ogoni people.
> The right to the control and use of a fair proportion of Ogoni economic resources 
for Ogoni development. 
> Adequate and direct representation as of right in all Nigerian national institutions. 
> The use and development of Ogoni Languages in Ogoni territory. 
> The full development of Ogoni culture. 
> The right to religious freedom. 
> The right to protect the Ogoni environment and ecology from further degradation.”
(Saro-Wiwa, 1992)
A major feature of the Ogoni struggle was the representative nature of the organiza-
tion under MOSOP. MOSOP was originally created as a socio-cultural organization by 
the Ogoni elite. Due mainly to the effort of Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP morphed into an 
umbrella organization. As such, MOSOP’s members comprised organizations repre-
senting women, students and youth, traditional and cultural leaders, and faith-based 
groups. The majority of the Ogoni joined MOSOP via their primary organizations. MOSOP 
stimulated a sense of pan-communal ownership of the organization by encouraging all 
Ogoni to contribute a token fee for the running of the organization and the struggle. This 
sense of communal ownership was later reflected in the mass participation in the organi-
zation’s campaigning activities. Apart from the proclamation of the Ogoni Bill of Rights at 
a mass rally of the Ogoni, there were protest marches and direct action campaigns that 
resulted in the shutting down of a number of oil wells operated by Shell. 
MOSOP’s campaigns resulted in a dual power situation, with the organization’s leader-
ship contending with the state and its allied companies and community elite. While the 
state and Shell sought to protect petroleum infrastructure and legitimize its operations 
through “community development” tokenism, MOSOP effectively mobilized commu-
nity members to delegitimize oil production. Despite the militarization of the Ogoni 
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communities and numerous human rights abuses committed by the military task force 
deployed to the area, Ogoni youths did not back down. As a result of these Ogoni 
struggles, production of crude oil and natural gas ceased in the area in 1993 when Shell 
abandoned all oil wells, flow stations, and major installations within the Ogoni area. 
However, the company’s pipelines still crossed through Ogoniland and continued to 
pollute the environment after 1993. 
As the confrontation between the Ogoni and the state intensified, some members of the 
traditional elite disassociated from MOSOP and made public pronouncements critical of 
the organization and Ken Saro-Wiwa. In 1994, continuing tensions across Ogoni commu-
nities resulted in the mob killing of four of the most prominent members of the Ogoni elite, 
among them politicians and government contractors who were part of the initial leader-
ship of MOSOP but spoke out against the organization’s increasingly radical mobilizations. 
Following the killing of the Ogoni Four (Saale, 2017; Isumonah, 2004), Ken Saro-Wiwa and 
eight other members of the MOSOP leadership were arrested and charged with murder 
at a military tribunal. In a hasty trial in 1995, from which Saro-Wiwa’s lawyer withdrew as 
a result of perceived irregularities, Saro-Wiwa and eight MOSOP leaders were sentenced 
to death (Vukor-Quarshie, 1997). Ledum Mitee, Vice President of MOSOP, was released 
(Isumonah, 2004). Despite international outrage and appeals from global leaders such as 
Nelson Mandela, Saro-Wiwa and the eight other Ogoni leaders were executed ten days 
later, before they were able to appeal the sentence. 
Even before this killing, the Ogoni struggle provided pictures conveying the real envi-
ronmental costs of fossil fuel exploitation. The images of poor African communities 
waging struggles against a huge transnational oil corporation through mass rallies 
and other forms of cultural mobilization helped to galvanize Western environmental 
campaigners. Globally, this was a period in which environmental activists focused 
strongly on highlighting the links between fossil fuel consumption and the global 
climate crisis. The Ogoni struggle became a major reference point for the Shell 
Boycott campaign in Western Europe and North America. MOSOP was, at this stage, 
supported by international organizations such as Greenpeace and even The Body 
Shop, a chain of stores selling natural cosmetics. However, some have observed that 
the messages sent out by Western environmental organizations essentially failed 
to reflect the demands of MOSOP, which were more political and best understood 
in their particular Nigerian context (Okonta, 2008). They argue that while MOSOP’s 
leader, Ken Saro-Wiwa, was successful in making the Ogoni struggle internationally 
visible by playing the green agenda, the environmentalists’ fixation on big oil may 
have in fact sidelined MOSOP’s political message, and privileged their narrow focus 
on petroleum pollution, thus excluding the crucial issues of political self-determina-
tion and “resource-control”. In the years after the killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa, MOSOP 
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increasingly professionalized into an NGO. Its campaigns tended to exclude radical 
demands, such as political autonomy, as included in the Ogoni Bill of Rights. After the 
“judicial murder” (Pegg, 2000) of the Ogoni Nine, a large number of the remaining 
leadership went into exile and dispersed across Africa, Europe, and North America. 
With MOSOP’s leadership abroad, a bitter leadership battle ensued between Ladum 
Mitee and Owens Wiwa, Ken Saro-Wiwa’s younger brother. The factionalization of 
MOSOP abroad adversely affected mobilization within the communities as local 
activists began to take sides. Abroad, the factions competed for donor support, and 
dissension ended only after the restoration of military rule in Nigeria in 1999 when 
some of MOSOP’s leaders started to return to the country. 
Following the restoration of military rule, the major factions of MOSOP prioritized envi-
ronmental campaigns. While rallies were organized on the annual Ogoni Day and other 
symbolic occasions, MOSOP became increasingly dependent on Western donors to 
fund specific projects. Following calls by MOSOP, the second post-military federal 
government in 2007 invited the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) to 
carry out an assessment of polluted sites in Ogoniland. The subsequent UNEP report, 
released in 2011, revealed that pollution “has penetrated further and deeper than many 
may have supposed” (UNEP, 2011). UNEP discovered that Ogoni community water 
sources were polluted by carcinogenic Benzene, with levels 900 times above World 
Health Organization guidelines. UNEP’s call for the immediate cleanup of polluted sites 
has been met with slow responses from the federal government and Shell. 
UNEP public meeting in Ogoniland
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However, the report’s release put a spotlight on Shell and Ogoniland, which may have 
influenced the company’s decision to reach an out-of-court settlement with members 
of the Bodo, an Ogoni community (Hennchen, 2015) following earlier payments to 
families of the Ogoni Nine in 2009 (Pilkington, 2009). These limited settlements 
between Shell and the plaintiffs marked victories for the families of the victims of 
violence that had unsettled the area in the 1990s, and for some of the communities 
exposed to pollution after 1993. However, many more Ogoni communities lack the 
financial resources to sue Shell in North American and Europe. 
Thus far, the people have resisted efforts by Shell and the Nigerian government to revive 
oil production in Ogoniland. Some members of the Ogoni elite, against popular senti-
ments in the communities, are trying to negotiate more favorable terms under which 
they would be willing to tolerate oil extraction activities in the area. However, among the 
Ogoni leadership, there remains a small group that is campaigning to keep the oil in the 
ground. All of them agree that the most pressing issue is to clean up polluted sites in 
Ogoniland based on the recommendations contained in the 2011 UNEP Report. 
THE KAIAMA DECLARATION AND THE IJAW YOUTH 
COUNCIL (IYC)
The Ogoni’s activism roused other communities across the Niger Delta, leading young 
Ijaw activists to create the Ijaw Youth Council (IYC) in 1998 and adopt the Kaiama Decla-
ration, which had the same thrust as the Ogoni Bill of Rights. 
The Kaiama Declaration, which was embraced at the end of an All Ijaw Youth Confer-
ence in Kaiama Town, Bayelsa State, noted that: It was through British colonisation that 
the IJAW NATION was forcibly put under the Nigerian State. But for the economic inter-
ests of the imperialists, the Ijaw ethnic nationality would have evolved as a distinct and 
separate sovereign nation, enjoying undiluted political, economic, social, and cultural 
AUTONOMY...The quality of life of Ijaw people is deteriorating as a result of utter neglect, 
suppression and marginalisation visited on Ijaws by the alliance of the Nigerian state and 
transnational oil companies. The degradation of the environment of Ijawland by trans-
national oil companies and the Nigerian State arises mainly because Ijaw people have 
been robbed of their natural rights to ownership and control of their land and resources 
through the instrumentality of undemocratic Nigerian State legislations such as the Land 
Use Decree of 1978, the Petroleum Decrees of 1969 and 1991, the Lands (Title Vesting 
etc.) Decree No. 52 of 1993 (Osborne Land Decree), the National Inland Waterways 
Authority Decree No. 13 of 1997, etc.
The Kaiama Declaration also asserted that “all land and natural resources (including 
mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities and are the 
basis of our survival.” The Ijaw youths challenged “all undemocratic decrees that rob our 
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peoples/communities of the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, 
which were enacted without our participation and consent” (Kaiama Declaration, 1998). 
They called for the “immediate withdrawal from Ijawland of all military forces of occupa-
tion and repression by the Nigerian State. Any oil company that employs the services 
of the armed forces of the Nigerian State to ‘protect’ its operations will be viewed as an 
enemy of the Ijaw people”.
The Kaiama Declaration sparked a wave of mobilizations in Ijaw communities 
throughout the Niger Delta despite threats of military crackdown. The IYC organized 
Mobile Parliaments that moved from village to town and from town to village every 
fortnight promoting the idea of Ijaw self-determination. Despite fierce debates, these 
Mobile Parliaments often reached consensual decisions. From the beginning, the IYC 
appointed as a subordinate body a “collective leadership” of seven members. One of 
the early decisions of one of the Mobile Parliaments in December 1998 was the obser-
vance of a day of Ogele, a peaceful but warlike cultural procession with drumming and 
singing. This was to be organized in several Ijaw communities on December 30, 1998 to 
call on “all oil companies [to] stop all exploration and exploitation activities(…) pending 
the resolution of the issue of resource ownership and control in the Ijaw area of the 
Niger Delta” (Kaiama Declaration, 1998). 
Prominent in the preparations of the Ogele was the Egbesu, a religious practice which 
had been revived a few years prior to the Kaiama Declaration. Adherents see Egbesu 
as a deity of war whose priests participate in recruiting and disciplining community 
soldiers when the communities are threatened by external forces. For example, the 
Egbesu institution was central to the mobilizations against early colonial incursion in 
1895 when coastal Ijaw communities of Akassa (Nembe) fought a war against the 
British Royal Niger Company over control of the palm oil trade. Egbesu became popular 
again among unemployed Ijaw youth during the heightened repression of the military 
regimes of the 1990s.
It may be due to the prominent role of the Egbesu adherents in the IYC mobilizations in 
1998 that the Nigerian military government perceived the call for Ogele as a declaration of 
war. The junta responded by sending soldiers and the Mobile Police to Ijaw communities 
in Bayelsa State, who committed human rights abuses (Human Rights Watch, 1999). The 
Ijaw Council for Human Rights claimed that soldiers killed Ogele participants and other 
members of Ijaw communities (Environmental Rights Action, 1999). Nevertheless, mass 
participation in the Ogele promoted a reimagined sense of Ijaw nationhood and signaled 
the intent of the people to resist the alliance between the state and the Shell corporation. 
The Ogele was followed by a continuous program of direct actions tagged Operation 
Climate Change, which involved road blockades and the occupation of oil installations, 
with people demanding the companies shut down oil wells and stop gas flaring. 
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As with the Ogoni, the Ijaw struggle was supported by Western NGOs. At one point 
in early 1999, over two hundred international organizations, mostly from Europe and 
North America, endorsed an open letter to all major transnational oil and gas producing 
companies operating in Nigeria in which the companies were asked to suspend their 
operations in the country. The letter acknowledged the demands of the IYC, stressing 
that “the Ijaw, like the Ogoni before them, [are] demanding their rights to clean air, 
water, and land by exercising the rights to peaceful protest and assembly. Oil opera-
tions, backed by the state security apparatus, have denied the Delta communities these 
rights” (Niger Delta Alert, 1999: p. 1).
The immediate success of the post-Kaiama Declaration mobilizations of the Ijaw 
masked internal contests for hegemony within the movement. Just like the Ogoni 
movement, the IYC agglomerated different organizations that all had distinct expecta-
tions regarding the struggle. Initially, the internal contest was managed through the 
selection of a Collegiate Leadership at the first IYC Mobile Parliament in December 
1998. None of the seven members, who each represented different tendencies, was 
superior to the other.5 Besides dealing with internal differences, the youths also saw 
themselves contending with members of the Ijaw elite, referred to as the elders. 
Some of the prominent Ijaw elders were openly hostile toward the Kaiama Declaration 
and the IYC from the beginning. In the first place, they felt slighted that the youths 
were attempting to set an agenda for the Ijaw without seeking their permission. Some 
organizers of the All Ijaw Youth Conference did not have much respect for the elders, 
who were considered to be too collusive with the Nigerian state (Ogon, 2012). After 
the Kaiama Declaration, the elders resorted to measures aimed at stifling the emer-
gent youth resistance. However, it should be noted that while the most politically 
influential Ijaw elders sought to destroy or appropriate the IYC, the majority of older 
men and women in the Ijaw communities welcomed the IYC and lent their support to 
its campaigns (Nathaniel, 2012). 
CONTESTS FOR HEGEMONY AND THE 
TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY
COMMUNITY MOVEMENTS AND THE POLITICAL LEFT
One of the major disappointments of the 1990s was the disconnectedness of traditional 
left organizations, which operated through the pro-democracy movement and commu-
nity resistance organizations such as MOSOP and the IYC. While all these movements 
seek social transformation and aim to restructure the colonial state, an encompassing 
counter-hegemonic discourse and vision did not exist to encourage joint mobilization. 
5 The IYC elected a more traditional Executive Council complete with 
President, General Secretary, and other officials in 2001. 
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The left’s fixation on the working class did not include an adequate analysis of people’s 
connection with ethnic communities. Also, the left did not seem to understand the 
partnership between the state, which uses the ethnic publics and the ethnic elites to 
entrench its rule via the promise of Development, and the elites, which depend on state 
patronage to secure economic benefits. 
Like in other petroleum-exporting countries in the Gulf of Guinea, in post-independ-
ence Nigeria capital accumulation was often directly linked to individuals and groups 
closely connected to state power. Relevant to this understanding is the way that other 
industries, including agro-industries, were suffocated by the pressures of rentierism, 
which expanded under the dictates of structural adjustment. Under those conditions, 
political struggles of the left were often framed as anti-imperialist struggles, and also 
as pro-democracy struggles, especially from the late 1980s onward. Working through 
organized labor and the students’ movement, the Nigerian left organized massive mobi-
lizations against the structural adjustment policies from the late 1980s onward. These 
mobilizations culminated in the pro-democracy movement, which emerged at the same 
time. By the beginning of the 1990s, new human rights NGOs were in alliance with the 
left in the struggle against the military. The pro-democracy movement included civil 
society coalitions such as the Campaign for Democracy (CD), the United Action for 
Democracy (UAD), the Democratic Alternative and the National Conscience Party (NCP). 
Each of these coalitions, which were dominant at different times, were led by members 
of human rights NGOs, radical lawyers, the students’ movement, and segments of 
organized labor. The pro-democracy movement represented a conscious effort by the 
Nigerian left to intervene in politics, not just by removing the military dictators, but also 
by introducing an alternative power base to contend with the Nigerian political elite. 
The pro-democracy groupings mobilized mostly university students but also the unem-
ployed, poor, and other socially dispossessed people in the urban centers, particularly 
in Nigeria’s largest city, Lagos. However, there was no organization with mass support 
or a sustainable member base. People simply responded to particular mobilizations and 
dispersed afterwards. 
Even when the pro-democracy movement was on its way to becoming the major 
force in Nigerian civil society in the 1990s, the left did not have a clear position on 
the ethnic mobilizations that were taking place at the time. Some of the leaders of 
the Niger Delta resistance movements, such as Ken Saro-Wiwa, joined pro-democ-
racy coalitions. However, many members of ethnic communities in the Niger Delta, 
including the Ogoni and Ijaw, did not respond to the campaigns of pro-democracy 
groups. Part of the reason for this disconnect was that the demand for democracy in 
itself did not address the real concerns of members of these communities. Anti-capi-
talist orthodoxy failed to resonate within ethnic public spheres, in particular because 
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traditional socialist organizations severely disapproved of all ethnic identifications in 
their attempts to amalgamate the working class. Orthodox Marxism, represented in 
the main by left parties, and an increasingly bureaucratized labor movement, were 
both unable to address the challenges produced by an increasingly neoliberalized 
state. One of the most profound effects of neoliberalism promoted through structural 
adjustment was to usher in the process of de-proletarianization, which weakened 
the working class as a political force. In Nigeria, by the beginning of the 1990s the 
industrial sectors were collapsing. Large-scale production was mostly restricted to 
the extraction of natural resources, especially petroleum. Many workers lost their jobs 
and returned to their villages and ethnic communities for refuge. University students 
graduated and returned home without jobs. It was the atmosphere created by struc-
tural adjustment that sparked a new wave of ethnic mobilizations as reflected in the 
Ogoni and Ijaw cases. 
With the traditional Left and the mainstream political elite failing to produce a 
counter- articulation to dominant economic policies and to organize political action 
to accommodate marginalized ethnic communities, groups such as MOSOP and IYC 
emerged with their own narratives. Across the world, grassroots social movements 
emerged to make bold political statements of their own (Robinson, 2008; Ceceña, 
2008). As Ana Esther Ceceña puts it: “Urban and rural collectives, people forced 
into precarious employment, displaced people, informal workers, nomadic collec-
tives, men and women of every background” were creating new communities around 
issues such as access to land, water, and jobs, and in collective opposition to the 
World Bank, the IMF, and the state’s denial of the right to self-determination (Ceceña, 
2008: p. 237). It was the impacts of structural adjustment that spurred indigenous 
uprisings in Latin America. The revolts that were engendered by these movements 
“often begin in communities firmly rooted in a particular place” (ibid., p. 238), as the 
uprisings of the Ogoni and Ijaw communities, the struggles over water in Cocha-
bamba, Bolivia, the landless peasants in Brazil and Bolivia, etc. show. In these cases, 
existing social dualisms, or “two publics” (or “dual society”; see Barret et al., 2008) 
fueled crises as indigenous populations and local communities sought to assert them-
selves against the force of state intervention. 
POWER TO THE PEOPLE VERSUS ELITE REPRESENTATION
As exemplified by MOSOP and the IYC, conflicts between youths and elites point to 
deeper disputes between those who resist and those who support state hegemony. 
As explained above, the colonial state presented Development to communities as a 
mechanism to seek consent in dealing with subjects via Native Authorities and other 
administrative structures. From early on in colonial rule, “traditional rulers”, warrant 
chiefs, and other members of the community elites were coopted or installed by the 
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state to represent the people. The custom of ethnic elite representation continued 
after independence, with politics serving to reproduce the regime of hegemony via 
elections or appointment by military regimes. Until MOSOP was established in the 
1990s, politics and the processes of political representation in the Niger Delta were 
determined almost exclusively by traditional politicians and the elites of the various 
ethnic groups and nationalities. When necessary, these elements worked together via 
different elite platforms, through which they then called for Development projects to 
increase the scope of (their) participation in the state’s schemes. Apart from periods 
when these elites were seen electioneering to support particular candidates, they 
did not mobilize for mass actions. Rather, they cozied up to any serving government 
by writing letters or seeking opportunities for curtesy calls to top government offi-
cials which they usually used to present demands for Development projects. Thus, 
the elites became used to acting on behalf of the people. However, from the 1990s 
onward, MOSOP and the IYC (re)defined the character and purpose of community 
mobilization and representation. 
The examples of MOSOP and the IYC show the important role played by the ethnic 
youth in the Niger Delta resistance against the state and big oil corporations. In both 
cases, association with the youth movement had little to do with age. Many active 
members of youth groups who participated in the Ijaw struggle and other community 
movements in the 1990s were well over forty. Though the IYC later defined youth as 
people below the age of forty, in reality many older people continued to remain active, 
as they considered themselves “young at heart”, as a grandfather involved in the Ijaw 
youth scene explained (Nathaniel, 2012). What is more fundamental to the under-
standing of the youth movement here is how they positioned themselves against 
state power. Youth are those who felt marginalized, poor, and who were often unem-
ployed, or in precarious employment. Youths were also generally dissatisfied with 
the guidance provided by the cultural and political community elders. The Niger Delta 
community struggles were thus a “youth” revolt against the state and its local and 
international agents. Rather than being exclusivist elite institutions of representation, 
the Congress of MOSOP and the Mobile Parliaments set up by the IYC were tools to 
strengthen internal democracy within the communities and create more represent-
ative structures for community representation. However, these structures and the 
communities’ public spheres remain contested spaces in which elites and subaltern 
forces compete to defend state hegemony, or to counter it. In their defiance of state 
hegemony, the community movements of the 1990s promoted the idea of “resource 
control” as part of a discourse challenging the state as a political apparatus imposed 
by colonialism. Instead, the movements focused on land rights and the “right to polit-
ical, economic, cultural and environmental Self-Determination of all communities (…) 
[and] the right of nationalities to be recognised and respected as communities, and to 
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be granted the right of political autonomy(…) to organise and manage their resources 
to assure their social development” (Social Action, 2007). 
The Niger Delta movements, like the pro-democracy movement, called for a restruc-
turing of the state via a National Conference that would draft a new constitution for 
the country. The military regimes rejected those demands, and backed by the United 
States and the European Union, insisted on conducting elections in 1999 based on a 
constitution that was drafted by the military and adopted by decree without involving 
Nigeria’s citizens. Since then, the transition to so-called democracy has been consoli-
dated through subsequent general elections, which were held in2003, 2007, 2011, 
and 2015. These five elections produced four different presidents, two of whom are 
ex-military dictators, while another has direct family ties with former military dicta-
tors.6 In the Niger Delta, the community resistance movements were also weakened 
following the elections in 1999, as neither the MOSOP nor the IYC endorsed candi-
dates. The IYC in fact mobilized the Ijaw against participating in the 1999 elections, 
calling instead for a National Conference to precede elections. However, the tradi-
tional politicians from both nationalities nevertheless actively participated in the 
elections as candidates and supporters of the three political parties that the military 
regime allowed to stand for the 1999 elections. Of these, the Peoples Democratic 
Party (PDP), which was the party favored by the regime, became dominant in the 
Niger Delta area. 
Periods of electioneering, when money, looted from state coffers, are handed over 
to local politicians, provide opportunities for the ethnic elites to exert their influence. 
As such, partisan political pressure, backed by money, further helped to undermine 
community movements. Politicians in the Bayelsa and Rivers States recruited many 
IYC members and gradually succeeded in eroding the organization’s radical political 
character. Ogoni and Ijaw politicians previously never associated with the commu-
nity movements emerged as elected representatives, suddenly became very 
influential, and worked to shift the focus of the narrative of these movements away 
from the struggle for self-determination to demanding Development projects. In the 
case of the Ijaw, the IYC was further weakened by emergent Ijaw politicians who 
succeeded in hijacking the organization’s leadership following the 2001 elections. 
At the same time, the politicians recruited Ijaw activists as political thugs in the 
run-up to the 2003 elections. In 2010, the IYC overwhelmingly backed Vice-Presi-
dent Goodluck Jonathan, an Ijaw, to take office as President following the death of 
President Umaru Yar’Adua. In the following year, IYC officials supported Jonathan’s 
6 Two of the presidents elected in Nigeria since 1999, Olusegun Obasanjo and Muhamadu Buhari, 
were ex-military dictators. A third, Musa Yar’Adua, is a younger brother of Shehu Yar’Adua, 
who was a military general and second-in-command in the regime of General Obasanjo.
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renewed candidature, whose political ambitions were almost fully aligned with Ijaw 
interests. 
On their part, the Ogoni elite aspired to elect one of their own as governor of Rivers 
State. By 2013, MOSOP made installing an Ogoni as Governor of Rivers State in the 
2015 General Elections its primary goal, and it campaigned hard to win the support 
of the political elite from other ethnic groups in Rivers State. Following a congress in 
2013, a MOSOP Communique stated that “the congress decried the marginalization 
of Ogoni occasioning our denial of fair representation at the national and state levels. 
The marginalization has regrettably deprived our berth at the highest level of govern-
ment in Rivers State (…) Congress resolved that come 2015, Ogoni will accept nothing 
less than the position of the governor of Rivers State” (MOSOP, 2013). However, the 
Ogoni failed to secure the post in the 2015 elections. None of the two main parties, 
neither the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) nor the All Peoples Congress (APC), 
were willing to embrace an Ogoni candidate. 
Nevertheless, since1999, when electoral politics was restored, the alternative mobiliza-
tions and discourses of the community movements have been privatized by the ethnic 
elite and turned into projects for advancing the political interests of those connected 
to the state. But even more fundamental is the fact that the elites have succeeded 
in recalibrating the movements’ narrative such that they now frame the securing of 
political posts and Development projects as the most effective way to serve commu-
nity interests. In this way, the restoration of politics as usual via periodic elections only 
undermines alternative mobilizations that advance popular power. 
The military junta allowed only three political parties to participate in the 1999 general 
elections. Initially, the only two parties, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the 
All Peoples Congress (APC), both backed by former military dictators, retired generals, 
and their political allies, were accepted by the junta to have met the necessary require-
ments. A third party, the Alliance for Democracy (AD), which represented the Yoruba 
elite, was also allowed to participate in the elections. The implication of allowing 
only three political parties to participate in the 1999 elections is that the transition to 
democracy in Nigeria excluded many political persuasions, including the major pro-
democracy coalitions such as Campaign for Democracy (CD), the United Action for 
Democracy (UAD), the Democratic Alternative (DA), and the National Conscience 
Party (NCP). Their exclusion led pro-democracy activists to monitor the elections – a 
role assigned to them by Western donors such as the United States Agency for Inter-
national Development. Yet as monitoring institutions, the platforms previously backed 
by the left have become increasingly depoliticized, with elections massively rigged in 
favor of parties aligned with the ruling elite. 
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The NCP challenged the electoral commission’s power to prevent political parties from 
registering. In 2002, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the NCP and ordered the elec-
toral commission to open up electoral participation for all political parties ahead of the 
2003 elections. By that time, however, the pro-democracy organizations had become 
weak, while the parties close to the elites had been able to consolidate their power. 
CONCLUSION
Nigeria has taken on its own distinct post-colonial form, with the state reflecting a 
character that is uniquely “Nigerian” due to the state’s socio-historical and spatial specif-
icities. This character, however, is informed by several factors, including the historical 
legacies of colonialism, which imposed their hegemony on pre-existing communities. It 
has taken brute force in many instances to compel new subjects to transfer loyalties to 
the new state. Since then, the materiality of the state has found expression in a number 
of instruments of coercion and bureaucracy. Studying the way in which the country’s 
elite has since the eve of independence embraced the colonial promise of Development 
in order to establish and legitimize power provides us with an understanding of the 
character of the state. 
This context is important for an analysis of how the Niger Delta mobilizations 
threatened existing powers and allied capital. Their cases demonstrate how social 
movements can be strengthened by cultural symbols and associated modes 
of organizing, as well as the limits of those tools. In the 1990s, these struggles, 
Child standing at Shell-oil polluted river bank, Ogoniland
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alongside left-led pro-democracy struggles, contributed to the collapse of a mili-
tary regime and the eventual re-introduction of civil government in Nigeria. Outside 
Nigeria, the resistance of the Ogoni was a major motivating factor for the Shell 
Boycott campaign in Western Europe and North America. There were many parallels 
between the Niger Delta struggles and the Nigerian pro-democracy movement and 
the global environmental movement. All of them identified military dictatorship and 
transnational oil companies as obstacles to building a better society. But they had 
diverging understandings of the nature of such an alternative society. Each of the 
movements expressed tendencies reflecting the dominant currents within it. Ulti-
mately, the pro-democracy movement wanted an end to military dictatorship and the 
establishment of multi-party democracy that would give the masses a government. 
The state and international capital responded by holding elections that effectively 
subverted pro-democracy goals. In the case of the environmental movement, the 
UNEP Report on Ogoniland provided an opportunity to demand the cleaning up of 
polluted sites. Concerning the fundamental community demand for the restructuring 
of the colonial state, nothing has been achieved. Instead, there is a privatization of 
popular resistance when organizations such as MOSOP or IYC are hijacked by their 
ethnic elites in order to integrate them into the accumulation processes of the state, 
both through political power and the way in which Development projects are called 
for and implemented via the awarding of contracts. Thus, the cases make visible 
how state hegemony and capital accumulation are entrenched through the intimate 
relationship between the state, capital, and ethnic elites. 
While traditional left organizations, environmental justice organizations, and commu-
nity resistance organizations in Nigeria all seek social transformation, what has been 
lacking is an encompassing counter-hegemonic discourse and vision. Crucially, a new 
left discourse should identify how to bridge this disconnect through community mobili-
zations. First, we need to understand the causes of this disconnect. They can be traced 
back to the rift in society created by colonial rule. Colonialism introduced a new citizen-
ship linked to the state to be exercised by civil society, which – it was hoped – would 
be mobilized. But with independence, this political sphere of citizenship was not ready 
to contend with a resurgent sphere of kinship, which emerged initially to protect people 
from the violence of the state. 
Mao Tse-Tung pointed out that “there are many contradictions in the process of 
development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contra-
diction whose existence and development determines or influences the existence 
and development of the other contradictions” (Tse-Tung, 1937). It is my contention 
that in the case of Nigeria the principal contradiction is that between the state and the 
community. It is this principal contradiction that primarily shapes the actions of power 
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clusters within civil society, and the state’s mode of rule and cooptation. I agree with 
Mamdani that it is the mode (or “form”) of rule that shapes the form of resistance to 
it (Mamdani, 1996). 
Whenever social relations produce contradictions, the hegemony of the dominant 
force is thrown into question. Traditionally, brute force has been the main instrument 
of the state in dealing with indignant communities. However, the promise of Develop-
ment, which includes the possibility of social advancement for community members 
in the state system, has served as an overwhelmingly successful mechanism to 
create community consent for state policies. In particular, the community itself 
becomes implicated in empowering the state through the support that it gives to its 
members to participate in the state’s business in one form or the other. But the most 
fundamental aspect is the backing of community members to participate in state rule 
via military appointments, political appointments, elections, and indeed by any other 
means deemed acceptable. The expectation is that such individuals will facilitate the 
fulfillment of the state’s Development promises. It needs to be pointed out, however, 
that the support for the ethnic elite within kinship society is not automatic. This is 
because kinship society itself is a battleground on which forces of community resist-
ance contend with elites whose traditional dominance over this sphere hinges in the 
main on the support they receive from the state. We see this manifested in Ogoni and 
Ijaw communities, where the elites that are most directly connected with the state 
have contended for control over the MOSOP and the IYC respectively. In both cases, 
the dominant force in the battle to extend kinship into the state sphere determined 
the degree of representation of that community in the state’s civil, or political sphere. 
What is thus needed to bridge the ideological gulf between the traditional left and 
community activists is a counter-hegemonic discourse based on an understanding of 
Nigeria’s post-colonial realities. 
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STRUGGLES TO OVERCOME  
CAPITALISM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
The Bolivarian Revolution in Venezuela was the first attempt in the world to carry out 
a socialist transformation in the 21st century. As a consequence, the debates about the 
Venezuelan experience have dealt not only with the actual political processes going 
on in Venezuela since 1999, when Hugo Chávez became president, but also in much 
broader terms with the possibilities, potentials, and limits of socialism in this century. 
This paper focuses specifically on the Venezuela experience, but this will be done within 
the context of ongoing Latin American debates about the so-called turn to the left with 
the emergence of “progressive” governments in most of South America, as well as 
current global debates about viable alternatives to capitalism. 
The challenges faced today in the endeavor to overcome capitalism are greater and far 
more complex than were imagined in the 19th and 20th centuries. Today we face not 
only the crisis of capitalism, but also the terminal crisis of the civilizational pattern of 
modernity that has been imposed on the entire planet for the last five centuries. This 
civilizational pattern is threatening human and non-human survival. In order to think/act/
create alternatives to this crisis of civilization, it is essential to tackle it in its extraordi-
nary complexity. We face not only a society of class exploitation/domination, but also a 
colonial, anthropocentric, racist, patriarchal, homophobic society, a society that, despite 
liberal discourses on multiculturalism, can only conceive as possible, as “modern,” one 
particular way of life, and asserts the hegemony of its Eurocentric modes of knowledge. 
A society with deep and growing inequalities that has naturalized a state of permanent 
war.
The theoretical and policy instruments that seemed adequate in the previous two 
centuries for the struggle to overcome capitalism are today extremely blunt, partial, and 
reductionist tools. The issues and lines of confrontation that were privileged by the anti-
capitalist struggles of the past centuries are not only no longer sufficient for addressing 
the challenges that we confront today; they also continue to downplay the importance 
of other basic dimensions of domination.
The experience of socialism in the 20th century, beyond its social achievements, its 
confrontations with imperialism, and its central role in the defeat of Nazi Germany, failed 
as a civilizational alternative to capitalism and to colonial modernity. In very schematic 
terms, the main dimensions of this failure can be summarized as follows:
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> The anthropocentric and Eurocentric visions of modernity, embodied by capitalism, 
were not challenged. On the contrary, the prevailing economism and the notion of 
progress were radicalized. Overcoming capitalist societies in terms of production 
became a benchmark of progress toward communism. (Tons of cement, tons of 
steel). This led to a deepening of the modern anthropocentric and patriarchal attack 
on nature that threatens the conditions on which the reproduction of life depends.
> An uncritical faith in capitalist science and technology, in the so-called produc-
tive forces of capitalism that were supposed to provide the material basis for the 
construction of a socialist society.1
> The criticism of liberal democracy as bourgeois: class democracy led to the cancella-
tion of any form of democracy, leading to the creation of authoritarian states where 
dissidents were regarded as enemies of the people.
> Its focus on state and party as the agents of change led to the complete lack of 
autonomy of many other areas of society, radically impoverishing its multiform 
fabric, repressed alternative memories, and blocked the processes of social experi-
mentation without which it is not possible to build another world.
> There was no recognition of the extraordinary value of the plurality of the planet’s 
cultures, leading to a radicalization of the colonial monoculture of modernity, now in 
the name of a universal proletarian culture. Diversity was limited to folklore.
> A lack of effective incorporation of the multiple dimensions of social life beyond the 
economy (cultural diversity, patriarchy, racism, sexualities, subjectivities, relations 
with “nature” and other patterns of knowledge) as essential to the possibility of 
radical social transformation. 
Socialist societies of the 20th century ended in abrupt or gradual transitions to capi-
talism, often savage forms of capitalism where corrupt mafias and global corporations 
have prevailed.
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the idea of socialism 
as an alternative to capitalism lost much of its appeal not only in Europe but in much 
of the rest of the world. Although the idea of socialism did not disappear from the 
political lexicon, it became rather marginalized. This was by no means the end of anti-
capitalist struggles, but most of these took other courses, other subjects, other political 
grammars, other imaginaries, other utopias, and other organizational dynamics. The 
most vigorous expressions of this new post-socialist phase of anti-capitalist struggles 
were processes such as the World Social Forum, with its multiple and heterogeneous 
1 The most important exceptions were the proletarian biology of Lysenko in the USSR 
and the radical questioning carried out during the Chinese Cultural Revolution.
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themes and expressions of struggles for another possible world. In contrast to previous 
anti-capitalist struggles, political parties were essentially marginalized and the idea of 
state capture did not have a prominent place on the agenda.
With the so-called progressive governments in Latin America, especially with the Boli-
varian Revolution, the notion of socialism gained new life. These political processes 
have appeared to consider and propose alternatives to most of the limitations and criti-
cisms that had been discussed in relation to the socialist experience of the 20th century, 
in the form of so-called “21st-century socialism.” The following aspects have been 
particularly important:
> The political dynamics leading to these new governments were not led by political 
parties but by a wide and diverse range of social movements, peoples, and commu-
nities.
> Critical debates on development and on other modes of human interaction with 
nature or Mother Earth2 were carried out. In Ecuador and Bolivia the rights of nature 
were recognized for the first time in constitutional or legal terms.
> Interculturality and plurinationality, the recognition and celebration of the rich diver-
sity of peoples, communities, traditions, and memories present in these societies, 
despite five centuries of colonial and republican monocultural states.
> In Venezuela, Ecuador, and Bolivia the Constitutions incorporated notions of 
participatory and/or communitarian democracy. It is significant that these forms 
of democracy were not embraced as alternatives (or substitutes) to representative 
democracy, but as ways to deepen and radicalize democracy.
In any attempt to evaluate the experience of these so-called progressive governments 
from the perspective of their anti-capitalist transformative potential and in their contri-
bution to building alternatives to the current crisis of civilization, it is essential to go 
beyond the single axis, from which a large part of the tradition of the left has focused 
its analysis. Namely: class relations (to what extent has the correlation of forces been 
altered in favor of the popular sectors? Has there been a redistribution of power and 
wealth?) and geopolitics (primarily positions relative to imperialism). 
Governments whose discourse appeals to “popular” anti-imperialism have been consid-
ered as “progressive” or “left-wing” almost regardless of their policies in other areas 
of the structures of domination. It’s worth re-emphasizing: power relations, exclusion, 
and domination in contemporary societies are more complex and multidimensional. 
2 Mother Earth is a widespread term used by indigenous people throughout the Americas. However, from some 
feminist perspectives, this is a patriarchal characterization of nature as the place where life and culture are 
created and reproduced, and is conceived as a maternal protector, virginal and immaculate, similar to the way in 
which the patriarchy understands women. 
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These can hardly be understood within the reductionist conceptions that were previ-
ously considered to be sufficient for accounting for the main issues implicated in the 
transformative struggles against all forms of domination. Today there is no single axis, 
no principal contradiction that is able to capture the complexity of the challenges posed 
by the current civilizational crisis.
These concerns will guide the analysis of the Venezuelan experience of these years. 
This will be carried out in the following sequence. First, the paper deals with the 
historical background that made the Bolivarian revolution possible. Secondly, the basic 
characteristics of the initial Bolivarian project will be discussed, followed by the most 
significant highlights and achievements of this political process. All this will provide the 
basis for the critical/analytical analysis of the Bolivarian experience (“Tensions, contra-
dictions and limitations of the Bolivarian process as a transformative experience”). The 
paper ends with a reflection on what can be learned from this social transformation, as 
well as some general political conclusions. 
THE TERMINAL CRISIS  
OF THE OIL RENTIER STATE
The political system that replaced the military dictatorship of Marcos Pérez Jiménez in 
1958 was characterized during its first two decades by sustained economic growth, 
a relative improvement in the living standards of the popular sectors of society, and 
a significant degree of legitimacy.3 However, in the late 1970s the country entered a 
prolonged economic, political, and cultural crisis. This marked the beginning of the 
terminal crisis of the oil rentier state (and society) that had prevailed for most of the 
century. In immediate terms this was expressed in a sustained reduction of per capita oil 
income which limited the state’s ability to meet the demands of the population. The two 
major parties, Acción Democrática and COPEI, had been transformed into clientelistic 
and corrupt electoral machines that were increasingly distancing themselves from their 
previous support bases. There was also a significant and sustained displacement of 
what had been the hegemonic social democratic imaginary, with the emergence of a 
strong ideological offensive characterized by anti-state liberalism and anti-politics. 
This increasingly excluded the popular sectors, even from political discourse (Lander, 
1995a). These trends had a turning point at the beginning of the second government 
of Carlos Andrés Pérez (1989), when the implementation of the package of structural 
adjustment policies under the Washington Consensus was announced. These adjust-
ment policies were required by the IMF so the country could obtain new loans despite 
its severe budgetary constraints and difficulties in paying its foreign debt. These neolib-
3 This in spite of the guerrilla struggle that took place in the country 
during the 1960s, inspired by the Cuban Revolution.
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eral adjustments had already occurred in most of Latin America, but they had been 
postponed in Venezuela thanks to its high oil revenues. February 27, 1989, while the 
Venezuelan delegation that was to sign the Letter of Intent agreeing to the adjustment 
policies with the IMF was in Washington, saw the first day of the Caracazo: massive 
looting and popular protests that took place in major urban centers over several days 
on a scale unknown in Venezuelan history. After some initial confusion, the government 
responded with a brutal repression that caused hundreds of deaths. 
The impact of these adjustment policies was devastating for workers and the subaltern 
world in general. There was a sharp reduction in real wages and the share of labor 
compensation in national income. Labor costs in industry were substantially reduced. 
According to the methodology that measures poverty in terms of money income, there 
was a significant increase in levels of poverty and extreme poverty. There was a qualita-
tive leap in inequality. All this translated into a deterioration of living conditions, limiting 
access to employment and food for a significant proportion of the Venezuelan popula-
tion (Lander, 1995b). The result was the final shattering of any illusion of legitimacy of 
the political system. Discontent with and detachment from the political system became 
widespread, particularly in the subaltern sectors of society, but there was no visible 
political alternative on the horizon. Overall, the left was weak. It had been defeated in 
the armed struggle of the 1960s, and did not present a credible electoral challenge to 
the weakened but still dominant political parties. 
A few years later, as an expression of the fact that this discontent had spread to the 
armed forces, on February 4, 1992, there was an attempted coup d’état led by Hugo 
Chávez. A second attempt occurred in November of the same year. Chávez, a career 
officer in the army, had created the underground Bolivarian Revolutionary Movement 
200 in the early 1980s. This clandestine military organization had been radicalized by 
contact with some leaders of small radical leftist parties. The majority of the popula-
tion reacted to these events with calm expectation. There were no significant popular 
reactions to these coup attempts by military officials who were unknown to most of 
the population. This confirmed the depth of the crisis of legitimacy. Almost instantly, 
Chávez became an important symbolic reference point. 
This crisis continued for a few more years. In 1993 Carlos Andrés Pérez was ousted 
from the presidency on corruption charges, and in the presidential elections that 
followed, for the first time since 1958, the new president was not nominated by Acción 
Democrática or COPEI. Rafael Caldera, who had been the founder and main leader of 
the latter party, created a new party and in alliance with some small leftist organizations 
won the elections with an anti-neoliberal program. Caldera, after surviving the deepest 
financial crisis in the history of the country during his first years in office, and following 
a long period of indecision, negotiated an agreement with the IMF under the name of 
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the Venezuela Agenda and implemented the basic guidelines of the neoliberal agenda 
that he had questioned. 
The consequences of the reform of the Labor Law which drastically reduced social 
benefits for workers and of the policies of the opening up and internationalization of the 
national oil industry were particularly severe. In synthesis, these policies contributed 
to the deepening of the widespread distrust in the political system. In the late 1990s, 
Venezuelan society was deeply divided along economic, political, and cultural lines, and 
was facing a severe economic crisis that caused a prolonged deterioration of the living 
conditions of the majority of the population. Its political system was deeply discredited.
When Chávez won the elections in December 1998, he gave a voice and a sense of 
hope and direction to that widespread discontent. 
THE INITIAL CHAVISMO PROJECT
When Chávez was elected in 1998, he became president in a particularly unfavorable 
international context. At the time, anti-capitalist movements and parties had suffered 
severe political, theoretical, and ideological defeats worldwide. The Soviet bloc was 
about to collapse and the United States was positioned as the sole superpower in a 
unipolar world. The period was also characterized by the hegemony of neoliberalism and 
of the ideology of the end of History. Almost all Latin American countries had right-wing 
governments that had implemented the structural adjustment policies of the Wash-
ington Consensus and were involved in the global and continental so-called free trade 
agenda. Socialism had practically disappeared from political debate. China, the main 
“socialist” country, was rapidly taking steps in a capitalist direction and was becoming 
the most dynamic center of the global process of capital accumulation. The expres-
sions of a new phase of peoples’ struggles on the continent, the indigenous uprising in 
Ecuador of 1990 and the Zapatista uprising of 1994, were yet to come. As stated before, 
in Venezuela the left was weak, as were popular organizations and social movements.
The transformations that Chávez imagined were vague and lacking in precedents when 
he became president. Apart from Chávez’s own limited political background, essentially 
restricted to activities within the armed forces, in that particular historical and regional 
context it was difficult to envision whether a viable alternative to the neoliberal order 
could be thought of as socialist, or as a less radical transformation along the lines of 
a social democratic welfare state. Chávez said at the time that the two major political 
systems of the 20th century, liberal capitalism and socialism, had failed.4 He argued for 
the construction of an alternative society deeply rooted in the cultures and traditions 
4 A book of interviews with Chávez carried out by the Venezuelan historian Agustín Blanco Muñoz (1998) is 
the most comprehensive presentation of Chávez’s political thinking just before he became president.
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of the struggles of Latin American peoples. More than a model or a program, what 
was put forward were a set of value and policy orientations to guide the construc-
tion of the new society: the priorities were the “popular” sectors of society, national 
sovereignty, equality, inclusion, solidarity, overcoming the limitations of representative 
democracy, the union of the continent’s peoples, and the struggle for a multipolar world 
as opposed to the world shaped by the imperial hegemony of the United States. All 
this was conceived as a continuation of the epic battles for independence in the early 
decades of the 19th century and was closely identified with the figure of Simón Bolívar. 
The category which combined the national and the popular, the people, was a key word 
of the discourse.
THE MAIN MILESTONES  
OF THE BOLIVARIAN PROCESS
The election of a constitutional assembly to craft a new constitution was the most impor-
tant short-term proposal formulated by Chávez as a candidate. This became a priority 
of the new government, and on the day of his inauguration as president, Chávez called 
for a national referendum to decide whether this constitutional assembly should be 
elected. The proposal was overwhelmingly approved in a referendum. In a second refer-
endum the new Constitution produced by the constitutional assembly was approved by 
72 percent of the voters. This new Constitution was conceived as the main political and 
legal instrument for the transformative agenda of the new government. 
According to its preamble, the aims of this Constitution are: ...the supreme end of 
reshaping the Republic to establish a democratic, participatory and protagonist, multi-
ethnic and multicultural society in a state of justice, federal and decentralized State that 
embodies the values of freedom, independence, peace, solidarity, the common good, 
territorial integrity, co-existence and the rule of law for this and future generations; 
ensure the right to life, work, culture, education, social justice and equality without 
any discrimination or subordination; promotes peaceful cooperation among nations and 
furthers and strengthens Latin American integration in accordance with the principle 
of non-intervention and self-determination of peoples, the universal and indivisible 
guarantee of human rights, democratization of international society, nuclear disarma-
ment, ecological equilibrium and environmental goods as the common and inalienable 
heritage of humanity.
The economic model is defined on the basis of the state playing a strong role. While 
ensuring private property and private initiatives, the state reserves for itself the petro-
leum industry and other industrial, agricultural, and service activities considered to be 
of a strategic nature. From a political point of view, the most significant changes were 
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the introduction of a multiplicity of mechanisms and modalities of participation.5 These 
were conceived as tools to deepen and radicalize democracy in both the political and 
economic fields, without replacing representative democracy. The existing politico-
territorial divisions of states, municipalities, and parishes, as well as the separation of 
powers characteristic of the liberal tradition, were preserved. 
In contrast with what was happening on the rest of the continent, economic, social, and 
cultural rights were not only ratified, but significantly expanded in the new Constitu-
tion. Access to free and universal education, health services, and social security were 
established as state responsibilities. An ample range of indigenous peoples’ rights was 
recognized, including their territorial rights. As a reflection of the decisive role of Hugo 
Chávez in this process, the country’s name was changed to the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, the presidential term was extended to six years, and an immediate presiden-
tial reelection was introduced. 
An important moment of rupture carried out by the Chávez government came two years 
after the adoption of the Constitution when, on the basis of special powers that had 
been granted by the National Assembly through an Enabling Law, the President enacted 
49 new laws in 2001. The aim of these laws was the democratization of ownership and 
production; a reorientation of public sector financial instruments to promote small and 
medium-size enterprises; the creation of a micro-credit system; the promotion of alter-
native forms of property, and the creation of cooperatives. There were three particularly 
controversial laws concerning the eradication of large rural estates, against trawling, 
and increased state control over the oil industry.
This set of laws was seen by the business community and the political opposition as 
an attack on private property, with many arguing that these laws confirmed the statist 
or communist political character of the government project. A national business strike 
in protest at these laws in December 2001 marked the beginning of a phase of intense 
confrontation between the government and an opposition willing to use all the means 
at its disposal to overthrow it. In April 2002 a coup d’état toppled the government for a 
couple of days. This US backed coup finally failed due to extraordinary popular mobiliza-
tion and divisions within the armed forces. Those directly involved in the coup included 
the opposition parties, the main business associations, the hierarchy of the Catholic 
Church, and a sector of the armed forces. The private media played a leading role.
5 According to Article 70 of the Constitution: “Participation and involvement of people in the exercise of their 
sovereignty in political affairs can be manifested by: voting to fill public offices, referendum, consultation of 
public opinion, mandate revocation, legislative, constitutional and constituent initiatives, town meetings and 
forums and citizen assemblies whose decisions shall be binding among others; and in social and economic 
affairs: citizen service organs, self-management, co-management, cooperatives in all forms, including those of 
a financial nature, savings funds, community enterprises, and other forms of association guided by the values of 
mutual cooperation and solidarity. The law shall establish conditions for the effective functioning of the means 
of participation provided for under the present article.”
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Between the final months of 2002 and early 2003 a nationwide oil strike/sabotage 
campaign and a business lockout were carried out with the express purpose of over-
throwing the government. With no gasoline and limited means of transport for people 
and goods, and with no gas for domestic consumption, the country was semi-paralyzed 
for more than two months. The gross domestic product collapsed by 17 percent that 
year. And yet it was also a period of intense spontaneous organization and mobilization. 
The government only managed to survive this new overthrow attempt as a result of 
very high levels of active participation among the popular sectors. In 2004 a presidential 
recall referendum was carried out. Chávez came out of this referendum with increased 
legitimacy. He was ratified in office with the support of 59.1 percent of voters. A land-
mark of extraordinary consequences occurred in January 2005 when, at the World 
Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Chávez declared the Bolivarian process to be socialist.6 
In 2013, the country entered a profound political, economic, and ethical crisis. Almost 
simultaneously, the two main pillars on which the Bolivarian process had become highly 
dependent – the charismatic leadership of Chávez and high oil prices – were no longer 
present. Chávez died in March 2013. 
World oil market prices started to drop in mid-2014. In the presidential elections held 
shortly after the death of Chávez, Nicolas Maduro was elected with a margin of just 1.5 
percent of votes over Henrique Capriles, the opposition’s candidate. In December 2015, 
6 This critical issue will be analyzed towards the end of this chapter. 
April 2013, Plaza Diego Ibarra
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the opposition overwhelmingly won the parliamentary elections, achieving a two-third 
majority in the National Assembly.
Between 2014 and 2016 there was a sustained drop in the country’s GDP. Inflation 
soared to become the highest on the planet. Shortages of food and medicines, the 
decline of wages, growing insecurity, and the deterioration of public services all led to 
an accelerated reversal of the population’s improved standard of living that had been 
achieved in the previous decade. Massive levels of corruption became more visible. All 
this led to a growing rejection of the Maduro government. Faced with this fading popular 
support and the electoral advances of the opposition, the government was confronted, 
in schematic terms, with two basic options. The first was to recognize the need for 
a profound self-critical analysis of government policies with the purpose of trying to 
figure out the root causes of its rapidly increasing unpopularity. This would have inevi-
tably highlighted issues such as rampant corruption and inefficiency, the impossibility 
of continuing with the unsustainable highly subsidized exchange rate that was distorting 
the economy, as well as the need to re-engage with popular organizations in order to 
confront the economic crisis. 
However, the Maduro government clearly decided for another option. It seems to have 
assumed that if it wanted to remain in power it could no longer act within the limits set by 
the Constitution and could no longer count on favorable electoral results. Thus, instead 
of dealing with the basic issues that were creating these high levels of discontent, it has 
taken an increasingly authoritarian route: the Constitution is systematically breached; 
the National Assembly has been declared to be in rebellion against the constitutional 
order, and since then, for all practical purposes, ignored, and its constitutional powers 
taken over by the Executive and the Supreme Court of Justice. A constitutionally guar-
anteed presidential recall referendum was cancelled and the governor elections, which 
should have been held in December 2016, were indefinitely postponed. Police and mili-
tary repression has dramatically increased. President Maduro has ruled since February 
2016 by means of a State of Exception and Economic Emergency on terms that clearly 
violate the Constitution. He thus governs by decree, and many constitutional rights can 
be suspended. 
The tendency for left-wing or transformative experiences to become associated with 
authoritarianism can have severe and long-lasting consequences far beyond Venezuela. 
It serves to undermine support for anti-capitalist projects around the world. This is 
particularly so as a consequence of the widespread expectations that the Bolivarian 
Revolution had created. 
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MAIN ACHIEVEMENTS OF  
THE BOLIVARIAN PROCESS
It is not the aim of this work to provide a comprehensive analysis of the achievements 
of the Bolivarian process. However, a review, albeit cursory, of some the achievements 
of this process is essential to an initial understanding of the contradictions that have 
characterized this experience. In the first decade of the Bolivarian government there 
were high levels of politicization, significant changes to popular political culture and its 
organizational fabric, as well as significant improvements in the standards of living of 
the previously excluded popular sectors of the population. An extensive sense of dignity 
and inclusion and of the capacity to have a say over both one’s own life and the fate of 
the country was generated.
Through multiple social policies (the missions) aimed at different segments of the popu-
lation, levels of poverty and extreme poverty were significantly reduced. According 
to the UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the 
country became, along with Uruguay, one of the two least unequal countries in Latin 
America (CEPAL, 2013: p. 79). The population achieved better levels of nutrition (Organi-
zación de las Naciones Unidas para la Alimentación y la Agricultura, 2013), although this 
was not as a consequence of the country having achieved food sovereignty, but rather 
of its capacity to import food. Effective literacy programs were established. With 
Cuban support, the Barrio Adentro mission provided urban and rural primary health care 
services to previously excluded sectors of the population across the country. There was 
a massive expansion of the public pension scheme, incorporating millions of seniors. 
There was also an extraordinary expansion of free public university enrollment. An 
ambitious public housing program was set up. Levels of unemployment significantly 
decreased and informal employment declined from 51 percent in the first half of 1999 to 
41 percent in the first half of 2014 (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, n.d.). It has been 
estimated that the monetary resources devoted to social investments between 1999 
and 2013 amounted to a total of about 650 billion US dollars (Giordani, 2014). According 
to the UNDP, the Human Development Index of the country rose from 0.662 in 2000 
to 0.748 in 2012, from “medium” human development, to “high” human development 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2014).
Equally important was the impact of the Venezuelan experience – particularly the 
constituent process – in the so-called progressive or leftist displacements that occurred 
in Latin America in the first decade of this century. The Chávez government took 
the initiative by promoting several regional integration and solidarity organizations 
(UNASUR, CELAC, Petrocaribe, and ALBA) that have contributed to strengthening 
regional autonomy, thus limiting the historical dependence that the region has had on 
the United States. Venezuela played a critical role in the defeat of the Free Trade Area of 
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the Americas (FTAA) which would have meant the establishment of a neoliberal consti-
tution for the entire continent. When Venezuela started to confront this imperial project, 
every single government in the Americas, in spite of their many differences on particular 
issues, agreed on the benefits of negotiating and signing this agreement.
As a result of these policies the Bolivarian government was confronted, from 
the very beginning, with continued attacks by the United States government. US 
attempts to undermine or overthrow the Venezuelan government have taken many 
forms, such as financial and political backing for the right-wing opposition, support 
for the 2002 coup d’état, and systematic attempts to isolate the country. More 
recently, just before leaving office, Barak Obama renewed an Executive Order he 
had previously signed that declared that Venezuela represented an “unusual and 
extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States” 
(The White House, 2017). 
In a Posture Statement presented to the Senate Armed Forces Committee in April 2017, 
Admiral Kurt W. Tidd, head of the United States Southern Command, affirmed that: 
...Venezuela faces significant instability in the coming year due to widespread food, and 
medicine shortages; continued political uncertainty; and a worsening economic situa-
tion. The growing humanitarian crisis in Venezuela could eventually compel a regional 
response. (United States Southern Command, 2017)
In August 2017, Donald Trump threatened Venezuela with a United States military inter-
vention: We have many options for Venezuela and by the way, I’m not going to rule out 
a military option. We have many options for Venezuela, this is our neighbor (…) We’re all 
over the world and we have troops all over the world in places that are very very far away, 
Venezuela is not very far away and the people are suffering and dying. We have many 
options for Venezuela including a possible military option if necessary. (Jacobs, 2017)
TENSIONS, CONTRADICTIONS, AND 
LIMITATIONS OF THE BOLIVARIAN PROCESS
The deep political, economic, and ethical crisis that began in 2013 was, as stated above, 
precipitated by the death of Chávez and the collapse of oil prices. However, to attempt 
a more comprehensive assessment of the Bolivarian experience from 1998 to the 
present, and to draw lessons from this rich historical experience that generated so many 
expectations both inside and outside Venezuela, and explore why it basically failed as 
an alternative to capitalism and civilization in crisis, it is essential to go more deeply 
into other more basic structural and political issues. Some of these are of a historical-
structural nature pertaining to the reality of a country with an economy, political system, 
and hegemonic cultural patterns that for over a century have been based on expan-
sive state-controlled oil revenues. Others, of a more political and ideological nature, are 
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bound up with the contents and basic (changing) orientations of the Bolivarian project. 
These are factors that have had a crucial impact on the shape this process has taken.
DEEPENING THE OIL RENTIER MODEL:  
THE CONTINUED ASSAULT ON NATURE
As has been the case in the experience of all countries with so-called progressive 
governments in South America, during the Bolivarian process the predatory extractive 
development model was not questioned beyond the discursive sphere. Given the rise 
in demand for and prices of commodities in the first decade of the century, for the 
Venezuelan government, as for other governments in the region, the expansion of the 
colonial model of integration into the international division of labor and nature repre-
sented the easiest and most immediate option for obtaining the resources required to 
implement redistributive social policies and for preserving the electoral support that 
would give permanence to the government over time. By prioritizing short-term political 
advantage, the government consolidated the inherited primary export model.
The extraordinary expansion of social spending was made possible by a radical reorien-
tation in the use of the country’s oil rent, without even the slightest adjustment of the 
country’s productive structure. Many initiatives and modalities of Latin American solidarity 
such as Petrocaribe were possible thanks to this abundant income. Throughout the years 
of the Bolivarian government, dependence on oil exports increased. The participation of 
oil in the total value of exports rose from 68.7 percent in 1998 to 96 percent by the time 
of the onset of the current crisis in 2013 (Banco Central de Venezuela, n.d.(b)).7 In abso-
lute terms, there has been a reduction in the value of non-oil exports and private exports 
(Banco Central de Venezuela, n.d. (b)). The industrial sector’s contribution to the GDP fell 
from 17 percent in 2000 to 13 percent in 2013 (Banco Central de Venezuela, n.d. (c)). 
With its declared aims of limiting capital flight and curbing inflation, the government 
sustained a foreign exchange control mechanism with an extraordinarily overvalued 
currency; this accentuated the so-called Dutch disease that has characterized the Vene-
zuelan economy for many decades. For most sectors of the economy it is cheaper to 
import than to produce domestically. Apart from oil, few goods can be produced at 
competitive enough prices. Social policy and successive wage increases markedly 
increased the purchasing power of the population but this increase in demand was not 
accompanied by a commensurate increase in domestic production. The gaps had to be 
covered by increased imports. These could only be financed with income from oil exports.
In the 1970s, in another cycle of abundance due to high oil prices during the first govern-
ment of Carlos Andrés Pérez, the notion that Venezuela was a rich country was widely 
7 This was only partially due to the increase in oil prices. 
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accepted as common sense. The official discourse of those years called it the Great 
Venezuela. Popular discourse referred to Saudi Venezuela. This imaginary of great abun-
dance was repeated during the government of Hugo Chávez, this time under the name 
of Venezuela: a Global Energy Power.
With regard to climate change and the responsibilities of the country with the planet’s 
largest oil reserves, the distance between the discourse and the policies actually carried out 
could not be greater. In the negotiations during the United Nations Convention on Climate 
Change, representatives of Venezuela presented radical speeches blaming capitalism and 
the industrialized countries of the North for the high levels of fossil fuel consumption that 
threaten life on the planet. However, it has been government policy to maximize oil extrac-
tion. The clearest example of this profound contradiction is found in the so-called Plan de 
la Patria, the last government program presented by Chávez for the presidential elections 
of 2012. This program, subsequently approved by the National Assembly as the country’s 
development plan, is organized around five major objectives. Goal number five is to preserve 
life on the planet and save the human species. However, the target of goal number three 
is to consolidate the role of Venezuela as a Global Energy Power. To that end, according to 
this plan, oil production was to be doubled from three million to six million barrels per day 
between 2013 and 2019 (Asamblea Nacional, 2013). Fortunately, mainly due to inefficiency, 
lack of investment, and corruption in the state oil company PDVSA, these efforts have 
failed. Oil production in April 2017 was not much over two million barrels per day. 
The sale of gasoline and other fossil fuels at heavily subsidized prices (it is one of the 
few items whose price has not been impacted by inflation) not only encourages massive 
wasteful consumption, but has blocked any possibility of developing alternative energies. 
Faced with the collapse of oil prices, the government’s response has not been to open a 
national debate on alternatives to the extractive rentier policies of development, in order 
to comply, for example, with the constitutional mandate in relation to food security.8 In an 
attempt to deal with severe nutritional deficiency and the health crisis facing the popula-
tion, and the lack of sufficient foreign reserves to finance the required imports, it chooses to 
further deepen the predatory extractive model, now through mining. On February 24, 2016 
President Nicolás Maduro issued a decree creating the National Strategic Development Zone 
“Arco Minero del Orinoco” (the Orinoco Mining Arch) by which 112,000 square kilometers, 
8 Article 305: “The State shall promote sustainable agriculture as the strategic basis for overall rural development, 
and consequently shall guarantee the population a secure food supply, defined as the sufficient and stable 
availability of food within the national sphere and timely and uninterrupted access to the same for consumers. A 
secure food supply must be achieved by developing and prioritizing internal agricultural and livestock production, 
understood as production deriving from the activities of agriculture, livestock, fishing and aquiculture. Food 
production is in the national interest and is fundamental to the economic and social development of the 
Nation. To this end, the State shall promulgate such financial, commercial, technological transfer, land tenancy, 
infrastructure, manpower training and other measures as may be necessary to achieve strategic levels of self-
sufficiency. In addition, it shall promote actions in the national and international economic context to compensate 
for the disadvantages inherent to agricultural activity.” 
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12 percent of national territory, was opened up to mining.9 Some 150 transnational mining 
corporations from around the world were invited to participate. The armed forces have been 
assigned a central role in this project, both in preventing and repressing any form of resistance 
or opposition to this megaproject, and in the operation of newly created military-owned mining 
companies. This is a territory inhabited by several indigenous peoples, a territory belonging to 
the Amazon forest that plays a vital role in regulating climate regimes on the planet; an area of 
extraordinary biodiversity, it contains the main sources of water in Venezuela. The hydroelec-
tric dams that supply 70 percent of the electricity consumed in the country are located within 
the boundaries of the Arco Minero. All this is threatened by the large-scale open-pit mining 
projects that are planned for this area. This decision, in which the future of the country is at 
stake, was made by the President of the Republic, in the total absence of any public debate, 
without consulting the National Assembly, and in violation of both the Constitution and several 
laws concerning the rights of indigenous peoples as well as environmental and labor rights.
This is an area that has been undergoing a process of large-scale socio-environmental 
devastation as a result of illegal gold mining, which has expanded significantly over the 
past two decades. There are tens of thousands of miners often controlled by armed 
gangs. Violence rules. Apart from severe environmental destruction, there is wide-
spread drug trafficking and prostitution. Miserable and unhealthy working conditions 
prevail. All this happens not only with the complicity, but also with the direct participa-
9 The Arco Minero del Orinoco will operate as a Special Economic Zone, which, as has been the case in China and 
Viet Nam, seeks to attract foreign investment through financial and fiscal incentives, and the non-application of 
some national environmental and labor laws.
Oil Slick, Venezuela
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tion, of some of the regional authorities and military security bodies that are supposedly 
responsible for preventing these illegal activities. With the opening of this territory to 
large-scale open-pit mining this ongoing catastrophe can only increase. This consti-
tutes, in short, a structural deepening of the logic of the commodification of nature that 
has been hegemonic in Venezuelan society for a century.
Once again priority has been given to maximizing short-term state income through 
extractive activities. The most important public policies have been of a distributive 
character that has failed to question the structural base of the Venezuelan economy. As 
a consequence, in spite of many discourses to the contrary highlighting, for example, 
the importance of dialogues of wisdoms (diálogos de saberes), the main content of 
the inherited technological patterns has not, in practical terms, been challenged. 
The most significant technological transformation of the last decade and a half is not 
unique to Venezuela: namely, the rapid expansion of the use of cell phones and social 
media. These played a critical role in the organization of popular resistance against the 
right-wing coup of April 2002, and fifteen years later they are playing an equally important 
role in the organization/coordination of the massive rallies against the Maduro government. 
THE CENTRALITY OF THE STATE 
In the main political debates of the Bolivarian process there has been a severe lack of theoret-
ical debate that incorporates a critical evaluation of the socialist experiences of the last century 
with regard to questions such as what a post-capitalist society in this century could be or what 
could or should be the relations between state, market, and organized sectors of society. An 
informed and thoughtful study and debate on the post-capitalist potentialities and limitations 
of current transformations underway in China, Viet Nam, and Cuba have also been lacking. 
This of course is not a specifically Venezuelan problem; it is an expression of the current situa-
tion of the left throughout the world. Worldwide, the left has demonstrated its impotence and 
failure to respond credibly to the current global crisis of capitalism and the way in which this 
crisis has been harnessed by the representatives of global capital to advance further restric-
tions on democracy and an even greater concentration of power and wealth.
In the absence of more systematic and strategic debates about post-capitalist alterna-
tives, however, two types of proposals have been dominant. The first and the most 
widespread has been the automatic identification of socialism with statism (state-owner-
ship and/or state control).10 Each time a private company is nationalized, it is immediately 
renamed as a “socialist enterprise.” The second is the identification of post-capitalism 
with a communal state, an issue that will be dealt with further below in this text.
10 Between the first half of 1999 and the first half of 2014, the participation of the public sector in total 
employment increased from 15.5 percent to 20.7 percent (Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, n.d.).
~ 66 ~
In the Bolivarian political project, the state was conceived as the main agent or subject 
of social transformation. Historical and institutional legacies of a state-centric logic 
which has characterized most of Latin America throughout its history have undergirded 
this process. In Venezuela, oil has accentuated this logic to exceptional extremes. The 
whole of society has been organized around the state. The political system and parties 
have revolved around the struggles for the appropriation of parts of the oil rent by 
different sectors of society. Private accumulation of capital and the emergence of busi-
ness sectors have been directly fueled by public financing, subsidies, tariff protections, 
and the corrupt privatization of the public sphere. In the years of the Bolivarian process 
this state-centric logic became more deeply entrenched. 
The 1999 Constitution expands the scope of the state, mainly through its executive 
branch, both in the productive field and as guarantor of the social and economic rights 
of the population, especially those most in need. This extension of the state’s areas of 
competence also includes, among other things, control over trade union and student 
elections, the elections of the authorities of the autonomous universities, and the power 
to decide which political parties can be recognized.11 To the extent that oil income was 
embraced as the tool for promoting the desired changes, there has been an increased 
centralization of the control of this revenue by the executive branch of government. 
Besides the three traditional liberal branches of government (Executive, Judiciary, 
and Legislative), the 1999 Constitution created two additional autonomous branches 
of government: the Electoral Power, and the Citizen’s Power. This, however, did not 
alter the overall preponderance of the executive branch of government that has histori-
cally characterized the country´s political system. During the Bolivarian process, the 
other branches of government were completely subservient to the Executive. When 
the opposition won a majority in the National Assembly, the Assembly was declared to 
be in rebellion and stripped of all its functions. On several occasions when opposition 
parties won some municipal or state elections, the Executive created new parallel ad 
hoc structures to undermine and under-finance these opposition governments.12 
The identification of socialism with state control has had devastating consequences for 
the productive apparatus of the country as it has created conditions that impede the effec-
11 The elections of one of the biggest trade unions in the country, in the SIDOR steel plant, have been indefinitely 
postponed because the government is aware of the fact that it would lose them if they were carried out. The 
National Electoral Council has refused to register the leftist political organization Marea Socialista as a political 
party, absurdly claiming that its name sounds more like a slogan than a name for a political party.
12 When opposition candidate Antonio Ledezma won the elections to become the Metropolitan Mayor of Caracas 
in 2008, the National Assembly passed a law creating the Capital District, directly dependent on the Executive. 
Many of the functions and financing of the Metropolitan Mayor were transferred to the new government-
controlled structure. When one of the main leaders of the opposition, Henrique Capriles, was re-elected as 
governor of the state of Miranda in 2012, the National Assembly created CorpoMiranda, a parallel central-
government-controlled institution with a budget that was eventually larger than that of the governor’s office.
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tive operation of both the public and the private sectors. The state has lacked the capacity 
to manage the wide range of companies that have been nationalized. Most of the indus-
trial and agricultural enterprises that have been nationalized are less efficiently managed 
and have reduced outputs. This has been the result of bureaucratism, labor disputes, the 
sale of products at prices that do not cover production costs, as well as corruption.13 There 
has also been a lack of new investment, not only in maintenance but also in the techno-
logical upgrading of the plants. In some cases, such as in steel and aluminum production, 
the state-owned plants are exhibiting extraordinary levels of deterioration and disuse.14 
Consequently, a high proportion of these companies is generating operational losses and 
survives only thanks to the injection of resources from oil revenues.
This state-centered logic was, from the very beginning, accompanied by the recogni-
tion of the need to profoundly modify the “inherited” or capitalist state in order to carry 
out the process of transformation. The notion of the transition was framed in terms 
of the old state that refuses to die, and the new state that has still not been born. The 
way this challenge has been dealt with has varied at different moments of the Boli-
varian process. When the first large-scale social programs or misiones were created 
(the Cuban-backed primary health mission Barrio Adentro, the first education programs, 
etc.) there was a recognition of the need to overcome bureaucratic obstacles in order 
to bring the government closer to the people. Thus, parallel, more informal structures 
were created to implement the most critical social programs. This was also a reaction to 
the fact that many of these programs were delayed or even sabotaged by those people 
in office who were opposed to the government. These were seen as transitional or even 
emergency structures, not necessarily as the model of the new state in strategic terms. 
On the downside, these structures increased public employment, and contributed to 
turning the state into an even more cumbersome and less transparent structure. 
Over time, the strategic conception of the alternative state has been framed in terms 
of a Communal State. This has been conceived as a decentralized state, controlled 
directly by the population at the community level, that is, as part of a transition to forms 
of democratic self-governance from below. However, this has been a source of major 
tensions and contradictions as this mode of democratic, communal self-government is 
hardly compatible with the vertical control from above and vanguardism of the ideas and 
practices that have prevailed in the Bolivarian process.
13 When he announced his decision to intervene in the area of the state oil company in charge of fuel distribution, 
PDVSA, President Nicolás Maduro said: “There are very serious indications of the connection of mafia groups 
with some instances of state companies, we are going to pursue them and we will punish them with twice the 
severity with which they are punished normally.” (Aporrea, 2014)
14 According to the last official data provided by the Venezuelan Central Bank, basic steel production in 2011 was 
only 74.9 percent of the production level of 1997. In the case of aluminum, there was an even more significant 
decrease. The level of production in 2011 was only 52.3 percent of production levels in 1997 (Banco Central de 
Venezuela, n.d. (a)). 
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TENSIONS IN POPULAR ORGANIZATIONS PROMOTED  
BY THE STATE
Venezuela before the Bolivarian process was characterized as a society with a weak 
social fabric due mainly to the strong presence of the state and the overwhelming pres-
ence of political parties in all spheres of society. Political parties operated as the main 
agents for channeling the aspirations and demands of society. Political parties were the 
main actors in trade unions, professional associations, and student, local, and cultural 
organizations. There was limited space for the existence of autonomous social organiza-
tions outside the state/party network.
With the beginning of the Chávez government, the country saw the emergence of highly 
dynamic participatory and organizational processes involving millions of people: Technical 
Water Tables, Community Water Councils (Mesas Técnicas de Agua y Consejos Comu-
nitarios de Agua), Health Committees, Urban Land Committees, and, later, Communal 
Councils, and Communes. This organizational dynamic was the result of both the radical 
politicization that was happening in Venezuelan society and of public policies aimed at 
promoting these processes. Some of the social policies (misiones) were conceptualized in 
such a way that popular grassroots organizations were necessarily part of their implemen-
tation. All this marks a deep contrast with the experiences of Ecuador and Bolivia where 
government policies led to the division and weakening of pre-existing popular organizations.
The large-scale public promotion and financing of grassroots organizations, especially 
the Communal Councils and Communes, have produced contradictory results. On the 
one hand this has led to extraordinary levels of popular organization, unprecedented in 
Venezuelan history. Massive amounts of public resources were transferred to communi-
ties to address their most immediate problems: repairs to sidewalks, stairways, housing, 
cultural and sports centers, repairs to schools, and, in some cases, productive activities. 
This created a dynamic by which the self-identity and social fabric of local communities 
was strengthened. Social and political participation increased significantly. 
However, at the same time the historical logic of a statist centralized rentier model was 
reaffirmed, since most of these new organizations tended to rely directly on the transfer 
of resources from some state institution. The consequence of this dependence was 
a limitation of the potential for the consolidation and autonomy of these community-
based local organizations as alternatives to state structures, and as breeding grounds for 
other cultural and policy possibilities. The multiple forms of social organization cannot 
exercise control over and influence the orientation of public policy unless they have a 
significant degree of autonomy. If their functioning is highly dependent on the transfer 
of resources from state institutions, the democratizing role of these social organizations 
is severely limited. The deepening of the rentier culture and extractivist economy oper-
ated against self-reliance and enhanced a consumerist understanding of life quality. In 
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addition, the corruption associated with struggles in the distribution of the country’s oil 
rent found its way to the grassroots level of society. 
The contradictions between the demands and experiences of autonomy and self-govern-
ance vs. state or party controls from above were further enhanced when, in 2005, Chávez 
announced that the Bolivarian revolution was a socialist revolution. From that time on, 
vertical state/party control increased significantly. In legal and institutional terms, a whole 
complex of new laws designed to promote what was called People’s Power were approved. 
In 2009 the government even created a Ministry of People’s Power for Communes. 
However, instead of promoting people power, giving people more autonomy and the 
capacity to exert control over state institutions, these laws seemed to have been explic-
itly designed to increase state control over these popular organizations. Instead of 
increasing transparency as intended in the Organic Law of Public Controllership, all levels 
of public administration became more and more opaque. The laws of the Communal 
Councils and the Communes specify in great detail the purpose of these organizations, 
how they should be structured, the specific attributions of each part of the organiza-
tions, etc. These detailed legal norms suggest that these organizations are conceived as 
part of the state structure. This ambiguity is present in the National Social and Economic 
Plan 2007-2013 which refers to People’s Power both as if it were another branch of 
government that has to relate to the other branches of government, and something that 
is external to the state and has to keep an equilibrium with the state. 
As a consequence, there was a reduction in the rich diversity of organizational forms 
that had developed in previous years as there were molded to conform to new standard-
ized one-size-fits-all organizational arrangements. This completed the consolidation of the 
primacy of the state’s normalizing gaze over the multiplicity of social experiments from 
below. Similarly, given the dominance of a redistributive logic over a productive logic that 
characterized the policies of the Bolivarian government from the very beginning, clien-
telism has prevailed in a significant proportion of the state’s relations with grassroots 
organizations. In the transfer of state resources to communities the emphasis has been 
on solving the immediate problems of the population, rather than on structural changes. 
This has meant that, especially in urban areas, issues relating to other modes of produc-
tion and consumption, alternatives to the hegemonic civilization in crisis, have on the 
whole not been a central part of the experience. The oil development model and its rentier 
logic have not been questioned because it is precisely the income from this model that 
has made this kind of relationship between state and popular organizations possible.
Despite the participation of millions of people in these rich, multiple, organizational 
dynamics, their dependence on state resources made them quite fragile. In a political 
process that has for years celebrated the value of solidarity and had promoted this rich 
fabric of multiple forms of popular organization, it was surely to be expected that the 
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response to the severe economic crisis that began in 2013 would be one of solidarity, 
of a collective creative nature. On the whole, however, this has not been the case. The 
reaction to the crisis has been characterized more by pragmatism, individualism, and 
competition. The significant changes in the popular political culture of previous years, 
the sense of dignity, the subjectivities characterized by self-confidence and enthusiasm 
as a result of feeling part of the process of building a better future – with the crisis all 
of these entered into a retrogressive dynamic that has resulted in the erosion of the 
social fabric of solidarity and of the ethical values that had previously prevailed. Most 
of the grassroots organizations established during these years have been weakened 
both by the lack of state resources on which they have become dependent, and as a 
consequence of a fading confidence in the government and the country’s future. In 
an extreme case, some of the groups that were created in Caracas in defense of the 
Bolivarian process, the so-called collectives (colectivos), have become criminal armed 
groups that control territories and are involved in the trafficking of drugs and food. 
Yet despite these multiple difficulties and obstacles, there are, in these times of deep 
crisis, still many grassroots experiences that were nurtured by the politicization and 
activism of Venezuelan society over the last few years and have survived as autonomous, 
creative organizations. Even if they only represent a minority of the vast organizational 
experience of these years, they are living examples of what is possible today in the 
struggle for another, better future. Many other popular organizations are still discussing 
how to continue operating in this new context. Their sustained activities demonstrate 
that democratic organizations cannot be declared as such from above. Building up such 
organizations takes time, requires some level of autonomy and more horizontality than 
has been the case with the organizations promoted by the Venezuelan government.
After almost two decades of the Bolivarian process, the most important and vigorous autono-
mous popular social organization of the country continues to be Cecosesola, a network of 
cooperatives whose operations are centered in the city of Barquisimeto. This is an extensive 
network of cooperatives, agricultural production units, health and funeral services, and, espe-
cially, food distribution structures that connect producers and consumers. Tens of thousands 
of people are involved as partners or beneficiaries. Over decades of an ongoing process of 
self-reflection, debates, and experimentation, Cecosesola has established organizational 
arrangements of a genuinely horizontal democratic nature, with a very limited division of 
labor. All members are involved in the wide range of responsibilities. All decisions are made in 
assemblies (Colectivo de autoras y autores de Cecosesola, 2015). There is a profound contrast 
between this horizontal form of organization, built up over five decades of experimentation, 
and many of the vertical organizations created by decree by the Bolivarian government. 
Despite permanent generic references to “workers” in the Bolivarian discourse, neither 
workers nor labor unions have played a central role in the popular organizations of these 
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years. This, as has been noted above, is mainly due to the fact that the Bolivarian process 
has been characterized more by its distributive policies than by any significant produc-
tive transformations. Territorial organizations have by far been more important than 
work-based organizations. The role of unions has been quite marginal and their partici-
pation in the negotiation of salaries and working conditions limited. Wage increases 
have been granted in most cases by way of unilateral presidential decrees. As a whole, 
labor unions have not only been severely weakened, but in some cases have come to 
operate more as corrupt armed mafias than as organizations defending the interests of 
workers. This has been particularly the case in some construction and mining unions.
THE BLURRING OF BOUNDARIES BETWEEN THE PUBLIC/
STATE SPHERE AND THE POLITICAL/PARTY SPHERE
Closely associated with the central role of the state in the Bolivarian process, both in 
economic and political terms, is what has been the systematic blurring of boundaries 
between the public/state sphere and the partisan/political sphere. The use of public 
resources for partisan political purposes is not new in Venezuelan political history. 
However this practice acquires new features when it is supported by an explicit or 
implicit ideological justification that states that, since this is a Revolution, the use of any 
means to defeat the enemy is ethically justified. This has severe implications for two 
closely interrelated themes: democracy and corruption.
This extended fusion between the public/state sphere and the political/partisan sphere 
became a severe obstacle to the possibility of building a pluralistic democracy, as it 
was established by the 1999 Constitution. Since its inception, the United Socialist 
Party of Venezuela (PSUV) has used state resources for propaganda, mobilizations, and 
meetings, despite an explicit constitutional prohibition. Senior officials have repeatedly 
declared that public employees who do not participate in activities promoted by the 
PSUV or who support the opposition by signing one of its initiatives would lose their 
jobs. Expressions of these tensions are the disputes within the trade-union movement 
which identified with the Bolivarian process, between those who defend the autonomy 
of trade unions, both in relation to the government and the parties, and those who, on 
the other hand, argue that since this is a popular government that represents workers’ 
interests, there is no need for autonomy.
Over the last decade the most important grassroots organizations that have been 
promoted by the government have been the Communal Councils, conceived as the 
basic organizations for participatory democracy that would, over time, along with the 
Communes, displace the structures of the existing state (states, municipalities, and 
parishes). Over the years, debates and highly significant practical confrontations over 
how these privileged structures of democratic participation should be conceived have 
taken place. Are these plural spaces open to the whole society, are they public spaces 
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within which different projects and social and political perspectives can be confronted? 
Or, on the contrary, are these conceived as Chavista, “revolutionary,” or “socialist” 
political spaces? While Communal Councils have been created in many residential 
areas where political opposition forces dominate, there are important sectors within 
the government and the PSUV that have argued that these must be uniquely “Chav-
ista” spaces. This is a fundamental issue with significant implications for the future 
of democracy in the country. If these, the basic building blocks from which the struc-
tures of the new communal state were supposed to emerge, are defined in sectarian 
and exclusionary ways, if these are restricted to those who share the current political 
government agenda, this would leave out a significant proportion of the Venezuelan 
population that has not identified with the government or with socialism. This perspec-
tive would deny the possibility that Communal Councils could be part of a process of 
building a democratic society where all citizens could participate.
A more recent example of this fusion between the political/partisan sphere (representing 
a part of society) and the public/state sphere (which is supposed to represent the whole 
of society) have been the Local Committees of Supply and Production (CLAP), created 
as a mechanism for distributing basic goods (especially food) when severe shortages 
prevail. Although it is a public program, funded with state resources, it consists mainly of 
PSUV structures, such as the Bolivar-Chávez Battle Units (UBCH) and the Frente Fran-
cisco de Miranda (Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Mujer y la Igualdad de Género, 
2016). Under these conditions, it is not surprising that there have been repeated allega-
tions of political discrimination in this food distribution program.
The consequences of this merger between party and state from the point of view of 
corruption are equally severe. When the barrier between the public/state sphere and 
partisan politics is blurred in the use of public resources, it leads to the blurring of the 
boundary between the public and the private. As a result of this there is an increased 
lack of transparency in public administration, which in turn creates the institutional basis 
for extraordinarily high levels of corruption.15
15 Corruption on a massive scale has been one of the most severe problems of the Bolivarian process. There has 
been a serious lack of transparency in government expenditure. Previous procedures for public accountability have 
been at least partly dismantled, or have been used almost exclusively to target the opposition. The main source of 
corruption has been associated with the creation of departments for the control of foreign currency exchange in order 
to limit capital flight from the country. Since demand has always been much higher than the supply provided by the 
government, parallel (illegal), speculative exchange markets have emerged. This has produced an exponential increase 
in the value of the bolívar in relation to the US dollar. In August 2017 while the fixed official exchange rate for basic food 
and medical imports was 10 bolívars per US dollar the parallel exchange rate fluctuated between 10,000 and 18,000 
bolívars per US dollar. The office in charge of deciding which requests for subsidized foreign currency would be honored 
thus holds a tremendous discretionary power. New millionaires were created as a result. According to the ex-president 
of the Venezuelan Central Bank, Aimeé Betancourt, in 2013 alone some 20 billon US dollars in subsidized currency were 
supplied by the government to so-called briefcase companies for imports that never took place, an artificial demand not 
related to productive activities (Aporrea, 2013). This represents huge levels of public/private corruption that, according 
to some estimates, amounts to as much as 300 billion US dollars over the last ten years. 
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THE ROLE OF A CHARISMATIC LEADER
The overpowering leadership of Hugo Chávez was, in contradictory terms, both a basic 
strength of the Bolivarian process, and a source of some of its limitations. Without the 
charisma, leadership skills, and extraordinary communicative and popular pedagogical 
gifts that Chávez had, it would hardly have been possible to break the iron cage, the 
lethargy of a society which, as noted above, was characterized by growing inequalities 
and exclusions, a political system that had become delegitimized. The popular sectors 
of society lacked any prospects for a better future. He gave voice and a sense of direc-
tion to this enormous discontent and promoted processes of popular participation and 
organization throughout the country. In this way Chávez acted as a powerful agent or 
catalyst for social change.
However, the degree of dependence of the Bolivarian process on one person, the cult 
of personality, and the high level of concentration of power in his hands, constituted a 
severe limitation on the dynamics of deepening democracy. This type of overpowering 
leadership blocks the emergence of alternative leaderships, and is thus an extraordinary 
source of fragility for the entire political process. The absence of the essential leader, as 
demonstrated by the death of Chávez, could cause a major crisis.
The consolidation over time of the unquestioned leadership of one person prevents the 
creation of a democratic culture of debates between different perspectives. People who 
were close to President Chávez have described how this led to a climate of uncondition-
ality that limited the possibility of debates and confrontations between different ideas. 
Chávez mural
~ 74 ~
The leader was well protected from the less favorable aspects of reality. Under these 
conditions, access to power can easily be equated with access to, and the confidence 
of, the President. Opportunism easily masquerades as “revolutionary.” The indefinite 
reelection of the President on the basis of a constitutional amendment approved by a 
national referendum in 2009, made it possible, given the age of Chávez at the time, for 
the issue of creating relay leaderships to disappear from the horizon.
But even more problematic has been the tension between, on the one hand, the 
discourse and practice of popular participation, as a condition for the new forms of 
democracy in which power should reside with the people, and, on the other, the fact 
that again and again, decisions on fundamental issues for the country’s future (the crea-
tion of a single party, the need for constitutional reform, financing of major infrastructure 
projects, international agreements, the creation of new modes of popular organization 
or social programs) were announced on television without any previous information or 
public debate once they had been made by the President. The practice of “participatory 
democracy” has been basically restricted to local issues. Major decisions about the 
direction of the Bolivarian process were taken unilaterally and announced to the popu-
lation from above: “I have decided,” “I have ordered.” At a certain point the tension 
between these two divergent logics inevitably becomes evident, and this serves to 
undermine the people’s expectations about building a new democratic culture. 
This unilateral mode of exercising power has limited the practice of democracy and 
restricted popular sovereignty. Candidates for the National Assembly or governors were 
often personally selected by Chávez, sometimes despite the explicit opposition of the 
Chavista base, as was the case when some of these candidates were rejected because 
they were known to be inefficient or corrupt.
Another significant consequence of this mode of leadership has been the lack of conti-
nuity in the implementation of many government policies. As new situations arose, 
both Chávez and Maduro repeatedly announced new initiatives and programs, commis-
sions and committees that overlapped or replaced existing programs. This has been 
accompanied by a constant re-shuffling of ministers and heads of public enterprises and 
programs. Some of these public functionaries have acted as if they were starting from 
scratch. When these types of change occurred there was hardly ever any evaluation of 
the programs that were being implemented, leading to the permanent undermining of 
ongoing programs and much improvisation. 
THE GROWING MILITARIZATION OF THE BOLIVARIAN 
GOVERNMENT
The Bolivarian process has been characterized by a marked presence of the military and a 
military culture, both in the state and in the party. Chávez had more trusting relationships 
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within the military world than in the civilian world. During these years, active or retired mili-
tary officials have held high public office as ministers, members of the National Assembly, 
and governors and presidents of many major public enterprises. There is an inevitable 
tension between the pursuit of democracy in all spheres of society, as enshrined in the 
Constitution, and the extended presence of a military imaginary and the role that active 
and retired military officials have played in the Bolivarian process. 
The culture of the armed institution is, by its very nature, of vertical obedience and 
non-deliberative. The presence of the military in all state institutions in recent years has 
limited the possibility of transparent and democratic governance. What happens within 
military institutions, their esprit de corps and informal networks of loyalties that have 
been developed over time, are not transparent to the rest of society. Among the many 
allegations of massive levels of corruption that have been made over the last years, a 
large proportion have referred to military officials who have held positions of responsi-
bility in the institutions charged with the allocation of subsidized foreign currency, ports, 
food distribution, border surveillance, and control of illegal gold mining – precisely the 
areas where corruption has been more prevalent. 
Equally problematic has been the transferal of war-like imaginaries to political life, imbuing 
it with oft-repeated references to conflicts and battles. The aim of war is the extermination 
of the other, seen as the enemy. This is unpropitious for the emergence of a democratic 
political culture. The conception of politics as a confrontation between friend and enemy 
has informed much of the political imaginary of Chavismo. Many of the political and organ-
izational forms that have been created over the years have clear military roots. Election 
campaigns for the ratification of Chávez in the recall referendum of 2004, and the reelec-
tion of the following year, were referred to as “Battles of Santa Inés I” and “Santa Inés 
II.” The basic units of the PSUV are called battalions. In 2007 a new motto was created 
for the National Armed Forces: “Fatherland, socialism or death.”
The government of Nicolás Maduro has accelerated the process of militarization in the 
country. He has continued to grant additional powers and privileges to the armed forces. 
Among other things, there has been an increased military presence at all levels of govern-
ment. In February 2017, 34 percent of the members of President Maduro’s cabinet 
were active or retired military officials. This included the Minister of the Presidency; the 
Minister of Internal Affairs; the Minister of Justice and Peace; the Minister of Defense; the 
Minister of Agriculture and Lands; the Minister of Food; the Minister of Public Works, and 
the Minister of Ecosocialism and Water (Asociación Civil Control Ciudadano, 2017). The 
Ministry of Defense and all its agencies have been granted full administrative and opera-
tional autonomy, and its supervision by the General Controller of the Republic, enshrined 
in the Constitution, has been suspended (Aporrea, 2017). New business enterprises under 
the ownership and control of the armed forces have been created (El Nacional, 2016). 
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OVERCOMING PATRIARCHY?
As with other aspects of the Bolivarian process, the issues relating to the confronta-
tion with patriarchy have been crossed by major tensions and contradictions. There 
have been some significant partial successes. Important anti-patriarchal advances were 
made in the constitutional and legal realms in critical areas like women’s participation 
in the public sphere, protection from violence, and the promotion of women’s health 
and reproductive rights. This section highlights the conceptual notions that relate to 
overcoming patriarchy included in the political program for transforming society. Yet 
more research needs to be done in order to evaluate whether substantial changes have 
occurred as a result.
The Constitution of 1999 not only establishes full equality between men and women in 
all spheres of public and private life, but also states that the law shall guarantee legal and 
administrative conditions such as to make equality before the law real and effective; shall 
adopt affirmative measures for the benefit of any group that is discriminated against, 
marginalized or vulnerable... (Article 21); equality and equity between men and women at 
work are guaranteed and the value of household work is recognized. (Article 88) 
On motherhood and sexual and reproductive rights: Article 76: Motherhood and father-
hood are fully protected, whatever the marital status of the mother or father. Couples 
have the right to decide freely and responsibly how many children they wish to conceive, 
and are entitled to access to the information and means necessary to guarantee the 
exercise of this right. The State guarantees overall assistance and protection for mother-
hood, in general, from the moment of conception, throughout pregnancy, delivery and 
the puerperal period, and guarantees full family planning services based on ethical and 
scientific values.
Article 77: Marriage, which is based on free consent and absolute equality of rights and obli-
gations of the spouses, is protected. A stable de facto union between a man and a woman 
which meets the requirements established by law shall have the same effects as marriage.
Throughout the text of the Constitution, explicitly non-gendered language is used.16 
In 2007 the Organic Law on the Right of Women to a Life Free of Violence was approved. 
This is a comprehensive legal instrument for the protection of the rights of women, 
especially, but not only, relating to violence.
Regarding gender parity, in 2000, the National Electoral Council (CNE) decided not to 
apply the electoral law of 1998 according to which parties should nominate at least 30 
16 In Spanish, as in other languages, many words are gendered: “ciudadano,” “president,” “juez,” the masculine 
variant of citizen, president, and judge are usually used to refer both to male and female citizens, presidents, and 
judges. To counter this gender bias which suggests, for example, that to be a president you have to be male, 
both the masculine and the feminine forms are used throughout the Constitution: “ciudadano o ciudadana,” 
“presidente o presidenta,” “juez o jueza.”
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percent of women as candidates for public office. This requirement was considered to 
be contrary to the principle of equality enshrined in the Constitution. Later, in 2005 and 
2008, the CNE issued two obligatory resolutions on quotas for women’s participation. 
But these resolutions had limited impact, either because that same institution accepted 
nominations submitted by parties that did not comply with these standards and no 
penalty was established for noncompliance, or because in many cases women were 
on the lists as alternate candidates. Neither the government parties nor the opposition 
parties complied (Archenti & Tula, 2013; García Prince, 2012). These standards were not 
enforced in subsequent elections. In the Organic Law of Electoral Processes of 2009, 
currently in force, there is no reference to the issue of gender parity. However, in recent 
years there has been a significant increase in the proportion of women participating in 
legislative and municipal assemblies (Teresa García & Valdivieso, 2009). 
In the multiple forms of popular grassroots organization that have emerged during the 
years of the Bolivarian government, the participation of women has been very prom-
inent; in many cases they have been in the majority. However, in these grassroots 
organizations the incorporation of critical gender issues has been limited (Teresa García 
& Valdivieso, 2009: p. 145). 
In high-level public administration there has been a significant increase in the participa-
tion of women. At a certain moment four of the five existing state powers were headed 
by women (Parliament, the Judiciary, the Electoral Power, and Citizen’s Power). The 
Presidency was the only exception. However, “the participation of women is dispro-
portionately concentrated in public administration departments linked to social areas; 
on the other hand they are still under represented in areas that have been traditionally 
considered as the most important” (Madriz Sotillo , 2012). 
It is in education that there have been the most notable changes in the participation of 
women in recent years. There has been a marked difference in favor of women in the 
overall expansion of educational enrollment. Between 1999 and 2015 the percentage 
of the population who were students aged 15 or over was 10 percent. By 2015 it had 
increased to 12 percent. Among women in that time it went from 11.2 percent to 19 
percent. In 1999, 30 percent of the population aged between 15 and 24 years was 
studying, while by the first half of 2015 the figure had risen to 45.3 percent (41.1 percent 
of men and 49.7 percent of women). For all levels of education, there are more women 
studying than men. The participation of women in the labor market has, however, 
remained virtually unchanged: 49.7 percent in 1999 and 50.3 percent in 2015 (Instituto 
Nacional de Estadísticas, 2016). 
The Bolivarian government’s social policies regarding women have been character-
ized predominantly, like other social policies of these years, by its redistributionist and 
paternalistic character. These policies have been aimed at the most immediate needs 
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of women of the popular sectors, and focused on activities in their local communi-
ties, usually related to issues of care, which are seen as women’s responsibility. This 
could reinforce the existing gender division of labor. An indication of this is the fact that 
“housework” remains an almost exclusively female activity; the proportion of women 
engaged in this activity decreased from 35.1 percent in 1999 to 28.5 percent in 2015, 
but 98.1 percent of all the people who claim to engage in household chores are women 
(Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas, 2016).
As Anaís López (2015) says: The efforts of the Venezuelan State to redistribute oil 
income based on social programs have put women in the position of being targeted 
at the same time with gender policies and social policies. The result is that in terms of 
indicators of inclusion their situation has improved, while in terms of the transformation 
of gender relations not much has been achieved. 
In Venezuela, the experience of creating a common agenda or platform for women who 
were members of different political parties goes back several decades prior to Chávez’s 
election (Expanded Women’s Movement) (Teresa García & Valdivieso, 2009). During 
the Bolivarian process political polarization has been so intense that the possibility of 
joint efforts such as this has become more difficult. Nonetheless, for some specific initi-
atives and specific issues it has been possible to retain a certain degree of unity. This 
has not, however, eliminated the subordination of women’s agendas to the agendas 
of political parties. The clearest example of this is the fact that despite the significant 
increase in the participation of women in the public sphere, the patriarchal conceptions 
and practices of the Bolivarian government’s male political leadership have prevented 
the possibility of progress in women’s demand for sovereignty over their own bodies, 
particularly in relation to abortion rights. Although abortions are not actively criminal-
ized, low-income women still have abortions in precarious conditions that lead to many 
deaths. Adolescent pregnancy rates are very high: “The birth rate for ages 15 to 19 is 
101 per 1,000 women, as compared to 73 per 1,000, the average for Latin America and 
the Caribbean.” (United Nations Population Fund , 2014)
The political program of the Bolivarian process has addressed important aspects of the 
subordination of women. However, in broad cultural terms, looking to the future, the 
confrontation with patriarchy faces serious challenges posed by a political culture that 
celebrates strong male leaderships, the centrality of predominantly male military institu-
tions, as well as the conservative hierarchy of the Catholic Church. 
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PLURINATIONALITY AND INDIGENOUS PEOPLES
As noted above, the Constitution defines Venezuela as a multiethnic and multicultural 
country. In what is perhaps the most radical rupture with the country’s history, the 
Constitution contains an entire chapter devoted to a broad range of guarantees of the 
rights of indigenous peoples.17 
These rights are summarized in Article 119 as follows: The State recognizes the exist-
ence of indigenous peoples and communities, their social, political and economic 
organizations, their cultures, customs, languages and religions, as well as their habitat 
and original rights to the lands they ancestrally and traditionally occupy and which are 
necessary to develop and guarantee their way of life. It will be up to the National Execu-
tive, with the participation of indigenous peoples, to demarcate and guarantee the right 
to collective ownership of their lands, which are inalienable, indefeasible, and nontrans-
ferable, in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and the law.
For the first time in the country, a Ministry of Indigenous Peoples was created and, to 
date, all its principal officials have been indigenous. The Ministry has had a significant 
budget that has enabled the state to reach areas of the country occupied by indigenous 
peoples who historically have been outside the scope of public policies. Houses, health 
centers, and schools have been built and some productive activities supported.
However, taken as a whole, these policies, far from strengthening the indigenous world, 
their cultures, and their organizations, have actually weakened them. As has been the 
case in Ecuador, regardless of the content of some public speeches, indigenous people 
have been seen as poor, as lacking, as in need of assistance from the state. From this 
perspective it should not come as a surprise that most of the government’s policies in 
relation to indigenous people can rightly be characterized as colonial policies. This is, 
for example, the case with the creation of the Indigenous Communal Councils. Ignoring 
existing ancestral organizational forms and the existence of radically different cultures 
and traditions, which are supposed to be fully protected by the Constitution, the state 
has promoted the organization of indigenous communities and peoples in the same 
standardized organizational model that has been created in the rest of the country. To 
have access to public resources indigenous communities must organize themselves 
into Indigenous Communal Councils. This undermining of pre-existing forms of organi-
zation and patterns of authority has generated divisions and conflicts within indigenous 
communities.
17 These rights were not won through any significant capacity for mobilization and struggle within Venezuelan 
indigenous peoples at the time of the constituent debate. The wide range of rights included in the Constitution 
was a result of the incorporation of a large portion of the struggle’s agenda that had been articulated by 
indigenous organizations across the continent in previous decades. This partly explains why indigenous people 
during the Bolivarian Revolution have been unable to defend these rights. 
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The rights of indigenous peoples in the Constitution are built on the assumed recognition of 
their territories. These were called habitats to avoid hurting nationalistic sensibilities espe-
cially among the military. These are rights that relate primarily to indigenous peoples in their 
territory. To this end, one of the transitional provisions of the Constitution states that this 
territorial recognition and demarcation should be carried out within two years. However, 
seventeen years on, some communities have been given haciendas in a land-reform mode. 
Not a single indigenous territory has been recognized and demarcated. Consequently, 
virtually all the rights guaranteed in the Constitution remain unheeded. The right of indig-
enous peoples to preserve “their social, political and economic organizations, their cultures, 
customs, languages and religions, as well as their habitat and original rights to the lands they 
ancestrally and traditionally occupy and which are necessary to develop and guarantee their 
way of life” depends on the recognition of a territory in which they can carry out these activi-
ties. The same goes for the “right to maintain and develop their ethnic and cultural identity, 
worldview, values, spirituality, and sacred places of worship” (Article 121); the “right to 
maintain and promote their own economic practices based on reciprocity, solidarity and 
exchange [as well as] their traditional productive activities(…)” (Article 123); and the right 
to prior consultation regarding the “use of natural resources in indigenous habitats by the 
State” (Article 120). Since the recognition and demarcation of these territories has not been 
carried out, the state has ignored everything related to prior informed consultation. 
It is the same situation with regards to indigenous peoples’ right to apply their own 
norms of justice: “The legitimate authorities of indigenous peoples in their habitat may 
Indigenous woman of the Wayuu community
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apply instances of justice based on their ancestral traditions and only affecting their 
members...” (Article 260). If there are no territories that are recognized as indigenous 
territories, there is no place in which this right to apply their own legal traditions and 
their own standards of justice can be exercised. Without territorial demarcation, the 
rights of indigenous peoples guaranteed in the Constitution have been emptied of all 
content.
There are very compelling reasons why the Bolivarian government over the years has 
proven itself to lack the political will to follow through on one of the most important 
achievements of the Constitution of 1999. There has, for one, been an unwillingness to 
confront the interests of livestock ranchers and mining and logging companies that have 
continued to encroach upon the territories of indigenous peoples during these years. 
But the neo-extractivist and neo-developmentalist vision that has characterized the 
Bolivarian process has been far more important. The demarcation of indigenous terri-
tories would have created severe obstacles for the future exploitation of the abundant 
reserves of minerals such as gold, coltan (niobium and tantalum), diamonds, iron ore, 
rare earths, radioactive minerals, and many others that are mainly present in territories 
ancestrally inhabited by indigenous peoples. This became clear with the decree creating 
the Arco Minero del Orinoco that was mentioned earlier in this text. The territories that 
have been offered for large-scale mining projects to transnational corporations overlap 
with areas of the traditional territories of the E’ñepa, Hiwi, Mapoyo, Piaroa, Ye’kuana 
and Kari’ña peoples. Not one of these indigenous peoples has been consulted in rela-
tion to this mega-project.
BOLIVARIAN SOCIALISM
The most important political point of inflection that occurred during the years of the 
Chávez government was its declaration of the Bolivarian revolution as a socialist revo-
lution. This marked a clear breaking point which profoundly altered the course of the 
political process that had been taking place in the country. It went from a dynamic char-
acterized by inclusion, relative flexibility, and an open future, to a process characterized 
by more political exclusion, sectarianism, and with increasing vertical and authoritarian 
tendencies, even a proclivity for Stalinism. 
As noted above, the initial project of Chavismo was oriented by general principles and 
values without a clear project with regards to the desired future society. This project 
was conceived as rooted in the specificity of the historical experience of the peoples of 
Latin America, an alternative which clearly distinguished itself from both capitalism and 
Soviet-style socialism.
This open imaginary went through successive displacements and radicalizations as a 
result, among other things, of intense confrontations with the Venezuelan right-wing 
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opposition, the severe threats and destabilizing actions of the United States govern-
ment, a growing Cuban influence, as well as readings and political reflections by Chávez.
In January 2005, at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre, he declared that there is no 
other way to go beyond capitalism than socialism: I don’t have a doubt. It is necessary, 
we say and it’s said by many intellectuals of the world, to transcend capitalism, but I 
add, capitalism will not be transcended within capitalism itself, no. Capitalism must be 
transcended through socialism. That is the way to transcend the capitalist model, real 
socialism, equality! (Chávez Frías, 2005) 
In the presidential election of 2006, Chávez presented his candidacy as an option for 
socialism and won with 62.8 percent of the vote. An attempt was made the following 
year to incorporate socialism as the model of Venezuelan society into the Constitution, 
as this had not been incorporated in the 1999 Constitution. A national referendum for 
the reform of the Constitution was held in December 2007. This reform proposal was 
rejected in spite of the fact that Chávez had presented the referendum as a choice 
between George Bush and himself. The margin of votes was just over one percent. 
According to opinion polls, Chávez still had ample backing from the population. However 
his constitutional reform proposal had almost three million less favorable votes than he 
had when he won the presidential election of the previous year. Various explanations 
have been given for this huge collapse in the vote, among them the fact that people 
were asked to vote “yes” or “no” on 69 amendments (voted on two blocs) that had not 
been sufficiently discussed. But the fact is that in this referendum the majority of the 
Venezuelan population did not vote in favor of socialism (Lander, 2007a).
Between the late 1960s and 1970s a rich critical debate had taken place in Venezuela 
on the experiences of “actual socialism,” about different paths in the struggle to over-
come capitalism, and alternative modalities of political organization. These discussions 
took place in the context of the defeat of armed struggle in the country, the Chinese 
Cultural Revolution, May 1968 in France, and the emergence of Euro communism in 
the Communist parties of Italy, France, and Spain, as well as the vigorous movement 
of university renewal (Renovación universitaria) that occurred simultaneously in several 
Venezuelan universities. Central axes of these debates were anti-authoritarianism and 
the search for new organizational alternatives to the highly centralized undemocratic 
vertical structures which had historically characterized communist parties. Part of the 
debate was about the need to overcome the barriers that existed between the struc-
tures of political parties and the diversity of organizations, groups, and movements that 
existed beyond them.18 
18 Among the most significant contributions to these debates were Petkoff, 1990; Maneiro, 1997; Harnecker, 
2007, and the debates of the Cabimas Cultural Congress in 1970 that gathered together a broad range of left-
wing politicians, activists, artists, and intellectuals.
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When the Bolivarian process was declared to be “21st-Century Socialism,” this was 
basically done without incorporating any trace of historical memory. The main issues 
that led to the failure of 20th-century socialism as an alternative to capitalism and the 
civilization in crisis that were mentioned at the beginning of this text (anthropocentrism, 
Eurocentrism, its monocultural universalistic character, patriarchy, and the blind faith in 
progress) were not debated. The rich debates of the previous decades in Venezuela had 
been forgotten because socialism had basically disappeared from the political horizon, 
because the protagonists of these debates had died, had given up on politics or had 
adopted neoliberal perspectives. The publications that registered these debates had not 
been re-edited and were no longer available.
The fact that this socialist project was called “21st-Century Socialism” seemed to 
imply that this new society would not be similar to the experience of 20th-century 
socialism, in particular the Soviet experience. However, the idea of socialism could not 
relieve itself of this historical burden without a critical analysis of these past experi-
ences. In the absence of the will and/or capacity to address the vital issues involved, it 
was not possible to think that “21st-Century Socialism” would differ significantly from 
20th-century socialism. For the young people who enthusiastically joined this political 
project in the first decade of the century, the idea of socialism was uncontaminated, a 
promise of a better future, without any historical burdens. For the youth involved in the 
Frente Francisco de Miranda, created under Cuban ideological influence, socialism was 
a truth to be applied without any need for critical reflection.
The first worrying sign that the proposed “21st-Century Socialism” did not seem to have 
learned much from the experience of Soviet socialism came when Chávez made a call 
for the formation of a single government party.
Chávez declared that in order to advance in the construction of socialism, it was essen-
tial to overcome the existing organizational and political divisions between the groups 
that were part of the government. To this end, he announced that it was necessary to 
create a single party of the forces supporting the process. He suggested the name: 
United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV). 
I declare today that I will create a new party. I invite those who want to, to accompany 
me... The parties that want to do so, can keep their organizations, but will no longer be 
part of the government. I want one party to rule. The votes do not belong to any party; 
those votes belong to Chávez and the people, do not fall for lies. (Chávez Frías, 2016) 
Consistent with the manner in which “21st-Century Socialism” was declared, the crea-
tion of the new party lacked critical reflection on the historical experience of one-party 
systems in socialist regimes. 
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As was noted at the time: Among the vital debates about the experience of the actual 
socialism of the twentieth century are the issues of the role of the state and the party 
and their relationship in the possibility of building a democratic society. A state-party 
that controls each and every area of society eventually suffocates any possibility of 
debate and dissent, and with that, the very possibility of plurality and democracy. That 
is why among the core debates required for a democratic socialist society that does 
not repeat the authoritarian aspects of the last century’s experiences are those related 
to the role of the state, the character of the state, and relations between the state and 
the plurality of organization and forms of sociability that are grouped under the idea of 
society. Equally critical are the debates related to the search for political and organiza-
tional forms that are more favorable to the construction of an increasingly democratic 
society. Historical experience strongly suggests that the parity of state and party is not 
the path to democracy. (Lander, 2006) 
Without a raw diagnosis of the reasons why the Soviet state/party led to the establish-
ment of an authoritarian order that had its maximum expression in Stalinism, there are 
no tools available against the threat of recurrence.
Another sign of things to come in terms of the verticality of the party’s structure and the 
requirement of unconditional loyalty to Chávez was the fact that a political party in the 
process of being created, a party that still had no members, founding documents, stat-
utes or organizational structures, already had a functioning disciplinary tribunal (Lander, 
2007b). In a ceremony held in August 2007, President Chávez, referring to the high level 
of discipline required from all candidates that wanted to become members of a revo-
lutionary party, reported that a Provisional Disciplinary Council of the United Socialist 
Party of Venezuela had been created. 
As a result of a disagreement with public statements made by someone who was at 
that time coordinator of the United Socialist Bloc in the National Assembly, Chávez said: 
I sent a national leader who aspires to be a party member to the Disciplinary Council 
for talking nonsense. I’ ll be very careful (...). Critical thinking is essential for a revolution, 
but that’s a very different thing from going around speaking ill of a party that has still not 
been born, collecting signatures to be presented I don’t know where. Whoever wants 
to be an anarchist has to get out of here, we do not want him; a creative but disciplined 
militancy is required here. (cited in Carolina Díaz & Daniela Espinoza, 2007) 
Later, dissenting voices, senior government and party officials who made allegations about 
the growing corruption in the government, were labeled as traitors and summarily put aside. 
Chávez said the PSUV would not be Marxist-Leninist because “that is a dogmatic 
thesis out of line with today’s reality” (Agencia Bolivariana de Noticias, 2007). However 
the statues of the PSUV established democratic centralism as its basic organizational 
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principle: “understood as the subordination of the whole of the organization to the lead-
ership, the subordination of all members to their party structures, the subordination of 
lower level party structures to higher level ones, and the subordination of the minority to 
the majority (…).” (PSUV, 2009) 
These properly Stalinist tendencies, with which “21st-Century Socialism” took its 
first steps, closely intertwine with historical and structural trends that precede it in 
the country. These are the existence of abundant oil resources; a century of a state-
centered political and economic system characterized by clientelism; and a long history 
of military leaderships and governments. 
All this was reorganized around Chávez’s messianic leadership to crystallize into a Boli-
varian rentier socialism.
CAN WE LEARN FROM EXPERIENCE?
With the limitations and/or failures of the experiences of so-called progressive govern-
ments in Latin America as alternatives capable of going beyond capitalism and offering 
at least some initial pathways or transitions away from the civilization in crisis, we are 
facing the end of several historical cycles. It is not only the short historical cycle of high 
commodity prices or of the so-called progressive governments. It is also the end of a 
longer historical cycle, a cycle that could be said to have begun with the publication of 
the Communist Manifesto in 1848. It is the historical cycle of anti-capitalist struggles 
based on the idea that through the capture or control of the state it would be possible 
to bring about a process of profound transformation of the whole of society. This has 
been the shared belief of revolutionary uprisings such as the assault on the Winter 
Palace; in European Social Democracy; in Third World liberation movements and guer-
rilla struggles; and, once again, in the political projects of the progressive governments 
in South America. We are also at the end of the historical era of the Revolution, of the 
idea according to which it was possible to transform the whole of society, in all its 
multiple spheres, in a brief period of time. At the same time we are at the end of the 
historical epoch that – from the most diverse political and ideological standpoints – 
identified human well-being and happiness with ever increasing material abundance, 
with progress, and unlimited economic growth. The limits of the planet are forcing us to 
recognize that we have entered a new era.
In today’s globalized world what the state does or does not do is in no way indif-
ferent. State policies can make a difference. Public policies may curb some of the 
most destructive tendencies of neoliberalism. Public policies can contribute or not to 
an improvement of the living conditions of the population, access to education, health 
services, social security, etc. Public policies can be geared to repress or to guarantee 
human rights, protect or discriminate against minorities and migrants, and, to some 
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extent, can contribute to expanding or reducing inequalities. However democratic poli-
cies are not likely to be carried out without strong social and political organizations, 
networks, and movements that are able to exert pressure and have some degree of 
influence in blocking or pushing for certain public policies. In spite of the fact that states 
reproduce within themselves many of the contradictions and tensions of society, in the 
contemporary post-democratic world, most national state policies are not designed to 
operate as counter-forces to regulate and control the market, but as guarantors of the 
conditions required for the market to operate.
There are, on the other hand, many experiences around the world of democratizing 
dynamics based on an interface between social organizations and some state struc-
tures, especially at the local or municipal level. However, as historical experience has 
clearly shown, the state, the national state, is not, and cannot be, the subject or privi-
leged agent in the struggle to overcome capitalism. Nor can it have the guiding role in the 
profound cultural transformations required in today’s hegemonic civilizational patterns 
that are threatening life on planet earth. This is particularly so when an overbearing state 
protagonist blocks or limits the rich plural autonomous potential of the rest of society.
Neo-extractivism, established as the hegemonic regime of accumulation in all countries 
with so-called progressive governments, is an inevitable consequence of state-centric 
conceptions of societal transformation. State-centrism and extractivism feed into each 
other. When the state has been identified as the synthesis of the general interests of 
the nation, priority has to be given to maximizing state revenues. Given this general 
interest, every other interest, all other political/cultural options, even if they relate to the 
preservation of the Amazon or preventing the extermination of indigenous peoples, are 
considered to be “sectorial” or “corporate” interests. The consequences have been 
particularly devastating for indigenous peoples and peasant communities whose territo-
ries have been opened up to exploitation by public or private, national or foreign, Eastern 
or Western corporations. 
Instead of taking at least some initial steps in the direction of confronting the challenges 
posed by the civilizational crisis, the political projects and developmental policies of the 
so-called progressive governments ended up taking on and strengthening the prevalence 
of consumption and commodification, both in their international relations and within 
each country. By reaffirming the colonial modes of integration into the international divi-
sion of labor and nature, these governments have actively contributed to accelerating 
the dynamics of predatory global capitalist accumulation and climate change. In each 
of these countries, to some extent, the government’s legitimacy and electoral backing 
have relied on their ability to meet social expectations of ever increasing consump-
tion. This emphasis has contributed to the emergence and consolidation of a culture 
of consumerism that has, over time, contributed to undermining political support for 
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the left and to electoral defeats. As remarked by Boaventura de Sousa Santos, the PT 
governments in Brazil were more successful in creating consumers than in creating 
citizens.
Today we should ask ourselves a non-trivial question that does not have an obvious or 
easy answer. After more than a decade of so-called progressive governments in South 
America, are we closer to overcoming capitalism and more capable of responding to the 
challenges posed by the civilizational crisis, or, on the contrary, has integration into the 
destructive gears of the reproduction of global capital been deepened, and the hegem-
onic values of this civilization in crisis been further naturalized? 
Apart from its military dimension, the main victory of the counter-revolution of neoliber-
alism of the last decades has been the profound transformation that has universalized 
the cultural logic of possessive individualism as the dominant culture on most of the 
planet. Transformative projects that, in order to achieve and preserve legitimacy, have 
to rely on strengthening this cultural logic, cannot be considered as valid alternatives in 
the face of the challenges humanity faces today.
We need to rethink what we mean by the “left” today. Can extractivist developmen-
talist governments be considered to be “progressive”?19 Are they “leftist” governments 
even if their policies lead to the destruction of nature? Are they part of the “left” in spite 
of their systematic attacks on the plurality of indigenous and Afro-descendant cultures 
of these societies? If they don’t question the patriarchal cultural patterns that, among 
other things, deny women’s sovereignty over their own bodies? If, far from contributing 
to an expansion of democratic practices, they tend to increase state control and put 
limits on the exercise of democratic rights and participation? Can economic policies that 
give priority to increasing primary exports of energy, agricultural, and mineral goods, 
commodities that contribute to feeding the insatiable machinery of global capital accu-
mulation, be characterized as anti-capitalist policies? Are the notions of the left and the 
right historically outdated? Are these distinctions relevant for some issues, but not for 
others? 
Moreover, in the global geopolitical field significant displacements have occurred over 
the last decades. Reductionist binary categories such as “North/South” and “imperi-
alist/anti-imperialist,” grounded in identifying the United States as the only empire, are 
no longer adequate for understanding the changing realities of the contemporary world 
system. This has led the left to considering as friends or anti-imperialist allies govern-
ments and movements that have conflicts with the United States, even when these are 
as undemocratic and vastly distant from that other possible world to which we aspire 
19 In rigorous terms these governments can be considered to be progressive, but in a different sense from 
what this characterizations is usually assumed to mean. They are progressive in the sense that they have not 
abandoned a blind faith in unlimited economic growth and progress.
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as Russia, China, Iran, Belarus, and Syria. From a socio-environmental perspective, are 
Chinese and Russian transnational corporations, public or private, any better than corpo-
rations based in the United States or the European Union? 
It is absolutely necessary to reflect critically on the experience of the so-called 
progressive governments in Latin America in order to understand not only what has 
happened, but why it happened. We know the story of the complicity of communist 
parties all over the world with the horrors of Stalinism. This was not mainly due to lack 
of sufficient information. This complicity was the product of a Manichean conception 
according to which the world was divided between imperialism (bad) and anti-
imperialism (good). To the extent that the Soviet Union was challenging United States 
imperialism, it was considered desirable to take sides, to show solidarity, leaving aside 
other issues such as the totalitarian nature of the regime and the Gulag, core issues for 
the millions of people who lived this experience. The issue of how many people were 
killed has been a taboo for a good part of the non-Trotskyite left. Many decades have 
passed, and although there were a wide variety of positions within the left in relation to 
the Soviet bloc, in many parts of the world the left is still paying for the consequences 
of not being able to clearly disassociate itself from the authoritarian dimensions of that 
historical experience.
This story is repeated over and over again. Today the Spanish analyst Santiago Alba Rico 
warns us about what he calls the “tomb of the left” in Aleppo, Syria. In Middle Eastern 
geopolitics, the government of Bashar al-Asad in Syria (which according to Alba Rico 
has been a “murderer of hundreds of thousands of Syrians bombed, tortured, or disap-
peared”) has been seen by large sections of the left as an anti-imperialist ally, or as a 
“lesser evil” to the imperialist project in the region.
In order to allow Asad large-scale killing it has been necessary to lie a lot: it has been 
necessary to deny that the Syrian regime was dictatorial and even more, to affirm that 
it is anti-imperialist, socialist and humanist...
Much of the world left has been placed in effect at the margin of ethics and on the side 
of dictators and of the many imperialisms that subdue the region [...] this new error, 
added to many others, can turn out to be very costly. (Alba Rico, 2016)
We need critical solidarity with anti-capitalist struggles. Uncritical solidarity only serves 
to reinforce the most negative tendencies of these struggles and does not allow us to 
learn from experience.
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Ecuador, a country in the northwest of South America, has made international headlines 
in the last ten years since it introduced revolutionary concepts and principles into its new 
constitution, drafted in 2008. Nature, or “La Pachamama,” was declared to have rights of 
its own. Buen Vivir – Sumak Kawsay in the indigenous Kichwa language, which is accu-
rately translated as “living in plenitude” – was introduced as a guiding principle. And the 
state was declared plurinational, in recognition of the existence of 14 indigenous peoples, 
each of which have their own forms of social organization, their own health and educa-
tional systems as well as systems of justice and reparation for dealing with conflict. The 
establishment of a Constitutional Assembly had been one of the core demands of the 
powerful social struggles against neoliberalism since the 1990s. Four elected presidents 
were removed from power by popular protest in less than a decade, between 1997 and 
2005. After this long period of instability, in 2006, a new political movement called Alianza 
País (Country Alliance) with Rafael Correa as its candidate won the elections. This econo-
mist, who had spent many years studying abroad during the social struggles of the 1990s, 
nevertheless very convincingly included most of the social and political demands of the 
last decade in his political agenda. In 2007, he also initially embraced the initiative to 
“leave the oil in the soil”1 in Yasuní National Park, a megadiverse region in the Ecuadorian 
Amazon basin, before eventually authorizing its exploitation in August 2013.
Correa finally left Ecuador’s executive power in May 2017 to hand it over to his elected 
successor Lenin Moreno, from the same party. Yet, this article does not intend to offer an 
assessment of Correa’s government, nor of him as a president. Instead, we will focus on 
one very concrete experience of building Sumak Kawsay from the bottom up which has 
not always proceeded in harmony with the discourses on Buen Vivir articulated by the 
national government. Instead of discussing Rafael Correa’s political legacy in a general 
way, we will address the policies of his government only where they interfered – for better 
or worse – with the local process we intend to describe. Our analysis is situated in a 
rural and sparsely inhabited county in the Southern Andes region of Ecuador called Nabón 
where, in less than two decades, a significant process of multidimensional transformation 
and alternative-building in the spirit of Sumak Kawsay, or Buen Vivir, has taken place in a 
strikingly democratic way. Sumak Kawsay is an open and contested concept which consti-
tutes one of the most important Andean contributions to the debate on alternatives to 
development (cf. Lang & Mokrani, 2013). It considers humans as part of Nature, and thus 
promotes harmonic relations with all other beings, placing emphasis on communitarian 
construction from below in a territorial sense, which leaves plenty of room for diversity. 
Other important principles are equilibrium, reciprocity, and complementarity, instead of 
accumulation, progress, growth, and competition (cf. Capitán, García & Ghuaza, 2014).
1 Slogan taken from a poem by the Nigerian activist Nnimmo Bassey, which he read at the opening ceremony of 
the World People’s Conference on Climate Change, held in Cochabamba, Bolivia, on April 20, 2010: “Leave the 
oil in the soil, the coal in the hole and the tar sands in the land!”
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Our interest in the county of Nabón rests on the fact that this territory has undergone a 
substantial and measurable social transformation in the last two decades which, as we 
argue in this article, could be framed as an implementation of the Buen Vivir paradigm. 
Indeed, from being seen as one of the most miserable regions in the country, Nabón 
evolved to be one of the most inspiring models of the concept of Buen Vivir for the 
Constituent Assembly which took place in Ecuador in 2007-2008. Others regions have 
suffered a similarly high rate of migration, depended on remittances from abroad to 
survive, but none have shown social changes comparable to those in Nabón. So what 
has happened? How did this important turnabout take place? 
Adapting the analytic framework developed by the Global Working Group Beyond Devel-
opment and presented in the introduction to this book, we have analyzed what occurred 
in the territory of Nabón as a process of multidimensional alternative construction. Our 
analysis shows how a radical process of democratization was able to address some of 
the patterns of domination, like patriarchal and racist relations within the diverse popula-
tion of the county, which had trapped the population in poverty. Once people became 
protagonists of their own lives, they could also reverse some of the negative effects 
of recent modern development, in particular by building more harmonic relations with 
Nature and improving food sovereignty. Amid the deceptive revolutionary rhetoric of 
Latin America‘s Socialism of the Twenty-First Century, which was founded on taking 
over central state power and implementing top-down change from there, Nabón went 
countercurrent, engaging in a transformation process rooted in local practices and 
knowledges and reshaping the local territory in a sovereign manner. At the same time, 
we show how Buen Vivir remains a fragile counterculture, constantly threatened by the 
profit logic of transnational capitalism, which in Nabón materializes for example through 
mining concessions granted by the national government.
In order to situate the experience, this article begins with a historical overview of the 
Nabón region, placing emphasis on the resulting constellation of power relations. The 
next section examines the exceptional role international actors like the Swiss coop-
eration have played in this process. In the third section, we will then focus on the 
transformation of the existing municipal institutionality, which was guided by the objec-
tive of strengthening democracy and building a comprehensive system of participation, 
understood as decision-making from below. Here, we will also describe the system of 
participatory and solidary budgeting in accordance with sociocultural criteria that Nabón 
has developed and continues to implement up to the present time. This section will also 
look into the effects that the process of de-patriarchalization, led by two successive 
female mayors, has generated, as well as its de-colonizing dimensions, which have 
profoundly transformed the relations between the mestizo and the indigenous popu-
lation in the territory of Nabón. From the perspective of the Ecuadorian debate, this 
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is not only framed as the building of interculturality, but also of plurinationality, since 
indigenous peoples define themselves as nations of their own within the territory of 
the nation-state. The fourth section analyzes how societal relations with Nature have 
evolved in Nabón, up to and since the adoption of the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008, 
which has made Nature a holder of rights. Here the analysis revolves around two main 
axes: The way in which the population regained its food sovereignty by systematically 
changing agricultural practices and caring for water, and the threats this process faces 
through mining concessions. The fifth section of this article sheds light on the struggles 
around culture, knowledge, and education which have shaped the base of knowledge 
that underpins the process. Subsequently, we analyze how the transformative para-
digm of Buen Vivir has been resignified by the government of Rafael Correa and how, 
in contrast, the inhabitants of Nabón frame it themselves. And finally, the seventh and 
last section evaluates the relationship between the local process in Nabón and the 
central government of the Citizen Revolution as an external condition for its durability. It 
also considers certain differences between Buen Vivir as a horizon for multidimensional 
transformation and more conventional left-wing strategies of social change.
THE HISTORICAL CONFIGURATION OF 
POWER RELATIONS IN NABÓN 
At the end of the 20th century, Nabón County was officially listed as one of the poorest 
counties in the country. According to the census of 2001, more than 90 percent of the 
population was considered poor according to unsatisfied basic needs, and 76.4 percent 
even lived in extreme poverty (INEC 2001, cit. in Brassel, Herrera, & Laforge, 2008: p. 8). 
By then, many men had migrated in order to support their families. Their remittances from 
abroad generated 60 percent of local income. Hunger and malnutrition were well known 
in Nabón, where poor, eroded soil could not provide the necessary food for self-consump-
tion, while at the same time more than 90 percent of the population were peasants. 
A visitor recalls his impression of those days: “When I first got there, the only thing there 
was a desolate landscape with a society in poverty. The only difference in Nabón was 
that some people were even poorer than others, but all were poor” (Unda, 2007, cit. in 
Herrera, 2009: p. 29). 
Just sixteen years later, 97 percent of houses have access to drinking water (Quezada, 
2017); sewage infrastructure coverage improved from 13.7 percent in 2001 (SIISE-
INEC, 2001)to 20.4 percent ten years later (SIISE-INEC, 2010)and today supplies all 
village houses. Road infrastructure is significantly better; chronic malnutrition in chil-
dren under five years of age in the canton plummeted to a rate of 33 percent in 2014 
(PYDLOS, 2014) compared to 67.3 percent in 2001 (SIISE-INEC, 2001), and migration 
declined slightly, with 6.57 percent per the 2010 (SIISE-INEC, 2010) census compared 
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to 7 percent in 2006 (PEDCN, 2006). Income is once again mainly generated by the 
agricultural and artisanal production of the people of Nabón (Quezada, 2017). Even by 
2008, female heads of households earned 270 percent more than a decade before, and 
the average income had risen by around 180 percent (Unda & Jácome, 2009: p. 39).
Official data from the National Institute of Statistics and Censuses do show a slight drop 
in poverty, from 92.9 percent to 87.8 percent (SIISE-INEC, 2001, 2010) between 2001 
and 2010. But since the unsatisfied basic needs criteria that was applied puts emphasis 
on access to public services, it does not capture all the dimensions of the transforma-
tion in terms of well-being that have taken place in Nabón.2 
We would like to draw attention to the fact that, in contrast to these official, rather moderate 
numbers in poverty reduction, most people in Nabón state they are happy: in a survey 
regarding subjective well-being led by the University of Cuenca in 2012 and 2013, the vast 
majority of the local population expressed overall satisfaction with their lives. This survey, 
which was carried out in 2012 in 15 percent of Nabón’s households by an initiative over-
seen by a consortium of local governments in Azuay, subscribes to the approach taken by 
Bhutan’s Gross Happiness Index, which seeks to innovate the quantitative measurement 
of well-being (Ura et al., 2012). The survey inquired about issues central for well-being, 
such as whether people were satisfied with their freedom of choice and their capacity 
to control their own lives – to which, on average, more than 70 percent of the people 
responded “very satisfied.” Furthermore, the survey asked them about their satisfaction 
with their occupation, their family life, their financial situation, their leisure time, their envi-
ronmental surroundings, their housing, their spiritual life, food security, etc. The results of 
this survey showed 75.8 percent of the local population of Nabón expressing high satisfac-
tion with their overall lives (Morocho, 2013), and this despite 87.8 percent of its inhabitants 
being declared poor by the Statistical Institute. This profound contrast might shed light 
on the fact that standardized quantitative poverty indicators like income poverty or basic 
needs do not necessarily give a comprehensive picture of well-being or quality of life, as 
they do not take into account either the specificities of each context or cultural differences. 
Thus, they tend to single out rural zones, characterizing them as poor, as the standards 
regarding the decency of housing, access to public services etc. are mostly drawn from 
urban/modern modes of living (for an extensive discussion of this subject see Lang, 2017).
Traditionally a zone of agricultural production, Nabón has faced poverty as a direct result 
of erosion and the severe degradation of soil due to deforestation and the intensive 
monoculture of grain (wheat, barley, corn) on steep slopes vulnerable to washing out 
by bad irrigation practices, heavy rainfalls, and wind. By the mid-20th century, the region 
2 Mayor Magali Quezada also questions the data produced by the 2010 census regarding access to drinking 
water, which appeared to be significantly lower than the data produced by the municipality of Nabón (interview 
conducted by Miriam Lang on September 20, 2017).
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had already undergone an intense course of deforestation to provide coal for the new 
railway and the construction of the Panamericana road, but also because of an intensified 
demand for firewood and fine wood in the nearby city of Cuenca. The opening up of more 
areas for agriculture and livestock activities also served as a motive to cut down forests. 
Between the 16th and the 18th century, the period when haciendas were set up by the 
Catholic Church, the native inhabitants of the region experienced the dispossession and 
agricultural concentration of their land. The hacienda system was a system of social 
and political organization, production, and reproduction, widespread in colonial Latin 
America. It was a rentier system, based on the monopoly of land tenure and a form 
of exploitation of labor similar to slavery which expropriated and subordinated indig-
enous communities by force (Herrera, 2009; Carpio Benalcázar, 2009: pp. 11-15; Unda 
& Jácome, 2009: pp. 9-10).
At the beginning of the 20th century, liberal reforms introduced under President Eloy Alfaro 
not only declared Ecuador a lay state, but also largely dismantled the property of the Church 
– including the haciendas around Nabón. New legislation brought significant changes to 
the labor system, abolishing servitude for the indigenous population and generalizing paid 
labor relations instead. Former religious haciendas were confiscated by the state in order 
to be resold to former workers later on, a process which began around 1930 and went 
on over the following decades (Herrera, 2008: p. 81). The people of Nabón struggled to 
regain possession of their land until official agrarian reform policies were introduced in 
the 1960s and 1970s, in the context of the first wave of Latin American developmentism, 
aimed at modernizing rural regions and improving pre-capitalist conditions. 
It is important to point out that Nabón is the county with the largest concentration of 
indigenous inhabitants, namely people of Inca-Cañari origins, who live in Azuay province 
in the south of Ecuador (Carpio Benalcázar, 2009: p. 12). Once legally liberated from servi-
tude, peonage, or unpaid domestic service in the case of women, and granted new social 
rights, these indigenous people united to collectively buy large parcels of land and eventu-
ally formed four legally recognized indigenous communes, successively in 1939, 1944, 
1966, with the last one in 1985, which still exist today. These communities are organ-
ized according to the principles of indigenous Andean sociopolitical organization, which 
is essentially based on three pillars: a direct assembly democracy led by a yearly rotating 
cabildo of five elected people, unpaid community work for building and maintaining collec-
tive infrastructure, and the collective ownership of land. These indigenous principles of 
territorial and sociopolitical organization have been recognized by the Ecuadorian state 
since the first commune’s law was issued in 1937 (Martínez Valle, 2002: p. 11). 
The process of getting rid of the haciendas lasted several decades, from 1930 up to the 
1960s and 1970s, the decades in which Ecuador underwent agrarian reform. The experi-
ence of servitude has left its mark on the population and continues to have a great impact 
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on subjectivities: “They treated us like animals, and we were thinking like animals,” 
recalls a woman of Nabón (Herrera, 2009: p. 37). The fact that throughout these strug-
gles the former hacienda workers were not given the land back for free, but had to buy 
it, set a precedent for the unequal distribution of land which has perpetuated a structural 
inequality rooted in the system of domination created by the hacienda system. According 
to the position they formerly held on the hacienda, some people had been allowed to 
own animals, others to only grow plants on a small plot of land. This former position now 
determined the amount of money people could dispose of to buy land, or their capacity to 
pay back potential loans for acquiring land. Since legal dispositions, which were in force 
until 1973, only recognized men as heads of households, women were systematically 
excluded from officially owning and having authority over a piece of land as well as the 
means of production on that land. Subsequently, new individual land titles and usufruct 
rights concerning the communes were exclusively registered in men’s names (Herrera, 
2008: p. 83). Today, the territory of Nabón County is divided into four parishes3, mainly 
inhabited by the mestizo population, in addition to those four indigenous communes. 
Finally, it is important to note that the colonial matrix of power has been a determi-
nant factor of influence in the distribution of land. In Nabón County, the indigenous 
communes were pushed towards higher land, to areas which often have páramo ecosys-
tems4 that are not suitable for agriculture, or to less fertile lands characterized by steeper 
slopes, allowing for less intense exploitation, enough to feed only small livestock such 
as chickens, rabbits, and the traditional guinea pigs. By contrast, the mestizo population 
lives in the lower areas which are fertile ground for intense exploitation and the breeding 
of cattle and horses. During the postcolonial process, everything associated with indige-
neity was systematically inferiorized. The indigenous constituted the symbolic imaginary 
from which people had to flee and keep their distance. Mestizo identity emerged as a 
negation of the indigenous and subsequently as a path for upward social mobility. As a 
result, relations between mestizo and indigenous populations have been shaped by a 
habitual racism (Herrera, 2009: p. 39) rooted in the legacy of colonialism. 
Since liberal reforms meant a significant increase in the cost of human labor, they led 
to changes in agricultural production systems. The remaining non-church-owned haci-
endas of the Nabón area modernized and intensified their grain monoculture production, 
leading progressively to an excessive use of agrochemicals (Urena Rivas, 2017). New 
small independent farmers were able to find new circuits to sell their surplus. In the 
3 A parish is the smallest possible territorial circumscription in Ecuador, 
and the term does not bear any religious connotations 
4 The páramo is the ecosystem of the regions above the continuous forest line in the Andes, yet below the 
permanent snowline. Its vegetation is composed mainly of giant rosette plants, shrubs, and grasses which act 
like giant sponges, thereby enabling its most important ecological function: the storage of water.
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context of the Green Revolution5 during the 1960s, Nabón County experienced a boom in 
agricultural production and was known as the province’s granary, producing mainly wheat, 
barley, corn, and potatoes. But only a few years later, in the 1970s, the deterioration of 
the soil was already evident and production declined significantly. This led to periods of 
high seasonal and permanent migration, mostly of the male population, because the agri-
cultural production no longer enabled families to live well. Those families with only small 
properties were sometimes unable to even produce enough to feed themselves suffi-
ciently. The men went to seek work in the banana production of the Ecuadorian coastal 
region, in the gold mines of the South, as construction workers in the cities, or in the oil 
fields of the Amazon. Emigration from Nabón was further boosted around 1999 and 2000, 
when Ecuador experienced its worst economic and financial crisis, which led to the most 
significant emigration wave in the history of the country, mostly to the United States and 
Spain (Municipio de Nabón, 2006: p. 8-11). As a consequence of financial deregulation and 
a foreign debt crisis, in addition to severe damage caused by the El Niño climatic phenom-
enon in 1997 and 1998, Ecuador experienced a series of bank failures and government 
bailouts before the government declared a so-called “national bank holiday” and a one-
year deposit freeze in March 1999. As a result of the measures taken by the government 
of Jamil Mahuad to prevent a collapse of the whole financial sector which caused hyperin-
flation and major economic instability, many people lost their jobs and savings. The crisis 
hit those who were already vulnerable the hardest. President Jamil Mahuad was finally 
ousted from office by an indigenous-military coalition on January 22, 2000.
In Nabón, the massive emigration of men brought about a significant shift in the 
gendered division of labor and a feminization of the local population. At the turn of the 
millennium, there were 118 women to every 100 men in Nabón (Herrera, 2009: p. 30). 
Women were now in charge of all kinds of work, both productive and reproductive, 
as well as communitarian work and political participation – but, in most cases, they 
were still not the formal owners of the land, and when they were, they owned the 
less productive and smallest plots. This situation led to a systematic work overload for 
women and to an overall sensation of hardship: “For us, poverty clearly meant a lack of 
food,” explains Magali Quezada, the current mayor of Nabón.
EXTERNAL AND INTERNAL  
POTENTIALS FOR TRANSFORMATION
Paradoxically, in the context of development criticism that this book seeks to promote, 
change in Nabón first began with a project led by the Swiss development cooperation 
5 This was an international movement, beginning in the mid-20th century, towards an increase in the production 
of food grains (especially wheat and rice) that in large part was enabled by the introduction of new, high-yielding 
varieties requiring large amounts of chemical fertilizers and pesticides to countries of the Global South. It caused 
environmental damage and led to concentration processes in agriculture (for a critical assessment see Shiva, 1991).
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agency COSUDE, which started to work in the indigenous zone of the county in 1996. The 
indigenous communities took an active part in a contextualized needs assessment, which 
led the “Proyecto Nabón” to focus mainly on appropriate technology for irrigation, small 
loans, and agricultural production on a family scale. Sprinkler systems were installed in 
places where irrigation by gravity flow6 was washing out the soil, in order to prevent erosion. 
Peasants could borrow project money to buy tools, but had to repay it afterwards. Because 
of its geographical remoteness and the stigma of poverty, the county was basically cut 
off from access to credit by the official banking system. For this reason, COSUDE put an 
emphasis on the generation of communitarian credit associations based on mutual trust, 
as people knew each other personally (Samaniego, 2009). The vast majority of these local 
savings associations were run by women, who mostly were the ones in need of credit. 
These local savings associations also opened up the possibility of access to credit for 
indigenous people, who, in the racist climate of the time, could still simply be thrown out 
of a commercial banking institution and thus were dependent on local usurers. Later on, 
using the funds from the tool loans which they returned to the project as seed capital, the 
peasants managed to convince the provincial savings cooperative Jardín Azuayo to open 
a local office in Nabón. Today there are more than 90 savings associations administering 
self-organized credit in the county which are still run mainly by women.
Both irrigation and access to relatively cheap small loans, together with the vision of 
strengthening a small, organic, and diverse peasant agriculture on the basis of collective 
organization, were crucial to the rebuilding of agricultural productivity in the county. 
Due to the particular vision of its Ecuadorian coordinator, René Unda, COSUDE’s 
intervention was unique since it was designed from the beginning as a long-lasting, 
sustained process in which the demonstration of quick results and efficiency were 
not important. This approach represents a polar opposite to mainstream development 
cooperation, which generally focuses on modern, export-oriented agroindustry, and 
rests on the principle of global competition and comparative advantage. Finally, and 
most importantly, the process in Nabón was conceived as a democratic process in 
which the people of Nabón themselves, and not ‘experts’ from outside, would be the 
protagonists of change (Samaniego, 2009). To support the process, technical advisers 
were taught to thoroughly respect practical and ancestral knowledge, so that their 
intervention would follow the lines of a true dialogue of knowledges.
This process acquired a whole new dimension regarding the possibilities of change 
when, in 2000, for the first time in local history, a woman won the municipal elections 
of Nabón County. The woman was Amelia Erráez, a candidate of the political movement 
Pachakutik, which was founded in 1995 by the national indigenous umbrella organization 
CONAIE as its “political arm.” 
6 A system of canals and furrows through which water freely flows downwards.
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Erráez, born to an indigenous father and a mestizo mother, had experienced racism and 
discrimination herself and witnessed it constantly, as she recalls: Mestizo people would 
not put up with sitting next to an indigenous person. (…) There was a lot of violence. 
The indigenous people were drinking a lot and would sometimes beat their women in 
the street. The mestizos would throw bottles and stones at them, shouting that they 
were soiling Nabón. They [the mestizos] would simply take their sheep or other animals 
away – while on the other hand they were selling them the liquor.7
Erráez, a school teacher who would later be school principal in the zone, had also been part 
of several processes of social organization. Erráez was the local president of the teacher’s 
union and had played a prominent role in the movement for the administrative creation of 
Nabón County in the 1980s8, and in the collective elaboration of a local development plan in 
the late 1990s. Erráez ran for mayor as the candidate for a network of social organizations 
in Nabón because she knew that collective action was crucial to changing the fate of the 
County.Erráez invited the team of Proyecto Nabón to collaborate with the municipality and 
to extend their activities, which had initially been limited to indigenous areas, to the entire 
county. Subsequently, knowledge about participatory planning, forest management, and 
agroecological production was transferred to the local government. As a consequence, a 
department of environmental management was created, and a new system of participatory 
decision-making, developed on the basis of years of experience in the indigenous zone, 
was introduced. The second phase of this Swiss cooperation project focused on more 
specific knowledge- and skill-building such as food processing, carpentry, computing, 
environmental management, and integral farm management (Quezada, 2017).
TRANSFORMING AND EXTENDING 
EXISTING INSTITUTIONS
Amelia Erráez was the first female mayor in the history of Nabón. Under her leader-
ship, the municipality of Nabón ceased to be a political platform for the accumulation of 
individual power fueled by clientelism and paternalist relations, as is the case in patriar-
chal and (post)colonial Latin American political culture. “Corruption was the mother of 
everything,” Erráez remembers. She recalls that even in order to achieve Nabón’s crea-
tion as an independent county, provincial prefects asked for money. Justifying bribery, 
they would say that to get the authorities to commit, they would have to invite them to 
special venues or give them bottles of whisky.9 
7 Interview with Amelia Erráez conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 18, 2017
8 Until 1987, and going back to the 19th century, Nabón was part of Girón, another bigger county in Azuay province. 
Its municipalization was an important step towards it becoming autonomous in decision-making and building 
local well-being (Herrera, 2009: p. 57).
9 Interview with Amelia Erráez conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 18, 2017.
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Relations between citizens and the municipality were similarly based on arbitrary trade 
transactions; the citizens’ right to a service and the officials’ duty to provide it free of 
charge did not exist in practice. Each administration only served its own group, while 
the majority of people were not taken into account: “Before, when we went to the 
municipality, we always had to bring a chicken under the arm,” recalls Saúl Capelo from 
the El Progreso parish. Amelia Erráez expands on this: “The municipality was a very 
distant thing for them, they didn’t know what it was, what function it had. They thought 
the only thing they could do was to beg, to beg and beg again” (Samaniego, 2009: p. 
89). As a new mayor, Erráez attempted a breakthrough by introducing anti-patriarchal 
principles for the dissemination of power into the local state institution: she and her 
team have transformed the local state decision-making process structure into a collec-
tively managed instrument aimed at empowering the local population. The municipality 
of Nabón ceased to be used as an instrument of domination and became instead an 
institution working on restoring dignity.
Since 2000, Nabón has been governed successively by two women, Amelia Erráez 
(2000-2009) and Magali Quezada (2009-2017), who had served during the first period 
as council member and vice-mayor. Both were politically close to Pachakutik, the polit-
ical arm of the indigenous movement. These two women have given a local meaning 
to the Zapatista principle of “mandar obedeciendo,” governing by obeying. Both Amelia 
Erráez and Magali Quezada participated in a network of alternative local governments 
organized by Pachakutik which was founded at the national level around 2000 and 
provided political education and the possibility of internships and exchanges in order for 
participants to learn both theory and practice. At that time, ten years after the national 
indigenous uprising and five years after the foundation of the political movement Pacha-
kutik, the movement already governed a number of municipalities who were seeking 
to implement the principles of indigenous Andean philosophy: “Do not steal, do not lie, 
do not be idle,” as well as the principle of building from the bottom up, according to a 
communitarian assembly-based logic.10 When Erráez won in Nabón, some of them, like 
Cotacachi in the northern province of Imbabura, where Auki Tituaña was one of Ecua-
dor’s first indigenous mayors, already had some years of experience in building organic 
democracy. According to Erráez, by then Pachakutik was a rather loose formation in 
which people were not even members, but only adherents, and which was guided more 
by a set of principles than by a strict partisan program. Both mayors recall the network 
of alternative local governments as an important space where they and some of their 
collaborators acquired crucial knowledge for the challenge they had to face.11 
10 Interview with Magali Quezada conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 20, 2017.
11 Interview with Amelia Erráez conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 18 
and 19, 2017. Interview with Magali Quezada on September 20, 2017.
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In consequence, both mayors used the leeway that existing local state institutions gave 
them, but rearranged and extended them in some aspects with the aim of establishing 
a decision-making process from the bottom up. Overthrowing state institutionality had 
never been on the horizon of the indigenous movement in Ecuador. The objective was to 
convert existing institutions into a tool for Buen Vivir and rebuild the population’s trust in 
them. As a result, decisions are now taken on the basis of a direct assembly-based democ-
racy and consensus, rather than on the basis of a majority vote cast in the elected local 
legislative power, the concejo municipal, whose members usually follow partisan logic.
STEPS TOWARDS DE-PATRIARCHALIZATION
In addition to introducing new instituent practices, Erráez and Quezada symbolically and 
structurally began to de-patriarchalize politics in the county of Nabón. Alexandra Ochoa, 
who was part of this process from its beginnings and today is responsible for cultural 
management in the municipality, recalls the reaction of the men when women first 
entered the realm of local political power in Nabón:
At the beginning all [authorities] were men. If there were twenty women and one man, 
this man would be elected president. Because they would be saying that we had no 
time, because of the children, the house, and a lot of other stuff. But it was also a matter 
of self-esteem, we ourselves would say, no, not me. (…) At that time, when I had to go 
into the municipal council to ask for money for women’s activities, I was still at the door 
when the bunch of old men who were there would say: ‘Yeah, here you got something 
for the women and now please leave.’ So our strategy, once we had identified which 
ones were especially rebel against us women, was to call them to participate in all kinds 
of round tables on health, youth, and women. (…) There, they wanted to demonstrate 
their aptitude. 
At first, de-patriarchalization was a subtle process entailing the inclusion of women that 
was not named as such.12 Over the years, the politics around gender justice gradually 
became more explicit, especially within the municipality. Employees were encouraged 
to study gender at the University of Cuenca. Gender quotas were included in hiring 
procedures, and a flexible and mother-friendly institutional culture was established.13 
Many women from the county have expressed their pride in having female mayors and 
how this fact has helped them to feel empowered. 
Magali Quezada points out how this was a gradual process and how it was also 
strengthened by structural elements, for example in the budget allocation: Before, you 
would not see women neighborhood leaders, neighborhood presidents, presidents of 
12 Interview with Amelia Erráez conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 18, 2017.
13 Interview with Jessica Naula, director of projects at the municipality, 
conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 18, 2017.
~ 105 ~ECUADOR
organizations, women in the parish councils, women in social organizations, women 
demanding that things be accomplished, commissions led by women coming [to the 
municipality], women making demands about their issues. There is also a budget that 
is based on the idea of gender, to take into account the most vulnerable members of 
the population such as children, female heads of households, and I believe that this is a 
change. Before, you would never have seen such things. (cit. in Herrera, 2009: p. 185).
Indigenous community leader Sergio Morocho from the Shiña commune acknowledges 
that after participating in a women-led process for years, he has a completely different view 
of how relationships within his family, towards his wife and children, should be – a rather 
important dimension of well-being, normally made invisible in statistical measurements: 
“Today, I feel I have not given them the affection and understanding they needed, in retro-
spect I feel regret, because money does not save a person, not at all. I have five children, 
and the three eldest migrated. I have only been able to keep the youngest ones here.”14
In the communities, women were encouraged to overcome their shame and to speak 
out and men slowly got used to their presence in the assemblies and to their ability to 
make decisions. People were also made aware of gender justice, especially by working 
closely with communitarian authorities. A Leadership Training School for Women, 
offering one-year leadership programs, was established in 2016 in partnership with the 
Union of Indigenous Communities of Azuay (UCIA), the regional indigenous organization 
which has its headquarters in Nabón. At the inauguration of the school on May 21, 2016, 
Mayor Quezada set the tone by declaring that “women can acquire knowledge to make 
the territory a different bet: an inclusive territory where they are part not only of the 
work of the minga and in the house, but of defining the public policies that women want 
in the territory.”15 The school has the objective of training, every year, sixty women who 
have been vetted by their community, on topics such as: self-esteem, gender, human 
rights, violence, organization, advocacy, leadership, education, reproductive health, 
communication, and the Quechua language. Mama Juana, an octogenarian indigenous 
community leader who was persecuted in the 1990s for her activism in the indigenous 
movement, recalls that she learnt to be a leader from her mother and from the inter-
cultural school for indigenous women leaders “Dolores Cacuango” that was run by 
the CONAIE at the national level until recently. Mama Juana sees Nabón’s Leader-
ship Training School as a powerful alternative and as a chance to inspire young women 
to serve their community in leadership positions following the indigenous ethics of 
Buen Vivir.16
14 Interview with Sergio Morocho conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 18, 2017.
15 Official communiqué #DSC-1380 by the Autonomous Decentralized Municipal Government of Nabón, http://
www.nabon.gob.ec/portal/index.php/15-en/181-escuela-de-formacion-de-lideresas [accessed July 14, 2017].
16 Juana Morocho in Nabón during the field visit of the Global Working roup Beyond Development on May 13, 2017.
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A strong material indicator that a process of de-patriarchalization has taken place relates 
to women’s control over land and productive processes: According to the cadaster of 
Nabón, in 2006, only 5 percent of land property was legally possessed by women, 
although women were already playing a leading role in the struggles to regain land 
possession and in agricultural production (Herrera, 2009: p. 42). An actualization of the 
cadaster carried out in 2016 for the county’s four parishes17 shows that, nowadays, an 
average of 37.5 percent of the plots are owned by women. 
According to the municipality’s director of planning and projects, Yessica Naula, this signifi-
cant increase of 32.5 percent in ten years is due to a cultural change within the population: 
Women are the ones who lead the organizations on the ground, both the savings associa-
tions and the productive associations. They also need their land titles in order to ask for 
credit at the Jardín Azuayo Cooperative, as a guarantee. Women have a much more active 
role now that allows them to ensure their rights, for example in being taken into account 
when inheritances are passed over. Additionally, the municipality encouraged the legaliza-
tion of land in general, as back in 2006, many plots were not legalized at all.18
Nevertheless, the Nabón process also shows the resilience of the patriarchal system to 
transformation. Today, in 2017, women speaking out in assemblies are often a minority, 
and Estefanía Lalvay, the young Cañari woman who currently presides over the provincial 
indigenous organization Unión de Comunidades Indígenas del Azuay (UCIA) believes: 
“Although the situation is better than some years before, many more years of women’s 
leadership school are still necessary to achieve gender equity.”19 Fernando Vega, a 
former member of the Constituent Assembly in Montecristi (2007-2008) and scholar 
at the University in Cuenca who has accompanied the process in Nabón for several 
years, states in contrast that the process of women’s empowerment might even have 
lost force in recent years. He supposes that the generational transition between female 
leaderships has partly failed, as “many young women who went to the city to work or 
to study at the university do not show the same enthusiasm to support the processes 
inside the communities.” For Vega, this is a well-known dilemma: while contact with 
modernity allows women to move forward individually, at the same time, it unlinks them 
from communitarian processes (Vega, 2016: p. 202). 
DEEPENING DEMOCRACY
The new system of participatory local decision-making was based on the recognition of 
the value of the Andean Cosmovision and indigenous forms of social organization, with 
17 As the indigenous zone has its own form of traditional administration, the municipality 
has no data on the control of women over land in these areas.
18 Interview with Yessica Naula conducted by Miriam Lang by telephone on October 27, 2017.
19 Interview with Estefanía Lalvay conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on October 1, 2017.
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a strong emphasis on the general assembly as the most important body of decision-
making, but also on the principles of complementarity, reciprocity, solidarity, and unpaid 
community work (minga). This official recognition of indigenous ways of doing things 
by the local authorities was a crucial first step in transforming the tense interethnic rela-
tions which used to characterize the county into a prosperous intercultural conviviality 
where indigenous and mestizo voices have the same weight. In Nabón, instead of deni-
grating the indigenous population and considering inferior everything related to it, the 
new system considers its indigenous heritage an inspiration and a model which could 
be implemented throughout the county’s territory, including the zones where mestizos 
are in the majority.
At the same time, during those first years, the municipality came up with the slogan 
“The wealth of Nabón is its people” in order to counter the humiliating narrative of 
poverty and underdevelopment that the central state statistics had imposed on the 
population of Nabón: With the Nabón project, seeds and agricultural contributions were 
available. We could have just given them out, but we saw that if we just give we will 
maintain the situation that existed before. People would keep on being mendicants.
Everyone was stretching out their hands and saying: give it to me, give it to me, and 
whoever stretched them out the furthest got more. And we thought, this should not be 
the way; we should not promote mendicancy. We ought to promote self-reliance. We 
saw that self-esteem was very low. 
Mayor Magali Quezada talks to a citizen of Nabón
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So we created this slogan: the wealth of Nabón is its people, and we put it everywhere, 
together with the other half: minga for life. In this way we told people, you can do it – of 
course we will move forward. People felt appreciated. And so they said: I am a part of 
this.20 
The slogan not only challenged the narrow view of wealth as monetary income or access 
to goods and services; it also meant recognizing the hardworking, mainly female local 
population, their efforts to regain food sovereignty, and their specific situated knowledge. 
An initial diagnosis of needs was then carried out, not by external development experts, 
but by the population itself, in community assemblies. Seventy-nine coordinators were 
selected to communicate the priorities of the people in the different territories to the 
municipality, in order to avoid all the inhabitants of Nabón having to travel frequently to the 
central village – as the geographical area covered by the county is considerable and trans-
portation was deficient at the time. One indicator of the way in which this process has 
been consolidated is that nowadays, there is only a need for six such coordinators who still 
serve as the bridge between the territorial bases and the central county administration.
The new forms of local policy-making were built around a comprehensive organizational 
structure which integrated already existing structures. This comprises monthly meetings 
at the community level (a community being an agglomeration of houses which can be 
part of a legal commune with collective land, or of a parish with individual land titles) and 
trimestral meetings at the parish or commune level, whose decisions are then transmitted 
to the county’s development and planning committee which operates under national law. 
One main axis and goal of participation are the decisions around the municipal budget, 
especially regarding public expenditure. Nabón implemented a method of participatory 
budgeting that bridges between the situated needs and priorities of its people and the 
formal requirements of the central state and the law. Based on information relating to 
available public funds, each community, and in turn each parish or commune, decide 
their spending priorities, which are then compiled by municipal employees and made 
public in the county’s first general assembly each August (for the following year). In 
September and October, municipal employees translate this general budget into the 
format of an annual operative plan, also required by the law. The result is made trans-
parent and approved in a second general assembly in October, so that each citizen knows 
exactly how much money is coming to his or her community and for what purpose. A 
third and final general assembly is held in January for the previous year’s reporting and 
accountability and official approval of the new year’s budget (Quezada, 2017). 
At the same time, the overall municipal budget is not assigned only on the basis of a 
proportional rule that takes the different territories into account, but rather according 
20 Interview with Amelia Erráez conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 18, 2017.
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to several specific sociopolitical and ecological criteria which have been elaborated in 
cooperation with a team from the University of Cuenca. For example, 15 percent of 
the budget is divided between all areas following the principle of equity. Forty percent 
is assigned according to the demographic of the population of each area: How many 
people live there? How many are women and female heads of households? How many 
children or elderly people live there? Another 25 percent is distributed to areas which 
lack basic infrastructure like access to drinking water, irrigation, sewage etc. And finally, 
the last 20 percent is assigned following an evaluation of the ecological conditions of 
each territory, such as the loss or regeneration of forests, vulnerability, fertility etc.
Local regulations that institutionalized these proceedings were also brought in in a partic-
ipatory way; assemblies were held throughout the county in order to gather people’s 
criticisms and proposals. In recent years, under Mayor Magali Quezada, solidarity was 
introduced as an additional criterion to participatory budgeting in order to address the 
central government’s decision in 2013 to significantly reduce budget assignments to 
municipalities in a new law regarding territorial organization, autonomy, and decen-
tralization (COOTAD), following the Correa government’s push for centralization. The 
solidarity principle now allows different communities or parishes in Nabón to “lend” 
parts of their yearly assigned budget to another, in order to make bigger investments of 
major impact possible where needed. Following the rules of reciprocity, this money will 
be given back in case of future need to the community who gave it. 
Alexandra Ochoa, a municipal delegate who has been active since the beginning of the 
process, recalls: Of course some people say no, this is mine. This budget is mine and I 
can define it, not the authorities. So we have had to work and say: OK, this is yours, but 
let’s see, your brother or your neighbor needs it. Sometimes they also say: This year we 
will not be able to use our share. So to whom can we lend it? 21
It is striking to see how well informed the inhabitants of Nabón have become with 
regards to budgetary assignments. They know exactly where there are budget remain-
ders, and discuss their best use with the mayor or in their community. In parallel to this 
new budgeting process, the municipality has instituted several thematic roundtables on 
integral health, relations with Nature and biodiversity, tourism and patrimony, economic 
development, children and youth, and so on, in which individuals have opportunities to 
become involved. 
This new institutionality has stretched national regulations in order to improve local 
democracy, and as a result the role of the party representatives in the concejo municipal 
has shifted significantly. 
21 Interview with Alexandra Ochoa conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón, March 29, 2017.
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Now, instead of being “authorities” who take decisions for the people, they can only 
ratify decisions which have already been made by the people at the base level and help 
implement them: We at the municipal institutions are only executors. (…) We cannot 
decide one single cent by ourselves. If there is a change in the program or in an infra-
structure project, the community assembly decides and their decision is validated by 
the parish assembly, and they tell us: this is what we have decided. And the council only 
says if this is technically doable or not. The council only approves.22
In this way, specific partisan interests have lost a lot of their influence on the local 
policy-making process, and concejo decisions are generally taken by consensus, as the 
Mayor explains: At the council, we currently have two more counselors from my party, 
Pachakutik, two from Alianza País (the party of the national government) and one from 
Avanza. But the process is so empowered through the participation of the people that 
there is hardly any possibility to say no to anything. I would say that during the seven 
years that I have been in charge now, 99 percent of the decisions have been taken 
unanimously. The issues that do generate controversy are those which come in from 
the central State, which are imposed by the central government. Like the obligation to 
take money for garbage collection, for example. But in the end, we again resolved the 
way in which we would take the money together with the people.
These new instituent practices challenge the very understanding and practice of repre-
sentative democracy whereby citizens delegate their power or agency to elected 
representative proxies. 
On these grounds, electoral processes also have to meet specific conditions in Nabón: 
“Many candidates come here and expose their proposals not on the basis of a participa-
tory process, but from their own point of view. And people say: no, not like that. We 
have already decided what to do and now they come and want to impose this on us.”23 
This shows that it is fairly difficult to politically co-opt an empowered community which 
is used to self-determination.
ELEMENTS OF PLURINATIONALITY
Whilst at the national level, the plurinational state, one of the indigenous move-
ment’s main demands, only attained declaratory status when it was introduced 
as one of the characteristics of the Ecuadorian State in the preamble of the 2008 
Constitution, in Nabón, some elements of plurinationality are being put into practice 
on a local level. As Mayor Quezada explains, “At the beginning, we learned from 
the indigenous zone how to organize and applied this to the mestizo zone,” where it 
22 Interview with Mayor Magali Quezada conducted by Miriam Lang in Quito, March 23, 2017.
23 Interview with Magali Quezada conducted by Miriam Lang in Quito, March 23, 2017.
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was decided in assemblies that the Comités Promejoras (improvement committees) 
would be considered as equivalent to the cabildos or community governments in the 
indigenous zone. 
For Quezada, one important aspect of plurinationality resides in the importance that is 
assigned to communitarian assemblies: People know that before a decision is taken over 
an issue, this issue has to be well debated, the arguments have to be well presented, 
because they will be responsible for the decision they make. When it is a collective deci-
sion, all signs indicate that it will work out.24
The assemblies deliberate and decide on a very wide range of issues, including health, 
security, environment, solidarity, and sometimes religious issues. Quezada also explains 
how the communitarian logic has served to dismantle clientelist practices that have 
been normalized over centuries of colonial and then postcolonial rule:
The indigenous, authentically communitarian process, has taught us so much. For 
example, [the fact] that you cannot manipulate. People go to the assemblies by them-
selves and they like to go, there is no need to pay them or bring them in order to make 
them attend. Once I had a problem with a prefect of the province, because he began to 
offer the people buses for transportation and meals if they attended the provincial parlia-
ments. I told him: No! You are teaching them wrong. The people are empowered; this 
is about their responsibility with their territory. In Nabón we never give them anything, 
they assist because they have been entrusted by the community and they consider it an 
ethical obligation to do the best they can. If a leader doesn’t, they remove him. 
While mainstream politicians in today’s mainstream Andean political culture always act 
as if public work was their personal gift to the people, and had nothing to do with their 
social rights, Magali Quezada avoids being personally acknowledged for achievements. 
The classic signs “This work has been realized by (name of authority)” cannot be found 
in Nabón County. “Why should I officially inaugurate some work if we all know that it 
was the local community leader who did all the work, brought the people together?” 
she asks. These small refusals to comply with the ceremonialism of state power consti-
tute little steps in the path towards de-colonization. Nevertheless, the three big general 
assemblies that make up the participatory budgeting process are still carried out in a 
rather traditional way, with the national anthem being sung at the beginning and the 
authorities sitting on a stage above the general audience accommodated in chairs 
arranged in rows.
Following the same logic of learning from indigenous practices, mingas have been intro-
duced in rural mestizo zones. For all projects carried out in the county, people have to 
24 Interview conducted by Miriam Lang in Quito, March 23, 2017.
~ 112 ~
provide their workforce while the municipality funds the necessary materials: “That has 
allowed us to achieve a lot of things,” says the Mayor.
Patricio Sagbay lives in Pucallpa, an indigenous community which belongs to the Shiña 
commune. He is currently responsible for the communitarian irrigation system there 
and feels real ownership over the Nabón transformation process: The participatory 
budget departs from our communities. We learn about things and debate in our assem-
blies. We think this is the correct way; this, to put it briefly, is Sumak Kawsay. The actual 
administration is excellent; they meet the needs of our communities which we build 
together with our bases. (…) We now will implement an irrigation project on the basis of 
the principle of solidarian budgeting (…). We have struggled for 25 years for this project 
(…) and have finally started to build it ourselves, with shovels in our hands. (…) Now, 
the participatory budget will make it possible. (…) There are still traces of racism in the 
central village of Nabón, but we belong to Nabón County and we have to be equal. We 
are actually managing to assert our self-government in the commune. Although the 
Correa administration wanted to strip us of some competences, we carried on and we 
have made them respect us. Not because we are a majority, but on the base of the 
Constitution. We feel that our Cabildo [communitarian government consisting of five 
people elected by the general assembly each year] is respected as an authority by the 
mayor, not only as a territorial one, but also one that administrates justice.25
While indigenous communitarian justice is only practiced within the indigenous zone 
of the county, it is noticeable that their decisions are recognized by the local instances 
of ordinary justice. In Ecuador, the 2008 Constitution recognized the existence of indig-
enous justice systems, which are often more inclined to reestablish equilibrium and 
impose reparation instead of punishment. But the Correa government failed to translate 
this into practice and has blocked anything advancing a respectful and coordinated coex-
istence of both systems in practice. In the media, indigenous justice is often denigrated 
in racist terms as a variant of lynch justice, whereas the systematic racism present in 
ordinary justice is rarely addressed (De Sousa Santos & Grijalva Jiménez, 2012). On 
these grounds, it is important to point out that the municipal judge of Nabón has offi-
cially handed on cases to the indigenous cabildos for resolution and, stating a precedent 
in jurisprudence, has declared himself incompetent at resolving conflicts originating in 
the realm of the indigenous communes. This even led to a lawsuit being filed against 
him by the Correa government before he was removed from Nabón.26
At the same time, there has been tension for some years now in the indigenous zone 
of the county around the very core of indigenous communitarian culture and tradition. 
25 Interview with Patricio Sagbay conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on October 1, 2017.
26 Interview with Magali Quezada conducted by Miriam Lang in Quito on March 23, 2017.
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When traveling throughout Nabón, especially through the indigenous zone, one can 
clearly observe a conflict of values generated by migration. Migrants who live in the 
US and Spain often send their money to build spacious and luxurious mansions in their 
home communities, which contrast starkly with the traditional farm houses mainly made 
of adobe. Curiously, most of these new houses are not inhabited; sometimes they are 
used to keep small livestock in them, others serve to show off the family’s wealth, or 
they represent an investment, a real-estate asset to inherit and secure the future of their 
heirs. These architectonical contrasts symbolize a conflict of values between the capi-
talist value of material accumulation which confers superiority in a society understood 
as predominantly modern and competitive, and the notion of convivial, harmonious 
well-being that is at the core of Buen Vivir, where material wealth is not the goal once 
the fulfillment of basic needs is ensured. Migrants who leave their country are normally 
under social pressure to show their success abroad, in order to prove that the sacrifice 
the family made was worth it. 
In Shiña, one of the indigenous communes, a group of people, many of them returned 
migrants, are resisting the communitarian organization of everyday life and attempting to 
assert the modern/western concept of well-being that they have acquired in countries of 
the Global North. They denominate themselves as colonos (settlers), claim to be white 
and, in their struggle for individual land titles, even question whether Shiña was ever 
legally a commune with collective land property. This has already resulted in several court 
cases. Don Segundo Nivelo, one of their leaders, claims individual property rights and 
does not recognize either the authority of the assembly or of the elected cabildo.27 Other 
comuneros of Shiña state that there have been violent conflicts over the participation in 
mingas and the use of the common highlands. Some central government institutions, 
such as the Ministry of Social Well-Being, have taken the opportunity to fuel this conflict 
by supporting the colonos, thereby generating a local group loyal to the ruling party Alianza 
País, in order to neutralize indigenous demands articulated by Pachakutik and to weaken 
the politically independent process in Nabón (Vega, 2016: p. 190).28 At the same time, 
Sergio Morocho also reflects self-critically on the fact that this conflict has not always 
been managed well by the indigenous community authorities themselves.29
These tensions, which appear both in the architectural aesthetics of the indigenous zone 
and, in the case of Shiña, in the very structure of the commune indicate that, even after 
the consecration of plurinationality and interculturality as new principles of the Ecua-
dorian State in the 2008 Constitution and their adoption by the municipal government, 
27 Informal conversation with Segundo Nivelo in Cuenca on October 2, 2017
28 Interview with Magali Quezada conducted in Nabón, May 13, 2017 
29 Interview with Sergio Morocho conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 18, 2017.
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the westernizing allure of modern development is not alien to subjectivities in Nabón, 
where profoundly different understandings of well-being strive for hegemony and 
cause community conflicts to simmer beneath the surface. The traditional communal 
authorities have been unable to deal in a constructive way with these cultural changes 
introduced by migration and can only provide those people concerned with the options 
of compliance with the traditional rules or expulsion from the commune (Vega, 2016: p. 
187). On the other side, the colonos perceive the Buen Vivir proposed by the cabildos 
as an obstacle to their well-being and to modern progress.
SOCIETAL RELATIONS WITH NATURE
Fernando Vega describes societal relations with Nature in Nabón as follows: For the 
community, the conservation of Nature is essential to Buen Vivir. Nature is directly related 
to the identity of the community and without it, life is not conceived. One of the obligations 
that the community has, from this perspective, is to preserve Nature, and therefore the 
element linked to it in this context: water. The relationship with La Pachamama is part of 
the identity and constitutes the main food source. (Vega, 2016: p. 86)
REGAINING FOOD SOVEREIGNTY
The foremost priority in the context of building self-reliance was the focus on the 
production of food to meet the community’s needs, which necessarily involved caring 
for Nature. Indeed, the first step entailed recovering soil fertility through agroecological 
practices and a sustained effort at reforestation. 
Soil fertility restored
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According to Alexandra Ochoa, people involved in the process have been able to learn 
from their errors and correct them: We also made some errors. For example at the 
beginning, we said: Where there is major erosion we have to assign more budget. But 
then we noted that we were rewarding those who did nothing about the erosion, and so 
we turned it around: the budget got assigned proportionally to the reforestation efforts. 
We did a real reforestation campaign, all the population got involved, including municipal 
employees. The territory was divided: this piece of land has to be reforested by the 
organization, this by the community, and this by the municipality. And this process is still 
going on. But the issue was not only recovering the soil, but also recovering customs 
and traditions, for example starting to use the Andean seeds we had here again. (...) This 
is why today, Nabón has been declared cultural patrimony of Ecuador.30 
The second step was the creation of several producers’ associations for vegetables 
and small livestock, again mainly driven by women. These associations were then 
supported by the local government in their search for new regional markets and the 
development of collective strategies of commercialization for their produce. An impor-
tant step in this process was the creation of a local organic brand, Nabón Productos 
Limpios, which added value to the local produce. Organic strawberries, vegetables, 
and herbal teas from Nabón have gained a reputation in Azuay. Furthermore, traditional 
local food like guinea pig, the traditional chicha -drink made out of corn or local tequila 
distilled from agave has acquired a new status in the minds of the local population in 
relation to imported modern processed food. Finally, to safeguard a sustainable transfer 
of knowledge about the technology that ensures a harmonious relation with Nature 
in production processes, the municipality has supported the creation of an ecological 
agricultural school.
Here again, the specific logic of local savings associations has proved helpful. Within 
a project, each person involved can participate with a contribution as low as 1 USD 
a month for a loan of 200 USD. What makes the Nabón experiment so interesting is 
that the projects funded were collective projects, which differ from traditional micro-
loans given to individuals. Each savings association – today there are more than 90 
throughout the county, mainly women-led – decides on the interest rates which the 
participating people consider suitable. These collective loans also have effects beyond 
the expected economic benefits as they enable a collective venture where solidarity 
can flourish. For example, women working together in the San Juan Bautista farming 
association explained they can easily organize child care within their group because 
they are working together and can rely on each other. The value behind this alternative 
30 Interview with Alexandra Ochoa conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on March 29, 2017..
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funding process was “to connect people instead of connecting capital.”31 These resil-
ient, small, local, and organic production projects in Nabón are an effective alternative 
to export-oriented industrial monocultures, which tend to drive people out of rural areas. 
Another crucial issue related to food sovereignty was the expansion of the domestic 
drinking water system, which helped women gain more independence from their repro-
ductive tasks. On average, the rural women of Nabón especially save two hours per day 
since they no longer have to go and fetch water for the house. As mentioned above, 
today 97 percent of households in the county have access to water from the mains 
(Quezada, 2017).
As Magali Quezada rightfully points out: “When a population is poor and weak, it is 
easily influenced by outsiders.”32 Beyond official poverty indicators generally based on 
income and some international standards regarding housing etc., which often do not 
align with local ideas of living, the Mayor points out that for the people of Nabón, getting 
out of poverty was about having “enough food to eat; this will allow us to be in adequate 
health later, and to commercialize these crops (regionally), and at the same time put 
them at the disposal of the community, to trade them.” 
While Quezada supports financial assistance of the elderly, she is critical of some 
measures the central government has taken around the “eradication of poverty.” She 
says that in Nabón the Bono de Desarrollo Humano, the conditional cash transfer of 
50 USD which is given directly by the central government to families considered to 
be poorest, creates unnecessary dependencies and serves primarily clientelist political 
interests. The main divergence between a Buen Vivir process and centralized redistribu-
tive programs under the welfare state lies precisely in their creation or avoidance of 
dependencies. According to Quezada, “other actions should be taken in the case of 
people who are at a good age to work. We have proof that an organic farm which is 
well administered and, from an agroecological point of view, gets sufficient technical 
support can provide a family with a monthly income of 600 or 700 USD ,which allows 
it to live well in Nabón.”33
Today in Nabón there are 70 agroecological associations which have frequently asked 
the central state to change its agricultural policies. Only 24 percent of Nabón’s inhab-
itants state that they use pesticides, while almost 80 percent use organic fertilizers 
(Morocho, 2013: p. 21). Government policies are aimed at agroindustrial exportation 
31 Discussion held by Magali Quezada on the occasion of the field visit of the Global Working 
Group Beyond Development to the municipality of Nabón on May 13, 2017.
32 Discussion held by Magali Quezada on the occasion of the field visit of the Global Working 
Group Beyond Development to the municipality of Nabón on May 13, 2017.
33 Interview with Magali Quezada conducted by Miriam Lang in Quito on March 23, 2017.
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crops and are in no way concerned with supporting the dignified existence of rural 
people on their land (Muñoz Jaramillo, 2014: p. 14). The institutions of the central state 
often intervene to recommend a certain crop that supposedly obtains good prices on the 
world market. For example in Nabón, at a particular moment the Ministry of Agriculture 
pushed quinoa crops, which then failed to find a market. With the help of the people, 
the municipality decided to buy the local quinoa production and give it specifically to 
the mothers of malnourished children, with good results for the children’s health. This 
successful resolution attracted the attention of the Ministry of Health, which was quick 
to take credit for the program – highly ironic given that it had only been an emergency 
intervention to minimize the consequences of a failed agricultural policy.
Attaining food sovereignty on these terms is not only about leaving poverty behind; it 
is a way of de-commodifying food and returning it to its original purpose – nutrition, 
not profit – and of decoupling agriculture from the neoliberalized global market. The 
pressure to produce for exportation easily leads to interference by International Finance 
Institution’s (IFIs), like the Interamerican Development Bank or the World Bank, with 
their neoliberal loan packages.34 Once the population of Nabón realized they could once 
again exist relying on their own efforts, means, and environment, they had learned that 
they did not need the kind of loan which would force them to implement a neoliberal 
structural adjustment. Luckily in Nabón, the Swiss cooperation allowed a cash flow 
without intervening into the decision-making process, which marked a significant differ-
ence to the conditions of an IFI’s package deal. 
By prioritizing food sovereignty and nutrition, the local communities of Nabón have 
broken with the capitalistic logic of money-making. Rather than taking a gamble on the 
hypothetic trickledown effect of market-based indicators such as growth, the affected 
population took control over the decision-making process of how to escape poverty and 
achieve a dignified existence. They ignored outside market forces as well as the impera-
tive of macroeconomic growth, and instead grew their own food and reverted to their 
former autonomous existence. Nabón’s transformative experience proves that resist-
ance to neoliberalism can be effective when the power (of decision) is not transferred 
to representatives, but exercised directly and collectively by the concerned population, 
and when the role of institutions is limited to that of a facilitating and executive agent. 
Once the power of decision-making is transferred to a representative entity – through a 
political party or a civil society platform – the population will always have to rely on the 
moral quality of the representatives to ensure its subsistence.
34 On this issue, there is little doubt that President Correa’s bold rejection of the IMF and the World 
Bank at the beginning of his mandate sent a positive message that has set the tone for the 
nation’s independence – although since then, both organizations have returned to the country and 
are recognized by the Citizen Revolution’s government. This notwithstanding, Correa’s agrarian 
policies have largely pursued the same goals as the IFIs themselves: to phase out small-scale, 
family agriculture and integrate those workers into the larger cycles of capital accumulation.
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It goes without saying that the further away the decision-making process is from the 
affected population, the weaker the resistance to neoliberalism. In the case of Nabón, 
the population not only owns its decision-making process, but these decisions are taken 
and instigated from Nabón, not in Quito, Bern, or Washington DC. From a geographical 
point of view, since Nabón is a remote rural area, there was little competition of ideas 
that could have opposed this new social dynamic.
DEFENSE OF WATER SOURCES AND FORESTS; 
STRUGGLES AGAINST MINING
One central aspect of the strategy of regaining food sovereignty in order to strengthen 
the organization of communities has been the defense of water sources and forests. In 
Nabón, like in other parts of the Ecuadorian Andes, the páramo ecosystems constitute, 
together with forests, the most important water storage reserves. In Nabón County, 
according to the territorial development plan of 2014, 32 percent of the surface corre-
sponds to fragile, but ecologically highly valuable ecosystems like páramos (PYDLOS, 
2014: p. 90).
There have been several socio-ecological conflicts over the protection of páramos and 
forests in Nabón County in recent years. Firstly, an important share of the territory has 
been given to mining concessions: there are concessions for metallic mining, mainly 
gold and silver, as well as for kaolin – used in ceramics production – and construction 
materials. According to information obtained from the municipality, a total of eighteen 
mining concessions were allocated between 2002 and 2014, the most dangerous one 
concerning the Cerro del Mozo, the highest mountain of the region, which provides both 
irrigation channels and drinking water to several communities. According to Remigio 
Capelo, an anti-mining activist from the community of Ñamarín, which belongs to the 
parish of Cochapata, the project aims to remove the whole top of the mountain.35 The 
concessioner is Minera Cachabí Ltd., which, according to official data from the US Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission, is operating as part of a deal with the transnational 
Iamgold Corporation. In April 2016, the municipality invited Minera Cachabí to explain 
the project and its environmental impact to the population. Company representatives 
did attend the meeting, arguing that the project’s socialization was in any case manda-
tory, according to Ecuador’s environmental laws. In response, on August 19, 2017, the 
municipality issued a local resolution which declared “the territory of Nabón County, 
its páramos and fragile ecosystems (...) free of metallic mining in concordance with the 
Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador.” The same document requests the Ministry of 
Mining to stop any authorization process regarding the Cerro del Mozo mining project 
as well as related contracts, and to suspend any metallic mining concession in Nabón 
35 Interview with Don Remigio Capelo conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 20, 2017.
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County, arguing that they are mostly located in protected conservation areas or archeo-
logical reserves which belong to the cultural patrimony of Nabón (GAD Nabón, 2017).
In December 2014, the municipality issued a local law declaring a significant part of the 
county’s highlands a “municipal protection zone.” Significantly, this ordenanza forbids 
the extraction of non-renewable resources, while it allows human activities related to 
ecotourism, science, forest management, and sustainable agriculture. Furthermore, it 
claims to revive ancestral knowledges regarding ways to work the land in an organic 
way, to manage native species and non-timber products as well as to implement diver-
sified crops. In contrast with many conservation initiatives or national parks across the 
world, this local law does not exclude the local population on behalf of the Rights of 
Nature, but on the contrary respects both their traditional activities and knowledges 
(GAD Nabón, 2014).
These measures can be read as a preventive reaction to another conflict which occurred 
in March 2008. At the time, the mining company Minera Explorsur S.A., property of 
the Eljuri family, one of Ecuador’s richest and most powerful families, who own an 
economic group of the same name, began to introduce machinery into the páramo above 
Cochapata parish for the purpose of exploration activities. The people of Cochapata 
parish, who depend on this páramo for their drinking and irrigation water supply, first 
tried to negotiate with the Eljuris. But when this did not yield any results, in response 
to what they considered an invasion, about 70 local people went up to the mountains 
and burned down the machinery. Seven community leaders were sentenced to eight 
years’ imprisonment for sabotage by the provincial Justice Court of Azuay in April 2010 
– in spite of a general amnesty for environmental defenders issued by the Constituent 
Assembly in June 2008, three months after the conflict. Remigio Capelo and three 
other men, all claiming they had not even been on the spot on the day of the sabo-
tage, had to hide in the mountains for two years, with significant health consequences, 
before the National Parliament granted them amnesty in December 2011 (INREDH, 
2011; El Mercurio, 2011; Campaña Defensores, 2011).36
The criminalization of protest has been among the defining characteristics of the ten years 
of government under Rafael Correa. It has been directed especially against people and 
organizations who defend the right of La Pachamama. While in the early years, an old law 
which had been passed under military rule was used indiscriminately to categorize protest 
actions such as road blocks as “terrorism and sabotage,” from 2014 a new, rather puni-
tive penal code still guaranteed a rather broad definition of terrorism. This, alongside the 
term “rebellion,” has been a charge frequently used by the state against social protesters. 
At the same time, strategies that have proven successful in neighboring Colombia, such 
36 Interview with Don Remigio Capelo conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on March 29, 2017
~ 120 ~
as carrying out local referenda in order to rule out mining mega-projects democratically, 
have not been respected by the Correa government, as the case of Quimsacocha in the 
neighboring county of Girón, also in Azuay province, proved in 2011.37 
Currently, there is still much uncertainty about the future of the water reserves around 
the Cerro del Mozo. Ecuador’s new president Lenin Moreno, who came into office on 
May 24, 2017 and soon made clear certain differences between him and his prede-
cessor Rafael Correa, wants to carry out a referendum which includes a question about 
the prohibition of mining in protected areas. Another hurdle is the Codigo Organico del 
Ambiente law – the Organic Code of the Environment – which currently allows the envi-
ronmental authority to move or change the protected area limits or even to change their 
category. Nevertheless, there are many definitions of protected areas in Ecuador which 
frequently collide with each other, as well as strong economic interests around mining, 
and whether the mining threat to Nabón County remains or not will depend primarily on 
the concrete relations between such forces. 
STRUGGLES AROUND CULTURE, 
KNOWLEDGE, AND EDUCATION
AN ECOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGES
The transformation process of Nabón has a crucial cultural dimension. We have already 
stressed the importance of the production of a new narrative which has generated 
more self-esteem within a population that had always been despised for its rurality, its 
poverty, and in part for its indigenousness. During Amelia Erráez’ term as mayor, these 
people began to feel appreciated, that they themselves had something important to 
contribute to their collective well-being. 
In addition to the re-evaluation of ancestral knowledges regarding agriculture, health, 
and relations with Nature, Erráez recalls how the informal learning spaces worked at the 
beginning of the process: At night we gathered together like we were at school, with a 
blackboard, the counselors of the Nabón project, and the technicians of the municipality. 
We gathered together and analyzed what had to be done. René Unda was very important 
in this; he provided orientation, he was the strategist in some way. Once we had reached 
a consensus, the technicians learned how to implement it. Once they had learned, they 
would go out into the communities and teach the people. It was rather complicated. 
Universities do not teach engineers and technical professionals how to build social bonds 
37 In Quimsacocha, in response to a proposed gold-mining project promoted as “strategic” by the Correa 
government, 92 percent of the local population voted against mining in water sources on the occasion of a 
locally organized referendum in 2011. This vote was ignored, and a fresh attempt in 2015 to organize a new 
referendum which would be officially validated by the central government’s institutions has still not received the 
green light from the Constitutional Court. See http://www.larepublica.ec/blog/opinion/2011/10/10/la-consulta-
de-quimsacocha/ and https://lahora.com.ec/noticia/1101856741/noticia. 
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with people. They are used to being cold, far away from the people. It was rather difficult 
for them to learn a different way. (…) We had to insist on them accepting that scientific 
knowledge is exactly as important as practical knowledge, that neither of them is worth 
more. That we should not provide solutions but leave the people themselves with the 
questions they were raising. (…) Instead of saying that what people were doing was 
wrong, they would learn from them and simply suggest that they also try out other ways 
– and then together, they would evaluate which way had worked out better.38
The base of knowledge on which the transformation of Nabón was built could be 
described as an ecology of knowledges which combined traditional with modern, and 
scientific with experience-based knowledges, as well as formal with informal educa-
tion, without establishing hierarchies between them. 
During the time of Amelia Erráez, the municipality created a “Human Talent Center” 
which offered a wide range of training programs. According to Ochoa: We have also 
succeeded in teaching people more skills, in music, dance, but also in computing and 
finance, as well as basic entrepreneurial skills, in what we called a human talent center. 
Some young men and women from here have even managed to be admitted to the 
University in Cuenca and we already have several professionals from here; some of 
them work for the Municipality. Today, if you meet a young man or woman from here 
in Cuenca and ask them where they are from, they say proudly ‘from Nabón,’ whereas 
38 Interview with Amelia Erráez conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 18, 2017.
Municipal orchid garden with over 80 varieties of orchids, Nabón
~ 122 ~
before, they always said ‘from Cuenca.’ Now we have a new motto, which says: 
‘Creating the future,’ because this is what we are doing.39
OBSTACLES IN FORMAL PUBLIC EDUCATION
Concerning formal public education, access to higher education represents one of the 
greatest challenges in a country where it is still an exception for students of rural areas 
to get admitted to public university.40 To address this obstacle in young people’s lives, 
the municipality worked around a law which prevents it from developing educational 
policies and signed a contract with Santa Ana Corporation, a private company special-
ized in virtual education, in August 2015, a year in which not one single student from 
Nabón had been able to gain entry to the nearest public university in Cuenca. The objec-
tive is to strengthen the capacities of Nabón’s baccalaureate absolvents to enable them 
to pass the national exam that grants them admission to public universities. As the 
virtual classes take place in the afternoon, outside school hours, there is no interfer-
ence with the formal educational process. Thus, the initiative can even be carried out 
in coordination with the Ministry of Education and the student’s parents. From 2015 to 
2017, 300 students participated in the program. An evaluation of the outcomes was still 
underway at the time of this article’s completion.
Additionally, centralized state educational policies of the Correa government have posed 
a threat to the sustainable construction of interculturality and plurinationality, central 
features of the transformation of Nabón. In spite of the fact that the new education law 
passed in 2011 is called an “intercultural education law,” it has largely put an end to 
the very rich intercultural and bilingual education that had started in the 1970s in those 
regions of Ecuador with a large indigenous population. But with the new law, “what 
were bilingual intercultural schools today have become normal educational centers, 
which do not value the traditions,” as Ochoa states for Nabón. As a result, some youths 
from the indigenous zone do not value them either.41 Initially, the law claimed to “main-
stream” interculturality, but it has mainly caused it to disappear. As everybody has to be 
intercultural now, no specific culture was able to sustain itself anywhere, and Spanish 
became the official language of public education once again. 
Alexandra Ochoa, herself a mestizo woman, explains what consequences this had for 
Nabón: While in the mestizo zone we had normal education, in the indigenous zone we 
39 Interview with Alexandra Ochoa conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on March 29, 2017.
40 According to the Mayor in the interview conducted by Miriam Lang on March 23, 2017 in Quito, a baseline study 
carried out by Santa Ana Corporation states that at the University of Cuenca 98 percent of students come from 
urban areas and only 2 percent from rural zones. At the national level, while before the Citizen Revolution in 2006 
only 7 percent of university students were from rural backgrounds, in 2014 this proportion was slightly higher at 
9 percent. 
41 Interview with Alexandra Ochoa conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on March 29, 2017
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had intercultural bilingual education. This was where we strengthened their language, 
customs and traditions, and culture. But with the new law, all of this has been leveled. 
There are no more bilingual schools, all schools are now called ‘educational centers’ 
and that’s it. So now we are in the process of losing things, because the culture of our 
peoples is about organization and solidarity. Now there are just normal schools which do 
not value their culture, where only Spanish is spoken, even if in the textbook there are 
maybe two pages in kichwa. This is fine; but it just isn’t valued. This has brought prob-
lems, because the young people of the indigenous zone do not value their own culture 
anymore. We have done surveys and 2 percent of them already define themselves as 
mestizos, they are not indigenous anymore. (…) Some young people, when they are 
asked ‘what is it that you like least about your community?’ the answer is: the mingas42. 
The minga is such an important communitarian cultural process. This is the result of the 
encounter between the modern world and our world here.43
In bilingual communitarian schools, teachers were accountable not only to the parents of 
their pupils, but also to the community assembly and directives, and they played a much 
more important role within the social fabric of the community than a purely educational 
one. In 1988, the Ecuadorian government officially recognized these bilingual indigenous 
communitarian schools, and from then on they were co-managed between the Ministry 
and the indigenous organizations of each territory. This “intercultural bilingual educa-
tion system” enjoyed relative autonomy with the capacity to design its own curricula, 
produce its own educational materials according to each language and context, and 
it had also set up its own teacher-training system. At both the regional and national 
level, there was much deliberation around educational issues, and the system became 
a widely known example of successful interculturality throughout Latin America. At the 
same time, these intercultural schools were not exempt from criticism since they were 
severely underfinanced, their management was often chaotic, and sometimes used for 
personal favors (Lang, 2017: p. 99 ff.).
The 2011 education law claimed to put the system in order and returned all powers 
to the central state under the auspices of a “return of the state” policy often lauded 
as an anti-neoliberal strategy by the Correa government. Firstly, the law ousted indig-
enous organizations from the co-management of the intercultural education system. 
Most indigenous teachers were dismissed, some for political reasons, the majority 
because they lacked formal qualifications like a university degree, which were now 
mandatory in the context of Correa’s “meritocratic” system. As a consequence, many 
indigenous children now have mestizo teachers from anywhere in the country who 
42 Collective, unpaid community work, normally carried out on Sunday mornings, 
after which people share some food and spend time together.
43 Interview conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón, March 29, 2017
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neither understand nor adapt very well to indigenous cultural realities, which again are 
often considered merely something to be overcome. Thousands of small intercultural 
community schools were shut down because a new centralized model of Millennium 
Schools was now prioritized by the Correa government. 
Nabón was chosen to host one of these Millennium Schools: a centralized, very well-
equipped, large concrete infrastructure which would bring together children from all 
over the county. Nevertheless, at the time this article was under completion, the site 
for the construction had only been leveled, while newly elected President Moreno had 
already declared that he was not going to continue the Millennium School model – 
leaving Nabón’s educational future uncertain.
A former education minister, Rosa Maria Torres, believes that the Correa government 
has made public investment in educational infrastructure a priority because it is easy to 
show in numbers. But it has neglected all pedagogic innovation and missed an oppor-
tunity to transform the pupil-teacher relationship, which remains vertical, authoritarian, 
and anti-emancipatory (Torres, 2017) – and often racist.
Mayor Magali Quezada describes how the modernization of public education affects 
the rhythms and patterns of the reproduction of social life and how this has gener-
ated resistance within the indigenous zone of Nabón: That sense of a community 
school living together with the community no longer exists. Because the school was 
an important part of the community and the community was an important part of the 
school. Now, the children have to go a long way to their classroom; they have started 
to use modern systems like a school bus that picks them up from their homes. Before, 
they just walked to the school at the center of the community. The sense of commu-
nity is disappearing because they send them to the center of the county now. They are 
centralizing everything. Now there is one big school at the center of the county with 
more than 600 pupils. They regroup them all in the same package; many small schools 
have been shut down. There are no more intercultural teachers. (…) People resist, and 
at least this process has been stopped here. The plan was to shut down more than 
forty schools, but this has been stopped by many compañeros who resisted. It has 
been a rather unequal struggle; we have three compañeros who have court sentences 
for blocking the road, two are in jail, one of them is defending himself from abroad.44
Since the municipality lost its influence on the formal education system, it has managed to 
address this issue of the loss of identity among young people by designing a youth project 
44 Interview conducted in Quito, of March 23, 2017. On April 28, 2017, Silvio Morocho, one of the peasants of the 
indigenous zone of Nabón incriminated as a “terrorist” for taking part in a road block, was released, while the 
others still had to complete a 10-month jail sentence. Their incarceration was not the result of a protest against 
education policies, but against a tax reform which would have taken funds away from the provincial government 
(see https://www.elmercurio.com.ec/606477-lider-indigena-acusado-de-terrorismo-dejo-la-carcel/).
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that will take place in their spare time, outside school hours. These efforts aim to address 
the conflict between a formal education system that stresses the benefits of western-style 
modernization and a community culture that insists on the importance of tradition and a 
certain degree of decoloniality through a decoupling from the dynamics of modernization.45 
Alexandra Ochoa describes: Recently we opened a branch of the Casa de la Cultura in 
Nabón. There, young people from the mestizo and from the indigenous zone work together, 
also with the elderly because here, we value their experience very much. They organize 
dances and entertainment activities – all this is culture – in order to attract children to the 
process. (...) There is the official council of children and youth, but we want to involve the 
children actively in our process, socially and culturally. So we invented a project about 
writing tales and legends from Nabón. For three months of the year, the school children 
collect tales and legends from the elderly and write them down. And then there are prizes 
for the winners. We also gave a prize to the winning school; they could win a new sports 
court or something like that, but since the new law on territorial organization, COOTAD, we 
as a Municipality are not allowed to interfere with the schools anymore. There has been 
some partisan jealousy; they say that this is only the competence of the Ministry. (…) But 
they still allow us to carry out the contest and give prizes to the children.
In 2016, the best tales and legends from the last ten annual contests were published 
as a book. According to Juana Morocho, an elderly indigenous community leader from 
Pucallpa in the commune of Shiña, relationships between generations are imperative 
for the sustainability of Buen Vivir as it encourages people to take pride in and defend 
the community’s own cultural, political, and spiritual episteme. In a powerful act of 
resistance, on the occasion of the Global Working Group’s visit to Nabón, Mama Juana 
explained that there is no word for “development” in kichwa. What her community 
needs, she went on, is not development, but Sumak Kawsay.
BUEN VIVIR: A CONTESTED CONCEPT
Buen Vivir – Sumak Kawsay, or living well – began its journey around the world following 
its constitutionalization in 2008, inspiring numerous struggles and promising, in the 
eyes of some, an answer to the civilizational crisis affecting Ecuador and elsewhere. 
In the meantime, in Ecuador, the indigenous concept underwent a thorough process of 
expropriation and resignification. 
The following quotation exemplifies the expectations that emerged around this paradigm 
some years ago: In the same way that the plurinational State is the alternative to the 
liberal contractuality of the modern State, and interculturality is the condition for a society 
to be able to recognize itself in the differences that constitute it; Sumak Kawsay is the 
45 Interview with Alexandra Ochoa conducted in Nabón, March 29, 2017.
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alternative to the capitalist mode of production, distribution and consumption. (...) Sumak 
Kawsay also poses a different form of relationship between human beings, in which 
selfish individualism must submit to a principle of social responsibility and ethical commit-
ment, and a relationship with Nature in which it is recognized as a fundamental part of 
human sociality. So far, it is the only coherent discourse and practice that can stop the 
predatory and inhuman drifts of capitalist accumulation, which at the rate they advance 
become a threat to human life on the planet (Pablo Dávalos, quoted in Prada, 2013: p. 45).
At first, the introduction of these concepts to the constitution of 2008 was celebrated as 
a step of historical importance, by the indigenous movement as well, as evidenced by 
the following quotation from the Amazonian Kichwa leader Mónica Chuji, who was also 
Secretary of Communication at the beginning of Rafael Correa’s first administration: It is 
the first time that a notion which denotes an ancestral coexistence practice respectful of 
Nature, societies, and human beings, has been positioned visibly in the political debate 
and strongly inscribed in the horizon of human possibilities (Chuji, 2010 [2014]: p. 232).
This achievement should not be minimized. Many authors in later years took the 2008 
Constitution as the standard against which they measured the subsequent implementa-
tion of Living Well or its gradual reinterpretation in the successive Development Plans 
– or “Buen Vivir” Plans –, instituted by the institutions of the Correist State (see for 
example Gudynas and Acosta, 2011; Vega, 2014).
However, in retrospect it should be noted that the Sumak Kawsay paradigm had already 
undergone its initial resignification when it was enshrined in the specific format of a 
“Political Constitution of the State,” which has a specific function in the modern liberal 
State. It was elaborated in a very specific context with a pre-established structure, 
within the framework of representative politics, which of course is always the result 
of a correlation of political forces at a given moment. In the 2008 Constitution, Sumak 
Kawsay, which originally was clearly conceived as an alternative to development and 
even a different civilizational horizon, comes to simply coexist with development in a 
text where, paradoxically, development has a central place. In the constitutional text 
of 2008, Buen Vivir is conceived as the “paradigm of life towards which ‘develop-
ment’ should be oriented” (Cortez, 2011). Unfortunately, the doxa of modernization and 
progress that has underpinned development theory continues in force, reflecting the 
patronizing and patriarchal visions of the specific coalition of people who formulated 
Buen Vivir as a state policy (Manosalvas, 2014). 
Over time, in the process of the Citizen Revolution, the narrative of Sumak Kawsay 
as an alternative civilizational horizon was blurred and resignified, while the account 
of modernization that leads to well-being was enshrined as a principle of government 
action (Walsh, 2015). 
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In an apparent attempt to contain the potential of Buen Vivir, President Correa was 
swift to claim ownership of the transformative experience by institutionalizing it at the 
central government level, for example with the creation of a Secretary of Buen Vivir, a 
role which had a merely symbolic function. In contrast, the National Plan for Buen Vivir 
2013-201746 was a central instrument in the recovery of the state’s regulatory capacity 
in its move towards Neo-keynesianism. Its very creation by the National Secretariat of 
Planning and Development (SENPLADES) was a process precisely at odds with the 
core principles of Buen Vivir, since it was drafted using a top-down approach and was 
closely supervised by government experts.
The resignification of Buen Vivir took place through two interrelated movements: on the 
one hand, the subjection of Sumak Kawsay to the logic of the workings of the liberal 
state. Through its translation into the language and structure of Development Plans – 
soon to be called “national plans for Buen Vivir” – with their objectives, indicators, and 
goals, and its implementation by a management that prioritized efficiency and perfor-
mance (as a requirement so that the Correist political project could provide evidence 
of its successes) – Sumak Kawsay was domesticated by the metric mindset and the 
technocratic obsession with representing reality preeminently in measurable numbers 
(Moreno, Speich, & Fuhr, 2015). At the same time, it was stripped of its meaning, which 
was rooted in an indigenous episteme and ontology, and of its radically different under-
standing of socio-political relations and social relations with Nature, which presents a 
model of horizontal solidarity, of nurturing and regenerating life, which is not limited to 
the world of the human, but includes all other beings of the natural world.
 Of course, it would be a mistake to expect Sumak Kawsay, which forms a trans-
formative horizon, to appear in its “pure” state in all indigenous discourses, or to 
translate into practice without causing tensions or contradictions within communities. 
Rather, it coexists and merges with Western narratives, just as the resistant practices 
of many indigenous communities coexisted for centuries with practices of colonial 
domination and with the multiple onslaughts of developmental cooperation, such as 
public education. Thus, we can find statements such as CONAIE’s proposal to the 
2007 Constituent Assembly, in which the “equitable development of the whole of 
Ecuadorian society” is an objective to be achieved; or by leader Blanca Chancoso, 
claiming the “development of peoples in diversity” (Capitán et al., 2014: p. 226), 
just as we find other contributions such as the Amazonian Kichwa leaders Monica 
Chuji (ibid.: p. 231ff.) or Carlos Viteri Gualinga (2002) that clearly define development 
and Sumak Kawsay as polar opposites. According to Luis Macas, some have even 
46 National Secretary of Planning and Development, Government of the Republic of Ecuador Development 
Plan / National Plan for Good Living, 2013-2017 http://www.planificacion.gob.ec/wp-content/uploads/
downloads/2013/12/Buen-Vivir-ingles-web-final-completo.pdf [accessed July 13, 2017].
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attempted to define Sumak Kawsay as a Kichwa translation of the term development, 
thereby completely ignoring the fact that the two concepts originate in modes of 
living and historical experiences within completely different epistemes (ibid.: p. 183). 
What matters here is not the “purity” of indigenous discourse or practice, but the 
orientation it can provide. In other words, it can serve as an indication of the particular 
direction a social process is taking, whether it be towards a deepening of the civiliza-
tional crisis or towards alternative horizons.
The fact that, in the context of state discourse, Buen Vivir has gradually become asso-
ciated with development in the official discourse and public policies of Ecuador has 
had fundamental consequences: ‘living in harmony’ was undermined by a different 
philosophy of life, that of ‘living to work and to develop,’ in which ‘development’ 
becomes the objective and life is at the service of development. (Mignolo, 2011: p. 313) 
This resignification has been so successful that today authors like David Cortez iden-
tify this government version of Buen Vivir as a “governing device,” a “set of practices 
intended for the political management of a population’s life,” or a “technology of govern-
ance that inserts local practices into global policies” in the context of a “biocapitalism,” 
which also integrates “the knowledge traditionally excluded from the dominant knowl-
edge regime” (Cortez, 2014: p. 135ff.). 
Understood in this way, Living Well has lost all of its transformative potential. 
After ten years of Correism, this version of Buen Vivir is the one that sadly dominates 
Ecuadorian discourse. Nevertheless, in many territories other practices, relationships, and 
ways of life still persist, sustained particularly by those who initially shaped Sumak Kawsay 
as a civilizing alternative in different ways, depending on whether they were campesino, 
kichwa, or from other indigenous communities. Nabón, a rural county at the edge of the 
country, is one of those territories that contest the meaning of Buen Vivir in practice. 
For Mayor Magali Quezada, Buen Vivir means: Life in the community, socio-activity, coop-
erativism, the relationship between the mestizo and the indigenous, the recovery of those 
good ancestral practices we had, because it means going back to the good times, of course 
good times in the community, when decisions were taken collectively in the attempt to 
effectively include all sectors. It doesn’t mean just looking at how we give the poor more.
Fernando Vega conducted a study over several years on the perceptions and discourses 
around  Buen Vivir in Nabón, which included numerous workshops with different popu-
lation groups from Nabón carried out to investigate their views on Sumak Kawsay. 
He explains: There is no such thing as individual happiness; there is [a sense of] commu-
nity welfare. For the community to be in ‘good health,’ three concepts that constitute it 
must be strengthened: identity as a community, community work, and the integration of 
all its members. (…) Recovering customs and traditions is a priority for the community, 
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as it reinforces the bonds between its members. Having a common identity is impera-
tive in the fight for common goals. (Vega, 2016: p. 83)
At the same time, Buen Vivir is an integral concept that combines material, cultural, 
spiritual, and subjective dimensions, both at the individual and at the collective level 
(Vega, 2016: p. 51). But most importantly, Vega insists that there is not one model of 
Buen Vivir, and that the discourses and construction processes of the different forms of 
Buen Vivir are dynamic processes structured by history, territory, and culture, as well as 
through the interaction of organized and non-organized civil society with state actors at 
different levels (Vega, 2016: p. 181). 
PERSPECTIVES AND CHALLENGES
RELATIONS WITH THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
The county of Nabón is peripheral in the Ecuadorian geography of power. Perhaps this 
status has provided one of the conditions of possibility for a local process that was able 
to concentrate on its own highly localized needs while the main areas of the country 
underwent a systematic process of mainstream western modernization. Some of the 
achievements of Nabón stand in clear contrast to the politics of the central government 
during the 10 years of Rafael Correa’s government. While at the national level citizen 
participation was institutionalized, channeled into bureaucratic procedures and redefined 
in a rather passive, acclamatory way, Nabón sought to deepen and extend the possibili-
ties for decision-making from below. While the government in Quito quickly identified the 
indigenous movement as a political enemy and ever since has undertaken everything to 
weaken it, in Nabón the alliance between indigenous and mestizo parts of the county has 
been at the core of its achieved transformation and stands up to the present day. 
This contrast, in addition to the fact that the local government of Nabón had always 
been sympathetic with Pachakutik, a political party rivaling Correa’s Alianza País, has 
led to rather tense relations between the local and the national governments since the 
2000 elections. Mayor Magali Quezada reports that she cannot count the obstacles the 
central government has put in the way of the Nabón process. She recalls how she has 
been directly turned away by employees of the Ministry of Public Works in Quito for 
not being a member of Alianza País.47 At the same time, her municipality has enjoyed 
special attention from the central auditing institution, the Contraloría: In eight years, it 
was subjected to a total of thirty-five audits, which kept both her and her staff busy, 
preventing them from promoting more transformative activities. 48
47 Interview with Magali Quezada conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 20, 2017.
48 Several months after the end of the Correa administration, it is clear that the Contraloría not only obeyed political orders 
from the executive, but was also involved in massive corruption. The head of the institution, Carlos Polit, fled to Miami in 
June 2017 when the investigations into the corruption scandal around the Brasilian construction firm Odebrecht began.
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The relations between the local and the national level have been shaped by the politics 
of scale, where the ways in which local, national, or global scales are constituted and 
how they interact with each other are “essentially determined by power relations and 
their institutionalization. (…) the strategies of the various actors are precisely aimed at 
strengthening or weakening the corresponding scales according to their own interests. 
[Moreover], every scale must be understood as a field of forces which is characterized 
by often overlapping constellations of interests and power” (Brand et al., 2008). In the 
case of Nabón, it was COOTAD, the law of territorial organization issued in 2013, which 
deprived local governments of many legislative powers that would have been impor-
tant for Nabón’s multidimensional transformation process: Education, health, all policies 
regarding production or economic development, and policies regarding roads. It not 
only reallocated powers between municipalities and provincial governments, but also 
prohibited municipalities from making donations to projects in their territory. Only minis-
tries and institutions of the central government can make such donations, which, since 
they are not subject to close citizen participation, may open up the gates for clientelism. 
Besides the restructuring of local powers, another obstacle was the refusal by local 
branches of central government institutions to co-operate with mechanisms created 
during the Nabón process and to respect it as a valid political process in itself. For 
instance, one of the important qualities of the Nabón process was that all institutions 
– local ones and branch offices of central government institutions  – sat together in an 
interinstitutional coordination committee, in order to avoid unnecessary double work 
From left to right: Indigenous community leaders Estefania Lalvay 
and Juana Morocho with working group member Ashish Kothari (India)
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or contradictory measures within the territory. But the Correa government institutions 
abandoned this example of cooperation in 2010. 
The “itinerant cabinet” sessions introduced by Correa, in which he and his ministers 
would carry out their sessions in some remote location on national territory every 
month in order to get closer to the people and enhance their confidence in public 
institutions, would also be perceived as unwelcome intrusions into the longstanding, 
carefully balanced process of Nabón. As Quezada recalls: “They just invited everybody 
to express what they wanted and responded on the spot. This is no way of planning. 
They would ignore all the requirements for coordination with the territory or local institu-
tions, and make all kinds of populist promises.”49
RESILIENCE AND THE DURABILITY OF CHANGE
In retrospect, the territorial process of multidimensional transformation initiated in the mid-
1990s in Nabón has proved resilient to many economic, cultural, and political obstacles and 
adversities. It resisted the profound economic crisis of 1999/2000 as well as the aggressive 
politics of modernization and political control under Rafael Correa and – to a certain extent 
– the imaginaries of well-being and success that were introduced to the territory through 
migration. While the external conditions for its replicability have been rather hostile, the 
transformation has proven to be durable. It has also managed to sustain patterns for the 
material and symbolic reproduction of life that differ profoundly from the capitalist/modern/
western standard of material accumulation – redefining societal relations with nature around 
food sovereignty and the protection of water and forests instead of the sole imperative 
of productivity. It has succeeded in marginalizing racism, in giving indigenous people a 
real sense of inclusion while respecting their traditional ways of organizing, establishing 
justice, and managing property. It has created a general understanding of women’s multiple 
productive, political, financial, and cultural responsibilities within the population, which 
has influenced gender relations in the territory and established a trend towards de-patriar-
chalization. It has also strengthened subjectivities with a sense of community, collectivity, 
and solidarity, in opposition to the ontological claims of homo oeconomicus, the self-inter-
ested rational individual. It has managed to establish an ecology of knowledges which has 
boosted people’s self-esteem. Finally, through its specific system of participatory budg-
eting, it has constructed a method of material redistribution that disseminates power to the 
smallest entities, the communities, in contrast with the centralizing redistribution pattern 
that extractivism generates. It has managed to sustain a process of progressive self-reliance 
and strengthening democracy; it has largely marginalized private local potentates and has 
restored in both indigenous and mestizo people a sense of dignity, of community, and, 
above all, the capacity to directly determine important aspects of their own lives. For inhab-
49 Interview with Magali Quezada conducted by Miriam Lang in Nabón on September 20, 2017.
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itants of Nabón,  Buen Vivir not only represents a material post-development alternative; it 
is a philosophy of life and consciousness beyond the world that revolves around profit. It is 
also a political tool of resistance against western modernism and an opportunity to show 
how communities can co-exist thanks to ancestral culture and knowledge. The main village 
of Nabón is one of the few in Ecuador which has not replaced its traditional architecture of 
houses with wooden porches and balconies with concrete and colored glass. Today on its 
streets, mostly traditional handmade food, such as wheat tortilla with cheese, is on sale. 
The spiritual dimension has played an important role, particularly in the transformation of 
the relationship with Nature. It would be simplistic to believe that the numerous projects 
initiated by the municipalities and the inhabitants of Nabón involving irrigation or agro-
forestry were simply means of feeding the community. From a  Buen Vivir perspective 
– which breaks with anthropocentrism – these projects aim to care for Nature and all living 
beings, humans and non-humans. Thus, irrigation and reforestation contribute to enabling 
conditions on the ground for the reproduction of life to flourish and for Nature to regen-
erate in harmony with all living beings of the past, present, and future. Catherine Walsh, 
a decolonial scholar with a long history in Ecuador, reminds us that Buen Vivir denotes, 
organizes, and constructs a system of knowledge and living based on the communion of 
humans and nature and on the spatial-temporal-harmonious totality of existence. That is, 
on the necessary interrelation of beings, knowledges, logics, and rationalities of thought, 
action, existence, and living. This notion is part and parcel of the cosmovision, cosmology, 
or philosophy of the indigenous peoples of Abya Yala but also, and in a somewhat different 
way, of the descendants of the African Diaspora. (Walsh, 2010: p. 18)
At the same time, there are of course multiple factors that make the Nabón process vulner-
able: The cycles and logics of electoral democracy, which have not only driven the two 
mayors apart50, but will open up a new competition with open results for the continuity of 
the process in 2019; the dependency on foreign funding, either from the central govern-
ment and/or cooperation agencies, which usually comes with certain conditions, although 
the generation of an independent budget through local taxes has significantly improved 
over the years of the process; the tensions between different understandings of well-being 
influenced by migration to capitalist centers, which are especially present in the indigenous 
zone; the lack of employment prospects that many youths still associate with staying in 
Nabón, which will further nurture emigration; the threat that mining concessions on the 
water-storing highlands constitutes for all agricultural production; the effects of the free 
trade agreement with the European Union, which Rafael Correa’s government signed in 
2016, on small agriculture and the possibility of new public policies aimed at improving the 
deal’s implementation.
50 Amelia Erráez moved from Pachakutik to Alianza País around 2013 and ran in the 2014 
municipal election against her former vice-mayor Magali Quezada, who won.
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It is difficult to evaluate the conditions under which the people of Nabón will have to 
consolidate their achievements in the next years, since the transition in the Ecuadorian 
central government from Rafael Correa to Lenin Moreno in May 2017 signified a much 
greater shift than had been expected. Although Moreno won for the same political 
party Alianza País, he soon began to demonstrate his divergence from his predecessor, 
especially regarding the fierce political control Correa always exercised over the media 
and organized civil society, and his political will to bring to light networks of corruption 
that had apparently blossomed in Correa’s years. Soon afterwards Correa, who had 
emigrated to Belgium, would insult Moreno on Twitter for being mediocre, disloyal, and 
a traitor. As this article was nearing completion, the party Alianza País was on the verge 
of breaking up while many crucial political decisions had yet to be taken by the new 
government. Some important ones concerning Nabón, for example on mining conces-
sions in protected areas, were postponed to the beginning of 2018 since Moreno had 
proposed a referendum which would also cover these. 
From the perspective of Nabón, nevertheless, these dramatic changes in rhetoric and 
attitude in Quito take place on a distant stage: “They let us breathe now, they receive 
us well,” is how Mayor Magali Quezada describes the change she is experiencing.51 At 
least it can be said that the grounds for political action from the bottom up seem more 
promising again under a Moreno government. However, the continuation of mining 
would ultimately imply the failure of the  Buen Vivir experiment as a whole. 
DIVERGENCE FROM THE LEFT
It is interesting to note that, contrary to many traditional left-wing movements or to 
Hugo Chavez’ claim to have established 21st-century socialism in Venezuela,  Buen Vivir 
as a mode of resistance such as it is conceived in Nabón does not need to draw its polit-
ical and popular legitimacy from revolutionary action or rhetoric. It is not just that both 
mayors stand out by virtue of their modest and quiet ways. The people of Nabón have 
in fact largely maintained existing institutions, and they have challenged the nation-
state only in its claim to exclusive and centralized jurisdiction over justice, education, or 
redistribution, but not by seeking to remove president Correa or dramatically change the 
laws. In the region, recent revolutionary claims have been followed by more negative 
consequences than that of an emancipatory liberation from neoliberalism and multidi-
mensional domination. More prominently, Chavez’s socialist revolution (see the chapter 
by Edgardo Lander in this book) ended up laying the groundwork for the excessive usur-
pation of central power by Nicolas Maduro. In Ecuador, Correa’s grandiloquent project 
of a “citizen revolution” led to disciplinary statism and an intensification of extractivism. 
51 Interview with Magali Quezada conducted in Nabón on September 20, 2017.
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Instead, the people of Nabón took what was for them the simplest and the most obvious 
course of action: they collectively decided to act by occupying their own space without 
waiting for the central state to engage with anything. From a  Buen Vivir point of view, 
seeking reciprocity or knowledge-sharing beyond the community is valuable, but trying 
to ‘take power’ at a national level in the way that traditional leftist strategies have tried 
to is not included within this horizon of transformation that revolves around community-
building and the search for harmony and equilibrium.52 As Estefania Lalvay, the young 
indigenous leader from Ayaloma, states, the people of Nabón see value in simply being 
there, sharing and selling their healthy organic food, dressed in their traditional clothes, 
and being happy in the spirit of  Buen Vivir. 
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FOREST RIGHTS AND  
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conversations with Devaji Tofa and Mohan Hirabai Hiralal over the years. The backbone of this case study is 
made of warmth and hospitality, conversations, meetings, and perceptions shared over the years by different 
members of the gram sabha, particularly Dukku Dugga, Suman Dugga, Shivram Dugga, Shantabai Dugga, 
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and Ashish Kothari for taking time out to comment on the case study which helped enormously in improving 
it. My gratitude goes also to the Rosa Luxemburg Foundation for providing me the opportunity to write this 
case study. Last but not least, many thanks go to Miriam Lang for her regular reminders, prompt responses, 
insightful comments, and constant encouragement.
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Mendha-Lekha village is located in Dhanora Taluka of the Gadchiroli District in the 
Indian state of Maharashtra. The village is home to over 400 people, all belonging to 
the Gond tribe (indigenous people) or the Koya (human), as the tribe refers to itself. 
Like most other indigenous peoples or the adivasis in India, the people in this region 
are also heavily dependent on surrounding forests for their sustenance and livelihood. 
Within a traditional cosmology of the interconnection of all beings, humans, and forests, 
forests have been synonymous with existence for these communities. Under colonial 
rule, and, following Independence, under Indian governments who continued to follow 
colonial policies and practices, the forests were nationalized and access to forests 
for adivasis and other traditional forest-dwelling communities was systemically and 
consistently restricted and legally annihilated. For over 200 years such communities 
have been subjected to exploitation by the government – both colonial and non-colonial; 
oppressed by a centralized and corrupt bureaucracy; and marginalized by economic and 
industrial interests. In this context, in August 2009, Mendha became the first village in 
the country to have its legal rights and responsibilities to use, manage, and conserve 
the 1,800 hectares of forest falling within its customary boundary recognized under the 
Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forests Rights) 
Act, or Forest Rights Act (FRA), of 2006. This was a milestone in the history of forest 
governance not just in the village, but for the country as a whole. 
This legal change was the result of more than two decades of struggle – as part of 
a larger regional movement called the Jungle Bachao Manav Bachao Andolan (Save 
Forests Save Humanity Movement). Starting in the late 1980s, the movement chal-
lenged the centralized and top-down model of governance, appropriation of common 
property resources, and extractivism-based model of development in the region and 
the cultural, social, and ecological injustices that they perpetuated. This prolonged tribal 
resistance was successful in forcing the government to withdraw a few plans for the 
region, but a more significant outcome was that in the region’s many villages it trans-
formed into a strong movement towards self-determination and self-governance, which 
was based on tribal cultural identity and local community control over traditional lands 
and resources, including in Mendha. 
Mendha’s historic struggle and subsequent internal processes of transformation is an 
iconic and remarkable testimony of what a small tribal village, politically weak and voice-
less, could do to empower itself to become a formidable force. From a village where, 
until a few decades ago, the villagers would run into the forest and hide at the sight 
of an outsider, to a village today where no activities, even by the highest political or 
administrative functionaries, can be carried out without the villagers’ free prior informed 
consent. A story of facing and addressing political, administrative, economic, and social 
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challenges through informed decision-making based on the principles of respect, 
equity, consensus, transparency, and non-violence. The village’s strategies to address 
these challenges took place on two levels: internal and external. Internally, its trans-
formation has involved in-depth internal dialogue and reflection, and externally it has 
involved dialogue where possible, collaboration where feasible, and non-violent resist-
ance where needed. Through its resistance the village has consistently questioned, 
challenged, and eventually catalyzed a change in laws and policies, or dominant social, 
political, and economic norms. Within Gadchiroli, Mendha is now part of a collective of 
over thirty gram sabhas in the region who work as a political and economic pressure 
group.
Mendha’s struggle has had an impact on the lives of thousands of similar forest-
dependent villages and communities across India. For many such villages, government, 
and non-government agencies, Mendha today has become an informal center of 
learning. Hundreds of people from across the country visit and learn from Mendha’s 
experiences and experiments. The main actors in Mendha, however, believe that no 
initiative can ever be replicated as each situation, context, and people is different. Initia-
tives like Mendha’s provide other struggles with important lessons in order for them to 
develop their own unique initiative in response to their own local situation and socio-
cultural and political realities.
This case study is an attempt to describe and analyze the context, the struggle, and 
alternative approaches which Mendha’s struggle and experiments used and led to. The 
central question that this case study explores is how Mendha moved away from social, 
economic, and political exploitation and alienation to empower itself socially, politically, 
and economically. It argues that this transformation was possible because of several 
interrelated processes, the influence of larger regional movements, and a confluence 
of many actors and political ideologies. At the root of this was the village’s own intense 
aspiration and efforts devoted towards finding a resolution to the oppressive situa-
tion that they were faced with. Through this process, Mendha transformed its political 
community both from within and towards the outside. By doing so it acquired ecolog-
ical, social, and livelihood security, economic independence, and political efficacy. 
For the sake of easy reading and clarity, this case study has been divided into an initial 
descriptive part (in a chronological order) and subsequent analytical part. This has been 
done to the extent that it is possible to separate the two without affecting the flow. First, 
the section provides the background and context to Mendha’s resistance and transforma-
tion process, and describes the historical circumstances that led to the resistance and 
transformation. This is followed by a description and analysis of the process of resistance 
and transformation; the role played by external actors; the emergence of study circles 
to facilitate informed decision-making; the endeavor to explore and address internal 
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weaknesses, including gender and age-based discrimination, as well as external power 
structures, including by taking de facto charge of the village administration and forest-
based livelihoods and governance; and political ideology and institutions in Mendha. The 
subsequent section describes and analyzes what the village has been able to achieve 
through these institutions, including social, political, economic, and ecological gains. 
The fourth section contextualizes Mendha’s resistance and transformation in the larger 
regional political and administrative environment, its relationship with the state, state 
agencies, and the extreme and armed political left in the region, and some criticism 
that Mendha faces. The conclusion draws similarities between the situation when the 
Gadchiroli Movement began in the 1980s and where Gadchiroli district stands today, with 
forest rights recognized but with those same forests being leased out for mining. The 
case study comes to an end with an open question about what the future will bring.
BACKGROUND
COLONIAL FOREST POLICIES AND FORCED DISPLACEMENT 
Mendha’s resistance and that of hundreds of communities across India is part of a larger 
resource politics emerging from the competing aspirations of state, corporations, and 
local communities. Forests constitute over 76 percent of the total geographical area of 
Gadchiroli district. Most of these are dense and rich in timber, bamboo, and other forest 
produce important for local people as well as for the state for their commercial value. 
As much as 85 percent of the state’s bamboo, for example, comes from Gadchiroli 
district. Until recently, the forests of Gadchiroli had been extensively exploited by the 
state forest department for commercial purposes. Most of these commercial forest 
extractions were carried out through leases to different industries. For example, since 
1968, the Maharashtra government had leased most of its bamboo forests to Ballarpur 
Industries Limited (BILT). The paper mill, which has over the years become amongst the 
biggest economic powers in this region, was given leases which also included Mend-
ha’s forests. The roots of this resource politics lie in colonial rule and its appropriation of 
common property resources for the commercial interest of the state. 
Historically, across India forests were taken over by the colonial British government in 
1865 through the enactment of the Indian Forest Act and the creation of an elaborate 
forest bureaucracy to manage the forests. Colonial interests in these forests were extrac-
tive and commercial; local customary governance and its use of forests was considered 
an encumbrance and hindrance to the maximization of benefits for the colonial state. 
These customary uses therefore were either extinguished completely or were granted 
not as rights but as privileges, dependent on the payment of specified fees (Guha, 1994). 
The forests of Gadchiroli district, like in other parts of the country, were taken over by 
the British, but unlike in other parts these forests continued to be managed by local 
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feudal land lords (zamindars) until 1950. In 1950, this region was still part of what the 
British called the Central Provinces and Berar, also referred to as C.P. and Berar (parts 
of the present-day states of Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and Chhattisgarh). Much 
like the tribal populations across India, in Gadchiroli district tribal communities were 
also, and continue to be, heavily dependent on the forests for their subsistence and 
cultural survival. Considering that zamindars in this region were tribal themselves, there 
were few restrictions on subsistence resource extraction, barring species prohibited by 
the government because of their commercial value for the state. The zamindars would 
allow customary use and access rights to the local people according to their whims and 
fancies. In exchange for access to the forests, the local villagers were required to work 
for the zamindar without payment (begari).
After the Zamindari, or feudal system, was abolished in Independent India, the forests 
in Gadchiroli came to be vested with the State of India. and suitable areas were 
handed over to the Forest Department (FD) in 1951. Soon these forests were declared 
Protected Forests (PF) under the Colonial Indian Forest Act of 1927 (IFA). PF meant 
that the forests would be controlled and managed by a centralized forest bureaucracy 
although local people could continue to access resources for subsistence. At the same 
time, the government set up a committee to enquire into the customary rights of the 
local people, which was carried out between 1951 and 56. Based on this, in 1956 a 
detailed nistar patrak (record of rights) for each village was prepared in C.P. and Berar. 
These nistar patraks were unique and significant as such detailed records of the collec-
tive rights of each village over their common property resources were rarely elsewhere 
in the country. These nistar patraks, however, were not handed over to the respective 
villages but were kept at the nearest government land revenue office. After Maha-
rashtra became an independent state in 1960, these rights were included in the state’s 
Land Revenue Code and hence came to be legally accepted by the state (Pathak & 
Gour-Broome, 2001). 
In 1959, the government of India declared its intention to designate a large part of the 
forests in C.P and Berar, including those in Gadchiroli, as Reserved Forests (RFs). RFs 
mandate a highly restricted use of resources by the local people. The declaration of RFs 
as per the Indian Forest Act requires a process that entails the settlement of rights; few, 
if any, rights are allowed to continue, and if so, then on the basis of the payment of spec-
ified taxes. The nistar patraks lost in the government offices were gradually forgotten 
by the state and were forced out of people’s memory. Without following the specified 
legal processes, settlement, and/or the acceptance of rights as per the nistar patraks, 
these forests gradually began to be treated by the Forest Department as de facto RFs 
and people’s rights were systemically abridged, even though the legal declaration of 
RFs was made only in 1992. 
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Among the hundreds of villages impacted by these exclusionary, top-down policies 
implemented by the government was Mendha-Lekha village. A large part of their 1,800 
hectares of traditional forest was among the proposed RFs. Consequently, the Forest 
Department began to issue passes for accessing the forest, but now, in contrast to previ-
ously, these passes were issued upon payment of taxes only. Considering that access 
to the forest was essential for practically all the needs of a family and the specified 
official taxes were beyond the capacity of the people, a system of informal payments 
or bribes in kind to the local forest officers became a common practice. A conventional 
norm was to take a portion of the very first harvest straight from the farmer’s fields to 
the forest office, locally referred to as khaldda (to be shared by all concerned officials). 
This was in addition to the chicken, liquor, and local forest produce that they would have 
to give as payment throughout the year. Although the times during the zamindar were 
by no means easy for the people, people in Mendha describe the period between the 
state take-over in the 1950s and the early 1980s, when the movement towards self-rule 
became stronger, as one of great hardship and humiliation. People were at the mercy of 
the local forest officials, despite paying heavy bribes. 
RADICAL SHIFT IN FOREST POLICY AND LAW
In 2006, after a long-standing grassroots struggle by tribal communities across India 
against alienating, oppressive, top-down forest and conservation policies, the govern-
ment of India enacted a landmark law – The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional 
Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Rights) Act 2006, also called the Forest Rights Act 
of India for short (hereafter referred to as the FRA). The FRA is revolutionary in its 
acknowledgement of the historic injustice that has been committed against forest 
dwelling communities in colonial and post-colonial times and its declaration that the 
rights of these communities to their traditional forests are “already vested”; it is only a 
matter of completing the process of recording. The processes of the recognition and 
verification of forest rights in the FRA is currently the only legal process in the country 
for determining local forest rights. The FRA recognizes fourteen pre-existing rights to 
all categories of forest land, such as Individual Forest Rights (IFRs) over land being culti-
vated by forest-dwelling communities, but over which they do not have any tenure rights, 
and Community Rights (CRs) over the use of and access to forest land and resources 
which can be claimed under the law. In addition, the FRA also enables the gram sabhas 
(village assemblies) to claim their rights to use, manage, and conserve their traditional 
forests (here on Community Forest Resources or CFRs), and protect them from internal 
and external threats. The law also seeks to democratize forest governance by ensuring 
that the informed consent of the gram sabha is sought before their CRs or CFR forests 
are diverted for non-forestry purposes. If seen in conjunction, together all these provi-
sions have the potential to transform and radically democratize forest governance and 
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conservation regimes in India, impacting the lives of over 200 million forest-dependent 
people across the country (CFR-LA, 2016). Already in the country, a few gram sabhas 
(some successfully and others not so successfully) have legally challenged the diversion 
of their traditional forests for mining and other extractive uses, using the provisions of 
this Act. It is precisely for this reason that the implementation of the Act has remained 
an uphill task, with only 3 percent of its potential being realized a decade after its enact-
ment in 2006. One of the reasons for the poor implementation of the Act nationwide 
has been a lack of political and administrative will to support its radically transformative 
provisions. The only regions where the Act has been better implemented are those 
where forest-dwelling communities have mobilized local people’s movements, or civil 
society actors are active and administrative officials are supportive (CFR-LA, 2016). 
A report on the ten years of implementation of the FRA in Maharashtra, published in 
March 2017 (Maharashtra CFR-LA, 2017), indicates that Maharashtra is a leading state 
in the implementation of the FRA, having recognized 20 percent of the minimum poten-
tial of CFR rights. Significantly, over 60 percent of these rights have been recognized in 
Gadchiroli district alone, one of thirty-six districts in the state. This translates to mean 
that by March 2017, governance and management rights had been transferred to 1,355 
villages over an area of 433,995 hectares of forests in the district. A combination of 
factors have contributed to the progress made by the FRA in Gadchiroli, including a 
strong mass movement, a district-level study circle whose role is to understand and 
facilitate the process of filing claims, the effective and timely support of civil society 
actors, and an occasionally supportive district administration, among others. The 
district-level study circle ensured that the much forgotten existing record of rights in the 
form of nistar patraks were unearthed and provided to the villagers in order to make their 
claims stronger. They also worked as a pressure group to ensure that all relevant govern-
ment records that could be used in this process were provided by the government to 
each and every village in the district. In this context, Mendha emerged as an example 
and played an important role in the district-level processes related to the FRA. The 
village started with study circle discussions in their own village, followed by an effective 
implementation of the law, to eventually become the first village in the country to have 
their CFR rights recognized. This paved the way for hundreds of others in the district 
and in the country. Villages which, after years of alienation, were not convinced that 
rights could actually be recognized, saw Mendha as an inspiration and source of encour-
agement. The various struggles of Mendha’s villagers throughout the process of filing 
their claims and asserting their rights once they gained recognition have brought about 
significant policy interpretations and legal changes in the forest laws in the state and the 
country (see section on the implementation of the FRA below). Mendha continues to 
be an inspiration and learning ground for hundreds of villages across the country going 
through similar struggles to assert their rights under the FRA. 
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RESISTANCE AND TRANSFORMATION  
AT THE REGIONAL AND LOCAL LEVEL
In the mid-1980s, tribal communities already reeling under oppressive and alien-
ating forest policies and atrocities were in for another shock when the government 
announced a number of “development” activities for the region. In addition to the 
continuation of the commercial exploitation of forests by the Forest Department, the 
plan included an extensive network of 17-18 hydro-electric dams, mainly over the 
River Indravati, which flows through the southern region of the district, but also on 
other rivers. The plan, if accomplished, would have resulted in the relocation of large 
populations from Southern Gadchiroli and Bastar District in Madhya Pradesh – both 
largely inhabited by forest-dwelling adivasi communities. A massive people’s gath-
ering was organized in Gadchiroli district headquarters in 1984, with hundreds of 
tribal villages participating in the rally. This was followed by a series of village-level 
meetings, as well as meetings at the Ilaka (erstwhile feudal administrative division 
for a cluster of villages) level.
The Gadchiroli Movement raised many questions about the model of development 
that was being proposed and came to be called Jungle Bachao Manav Bachao 
Andolan (Save Forest Save Humanity Movement). Numerous slogans raised by 
the people during these meetings represented their political and developmental 
ideology. These included “Jungle jeene ka adhaar” (Forests are the basis of life), 
“Jungle katenge ham katenge, jungle bachenge ham bachenge” (If forests are cut 
our lifeline will be cut, if forests are saved we are saved), “Pani chahiye Bandh 
nahin, kuaan chahiye mruthyu nahi” (we want water not dams, we want wells not 
death – essentially saying building dams will kill people and to sustain life smaller 
water-harvesting structures and wells are needed). The most significant feature 
of these meetings was that the people participating in them were not only those 
directly impacted by the dams and leases but thousands of others who came in 
solidarity to resist this model of development, which was alienating and oppres-
sive. The Movement was supported at various points by a number of politically and 
socially influential individuals. Significant among them were Lalsham Shah Maharaj 
– an ex-Zamindar from the area, Dr. B.D. Sharma – a renowned civil servant, an 
activist for tribal rights and then Commissioner of the National Commission on 
Scheduled Tribes and Scheduled Castes, and Baba Amte and Sundar Lal Bahuguna 
– both renowned social workers, Gandhian, and activists. These important figures 
came from ideological perspectives ranging from socialist, to Gandhian, and the 
political left. All these political ideologies played an important role in influencing 
the Gadchiroli Movement, which subsequently transformed into a process towards 
self-determination and self-governance based on tribal cultural identity and local 
community control over traditional lands and resources. 
~ 145 ~INDIA
The Gadchiroli Movement revealed the power of the people to the government and 
to all political parties and in the end the dam projects were shelved. Control over the 
forests, however, remained with the Forest Department, and forest leases continued to 
be given for commercial extraction. 
TOWARDS SELF-RULE AND SELF-DETERMINATION  
IN MENDHA
A group of villagers from Mendha, including Devaji Tofa, attended all the rallies and 
meetings organized as part of Jungle Bachao Manav Bachao Andolan. In addition to 
expressing solidarity, this was one of the many attempts for them to find a solution to 
their own decreasing access to their traditional forests and increasing oppression by 
the Forest Department. Village elders had had many discussions within the village and 
also approached local and district level political and social leaders in the hope of some 
help and relief. Despite many assurances from political leaders over the years their 
situation had only worsened. During a meeting organized by the neighboring villages of 
Heti and Devsur, Devaji Tofa met Mohan Hirabai Hiralal, one of the main mobilizers of 
the Gadchiroli Movement. Mohan and his wife Savita were to play a quintessential role 
in bringing the Movement’s ideas to Mendha and in the subsequent internal processes 
and struggle towards self-rule.
Mohan and Savita were deeply inspired by Mahatma Gandhi’s vision of Hind-Swaraj 
(self-rule) and Vinoba Bhave’s ideology of Sarvayatan (rule by all). They had been 
associated with the student social movement and strongly believed in the idea that 
representative democracy in its current form rendered people powerless and vulner-
able to oppression. People have the real political power, which they hand over to 
their representatives in electoral and representative democracy, leading to a concen-
tration of political power in the hands of a few. They believed such a concentration of 
power to be a kind of structural violence. For true transformation, decision-making 
power had to be with the local community, and not just a few within the commu-
nity but all members. Being part of the Jugle bachao manav bachao andolan, their 
conviction had grown and it had become clear to them that there were two crucial 
issues to be taken into consideration for any kind of development in this region. 
These were: 
> Forests were the basis of life for people and hence people’s control over forests  
 and forest-related decision-making was essential.
> People and forests faced injustice because of structural violence perpetuated  
 by the concentration of power. They believed that such injustice would continue  
 until decision-making processes included all (direct democracy) instead of a few  
 (representative democracy) at all levels of governance. 
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In the current system of governance, decision-making power and control over resources 
were not in the hands of the people. The decision-makers in Delhi (the national capital) 
and Mumbai (the state capital) did not bear local interests in mind. The People’s Move-
ment was a clear indication of local discontent over injustices arising out of this situation. 
Mohan and Savita believed that the disempowerment of the people was a combined 
result of both external structural conditions and internal socio-political and cultural 
weaknesses. In such a context, while resistance against external structural injustices 
was important, processes of internal explorations were equally important for a mean-
ingful, all-pervasive and long-term transformation.
Having being part of various social justice movements , Mohan and Savita were in 
search of a collaborating village in order to collectively explore more deeply and actu-
alize on the ground the process by which a socio-political transformation could happen. 
With the aim of undertaking participatory action research towards this they travelled to 
and discussed their idea with sixty-five villages in Gadchiroli. Eventually, twenty-two of 
the sixty-five villages agreed to participate in such a study; Mendha was one of them. 
Devaji Tofa was himself very interested in understanding the process of transformation 
and accompanied Mohan and Savita to all the villages in the district. One of the impor-
tant criteria that this team set out for themselves was to engage with a village which 
1) was interested in action research of this kind and 2) already had certain elements 
conducive to this process of transformation. 
One important reason for the inclusion of Mendha in the study was its traditional justice 
system that distinguished it from other villages in the region. Traditional justice among 
the Gond tribe is consensus-based, i.e. no decision on any conflict is ever taken until 
all women and men in the community agree with the decision, including the parties 
directly involved in the conflict. In Mendha, this practice was still followed and the 
conflict-resolution process involved intense and long discussions till a consensus was 
reached. Other decisions regarding village governance, however, were not consensus-
based, but were taken by traditionally chosen village leaders, invariably men. On Savita 
and Mohan’s request, Mendha invited them to stay in the village and take part in the 
study1. Mohan and Savita began by joining the informal evening gatherings at the village 
square. Soon they introduced the idea that discussions in such gatherings would be 
called “study circle discussions” and used as the main methodology for the collabo-
rative action research project. Anyone in the village interested in the subject of the 
discussion would join them. This was a critical intervention in Mendha’s long journey 
towards self-rule and over the years it has emerged one of Mendha’s strongest points 
– discussing issues exhaustively, respectfully, and honestly in an open and non-judg-
1  Savita and Mohan lived in Mendha for a period of a year-and-a-half for the action research. 
Since then they have stayed involved with the village as long-term collaborator friends.
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mental environment, and taking into account the most insignificant sounding opposition, 
till every member of the village agrees or consents. 
Considering that the forest was an immediate and significant issue for the village 
and this is what Savita and Mohan were also interested in exploring, the first action 
research method that Mendha village undertook with Mohan and Savita was on 
understanding the “forest/people relationship” in all its dimensions. This became 
the main issue of discussion in the village square discussions or the study circles. 
People in the village joined these discussions in large numbers and kept bringing 
up the issue of their reduced access to the forests and oppression by the Forest 
Department. The study circle began discussing why they were not able to address 
something as crucial as access to the forests. Why did they not have access? What 
had happened to their nistar rights? Why was the Forest Department taking all 
the decisions regarding the forests? Who was the Forest Department? Numerous 
similar questions arose and were discussed in depth. 
EMPOWERMENT BEGINS BY UNDERSTANDING AND 
ADDRESSING INTERNAL WEAKNESSES
Over a period of time the study circle concluded that the above questions were linked 
to the villagers not being empowered enough. Discussions on what makes people 
disempowered identified four main reasons for disempowerment: external systemic 
and structural injustices, and internal weaknesses. Villagers began discussing what the 
major internal weaknesses were that rendered them disempowered. 
They identified many but concluded that mainly four of those reduced their political power:
> The traditional decision-making system involved only male elders, presided by  
 the village priest; youth and women were excluded. 
> The non-involvement of women in traditional decision-making meant eliminating  
 50 percent of the village’s perspectives, knowledge, and wisdom from those  
 decisions. 
> Alcoholism among men was leading to domestic violence against women,  
 draining resources, and rendering people incapable of making effective decisions.
> Not knowing and not understanding administrative and legal processes was a  
 disadvantage and led to villagers not being able to take informed decisions.
The members of the study circle concluded that ensuring access to the forests would 
mean gaining decision-making rights and powers. These powers could only be gained 
through a long and difficult struggle against very strong structural and legal regimes. 
Such a struggle would mean self-empowerment and no process of self-empowerment 
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could be achieved if women were not an integral part of the struggle (including in deci-
sion-making), if people were inebriated, and uninformed. 
ALCOHOLISM A PRIMARY ISSUE FOR WOMEN
When women were encouraged to be part of village decision-making processes, 
the first issue that they raised was “alcoholism.” Local alcohol brewed from Mahua 
(Madhuca indica) is part of traditional Gond culture and its rituals. Alcohol consump-
tion in the village, according to women, was not restricted to ceremonial purposes and 
had reached a level that was leading to the exclusion of women, domestic violence, 
and poverty. They also pointed out what had already been discussed in study circles 
on numerous occasions: that alcoholism was rendering people incapable of making 
effective and informed decisions. Women insisted on a ban on the production, sale, 
and consumption of alcohol in the village. This brought out many internal conflicts in the 
village and also revealed the impact of external power hierarchies. 
Many men, particularly those who consumed alcohol or were financially benefiting from 
its trade, began to strongly resist women’s participation in decision-making (mild resist-
ance to this continues to date); those already in positions of power began to see women 
as a threat to their power. Every discussion in the study circles about a ban on alcohol 
led to intense conflicts. A decision was taken in the study circle to discuss the “impact 
of alcohol on their society and well-being” instead of a discussion on “banning alcohol 
consumption.” Special efforts were made to ensure that those consuming alcohol or 
financially benefiting from its production and sale were present in these discussions. 
Various questions began to be discussed, including what is the impact of alcoholism on 
the village? Who benefits from it? What impact does it have on children, women, and 
families? What impact does it have on those who drink, produce, and sell it? What does 
banning alcohol mean? What impact would it have? 
People insisted that alcohol was an integral part of traditional Gond culture and ceremo-
nies and hence should not be banned. The study circle then decided to discuss what 
was the meaning behind the use of alcohol in ceremonies. This meant delving deeper 
into the origins of such traditions and the reasons for them. Over a year of discussions 
concluded that the use of alcohol in the current context was no longer aligned with 
what it traditionally was. People had forgotten the meaning, origins, and significance of 
alcohol in the ceremonies. After a deep exploration of what the use of alcohol in tradi-
tional ceremonies really meant the study circle’s discussions concluded that the current 
use of alcohol was a form of abuse and traditions were merely being used to justify such 
abuse. The regulation of the production and use of alcohol was therefore not found to 
be in violation of traditional practices. 
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Following these discussions the gram sabha eventually took the following decisions 
regarding alcohol production and use in the village:
> Alcohol will not be brewed by the villagers, except for ceremonial and ritualistic  
 purposes and only with permission of the gram sabha; 
> Alcohol will not be sold in the village; 
> Alcohol will not be consumed within the village, except by elders during the  
 ceremonies (young people were forbidden from consuming alcohol); 
> Those drinking outside and coming to the village shall not engage in violence or  
 social disruption of any kind. 
Any violation of these rules would result in social sanctions and cultural penalties. One 
of the positive outcomes of this was women’s mobilization and organization. They came 
together to start a support group for those who may be facing domestic violence or 
oppression because of alcoholism or other reasons. This later translated into the forma-
tion of an empowered and socially active women’s group in the village and the active 
participation of women in all decision-making processes and village struggles.
THE DISTRICT-LEVEL ANTI-ALCOHOL MOVEMENT IN GADCHIROLI
At the same time that Mendha was struggling with the issue of alcohol, discussions and 
movements against alcohol started gaining momentum across the district of Gadchiroli 
and slowly spread to other neighboring states such as Andhra Pradesh. The idea of 
an alcohol-free district was not a moralistic or ethical issue but a political issue related 
to local empowerment and development. A district-level study group, which included 
thinkers and activists from the district, was formed to improve understanding of this 
issue. This group calculated and compared the amount of money coming to the district 
for development and the amount that was being spent on alcohol: the latter was found 
to be greater than the former. The district-level movement and Mendha’s decisions on 
alcohol inspired over 150 gram sabhas in the district to formulate their own internal 
regulations related to alcohol. Eventually, the district administration was forced to admit 
the social impact of alcohol and officially banned alcohol in the district, except if brewed 
for ceremonial purposes and for self-consumption. A subsequent study carried out by 
the district-level study circle in 1993-94 showed that the ban had led to 65 percent of 
people giving up alcohol. They also found that such people and their families enjoyed 
better socio-economic circumstances than before; their children had better education, 
and domestic violence against women and children in such families had substantially 
reduced. While the anti-alcohol movement weakened in the rest of the district over a 
period of time, the alcohol ban continues to be complied with in Mendha. 
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ESTABLISHING A POLITICAL  
AND DEVELOPMENTAL IDEOLOGY 
Within this larger context, one of the initial journeys for the village was to establish its 
implicit political ideology. This political and developmental ideology emerged through an 
organic dialectic between the traditional Gond way of being and Mahatma Gandhi’s idea of 
Hind Swaraj as it informed the process through Mohan. The idea of Hind Swaraj itself was 
never directly discussed in the study circles but influenced the discussions through Mohan.
As he explains: Vinoba Bhave, a well-known Gandhian, had spoken about self-rule to be 
based on consensual decision-making. Vinoba said that there is a polity that calls itself 
“Democracy” and pretends to be sarvayatan (rule by all). However, this system uses 
violence to achieve democracy. No system based on violence can call itself sarvayatan, 
even if it pretends to work on the basis of one person one vote. On the contrary, sarvay-
atan should be based on wisdom, competency, freedom from attachment and hatred, 
and devoted to the welfare of all. 
This would include the basic principles of:
> Comprehensive and equal development of all
> Maximum possible distribution of political power
> Minimum possible governance
> Simplest system of administration
> Lowest possible expenditure
> Universal, uninterrupted, and free distribution of knowledge.
With the infusion of these basic principles the study circles began to explore the concepts 
of development and governance. The discussions began to explore questions such as 
what is Government? What is Development? Is development the construction of roads, 
schools, and hospitals? Who should carry out development and for whom? Villagers 
knew that in the current scheme of things all decisions were taken by the govern-
ment, including about village development and the use of and control over resources. 
Everyone expected the government to do the right thing, but no one in the village knew 
who or what the government was. The collective experience of people showed that the 
government did little for the well-being of the people. Their experiences with govern-
ment officials had largely been shaped by oppression, extortion, and bribes. Villagers 
began to question why they should wait for the government to “develop” them? 
Why could they themselves not define what their needs were and address them? 
This gave rise to two main slogans in the village: “Dilli, Mumbai mawa sarkar, Mawa 
nate mate sarkar” (our representatives constitute the government in Delhi and Mumbai 
and WE are the government in our village) and “Jungle nasht karne vikas nahi, sanskriti 
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nasht karne sudhar nahi” (no development by destroying forests, and no reform by 
destroying cultures). Both these slogans represented Mendha’s political and develop-
ment ideology in a nutshell. These slogans laid a strong ideological foundation for village 
self-rule and Mendha’s struggle to take charge of its forests.
VILLAGE INSTITUTIONS AS PART OF THE PROCESS OF 
SELF-EMPOWERMENT
Although not written down or necessarily articulated as such, the various principles 
that emerged during the study circle discussions and became basic principles deeply 
entrenched in Mendha’s decision-making institutions and processes included a collab-
orative knowledge-creation space using new and old knowledge systems (including 
villagers and outsiders); a decision-making space where no outsiders can interfere; 
equal opportunity for all in decision-making within the village through consensual deci-
sions; a space for non-violent action, which can be undertaken by anyone from within 
and outside, under the supervision of the gram sabha.
ABHYAS GAT OR STUDY CIRCLES
Study circles are important village institutions in the production, assimilation, and trans-
mission of knowledge. According to Mohan, “any social group is a conglomeration of 
some thinkers, some talkers, some doers, some whose nature is to work for the benefit 
of the others, while others are self-focused and subversive in nature. The need is to iden-
tify those who like to talk and start discussing with them, if issues are of consequence 
Gram sabha, Mendha
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or interest others will join in.” This is how the discussion groups/study circles/Abhays gat 
started in Mendha. When people would sit and discuss, Mohan and Savita would join them 
and start introducing a range of issues which were not traditionally discussed, including 
news of the outside world and new laws and policies. Villagers found these discussions 
enriching as these provided them with insights into the outside world. As described earlier, 
one of the most significant study circles was on Forests and People which lasted from 
1987 to 1989. The results of the discussions emerging from this became the foundation 
for the struggle for self-rule in the village. Gradually, the villagers started using the oppor-
tunity when visitors came to the village to talk to them in the evenings, find out about 
their work, and inform them about the village initiative. They also started inviting experts 
from outside if needed. In this way, a large number of people became associated with 
Mendha over a period of time who contributed directly and indirectly towards their effort. 
Study-group discussions helped the villagers develop their own conversation skills and 
confidence, awareness of the world outside, and, most importantly, provided them with 
important contributions towards informed decisions to be taken at the gram sabha meet-
ings or in negotiations with powerful outside government and non-government actors.
GRAM SABHA (THE VILLAGE ASSEMBLY)
The gram sabha is the main decision-making body in the village and is represented by 
at least two people (one male and one female) from each family in the village. Deci-
sions are taken unanimously (not on the basis of a majority) and implemented through 
oral yet strong social norms. The gram sabha has many specified rules, some of which 
are written down and kept in the gram sabha office, but not all. Villagers believe “rules 
when written down tend to become rigid, and allow for little flexibility.” The gram sabha 
meets every Purnima (full moon) at noon. But villagers meet regularly on various issues 
and for pressing or urgent matters all members are informed and a meeting is immedi-
ately convened. Attending gram sabha meetings is compulsory for each family as the 
village considers regular dialogue-based informed decision-making to be their biggest 
strength. On average, about 75 percent of members attend the gram sabha meetings. 
The appointed day of the gram sabha is also a declared polo2 (community holiday), to 
make it possible for the maximum number of people to participate. There are no gram 
sabha office bearers; Devaji was appointed convener in recent times to ensure a smooth 
running. Gram sabha meetings begin with appointing a president for the day; the presi-
dent convenes the meeting. Minutes of the meetings are meticulously maintained. 
The gram sabha has an office where all the village records, records of the meetings, and 
accounts are kept and other village organization activities are carried out. One person 
2  Polo is a traditional system of declaring a break from individual activities on 
one day in a week to facilitate community meetings and activities.
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from the village has been appointed as a regular office administrator to manage the 
office and is paid a salary by the gram sabha.
GRAM SABHA RULES
> Cutting trees for fruits, flowers, leaves, or honey and cutting primary branches of 
trees is strictly prohibited.
> Liquor brewing and consumption is strictly prohibited and violations are fined. Distilling 
for traditional ceremonies is permitted upon prior permission of the gram sabha.
> Central or state government agencies, contractors, NGOs cannot carry out any activ-
ities in the village without the free prior informed consent of the gram sabha.
> All villagers are to endeavor to contribute towards village administration voluntarily.
> The difficulty of an individual is the difficulty of the community and the difficulty of 
the community is the difficulty of the individual.
> All internal village conflicts will be resolved in the gram sabha by consensus. Gram 
sabha members should avoid involving police or the court without prior discussions 
on the issue in the gram sabha.
> Beneficiaries for all government schemes should be selected by the gram sabha by 
consensus.
> People are free to bribe officials in cash and kind if they so wish, but they must take 
a receipt in writing from the person or else deposit the same amount in the gram 
sabha account.
> When visitors (including government officials) visit the village without prior notice, 
people must continue with their important work and must not feel compelled to 
attend to the visitors. 
> Shramdan (voluntary labor contribution) for any village activity should not be under-
taken if it falls only on a few people and families; all must contribute.
> All living beings (including humans) have equal rights to natural resources. We will 
strive to use natural resources without impacting upon other species.
> Irrespective of who owns the land, water above and below belongs to all, and all 
villagers have an equal right over it.
> 10 percent of all earnings by members of the gram sabha will be deposited in the 
village bank account for collective use.
> 2.5 percent of the harvest has to be deposited in the village grain bank.
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Decisions in the gram sabha are consensus-based, and if no consensus is reached 
the decision is deferred. Any member of the village can re-open a decision for further 
discussion at any time in the future. The consensus system seems to works well in 
Mendha because of its homogenous population and an absence of caste inequities. 
Inclusive and transparent decision-making ensures the villagers’ adherence to all gram 
sabha decisions. Decisions taken by the gram sabha prevail over any other official or 
unofficial orders. All outsiders (government officials, researchers, NGOs) who intend to 
carry out any activity in the village or the adjoining forests have to present their plan in 
the gram sabha and seek the permission of the village.
IMPLEMENTING SUB-COMMITTEES
The village has various sub-committees constituted to implement the decisions of the 
gram sabha, such as the Van Suraksha Samittee (VSS) or Forest Protection Committee, 
which implement all decisions related to forest management. In recent times, all the 
members of the village have been organized into Self-Help Groups (SHGs), each group 
including five men and five women. These SHGs work as smaller support groups for its 
members and also collectively undertake various responsibilities for the commons in the 
village. The village has also constituted smaller groups, some looking at the drafting of 
community diversity registers, another working on the formulation of a forest manage-
ment plan, yet another looking into water-related issues; another group manages the 
village tractor, and yet another group is working on the formulation of job plans under 
the National Employment Guarantee Scheme. The traditional system of justice also 
continues. For all activities carried out under the gram sabha, whether related to labor, 
research, management, or governance, villagers are paid by the gram sabha at a fixed 
daily wage rate (except in some cases when the village decides to carry out an activity 
through voluntary contributions or shramdaan). This ensures that all village governance 
activities run smoothly while the livelihoods of the people are secured. Shramdaan 
depends on the need in the moment and whether or not resources are available for 
them. If not, then villagers contribute voluntary labor. There are also common social 
activities which are collectively done, such as village cleaning, village functions, extin-
guishing forest fires, forest patrolling, livestock grazing, among others.
SELFEMPOWERMENT AND INSTITUTIONS
Before understanding how Mendha addressed some of the systemic and structural 
injustices it has suffered, it is important to understand the state’s governance and 
administrative context that Mendha is a part of. 
India has a three-tier federal system of governance: the Central government, State 
government and the Panchayati Raj System (adopted by different states in 1960s). 
Under the Panchayati Raj System the smallest unit of decision-making is a Panchayat. 
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A Panchayat can be at the level of one village or a cluster of villages, depending on the 
population of the villages. This means that one or two representatives from each village 
are elected to the Panchayat (if the Panchayat has many small villages then representa-
tives from some villages may not be part of the Panchayat). Each Panchayat has tenure 
for five years and the head of the Panchayat is called the Sarpanch. The government 
appoints a government functionary as a secretary to the Panchayat. Eight times a year, 
all the adult members of the villages which are part of the Panchayat are expected to 
meet. This is officially called the general body of the Panchayat or the gram sabha. 
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM   POLITICAL SYSTEM 
         
This system of governance has often been criticized for being an extension of repre-
sentative governance and not direct democracy, and consequently for not being truly 
empowering for the village communities. The Panchayat gram sabha meetings are 
rarely attended by the villagers as their villages are far and issues concerning them are 
rarely discussed in depth. Panchayats therefore have become another corrupt extension 
of the government establishment, with little financial or administrative power. One of 
the unfortunate realities across India is the heavy politicization of the Panchayats. It is 
common practice for national and regional political parties to establish roots at the village 
level and candidates standing for Panchayat elections often have party affiliations. This 
has created political divisions and factions within the villages and Panchayats, often 
leading to murky politics of power rather than elections for this basic unit being based 
on issues of local significance.
Officially, Mendha falls under the Lekha Panchayat, along with two other neighboring 
villages. The three villages falling under this Panchayat together elect five members 
State legislature
Central government




District administration District Council or Zila Parishad 
Panchayat cluster or Samiti 
P A N C H A Y A T  
Sub-divisional office and Tahsil
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who constitute the executive council for these villages. This is officially the first level 
of decision-making for these three villages. However, in the case of Mendha, the first 
level of decision-making happens de facto at their own village gram sabha (see section 
above). Mendha’s gram sabha unanimously selects (instead of electing) members to 
represent them in the Panchayat. This method of selecting members for the Panchayat 
is a practice followed in most Gond villages in this region, as an extension of the tradi-
tional practice of choosing village elders to make decisions for the village. Among the 
reasons why Mendha chose to continue with this traditional system of nominating 
rather than electing was the desire to avoid the village being divided along party lines.
In Mendha, the compliance of the villagers with decisions made by their own gram 
sabha is more important than the ones made by the official Panchayat. Initially, there 
was resistance in the Panchayat to this but there has never been any major conflict 
between these two institutions. Over a period of time the Panchayat has accepted 
the importance of Mendha’s gram sabha for its people. The gram sabha has also 
established itself as an informal but empowered institution both within and outside of 
the village. The gram sabha has often coordinated with the Panchayat to ensure that 
Mendha receives the benefits that come from state agencies through panchat, but also 
to ensure that the distribution of these benefits within the village is handled by the gram 
sabha so that it is transparent and equitable.
TAKING CHARGE OF VILLAGE ADMINISTRATION AND LEGAL RECORDS 
Study circles had already identified the lack of knowledge about legal and administra-
tive processes as one of the reasons for disempowerment. Subsequent discussions 
helped them realize that not being in possession and control of official papers, records, 
maps, and information about their village, lands, and forests added to their being disem-
powered. All this information was recorded and kept by government agencies. The 
absence of any documents or information related to their nistar rights prevented them 
from asserting these rights. 
As a first step towards achieving self-rule, the gram sabha established an office of its 
own and initiated the process of acquiring factual, legal, and political information about 
their village, including various village, revenue, and nistar maps. The villagers faced 
strong initial resistance from the local administration but eventually they succeeded. 
Once all the legal and government records of rights and maps were with them, they 
insisted that the revenue and forest officials come and help them ascertain their legal 
boundaries on the ground as per the maps. This was an extremely important victory 
for the villagers to gain the confidence that political power that rightfully belongs to 
them can be taken back through informed, transparent, and non-violent collective 
action. Taking charge of their nistar records was also significant from the point of view 
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of hundreds of other villages of erstwhile C.P. and Berar province facing resource aliena-
tion. These villages could now also ask for their own nistar patraks. Subsequently, some 
of these records also became crucial evidence for claims filed under the Forest Rights 
Act when it was implemented.
The second step towards self-rule was a declaration that no outside agency, whether 
Central government, State government, contractors, or NGOs, would carry out any 
activity in the village without the free prior informed consent of the village. Mend-
ha’s declaration of self-rule Dilli, Mumbai mawa sarkar, Mawa nate mate sarkar was 
announced to all. 
TAKING CHARGE OF THE FORESTS AND ASSERTING CULTURAL IDENTITY 
BY RECONSTRUCTING A GHOTUL 
With its declaration of self-rule, Mendha also announced that having taken charge of 
their nistar forests, the villagers would no longer pay any bribes to any government 
offices and would no longer allow their forests to be commercially exploited. Mend-
ha’s declaration of self-rule faced strong opposition from all conventional centers 
of power – the strongest coming from the Forest Department. Mendha’s declara-
tion came at a time when the department was in one of its harvest cycles and had 
employed labor from outside to carry out forestry operations in Mendha’s forests. 
The village decided to stop the harvest. The entire village calmly marched to the 
forest and surrounded the area being felled. They asked the workers to stop cutting 
the trees. The village strategy was to not use any violence, whatever the situation. 
The villagers kept asking the department to go back and stop all forestry operations. 
The police was called in and many threats were made over the next few days; the 
villagers, however, persisted. When the police came to the village, the villagers 
invited them to a discussion to explain what they were doing and why. Eventually 
the Forest Department had to stop the work but the conflict with the department 
continued and intensified.
The villagers’ next step towards asserting their nistar rights over the forests was to 
harvest teak (Tectona grandis) wood to reconstruct a traditional structure called a ghotul 
(Tofa & Mohan, 2006). Through the study circle discussions, the villagers had rediscov-
ered the significance of ghotuls for Gond culture. In conventional Indian society, tribal 
culture has been considered uncivilized and backward, and in need of reform. Various 
dominant religions have had programs for their active conversion. Consequently, many 
tribal communities have adopted, either forcefully or through systemic assimilation, 
dominant cultures and religions, such as Hinduism, Islam, or Christianity. In the process, 
many important cultural linkages have been lost. One such important aspect of Gond 
culture was the ghotul. The ghotul was (and in some small pockets still is) a unique 
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system of learning and transference of knowledge, culture, and worldviews. A ghotul 
is a hut where young unmarried girls and boys would assemble, dance, sing, discuss, 
learn, and sleep. The renowned anthropologist Verrier Elwin explains that “the Gonds 
believe that Lingo, the supreme deity and the heroic ancestor of the Gond tribe, was 
the founder of the first ghotul, and is at the centre of the ghotul’s culture” (1947). Tradi-
tionally, a ghotul would have an elder facilitator and young, unmarried boys and girls 
as its members. The ghotul was a system of education and transmission of traditional 
wisdom and knowledge. The members of a ghotul would have lessons in cleanliness, 
discipline, hard work, taking pride in their appearance, respect for themselves and their 
elders, and the value of community service. No major social activity could happen in a 
community without the participation of ghotul members, who would participate actively 
in all village functions from birth, marriage, to death ceremonies. 
As Elwin describes: With boys telling stories, asking riddles, reporting daily affairs, plan-
ning expeditions and allotment of duties, the ghotul is a place embedded in and nurtured 
by the larger socio-religious landscape of the Gond society – a sacred place where no 
wrongs can be committed. The message of the ghotul – that youth must be served, that 
freedom and happiness are more to be treasured than any material gain, that friendli-
ness and sympathy, hospitality and unity are of the first importance, and above all that 
human love – and its physical expression – is beautiful, clean and precious. (1992) 
The ghotul was also used as a space for village meetings and gatherings. The free inter-
mingling of women and men in ghotuls was looked down upon and actively discouraged 
by outsiders and observers of the dominant religions. As a result, ghotuls were largely 
destroyed and their cultural relevance lost in these parts. The decline of ghotuls also 
meant a decline in the cultural, moral, and spiritual education of the Gond’s youth. 
This was the reason why Mendha chose the revival of their gotul as a symbol of their 
cultural identity and sovereignty, as their first major struggle on their journey towards 
self-rule. The villagers decided to assert their nistar right and bring teak wood from their 
forests to build their ghotul. Ghotuls were traditionally built using teak wood. The extrac-
tion of teak from the forests was officially prohibited under colonial forest laws, and 
permissible only for the Forest Department. The villagers did not seek permission from 
the Forest Department to assert what they knew were their legitimate nistar rights. 
On a predetermined day, the villagers went to the forest and collected teak wood to 
construct their ghotul. For the Forest Department, this extraction of teak was a very 
strong symbol of defiance and a denial of the government’s authority. The Forest 
Department tried to seize the wood but the villagers formed a human chain around 
it and defended it peacefully. The police was called in; “there were more police than 
people in the village,” as Devaji puts it. As part of their strategy, all men stayed indoors 
and the women came and faced the police; they politely told them “we will not retaliate 
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with bullets, nor hit you with stones, in fact we will not hit back at all (…) but if you take 
this wood away, we would go to the forest and get more and build our ghotul again. 
We will do this every time you destroy our ghotul.” The Forest Department, however, 
forcefully took the wood away. In no time, the villagers went back to the forest, got 
the wood, and rebuilt their ghotul. The destruction of the ghotul by the Forest Depart-
ment angered tens of villages in the region, and thirty-two villages which were part of 
the zamindari Ilaka (the area which was traditionally under one erstwhile feudal land-
lord), of which Mendha was also a part, came together to deliberate on a future course 
of action. After considering many possibilities, including writing petitions and meeting 
relevant officials, they decided to take direct action. Twelve of the villages declared that 
they would build their ghotul and on a pre-specified day the villagers marched in large 
numbers to the forest, harvested teak, and rebuilt the ghotuls. The Forest Department, 
fearing that stopping one village could mobilize thirty-two villages, so stopping twelve 
villages might mobilize hundreds of villages in the region, refrained from any further 
action. The ghotul still exists in the village as a symbol of their political assertion and 
village self-rule, although socio-culturally it is not used today as it traditionally was.
In 1987, even while the struggle over the ghotul was going on, the study circle was 
discussing the importance of the forests for the physical and cultural survival of the 
tribal community. Debates had already started in the village about what the forests 
meant for them and what should be the right method to manage them and regulate their 
use. The long-standing lack of tenure security had led to many harmful extraction prac-
tices, often causing extensive damage to the forest. The gram sabha decided to stop all 
unregulated use of the forests by its own members and many rules for the protection of 
the forests were adopted after intense discussions. 
Some of these were:
> All of the village’s domestic requirements would be met by the surrounding forests 
without any fee payments to the government or bribes to its local staff. 
> Extraction for domestic requirements would be regulated by the gram sabha, based 
on a set of oral rules collectively discussed and adopted. 
> The extraction of forest resources (including timber) would only be for personal use 
and to supplement livelihoods, and not for large scale commercial purposes.
> No outsider, government official, or private individual would be allowed to carry out 
any activity in the village without the permission of the gram sabha. 
> Outsiders would need the gram sabha’s permission to extract resources. Fines 
would be imposed on those not complying.
> The voluntary and rotational patrolling of the forest by the villagers, two people per day.
~ 160 ~
Although the forests were legally still under the jurisdiction of the Forest Department, 
the village now had de facto control over them. They decided to stop all ongoing commer-
cial activities by outside agencies in their forests, including by the Forest Department 
and the paper mill. As the descriptions below will reveal, legally there was no space 
for this assertion by the gram sabha but there was nothing that the outsiders could do 
when faced with the united, strong, and non-violent resistance that the villagers put up 
whenever their rules were not adhered to. 
In 1990, Mendha forced the paper mill to stop bamboo harvesting. The mill, which 
had a valid license from the government, began suffering heavy losses because of 
this restriction. The company offered a donation to the villagers and a regular source 
of employment, among many other perks and incentives, but the villagers remained 
determined in their position. As many villagers had in the past been employed in 
these forest extraction activities many of them were economically impacted by their 
own decision. This, however, did not deter their determination. The lease of the mill 
expired in 1991; Mendha village wrote to the Chief Minister of the Maharashtra stating 
that “the bamboo in our forests should not be given to the paper mill without our 
free prior informed consent. Even if the lease is renewed, we will not let the mill cut 
the bamboo here.” As an alternative they proposed to carry out a bamboo harvest 
in a regulated and sustainable manner in collaboration with the Forest Department 
under a newly declared National Policy on forests. Their demands were rejected; 
Mendha continued to resist and did not let the mill harvest bamboo from their forests. 
Mendha was among the few villages in the country which was successful in stopping 
commercial activities by outsiders in their traditional forests, which were legally under 
government jurisdiction.
THE STRUGGLE FOR INCLUSION IN JOINT FOREST MANAGEMENT (JFM)
The national forest policy of India was changed in 1988, and for the first time in the 
history of Indian forestry it was recognized that the first purpose of forests in the country 
was to conserve biodiversity and to meet local needs. This was a departure from the 
earlier policy which had placed “commercial value” as the first charge of the forests. 
Under this policy, in 1990 a scheme was initiated called the Joint Forest Management 
(JFM) Scheme, to be implemented by the Forest Department. The objective of this 
scheme was to regenerate degraded forests through the participation of local people 
and by sharing the benefits with them. This was arguably the first small step towards 
any involvement of local people in the management of forests in the country. This 
scheme, however, was only meant for forests which were already degraded and not 
forests which were in good condition.
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In Mendha, ever since the declaration of self-rule their relationship with the Forest Depart-
ment and the government had remained non-violently confrontational. At the same time, 
people’s livelihoods had also been impacted by the halt to commercial forestry. Wage 
labor in forestry operations was one of the few sources of cash income for the villagers. 
The village would have considered the sustainable harvest of some forest resources 
themselves but this was not possible due to the harsh, anti-people laws and adminis-
trative procedures. The new JFM policy was discussed in the village study circle and it 
seemed to be the best available policy space for them to resolve their dilemma. 
In 1992, when the JFM resolution was adopted by the government of Maharashtra, 
the scheme was not applicable for districts like Gadchiroli where most of the forests 
were closed canopy natural forests. Mendha, after intense study circle discussions, 
sent a proposal to the government to harvest bamboo from their forest in collabora-
tion with the Forest Department under the JFM scheme. This proposal was rejected 
by the government on the grounds that the scheme was only meant for regener-
ating degraded forests and not for dense and diverse forests like Mendha’s. Mendha 
continued to write and discuss with the people in charge for months. In August 1993, 
after sustained perseverance, the policy was finally amended and was extended to 
Mendha’s forests. Mendha thus became the first village with standing dense forest to 
be brought under this scheme in Gadchiroli district, possibly in the entire state. This 
also led to a change in policy in general and the scheme was opened up to villages 
in and around other standing forests in the state. After many discussions the village 
re-started bamboo extraction from the forests jointly with the Forest Department 
under this scheme. 
This was a significant development considering that at that time JFM was the only 
policy space allowing for any kind of people’s participation in forest management. The 
scheme itself, however, has been heavily criticized across the country on a number 
of grounds, including the fact that it does not devolve real decision-making power to 
people, does not address the issue of access and use rights, and that the people’s main 
role is largely to provide labor in predetermined activities. Many JFM villages have been 
in conflict with the Forest Department for not honoring promises made under JFM, 
including those related to benefit sharing. JFM promised to share with the villages 50 
percent and above of the profits accruing from all forestry operations, independently of 
wages. In most cases, this was not done and decades later many villages continue to 
fight for their rightful share. 
 Mendha was criticized by many during this time for entering into an arrangement with 
the government despite knowing their oppressive and unjust strategies and policies. 
The process of JFM in Mendha, however, was different from that in other parts of the 
country. In Mendha, the gram sabha remained the main decision-making body, and its 
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wishes would be respected by the Forest Department. The composition of the JFM 
committee was the same as the sabha and included a man and woman from each 
family. Mendha continued forest management under this scheme until the implementa-
tion of the Forest Rights Act in 2006.
THE STRUGGLE TO GAIN ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT AND ADDRESS 
ADMINISTRATIVE CORRUPTION
Through the study circle discussions, the Mendha villagers also understood that economic 
empowerment was an important aspect of political empowerment. However, there were 
few opportunities for a village assembly, established de facto, with no state recogni-
tion to empower itself economically. There were numerous government schemes that 
funded the Panchayat (which is the first unit of decision-making in the state administrative 
system) to implement government programs. A small portion of this fund actually reached 
the villages for whom it was intended. Mendha’s gram sabha wrote to the state govern-
ment asking for the funds meant to be directly given to them for their development. This 
request was rejected on the grounds that the gram sabha was not a legal body. Finally, 
the village registered an NGO called Village Planning and Development Council, Mendha 
(Lekha), with the gram sabha as its general body and decision-making unit, and after much 
struggle their proposal was finally accepted. Mendha’s gram sabha was able to open a 
bank account and small funds began to be deposited in the account. In order to maintain 
financial transparency in its own operations, the village put in place certain procedures for 
its members. These included, for example, all payments made by the gram sabha should 
be made by check and against signed documents. Two people in the village would be 
assigned (on rotation) to sign the checks, two others to withdraw the money, and another 
two people to keep an account of withdrawals and receipts. Detailed accounts would be 
read out in the gram sabha regularly and would also be audited by an external auditor. 
To stop financial irregularities practiced in government establishments, a decision was 
taken in the gram sabha that citizens of Mendha would not pay any bribes to anyone. 
In case a payment is made in kind or cash by a member of the gram sabha, a receipt 
would have to be taken. If any payment is made without any supporting document then 
that person would be liable to deposit an equivalent amount as a fine in the gram sabha 
account. Another huge space for corruption and financial mismanagement in many parts 
of India is when daily wages are paid under government programs. Often wages paid 
to the workers are much less than what is shown in the musters for which their signa-
tures are taken. This is usually not contested by the person receiving payments, either 
because villagers cannot read or write, or they are not shown the documents that they 
are signing, or they are threatened that they would not be paid at all. Such “cuts” have 
been a common phenomenon in all government schemes and programs reaching rural 
India. To overcome this, Mendha took a decision that villagers, when receiving wages 
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under any government scheme, would not go individually to the government office. 
Instead, the concerned government functionary is called to the village on a specified 
day to make the payments when all villagers are present. Mendha’s villagers are now 
well-informed about the importance of checking the details of what they are signing 
when they accept funds and sign papers. There have been many instances in the village 
when government functionaries have been made to pay a fine to the gram sabha when 
they were found to be engaging in financial mismanagement in the village.
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FOREST RIGHTS ACT AND A FUNDA-
MENTAL SHIFT TOWARDS POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT
The implementation of the Forest Rights Act in 2006 created an immense opportunity 
for forest dwelling communities to be able to transform forest governance in India. 
However, as mentioned earlier, even ten years on, the implementation of the Act 
remains abysmally low in most of the country. Gadchiroli district in general and Mendha 
village in particular have, however, also emerged as leaders in setting milestones 
towards the implementation of the FRA for themselves and for the country as whole. 
Gadchiroli district is the only district in the country which has seen an over-60-percent 
implementation of the FRA. Mendha became the first village in the country to have their 
CFR rights over 1,800 hectares of their traditional forests recognized in 2009. 
A combination of many factors has contributed to the successful implementation of the 
FRA in Gadchiroli, including collective action from the mobilized gram sabhas, supported 
by effective and collective advocacy and technical input from mass movements and 
civil society groups, and some responsive and proactive district administrators. Mendha 
also had a significant role to play in this success. Mendha’s experience of filing claims 
under the FRA and ensuring its implementation led to multiple learning processes at 
the district and village level in Gadchiroli. The district’s study circles focused on under-
standing and discussing the provisions of the law and its implications for supporting 
long-standing local struggles for resource use and governance rights. Villages from 
across the district, state, and other states visited (and continue to visit) Mendha to learn 
how the claims were filed before initiating similar processes in their own villages. 
In the village, however, the struggles for self-rule did not end with the recognition of 
legal rights under the FRA. In fact, a harder battle related to the actual transfer of power 
from the state to this small tribal community began in 2009, when Mendha’s legal rights 
over its forests were recognized under the Act. In 2010, the gram sabha finally decided 
to exercise the right to the sustainable harvest and sale of bamboo from their forests, 
no longer with the Forest Department but on their own. However, under the forest laws 
the village would still require transit passes from the Forest Department to transport 
the bamboo outside the village. The village approached the Forest Department to issue 
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transit passes but the department refused. Instead, the department invited the village 
to continue to work under the conditions of JFM, with them as daily wage laborers, 
a suggestion that the village refused. The Forest Department refused to issue transit 
permits, contending that bamboo was legally considered “timber” under the forest 
laws and not “Non-Timber Forest Produce” (NTFP), and that the FRA did not allow for 
rights to fell timber species. Hence, Mendha should not harvest bamboo.
Mendha continued to correspond with and petition the Forest Department and the central 
Ministry of Environment and Forests for the transit permits to be issued. Consequently, 
the then Minister of Environment and Forests, Mr. Jairam Ramesh, wrote a letter on 
March 21, 2011 to the then chief minister of the state in which he ordered that the state 
Forest Department treat bamboo as NTFP and respect the rights of the communities 
under the FRA. The letter further stated that in areas designated as CFRs, the Forest 
Departments must give the gram sabha the right to issue transit passes for bamboo. 
When the situation was not resolved, Mendha decided to take the route of direct polit-
ical action again. In February 2011, the gram sabha declared that one adult from each of 
the eighty families in the village would go to the forest and extract one bole of bamboo 
(Pallavi, 2011). They organized a symbolic sale by inviting citizens from across the 
country to come and buy their bamboo, including people of political and social influence. 
Subsequently, the Minister of Environment and Forests along with the chief minister of 
the state visited the village and promised to help resolve the conflict.
Bamboo patches which Mendha harvested under JFM
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Finally on April 27, 2011, the state Forest Department handed over a transit passbook to 
the village community leaders, signifying that the village gram sabha would henceforth 
exercise the power to harvest and sell bamboo from its CFR, and issue transit passes for 
transporting the harvested bamboo (DTE, 2011). This event marked the beginning of a 
change in the bamboo regime in the state and in the country. A national debate created 
around Mendha’s struggle for transit passes was among one of the many debates that 
led to an intervention from the Ministry of Tribal Affairs (responsible for the implementa-
tion of the FRA). The rules under the law were amended in July 2012. The amended 
rules stated that ‘the transit permit regime in relation to transportation of minor forest 
produce shall be modified and given by the Committee’ constituted under Section 4(1)(e) 
of the Act or the person authorized by the gram sabha. Further, the procedural require-
ment for transit permits would in no way ‘restrict or abridge the right to disposal of minor 
forest produce.’ In August 2014, the Governor of Maharashtra intervened and issued a 
notification requiring the definition of Non-Timber Forest Produce to be in line with the 
FRA by cancelling the provisions under the colonial forest laws Section 2-vii of the IFA, 
where bamboo was listed as a tree), bringing an end to a colonial legacy. Over a period of 
time, many other changes were brought about in the state laws to facilitate the exercise 
of rights by the gram sabhas. These significant changes related to the harvest of forest 
produce and the management of CFRs to strengthen local livelihoods and economies. 
Mendha-Lekha’s successful struggle has inspired hundreds of villages across the country 
to claim and assert their rights over bamboo and other forest produce to change not only 
forest governance but local economic discourse and debates.
During their first commercial harvest in April 2011, villagers sold bamboo at Rs. 23/- per 
pole, a rate higher than the highest price the Forest Department had ever sold the bamboo 
for. By the next season in 2012, villagers had already worked out a detailed system of 
harvesting, monitoring, and selling based on existing systems at the Forest Department, 
local knowledge systems, and outside experts. They again sought help from the Forest 
Department to make the trade transparent and prevent exploitation by contractors and 
market forces; help was refused again. Not discouraged, the village continued with its 
discussions on rules and regulations for bamboo harvests and wildlife conservation. They 
insisted that these rules and regulations must be followed by the contractors seeking 
tenders for bamboo harvesting in their forests. After rejecting the highest bidder who 
was not ready to adhere to the conditions of sustainability, they identified someone who 
would. The gram sabha appointed four village elders (women and men) who had long 
participated in the forest struggle to supervise and monitor the process of extraction. 
Mendha villagers provided the work force and for additional help people from neighboring 
villages were employed. All involved in the process were paid wages by the gram sabha 
at rates much higher than the Forest Department’s e.g. Rs. 13/- per full-length pole (not 
more than fifty poles a day were allowed to be harvested). This was much higher than 
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the Forest Department’s rate of Rs. 13/- per bundle of twenty poles. These high rates 
were largely used to pay the workers, unlike in the case of the Forest Department where 
most of the money went into administrative expenses and corruption. At the end of the 
season, Mendha organized a two day gram sabha meeting to finalize the accounts of 
the harvest and sale. After making payments to all those who participated in the harvest 
in any capacity (which included almost all villagers and neighboring villagers), Mendha’s 
gram sabha earned over Rs. 5,000,000 in the very first year of harvest. The villagers 
decided to invest the money and use the interest for village and forest development in the 
future. The commercial but regulated system of harvest and monitoring established by 
Mendha became an inspiration for other villages. After a period of time, the Forest Depart-
ment also started using Mendha as a training site for their staff in bamboo management. 
After the initial years of harvesting, Mendha’s gram sabha decided not to continue with the 
bamboo harvest but to move towards forest management. This would mean a shift from 
a large-scale harvest in the season to a needs-based harvest throughout the year. They 
decided to focus instead on management and conservation activities such as bamboo clump 
management, soil and moisture conservation, mulching, fire protection, and plantations. 
These activities were included in the village development and forest management strate-
gies and linked to the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee (MGNREGA) 
program set up by the government of India. This ensured that villagers would have an oppor-
tunity to earn throughout the year while working on their village and forest management 
activities. Simultaneously, Mendha’s gram sabha has now appointed a team of villagers to 
prepare a written development, conservation, and management plan. Experts from outside 
like Dr. Madhav Gadgil, a renowned ecologist, have been requested to guide the process. 
The Mendha experience in the management and governance of forests has already been 
used to produce a set of guidelines (Margdarshika), with support from the Vidharba Statu-
tory Development Board, for other villages who want to follow a similar process.
A UNIQUE JOURNEY FROM PRIVATE PROPERTY TO A COMMON 
PROPERTY RESOURCE
At a time when the entire world is moving towards the privatization of common prop-
erty resources and land grabbing is a global phenomenon, Mendha took a revolutionary 
step away from both of these in keeping with its ideology that land, water, and forests 
are common property resources and must be used sustainably and equitably distrib-
uted. In 2013, Mendha’s gram sabha declared itself a Gram Daan village, with 100 
percent consensus, using a little known Act called the Maharashtra Gram Daan Act, 
1964. Consequently, all privately owned property in Mendha is now under the collective 
ownership of the gram sabha. The gram sabha is the owner of all land and resources 
in the village. With this declaration, Mendha became one of the twenty villages in the 
entire state to do so. 
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Some of the main features of a Gram Daan village under the Act include:
> The ownership of all individually owned land is to be surrendered to the gram sabha.
> 5 percent of land owned by individual landowners is to be contributed towards a 
village land pool, to be given to the landless in the community.
> The farmer who surrenders the land is legally referred to as a gram daani farmer. The 
gram daani farmer continues to cultivate his/her land. This land can be passed on to 
the next generation of the farmer but the ownership of the land rests with the gram 
sabha.
> The land however cannot be sold.
> As per the Act, if 75 percent of the families in the village agree to declare the village 
a Gram Daan village it can be declared a Gram Daan village.
> Once a gram sabha has taken a decision to enact a Gram Daan and if it is part of 
a group gram Panchayat, then it acquires an independent status and the Gram 
Mandal (same as a gram sabha) becomes the basic decision-making unit and 
administrative functionary. This implies that Mendha’s gram sabha is no longer 
under the Panchayat, even legally and administratively, but is an independent 
body.
> At the state level there is a Gram Daan board to look after the matters concerning 
Gram Daan villages.
Mendha had started discussing the subject of Gram Daan when it was first intro-
duced to the village by Mohan in the study group discussions in 1985-86. By late 
2006, over 80 percent of families had already agreed in favor of the Gram Daan. 
However, keeping with its principle of consensus, the gram sabha decided not to 
move further till 100 percent of families had agreed. The matter continued to be 
discussed. Finally, 100 percent of families agreed in favor of the Gram Daan but 
then it was realized that the consensus only included people above 18 years. The 
process then started again to discuss the issue with people between the age of 
14 and 18. These discussions were held in smaller youth groups, with girls and 
boys. This group also agreed and finally the Gram Daan was declared in a meeting 
with all the government revenue and administrative officials in 2013.The village has 
already drafted a set of rules for itself, which have been approved by the state Gram 
Daan board, as procedurally required. The village is currently waiting for a letter 
confirming its status and its independence from the Panchayat that it is currently a 
part of. 
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SELF-RELIANCE AND  
A BETTER QUALITY OF LIFE
Through its struggles, debates, discussions, and transformative processes, 
including evolving institutional structures and systems, the village has been able 
to achieve political empowerment, gender equity, secured livelihoods, economic 
independence, food security, secured access to natural resources, and cultural and 
ecological security. 
ACHIEVING ECOLOGICAL SECURITY THROUGH FOREST 
CONSERVATION
The governance, management, and conservation of forests are among the important 
pillars of Mendha village’s self-rule. To ensure that forests are not over-exploited, the 
village follows a system of forest patrols in which four people from different households 
contribute to forest protection every day. This is on a rotation basis and one of the volun-
tary activities that every household has to contribute towards. Patrolling teams ensure 
that there are no fires, extraction without permission by outsiders, or unregulated use 
by the villagers themselves. The village Patel (traditional head) provides free passes to 
people for the extraction of Non-Timber Forest Produce and fuel wood as per the gram 
sabha’s decisions. The penalty for offenses is subject to the nature of the offense and 
the economic status of the offender; fines can be paid in cash or kind. In case of forest 
fires, which are common in summer, the entire village voluntarily helps to put out the 
fire. This is particularly important also because the village has created plantations in the 
open patches in the forest, taking advantage of funds available through various govern-
ment schemes. These plantations stock the forest with local species and also provide 
the people with employment.
Mendha’s gram sabha has also decided to keep 10 percent of its forest completely 
untouched as the village’s biodiversity reserves. No extraction of any kind is allowed 
on these patches of forest. Dedicated to the local deity Pen Geda (God’s forest), these 
patches are locally referred to as Konalkadiya, Sailandongar, and Penmetta. The objec-
tive is to safeguard wildlife which may otherwise be disturbed by resource extraction 
activities undertaken for local livelihoods. Specific rules have been formulated to ensure 
the protection of this forest and the wildlife within. 
Livestock grazing is also collectively managed, with two people per day on a rotation 
basis taking on the responsibility. A reminder is given to the person who will be going 
the next day by placing a stick in front of her/his house. An important issue that faces 
the gram sabha currently, and which often comes up in study circle discussions, is that 
of the increasing goat population. The number of goats in the village has increased as it 
is a good economic option for people (Rs 400/kg for the sale of a goat). This, however, 
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has also started putting pressure on the forest and is a matter of concern for the gram 
sabha which is currently being discussed.
A group of girls and boys in Mendha, with help from Dr. Madhav Gadgil (a renowned 
scientist), were engaged in a year-long study as part of a study circle tasked with drafting 
a community biodiversity register. These youths remain active and often engage in 
sharing this knowledge with other neighboring villages. This existing information is 
currently being used by another team to prepare a management plan for their forests, 
also with help from Dr. Gadgil.
FINANCIAL SECURITY OF THE COLLECTIVE THROUGH 
ECONOMIC INDEPENDENCE
Mendha has never been reliant on external funders and non-government agencies 
for funding. They have always struggled and ensured that peoples’ livelihoods are 
ensured through various government schemes, which are part of the state-allocated 
development funds coming to the region. Additionally, Mendha’s gram sabha receives 
funds under various government projects that they put into their village, e.g. a project 
on soil and moisture conservation or funds received from the Tribal Development 
Department for collective irrigation projects. To create a common pool of funds for 
collective actions a decision was taken to contribute 10 percent of the earnings from 
all job opportunities created by the gram sabha into the gram sabha account. Minor 
amounts are also generated by those who visit the village through voluntary contribu-
tions towards their stay. 
As mentioned above, by providing ownership rights to the villagers over forests and 
forest produce within their customary boundary, the FRA strengthened the village 
economy, as a collective and for individuals. The over Rs. 5,000,000 that the village 
earned in 2011-12 (following the deduction of wages and other expenses) from the 
extraction of bamboo from their forests were deposited in the gram sabha account 
and the interest generated from this is sometimes used for village management and 
governance activities. Another important commercial produce that is harvested from 
the forest is tendu patta (leaves harvested for making a local cigarette called bidi ). 
The forests of Gadchiroli are rich in tendu trees. These leaves are auctioned by the 
gram sabha to traders when trade is opened for fifteen days in summer. The traders 
pay wages to villagers who are involved in the collection of the leaves and a royalty 
to the gram sabha. Part of this royalty is distributed back to the collectors while the 
remaining amount is retained by the gram sabha for village and forest development 
activities. The funds generated from these various sources are deposited in the gram 
sabha account.
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LIVELIHOOD SECURITY FOR THE PEOPLE
The livelihoods of the people are extensively dependent on farming and forest produce. 
Sufficient water throughout the year ensures a good agricultural harvest. The village 
follows the principle that water is a common property resource and, irrespective of 
where it is found, it belongs to all in the village. This policy has helped ensure an equi-
table water distribution system in the village. A supplementary source of income for the 
villagers is the extraction and sale of non-timber forest produce such as leaves, flowers, 
bamboo, honey, among others. In the past, these products were harvested from the 
forest and sold independently, leaving people at the mercy of buyers who would exploit 
the situation knowing that collectors were desperate to sell. These products are now 
collected in a regulated manner, based on the gram sabha’s decisions, with many of 
the products now being bought from the individual collectors by the gram sabha. The 
gram sabha identifies the right time and market for the produce and sells it collectively. 
The profits are given back to the collectors. This has ensured better prices and a non-
exploitative environment for the villagers. Non-timber forest produce like tendu leaves 
and bamboo earn very high revenues and are bought by contractors. The negotiations 
and the sale of these are carried out by the gram sabha, which also earns royalties from 
the sale; the villagers get a daily wage payment from the contractor and subsequently 
also a share of the profit.
In addition to this, if employment is needed the village has taken the unique step 
of combining a government program called the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Scheme (MNREGS) with village governance and forest 
management activities. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guar-
antee Act of 2005 (MNREGA) was aimed at enhancing the livelihood security of 
people in rural areas by guaranteeing one hundred days of waged employment in a 
financial year to a rural household whose adult members volunteer to do unskilled 
manual work (Ministry of Rural Development, 2005). Although well-intentioned, 
this scheme, implemented by various government agencies, has been often criti-
cized for immense financial misappropriation, and creating employment through 
activities that are not necessarily useful for people. Mendha, however, managed to 
obtain a special Government Resolution that ensures that the gram sabha and not 
the Panchayat will be the implementing agency for the MNREGA. Consequently, a 
committee was constituted in the village in 2011 which identifies jobs to be under-
taken in the village. These jobs are based on the village and forest development 
and conservation activities identified by the gram sabha. The first work to be under-
taken was watershed development in 2012. The gram sabha appoints a coordinator 
(Rojgar Sevak) on a rotation basis who, along with the committee, prepares an esti-
mate of the work needed in the village and creates a muster roll. The coordinator 
then coordinates with the concerned government agency to finalize the project 
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and to receive funds. These funds are transferred directly into the gram sabha’s 
account and used to pay those employed through this. Through its effective use of 
funds the gram sabha has ensured employment to anyone who requests a job on 
any particular day of the year (if needed). This is unlike other areas where only a 
few people get employment for 100 days in a year. A fixed daily wage is paid for all 
the activities thus undertaken. Through this, Mendha-Lekha has also managed to 
address one of the most pressing issues faced by many rural areas in India, distress 
and out-migration due to unemployment, enabling people to stay in the village to 
work on various developments for better village governance and natural resource 
management. Youths are also engaged as and when needed in activities related 
to village governance, such as managing paper work, accounts, hospitality, among 
others.
Mendha’s gram sabha has always attempted to take advantage of various govern-
ment development schemes meant for the villagers. Unlike in other villages, where all 
government support agencies work as independent units, bringing few benefits to few 
beneficiaries and opening up a huge space for favors and corruption, Mendha has collec-
tively taken responsibility to ensure that all schemes are used for equitable benefit and 
with total transference. They believe that government funds are our own tax funds and 
should be utilized by us. The first steps towards this were taken in 1996-97 after a few 
discussions between villagers and some outside members in a study circle. Following 
this discussion, the village invited all local government agencies (represented by their 
concerned officers) to attend a joint meeting in the village. A gram sabha was held for 
the purpose and during the meeting the villagers asked the government representatives 
to put down in writing (on a blackboard) exactly how much money was available under 
each department for village development activities. By following this system the village 
ensured a closer coordination among all agencies and also the improved delivery of 
beneficiary and welfare schemes to the village. Many years later, in 2014, the govern-
ment of Maharashtra made it a policy to follow a similar convergence of resources from 
different government agencies to the villages which have received CFR rights for village 
development and forest conservation.
SOCIAL SECURITY FOR THE PEOPLE
Amongst the less highlighted but very significant aspects of Mendha’s efforts has 
been the securing of social security for its citizens. Active participation by women in 
village decision-making and study circle discussions as well as in all the action sub-
committees has led to their empowerment, and consequently their voices being heard. 
Women collectives (Self-Help Groups) have been formed which ensure that women are 
protected against domestic violence and also ensure their economic empowerment. 
Collective assets such as the village tractor and a stone quarry are managed by the 
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women’s group, which also earns profits from these activities (the tractor can be hired 
by people from within the village as well as from outside). 
Realizing that people are most prone to exploitation in times of distress, the village has 
taken a few important decisions. One of them is the establishment of a grain bank. 
The grains are contributed to the bank by all villagers soon after the harvest. These 
can then be borrowed by anyone in times of scarcity or when the crops fail for any 
reason. Whoever borrows grain has to return an amount that is slightly more than that 
borrowed, when they are in a position to do so.
The second important step has been the establishment of a village loaning system. 
Tribal and forest-dependent people across India are exploited as they are often forced 
to take loans from money lenders in times of scarcity. These people often get into a 
never-ending cycle of exploitation, with ever-increasing interest rates. In some situ-
ations children end up still bonded to the moneylenders for loans that their parents 
may have taken out. To avoid such exploitation, Mendha’s gram sabha offers a finan-
cial loan to anyone who needs money. For the first year no interest is charged; in the 
second year a 2 percent interest rate is charged, and over a period of time the rate of 
interest increases nominally. The Self-Help Group that the villagers are part of ensures 
that such a loan is offered in needy times and also ensures that the loans are returned 
in due time.
Although medical facilities are provided to tribal communities free of charge in govern-
ment hospitals, often villagers do not have the money for extreme health emergencies, 
which can only be treated in private hospitals. The gram sabha also provides financial 
support to the villagers in such extreme situations.
Since agriculture is an important mainstay of the people, the decision that all under-
ground and surface water in the village belongs to the collective is very important 
for Mendha. This decision ensures that water is available to all, irrespective of where 
it is present. Mendha’s gram sabha has built many check dams on individual and 
village common lands for soil and moisture conservation, to ensure ground water 
recharge. The gram sabha has constructed over 1,000 galli plugs, seventeen farm 
ponds, one forest pond and one community well to recharge water and provide 
water to all.
Amongst the most significant actions that the village has taken in recent times has been 
declaring the land in the village (community owned or privately owned) to be the village 
commons under the Gram Daan Act of Maharashtra (please see above for details). 
Most importantly, Medha’s gram sabha ensures equal benefits and welfare for all in 
the village – in the gram sabha young and old, men and women, poor and rich all have 
equal opportunities. Future plans of the village include: the move towards 100 percent 
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organic agriculture and growing native crops; the revival of the fast eroding Gondi 
language, culture, and traditions; the tackling of soil erosion through regulated grazing; 
the establishment of a federation of gram sabhas in the region, and to restore an educa-




MENDHA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE STATE
Mendha’s slogan “Dilli Mumbai Hamari Sarkar Hamare gaon main ham he sarkar” 
defines Mendha’s relationship with the state. The villagers hold themselves respon-
sible for the state and consider themselves a part of it. They believe that governance is 
a combination of direct democracy and accountable representative governance. Elected 
representatives are not decision-makers but carriers of concerns and decisions taken 
through the platforms of direct democracy (in this case the gram sabha) to the appro-
priate levels. Decisions taken at the district, state, or national level should be based on 
the decisions taken at the village gram sabhas or other localities. 
The main actors in the village believe that the citizens of any democratic representa-
tive government are directly responsible for the kind of government they elect. If the 
elected government at the center of the state is exploitative, then it indicates that we 
as the government in our villages and localities are weak. Strengthening our power in 
Nursery of Mendha Lekha
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our villages and localities through direct democracy is the only way we can contribute 
towards improving governments at state and national level. This however is not a 
struggle that a single village can undertake. To transform the political establishment at 
the state and district level, to make it more accountable to the people who elect them, 
each village has to transform and empower itself. A struggle without addressing intrinsic 
internal weaknesses and inequities cannot bring about a long-term political transfor-
mation toward justice and equity. Only the collective of empowered gram sabhas and 
localities can transform representative governance. 
With this ideology, they have never rejected the idea of the state or the role of the state 
even while disagreeing with the centralized functioning and extractive policies of the 
state. Their relationship with the state has been non-violently confrontational because 
of the state’s political and economic agenda, yet where possible they have negoti-
ated and collaborated with state agencies. They have utilized all possible government 
schemes and programs as long as these did not contradict gram sabha’s own rules, 
systems, principles, and decisions. In their relationship with the state, therefore, they 
have kept the political power within their village in their own hands, and have strived to 
get the state to respect and adhere to village decisions, either by coercion, collabora-
tion, dialogue, or resistance.
MENDHA AND THE POLITICAL LEFT
As mentioned in the introduction to this case study, Mendha’s struggle is rooted in a 
district-level movement which itself was catalyzed by socialist mobilizing. Gadchiroli 
district (along with many other neighboring districts and states) has also been under the 
influence of the People’s War Group since the 1970s. Often referred to as the Maoists, 
these armed groups support the vision of tribal self-determination and self-rule in these 
areas. Claiming their resistance to be against feudalist, fascist, capitalist, imperialist, 
and corrupt forces leading to injustices against the local tribal and non-tribal communi-
ties, they see the current form of government as the highest manifestations of these. 
Their presence is cited by the government of India as a reason for the heavy militariza-
tion of this region. For decades there has been an uncomfortable co-existence between 
socialist and Gandhian civil-society groups and the left-wing extremist groups in the 
district. Their positions vis à vis each other range from a complete rejection of each 
other’s approaches to an agreement on ideologies but disagreement about the means 
of achieving the goals. Mendha, like many other villages in this region, has often been 
caught in the conflict between government forces, socialist ideologues, and the armed 
Maoists, accused by each group to be aligning with the other. Mendha, while it strongly 
believes in the ideology of village self-determination, has never agreed with the violent 
means of achieving this. Non-violence has been one of the core values and strengths 
of Mendha’s struggle. 
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The point of contention between Mendha and the Maoists has been Mendha’s 
slogan. The Maoists, while agreeing with the second half of Mendha’s slogan (WE 
are the government in our village), completely reject the first half (OUR government 
is in Delhi and Mumbai). The current form of government for them is oppressive, 
does not represent the interest of the oppressed, and is hence unacceptable. As 
explained by Devaji and Mohanbhai, Mendha, while not in agreement with the 
current form of governance (representative governance) must take the responsi-
bility as others for having brought it to power or not having been able to change 
it. Mendha, therefore, has always negotiated and collaborated with the govern-
ment wherever possible, even while resisting where needed – an approach that the 
Maoists reject. Amongst the strongest oppositions that Mendha faced from these 
groups was when it decided to file legal claims over their forests under the Forest 
Rights Act. The Maoists claimed that tribal communities including Mendha already 
had forest rights (unlawfully taken over by the state) and Mendha had successfully 
asserted them. Mendha didn’t need an oppressive and capitalist state’s concur-
rence or the legal acceptance of their rights. Both sides have largely maintained 
their positions and a respectful distance from each other.
In the past, Mendha’s largely successful struggle in such a conflicting environment has 
often been intriguing for many. Government agencies were often suspicious that they 
are associated with the Maoists, while the others have wondered why despite such 
resistance the police have not used its indirect oppressive strategies in Mendha, some-
thing which is common in other villages in this region, particularly in those resisting the 
government’s extractivist plans and policies.
In recent years, within the struggles influenced by the non-armed left ideologies in 
the region, Mendha has been criticized for collaborating with the state even when the 
state’s corrupt, unjust, and extractive motives are clear. At the present time, Gadchi-
roli district is in a state of flux. On the one hand it has the distinction of being a district 
with the highest number of village communities who now have control over their 
forests under the Forest Rights Act. On the other hand, the government continues 
to issue and propose leases to mining corporations and other industries, in complete 
violation of the policy of free prior informed consent (Pathak Broome & Raut, 2017). 
While hundreds of villages are now devising strategies and plans for forest-based 
livelihoods, strengthening themselves and their gram sabhas through the trade of 
forest produce which till recently was under state monopoly, the state continues the 
narrative that mining and industry bring employment and development to the region. 
A resistance movement is currently brewing in the district against these leases. In this 
context Mendha’s position has not emerged very clearly. Mendha has been part of 
district-level study circles on forest rights and mining and continues to emphasize the 
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importance of study circles to have more informed and widely discussed strategies. 
Those involved in the resistance feel that study circles are important but that these 
are also times for more direct action, like Mendha has taken in its past struggles. They 
find Mendha’s support in such confrontational direct actions wanting. With its agenda 
of pushing mining in the district, the state continues its covert and overt pressure 
tactics on villagers and activists involved in anti-extractivism resistance. A common 
strategy of the state to do so is by branding them as anti-development, anti-national, 
and as supporters of the banned armed left-wing groups. Mendha faces the accusa-
tion that it, along with other villages which often collaborate with the state, finds it 
difficult to take a clear position against the state in such situations.
THE ROLE OF EXTERNAL ACTORS IN MENDHA’S 
TRANSFORMATION
As described in in the section about Mendha’s journey to self-empowerment, in the 
initial stages of its struggle the action research undertaken with Mohan and Savita 
played an important role in Mendha’s initiative. The traditional village square discus-
sions morphed and evolved into study circles, turning into an opportunity for a large 
number of people from outside to interact with the village. According to Mohan, there 
are two very significant kinds of roles that outsiders have played in this initiative. One 
has been his own consistent and catalytic association as part of the study group, which 
he calls his “collaborator friends,” and then a larger network of government and non-
government actors who stay associated as a large support network, or “Friends of 
Mendha.” Both these external actors have played a critical role in the entire process. 
Most help from outside actors has been in the sphere of knowledge-generation through 
study circles and sometimes in the implementation of some activities such as drafting 
Community Biodiversity Registers, financial accounting, the use of technology such as 
cameras, computers, the internet etc. Outsiders, however, are strictly prohibited from 
intervening in any decision-making processes, which are the exclusive prerogative of 
the citizens of Mendha. 
Mendha has consciously and strategically avoided any financial dependence on NGOs 
and external funding agencies. Funding has been mobilized through its effective use 
of government funds, and programs allocated by the state for tribal development in 
the region. Instead of leaving the government agencies to implement these schemes, 
Mendha has either de facto or through official means taken charge of these funds, 
schemes, and programs to implement them as per the gram sabha’s decisions. These 
funds are in addition to the gram sabha’s own earnings through the sale of forest 
produce, donations by visitors, and voluntary contributions by the villagers.
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THE HURDLES MENDHA FACES
Apart from the challenges emerging from state laws and policies which have been a 
running thread throughout Mendha’s struggle, amongst the strongest challenges that 
Mendha has faced have been from its immediate neighbors. Mendha’s conflicts with 
its immediately neighboring villages began soon after its declaration of self-rule and the 
announcement of their governance structure with its rules and regulations. Mendha’s 
forests have been customarily used by neighboring villages. Over the years, as the 
forests of these villages gradually depleted, often through cultivation (outside the legal 
system), dependence on Mendha’s forests gradually increased. Many of these villages 
also depended on daily wage employment in commercial activities undertaken by the 
state and the paper mill. In the process of announcing their rules and regulations for the 
management and governance of forests, Mendha’s gram sabha invited its neighbors to 
join in the effort. Neighboring villages would be allowed customary use of the forests as 
long as they informed the gram sabha and followed all rules of regulated use as decided 
by the gram sabha. This assertion of power was not acceptable to the neighboring 
villages. The discontent of the neighboring villages was actively encouraged by the 
Forest Department which asserted that the forests belonged to the state. The forest 
staff continued to take bribes and provide indirect support to those who would violate 
Mendha’s rules. Mendha’s gram sabha held many discussions with the gram sabhas 
of its neighboring villages to explain their position but without much success. Over the 
years this also became one of the major factors alienating the village youth from the gram 
sabha. The village’s young people found themselves taunted as “the self-rule wala” in 
the local markets, schools, and other public spaces. The situation for Mendha changed 
after the Forest Rights Act was implemented and their rights were legally recognized. 
The significance of Mendha’s resistance began to make sense and neighboring villages 
started the process of claiming their rights. Mendha continues to maintain the position 
that neighboring villages with customary access are allowed in their forests as long 
as they also use them responsibly and follow the principles of sustainability. In order 
to resolve their long-standing conflict with the neighboring villages, Mendha has now 
started a process of dialogue with the traditional institutions and leaders in their Ilaka. 
On the other hand, with most villages receiving access, use, and management rights 
under the FRA, the neighbors now understand Mendha’s struggle better. In recent 
years, over thirty villages have come together to form a regional federation as a support 
group for constituent gram sabhas to manage and govern their customary forests.
In recent years, major challenges have emerged in the form of market forces and 
contractors involved in forest trade. A contractor raj (rule) flourished during the 
Forest Department’s exploitation of forests. Contractors enjoyed many privileges, 
much freedom and high profits by winning favors from the forest staff. An informal 
economy meant high profits for contractors, heavy bribes for forest officials, a loss 
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of revenue for the state exchequer, and low wages for the forest workers. These 
contractors now have to work with Mendha, with all its transparency, rules, and regu-
lations. A contractors’ lobby in the district is now ensuring that villages like Mendha 
which insist on transparent processes do not find a market for their produce or their 
produce is sold at a lower price at auctions. Many unsuspecting gram sabhas where 
internal processes are not very strong are providing easy resources for the lobby. 
Facing difficulties in accessing the market for their produce and being undercut by 
the contractors, Mendha village, along with many others in the district, has already 
submitted petitions to the government for them to implement a minimum support 
price mechanism to stop such exploitation. While action from the government 
remains pending Mendha and a district-level study circle continue to contemplate 
their next course of action.
CONCLUSION
Mendha’s journey has been a continuous, dynamic, and dialectical relationship 
between struggle and alternatives; non-violent opposition and cooperation; rejection 
and negotiation. Each struggle has led to the emergence of alternatives not just for 
the village but for a larger community, often with national-level implications. These 
include changes in the Joint Forest Management Policy, policies related to the imple-
mentation of the Forest Rights Act 2006 and the process related to the Mahatma 
Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 of the Government of India. 
Mendha’s struggle includes implementing existing legal and policy measures, the 
struggle to change or amend such laws when they do not support the decisions of 
the village, and to implement their decisions even when such laws and policies do 
not exist. 
The factors underlying Mendha’s successful struggle include: its detailed and open 
study circle discussions which are held for a requisite length of time; well-informed 
consensus-based decisions (no consensus, no decision); equal opportunities for all, 
including women in decision-making and the implementation of decisions; non-violent 
action; its ability to garner solidarity and support from a larger community, ranging 
from villages in the district, to individuals, and groups from across the country. 
Among the most important and unique aspects of Mendha’s efforts have been the 
study circles which have enabled villagers to completely understand a situation before 
adopting strategies to deal with it. This has helped them in analyzing and under-
standing government schemes, policies, and laws in such a way that they have been 
able to use and implement them for their own benefit while retaining decision-making 
powers. Consequently, many schemes and programs which have been criticized for 
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being top-down and/or corrupt elsewhere have been used in Mendha in their own 
unique way, including JFM and the MNREGA. Mendha, however, believes that no 
initiative can ever be replicated or up-scaled. Each situation, context, culture and 
people involved are different. Initiatives like Mendha’s are meant to be learnt from in 
order to develop one’s own unique initiative depending on one’s own local situations. 
While Mendha continues to face hurdles from market forces, it is also facing criticism 
from some quarters for not supporting the struggles against mining in the region. 
With over 1,000 villages whose Forest Rights have been recognized, and gram sabhas 
in the region earning much more from their forests than any government develop-
ment and beneficiary schemes could provide, the region once again faces threats to 
these forests from over twenty-five proposed mining leases, one of which has already 
started operating. Whilst on the one hand various regional gram sabha federations 
are emerging, on the other, forests are facing the threat of being diverted for mining 
once again. 
Even as this case study is being written, Gadchiroli appears to be standing at the 
same point today where it was in the 1980s when the Gadchiroli Movement started. 
The difference today is that the gram sabhas are stronger, but so are the economic 
and extractive powers. What role Mendha will play in this state of flux, and whether 
this is an opportunity for thousands of Mendhas to emerge or for the market economy 
powers to win, the times ahead will unfold.
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GLOSSARY OF LOCAL WORDS USED
 Zamindar Landlord
 Begar Free labor
 Panchyat  Village executive -  
  Officially the first unit of decision-making under  
  the Panchayati Raj System of India 
 Patel Village head appointed by the British  
  in tribal areas to liaise with people
 Nistar Patrak Record of usufruct rights
 Kahdi Bribe
 Sarkari Belonging to the government
 Andolan  People’s Resistance Movement
 Poojari Priest
 Gaita Traditional priest in Gond villages
 Sarpanch Elected head of a Panchayat
 Ghotul A traditional structure and system for youths in Gond villages
 Koya Human (Gonds sometimes refer to themselves by this name) 
 Patwari  Local land record officer
 Ilaka Unit of area under a certain landlord during British rule
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On May 15, 2011, mass rallies and occupations eclipsed Spain’s major cities. The date 
is widely considered the birth moment of the “Indignado movement”, also known as 
the “15M”. While it is quite difficult to measure the wider impact of the 15M, one of 
its very tangible achievements, i.e. one of the direct translations of its social unrest 
and indignation, is to have triggered the victory of “citizen platforms” across Spain in 
the municipal elections of 2015 – one of the major experiments in electoral democracy 
in Europe’s recent political history. In less than a year, various platforms – most of 
them with no previous experience in electoral politics – succeeded in winning elec-
tions in some of the bigger municipalities (Madrid, Barcelona, Zaragoza, and Coruña, 
among others). In fact, citizen-based electoral platforms emerged in almost every city 
and every village. In some cases, they joined governments as coalition partners (e.g. in 
Valencia and Badalona, a city in the metropolitan area of Barcelona), and in many others 
they are currently opposition forces. Also part of the post-15M idea of so-called “new 
politics” (nueva política) is Podemos, the left-wing political party that was launched in 
Madrid and established a nationwide presence (with the vision of seizing the Spanish 
nation-state as its central aim) in parallel with the municipalist wave.1
The aim of this text is to offer an understanding of the movement’s mutation into what 
has been termed an “institutional takeover”. It will focus in particular on the potentiali-
ties and limitations of municipal politics, and discuss the open possibilities of “Radical 
Municipalism” in changing political power relations in the city. It will also look at what 
kind of strategies are needed to create and sustain a shared project based on a broad 
and expansive social movement that does not define itself purely in terms of its elec-
toral and institutional aspirations. For the left, this is a classic question to which I want 
to humbly add my concrete and vivid local perspective.
Barcelona en Comú (Catalan for “Barcelona in Common”), epitomizes the recent rise of 
social movements to institutional power in the country. It is a citizen platform created 
to become an elected institutional body in the municipality and a platform for a variety 
of social movements in the city. The expectation among many is that this initiative will 
open up opportunities to redistribute wealth, fight for social achievements, and deepen 
democracy by linking institutional policy-making with social mobilization.
My analysis will draw on the concept of the political cycle (Rodríguez, 2016) with its 
three distinct moments (which will be more or less present throughout the analysis). 
These three stages will provide a useful framework to better grasp how the movement 
1 This new political force, which also claimed to have its roots in the 15M movement, witnessed an unexpected 
electoral surge in May 2014, landing 6 seats in the European Parliament. Moreover, in 2014–2015, local groups of 
Podemos would end up joining municipal citizens’ platforms in many towns and cities. However, it is important 
to stress that municipalist platforms and Podemos are in most cases two different political actors.
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was created, and how it has evolved over time, exposed to different conjunctures and 
challenges. This historical framework will also enable an understanding of how the 
emergence of Barcelona en Comú has (re)defined the “(new) rules of the game”, and 
how its approaches were subsequently replicated in other cities across Spain. 
The political cycle comprises:
> The movement phase: The political cycle was initiated by the peaceful democratic 
upheavals of May 15, 2011. This was a true “event” (to use Alain Badiou’s term) to 
the extent that it catalyzed a series of mobilizations and collective experiences.
> The municipalist hypothesis, or political party-phase: The second moment involves 
organizing an “institutional strategy” (apuesta institucional), or “seizing the institu-
tions” (tomar las instituciones). This stage is characterized by higher degrees of 
organization and oriented towards the creation of new political instruments: elec-
toral platforms constituted by citizens and new political parties.
> The institutional phase. The third stage is characterized by governance, or the insti-
tutionalization of some part of the movement, and based on the recovery of the 
State as a sovereign instrument to implement politics.
THE INDIGNADO MOVEMENT  
AT AN IMPASSE
The 15M or Indignado movement marked the tipping point of the current political cycle, 
a critical moment that had been long in the making. Since the beginning of the economic 
crisis in 2008, Spain has gone through truly exceptional times that have culminated in 
the imposition of austerity measures, exposed broad segments of society to increasing 
impoverishment and rising unemployment, and eroded the political legitimacy of domi-
nant parties and unions. Social movements formed in response to these dynamics. 
15M catalyzed these and engendered an enormous extension of the movement in 
subsequent years, including the spread of neighborhood assemblies and movements in 
defense of social rights such as healthcare or education. 
When established political institutions appeared immune against the proposals for 
change, the movement turned an economic and social crisis into a political crisis, a 
challenge to the political system, by attempting to take over the very institutions it 
had wanted to reform. In this section I will describe the core elements of the 15M or 
Indignado movement and contextualize the political impasse that led to the strategy of 
standing for public office.
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THE ORIGINS OF A DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION
The 15M was a peaceful and democratic uprising that began with occupations of the 
squares of major Spanish cities on May 15, 2011, a week prior to local elections. It started 
as a small, inarticulate, and youth-centered movement that was both a massive outcry 
against austerity and a challenge to the very foundations of representative democracy. 
Calls for “Real Democracy Now” and famous slogans such as “They don’t represent 
us”, “They call it democracy, but it’s not that”, “We are not commodities in the hands of 
bankers and politicians”, or “It’s not left or right, it’s the ones at the bottom against the 
ones on top” pointed towards a sort of non-ideological politics articulated beyond tradi-
tional party lines and a critique of the state as the monopolist of the political. The word 
that encapsulated the movement’s central demand was a classic term that no one would 
have suspected would experience a revolutionary revival: democracy (Rodríguez, 2016).
Another new element introduced by the 15M was the idea that politics was not the 
exclusive business of representatives and experts, but a sphere in which ordinary citi-
zens can get involved. Women and men of different ages occupied the squares not only 
to say that the system was broken, but also in order to practice direct democracy: to 
share, talk, and listen to each other, to debate, and to learn. And many of those partici-
pants had no previous experience in terms of political engagement. In this way, people 
expressed in the squares the need to reinvent democracy, to reclaim it. Through that 
collective experience, people became aware of their own strength and their potential 
capacity as a collective force to question and challenge the causes of injustice that 
aggravate them. (Charnock et al., 2012)
However, the 15M movement was not limited to the physical occupation of squares. It also 
had an important virtual dimension, with social networks such as Twitter and Facebook 
acting as its main connectors. These media channels had a clear public and external layer, 
and were used mainly as platforms for free speech, and to mobilize and organize protests.
Some have called this a “post-mediated public sphere” beyond the mainstream media, 
a sphere in which the movement’s calls were circulated, where slogans were shared, 
and activists tested the general climate and their political proposals. (Toret, 2013). The 
increasing use of social networks came to displace the more political and experimental 
projects that had previously emerged, such as the Web 2.0 (with Indymedia as the main 
example), or the blogosphere.
The 15M strongly politicized its supporters, and quickly sparked a widespread sense 
of affinity. The official surveys published at the time in the mainstream media revealed 
that almost two-thirds of the population were sympathetic towards the protesters. The 
enormous size and scale of the mobilizations and their peaceful character, the social 
composition of the revolt’s protagonists (the young and the precarious middle-class), as 
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well as the strong opposition against the imposed austerity policies helped to generate 
a broad consensus. “Reclaiming democracy” was something that a large part of the 
population identified with.
The sheer reach and growth of the 15M movement reveals that the process was not 
something triggered by social movements alone. Certainly, it cannot be explained 
without accounting for the militant work and the constant contributions of these active 
minorities. However, it also contained something radically “new” and fresh, something 
that went beyond the parameters of previous mobilizations and shattered the legitimacy 
of the political regime, in other words, of the structures that had hitherto been consid-
ered vital: the system of parliamentary democracy which had emerged after the end of 
the Francoist dictatorship in 1975, the Spanish Constitution, the party system and its 
main institutions, as well as conventional political grammar, etc. (Collado, 2016).
Gradually, inspired by the aura of May 2011, there emerged a constellation of local 
movements. These included groups protesting against austerity policies and the privati-
zation of public services (healthcare, education, transport, water and energy supply) 
known as mareas (“tides”), and more transversal movements demanding radical 
changes regarding, for instance, the transformation of mechanisms of representation 
(“real democracy”), public debt audits, or stricter public control over banking practices 
and corruption, etc. One of the stronger grassroots movements of this period was the 
PAH (Plataforma de Afectados por la Hipoteca / Mortgage Victims Platform), which after 
15M Demonstration, 2011
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eight years (PAH was founded in February 2009 in Barcelona) is still fighting to change 
Spanish mortgage legislation that forces the (often evicted) borrowers to continue to 
repay their debt after foreclosure.
THE GLASS CEILING AND THE WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY
Nevertheless, after more than two years of mobilization, and in spite of all the mentioned 
powerful struggles, the 15M movement seemed to reach its limits. Lacking an institu-
tional counterpart, it found itself in an institutional deadlock, and both its proposals and 
its demands were neither heard nor internalized by the constitutional system. Over 
the course of the “acampadas” (the Indignados’ camps in the squares), many political 
figures from traditional parties called on the 15M movement to end the occupation of 
public space and stand for election instead. If they claimed to represent the people, the 
established political class reasoned, then the movement should “try to achieve your 
goals with votes and not with banners.”2
Responses to the demands of the PAH provide another clear example of the deafness 
of the major parties in Congress and in office. The group’s presence during the debate 
that took place in Congress in February 2012 on a Popular Legislative Initiative (PLI) on 
housing for which they had gathered more than 1.5 million signatures marked a histor-
ical turning point. Not only were PAH supporters not heard, they were literally expelled 
from Congress and looked down on.
The rejection of the PLI showed that popular mobilization alone would not be enough 
to break down the defensive wall protecting institutionalized political power. More-
over, there was a growing sense among activists on the street that it would become 
increasingly difficult to sustain the level of mobilization. This gave rise to feelings of 
political impotence as the movement found it hard to channel popular discontent.
However, different activists and movements kept thinking and maneuvering (with an 
intelligence and passion unseen since the struggles of the 1970s), and the metaphor 
of the “glass ceiling” became common currency. In the words of one of the organiza-
tion’s members, “the movements have moved from protest to action and have become 
ambitious   There’s a glass ceiling for the movements and evidence that the laws are 
being changed by the institutions” (Blanchar & Mumbrú, 2014). What the statement 
implied was that while the movement had reached a political deadlock, a true impasse, 
the defensive wall protecting the establishment was actually weak. Soon enough, a 
number of members (many of them seasoned activists) identified a unique window of 
opportunity: they concluded that grassroots movements needed to seize institutions to 
end austerity and translate the growing sense of frustration into a source of strength. 
2 The following video shows major figures of the Popular Party calling on 
15M to stand for elections (Maldita Hemeroteca, 2015).
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The main hegemonic social and political actors’ inability to channel social discontent and 
unrest marked an opportunity.
This realization led to widespread discussions within the movements: eventually, 
“seizing the institutions” translated into creating broad citizen platforms and coalitions 
that would use the electoral system as a lever of change. The success of Podemos in 
the European elections of May 25, 2014 would accelerate this process, confirming the 
electoral hypothesis (or the “institutional assault” hypothesis) as the solution to the 
impasse of post-15M mobilizations.
THE PRAGMATIC TURN OF THE SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS: THE MUNICIPALIST 
HYPOTHESIS
The strategy of standing for public office was by no means an obvious option for local 
activists in Spain, particularly in Barcelona, which has a strong anarchist and autono-
mous tradition. Moreover, one of the major slogans of the Indignados was “they don’t 
represent us”, a statement critical just as much of representative democracy itself as 
of those in office at the time. As I have already mentioned, what provoked the move 
was both the severity of the economic and political crises and the sense of a “glass 
ceiling” limiting the scope of what the movements were able to achieve from outside 
the institutions.
The question of which elections to stand for – at the municipal, autonomous commu-
nity (Catalan), or the Spanish general election level – was initially an open one. Those 
advocating the municipal strategy argued that instead of viewing the nation-state as the 
focus of political action, as most parties did historically, political power should emanate 
from the local level, and later include the option of expanding to other levels or working 
in coordination/cooperation with other local actors. Local institutions were those with 
the greatest potential to act as vehicles for achieving many of the principal goals of 
the Indignados, in particular the deprofessionalization of politics, participatory democ-
racy, transparency, and a battle against economic inequality. Local governments have a 
greater potential for true democratization compared to states, and therefore it is at the 
local level that many decisions should be made. Municipalism and local frameworks are 
especially suited to reverse the logic of representative democracy and create dynamics 
and spaces of direct and popular democracy as they can easily facilitate the construc-
tion of structures of self-organization, decision-making, and political intervention that 
act outside the exclusively institutional sphere and yet have the capacity to influence 
that sphere.
This approach was laid out in an influential publication titled “La Apuesta Municipalista” 
(The Municipal Wager), by various authors of the Madrid-based Observatorio Metropoli-
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tano in 2014. According to the text, the hypothesis can be summed up as follows: “If 
we take the institutions that are closest to citizens, the municipalities, and we turn them 
into sites of direct decision-making, we can create a democracy worthy of the name” 
(Observatorio Metropolitano, 2014: p. 143).
Municipalism is a political strategy that can be adopted by political platforms of different 
kinds (from social movements to political parties). However, despite its electoral focus, 
the “radical or democratic municipal strategy” must exist in tension with the tradi-
tional institutional and party politics it seeks to infiltrate. As the authors of “La Apuesta 
Municipalista” explain, “the main requirement is that these candidatures are built as 
‘movements’ rather than ‘parties’ in the classic sense of the word. With the aim of not 
reproducing the sins of the ruling political class, the ‘municipal wager’ is conceived 
as a project controlled ‘from below’, subject to collective accountability.”(Observatorio 
Metropolitano, 2014)
A municipal initiative also had two further, pragmatic advantages over standing for 
the Catalan or Spanish elections. First, getting the message out to citizens without 
relying on mass media would be easier on a smaller scale, working through the well-
articulated networks of movements and neighborhood associations across the city. 
Second, at the time the question of Catalan independence, an issue that divides the 
left, was at the top of the institutional agenda in Catalonia. Working at municipal level 
would allow those with different views on the national question to come together 
around common goals for Barcelona.3 Finally, the decision was also linked to the fact 
that it would be easier to win municipal elections, and that if this was attempted it 
would more likely prove to be an inspiring experience. Some people link the strategy 
of municipalism with the PAH’s discourse about “small victories” as the path to great 
change. Or, as it was said in the public squares during the 15M: “We are moving 
slowly because we are going far.”
THE PROCESS OF CONFLUENCE IN  
BARCELONA EN COMÚ
The concept of confluence is vital to understand how movements or citizen platforms 
organize municipal candidatures, and how open and participatory approaches to elec-
toral and institutional politics are built.
To launch the candidacies for the 2015 municipal elections, instead of searching for 
coalitions between existing political parties, the aim was to build an open platform that 
would encourage people with existing party affiliations, but also (and mainly) people not 
3 At the time the question of Catalan independence, a divisive issue for the left, was at the top of the institutional 
agenda in Catalonia. Working at municipal level would allow those with different views on the national question 
to come together to find common goals for Barcelona.
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belonging to or identifying with a particular political party, to participate. The manifesto 
expressed the idea of confluence as follows: “We don’t want a coalition or a mixing of 
political parties. We want to avoid the old logic of parties and build a new space that, 
while respecting the identity of everyone involved, is more than the sum of the parts 
that make it up.”
This proposal was submitted to the citizens of Barcelona in June 2014, and had to win 
30,000 supporters before September to be able to move forward. The group of activists 
promoting the proposal first secured the support of more than 30,000 neighbors, who 
embraced the initiative and its founding manifesto, which was later backed by other 
platforms and parties.
The result was a broad alliance of forces that would give rise to a candidature character-
ized by its mixed composition and a marked a-partisan accent that put the movement’s 
aims before its name. The following parties joined: Podemos, ICV (the Catalan green 
party), EUIA (a traditional left-wing party), EQUO (a Spanish green party), and Procés 
Constituent (a leftist platform promoting a constitution-making process in Catalonia).4 
The participation of ICV was particularly significant; as a party represented at the munic-
ipal level, they qualified Barcelona en Comú for participation in the mayoral TV debates, 
which greatly increased the movement’s public visibility.
Local social movements were another important actor that shaped Barcelona en Comú 
from early on. Although their relationship with the new organization was never formal-
ized, the municipal movement was led by activists from social movements, with parties 
formally joining the process later. Many of those who started discussing and building 
the platform belonged to previously existing movements, such as the PAH, neighbor-
hood associations, free culture activists, etc. There was also support from some critical 
sectors and relevant personalities in the academic field, and from individual citizens who 
were previously not affiliated with political parties or social movements.
To sum up, the idea of confluence has two important elements. First, the role played 
by leading social movement activists both during the process of confluence and as the 
project’s public face, was one of the elements of electoral success. This enabled the 
initiative to win new activists and voters beyond those who were already identifying 
with its cast of political actors. In the 2015 elections, abstention dropped by 8 percent, a 
factor that was decisive for the victory of Barcelona en Comú. The electoral strategy of 
Barcelona en Comú was to attract voters who usually stayed away from the municipal 
4 The actors involved in the process of confluence were diverse. Two of them, the eco-socialist party Iniciativa per 
Catalunya (ICV), and the communist Esquerra Unida i Alternativa (EUiA), had a long history in Catalonia and three 
seats in the city council. The others, EQUO, an environmental party, Podemos, the left-wing party launched in 
Madrid, and Procés Constituent, a Catalan republican political movement, had never stood for the Barcelona 
municipal elections before.
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elections: a figure that reached 47 percent across the city but in some districts was as 
high as 58 percent in the 2011 elections.
Second, the organization of the “confluence method” meant, at least in theory, that 
citizens were able to participate on equal terms with members of previously existing 
political parties. But the day-to-day realities have been quite different, and although 
the original idea was that members of political parties should join and participate in the 
citizen platform as individuals, and not as representatives of their own organizations, 
those “structures” still continue to exert a strong influence.
RELATIONSHIPS WITH THE POLITICAL LEFT
One important element of this political cycle has been the challenge to the old Spanish 
constitutional regime, and also its break with the traditional left worldview. The 15M 
represented a radical departure from the traditional left. Characterized by entirely non-
partisan slogans and non-ideological politics, it intended to situate “the political” beyond 
the categories of left and right, and focus more on processes, concrete practices, and 
objectives.
The 15M movement saw the parties of the left as main actors in the political arena, 
and therefore as part of the problem. It identified the major Spanish trade unions as 
responsible for the current situation, rejecting their fragmentation and sectarianism, 
empty ideology, useless power struggles, as well as their involvement in a number of 
corruption scandals.
The 15M’s initial slogans and calls had an inclusive and transversal character that lacked 
the traditional elements of the left. “It’s not a question of left against right, it’s the ones at 
the bottom against the ones on top”, or Occupy’s meme of “We are the 99%”, referring 
to an almost universal and open majority. “Normal people” joined a movement that was 
thinking beyond traditional ideological identities. References to the “proletarian revolu-
tion” or “class struggle” were branded as ideological, leftist, antiquated, outdated politics. 
The focus was now on “democracy” – democracy as a counterpart to the political crisis 
of liberal representation. In this context, the official left was disoriented, marked clearly 
by its failure to deliver on the promise of social equality, which had an influence on the 
middle class and the politicization of younger generations condemned to precariousness.
There is a part of the 15M discourse that became an obsession for a great number of 
people: to be many, to convince the majority, to reach out to the “average citizen”. This 
idea also produced the so-called “victory hypothesis” that winning the elections was 
possible. One of the features of this new politics, in addition to transparency or demo-
cratic regeneration, was its belief in the possibility of victory and change.
The rise of Podemos and different municipalist candidacies such as Barcelona en Comú 
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has disrupted Spain’s traditional party system. Both kinds of projects share the vision of 
changing the discourse of the political left, but there are some important differences. 
While Podemos explicitly defends a populist approach to politics in which the simpli-
fication of discourse plays an instrumental electoral role, in the case of Barcelona the 
claim is that instead of defending grand structural discourses, the focus should be on 
ordinary people’s actual demands. The aim in the latter case is to transform the struc-
ture of power at the local level so that ordinary citizens can become actively engaged 
in politics, while in the former case the strategy is to join people’s views up with the 
leadership’s interpretation.
A further difference between Barcelona en Comú’s discourse and that of the traditional 
left (and of Podemos as well) is that it prefers cooperation and construction to confronta-
tion, which is a genuinely masculine feature of politics. Instead of speaking about “us” vs. 
“them”, it refers to the common good. Here, it is important to think about municipalism as 
a method and to reflect on the concept of confluence (see the sections below).
Another element that the movement has derived from the “confluence method” is that 
it does not see itself as the section of the left whose task is to provide the old left-wing 
parties with a new identity (I am referring here to ICV or EuiA, for example, or IU at the 
Spanish level), but as an open, inclusive, and democratic mechanism that can help build 
a different kind of political space. This is due to the perception that there is no need to 
organize around a more or less traditional party apparatus in order to “seize the institution”.
A confluence between the old and the new left, between militants of different vital 
trajectories, has been possible. As the activist A. Recio points out, during such a process 
it helps to exclude references to the working class or the possibly communist character 
of a new model, which could give rise to conflicting sensibilities, and substitute these 
with new proposals that include ideas (or reformulated ideas) that have been part of this 
tradition: economic democracy, municipalization, predominance of the public or collec-
tive, egalitarianism, etc. (Recio, 2016). Having an asset like the charismatic Ada Colau is 
certainly another factor that supports this trend towards confluence.
THE FEMINIZATION OF POLITICS
The feminized nature of the municipal movement is particularly noteworthy. In Barce-
lona, the citizen platform chose Ada Colau, who a few months later became the first 
female mayor of Barcelona. Ada Colau was the charismatic head and spokesperson of 
the PAH, a young Barcelonian activist who has been a ‘public face’ of Spain’s new social 
movements since the days of the 15M. The PAH’s huge impact as a political organiza-
tion and Ada Calau’s growing popularity, supported by her strong media presence, made 
her the best candidate to lead the new coalition into the upcoming municipal elections, 
not least because she enjoys broad political backing. Colau represents all the ideas that 
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form the core of the new municipal candidatures: respond to the will and basic needs 
of the people, and not to the interests of private corporations; embrace the necessity of 
developing new forms of political representation; respond to the 15M claim of building 
democracy from below; not to leave politics in the hands of bureaucrats and “experts”; 
to build political confidence through actions, and not through words; etc.
Beyond this publicly visible level of leadership, women played a strong role in all branches 
of the movement, from neighborhood groups to policy-making. This was part of a delib-
erate strategy to feminize and de-patriarchalize politics; Barcelona en Comú has two 
coordinators for each of its organizational branches, 50 percent of which have to be 
female. The organization has no individual leadership roles; its elected executive body, 
for example, counts eight members, and its coordinating team consists of 40 members.
But as the feminist movement itself concedes, the introduction of gender quotas is not 
enough. According to the philosopher Montserrat Galceran, the feminization of politics 
comprises three elements. First, gender equality at the level of institutional representa-
tion and public participation; second, a commitment to public policies that challenge 
gender roles and seek to break down patriarchy; and third, a different way of doing poli-
tics, based on values and practices that put an emphasis on everyday life, relationships, 
the role of the community, and the common good. (Galcerán & Carmona, 2017). The last 
implies the development of feminist public policies in all areas, and the introduction of 
ideas such as diversity, co-responsibility, cooperation and non-competition, as well as 
care, all of which have a deep impact on classical conceptions of power.
Demonstration to claim equal rights for women, 2015
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Barcelona en Comú has incorporated these three elements, and has made the femini-
zation of politics one of its main slogans. Beginning with the presentation of a female 
candidate for mayor, followed by a large number of female candidates for the city council 
(and the district council) elections, the feminization of politics was visible from the very 
beginning. Women had a very strong presence in the electoral campaign in general, and 
they represent 60 percent of the city government.
Moreover, within the organization, representation in the different organs includes at 
least 50 percent of women at every level. Among other measures, many organs even 
limit the length of speeches in order to counter male dominance and incentivize the 
participation of women. In March 2017, the platform placed a call for external evalua-
tors to assess the organization in terms of gender equality. From the point of view of 
implementing feminist policies, the city government has made strong compromises. 
For instance, it has produced a manual for urban planning that takes into account the 
gender dimension, a gender justice plan, a sexual diversity and gender plan; it has also 
implemented measures to counter gendered violence, and developed a strategy against 
the feminization of poverty. Each of these plans and measures includes specific actions 
that are currently being implemented.
Finally, from the point of view of changing actual practice, there are many dynamics 
and styles that should be mentioned, although changing and sustaining these feminist 
approaches is a constant struggle within the organization. Some interesting points include 
establishing non-confrontational discourse, the rejection of patriarchal styles, accepting 
mistakes and changes in opinion, establishing horizontal forms of organization, etc.
BUILDING DEMOCRACY STEP BY STEP
Barcelona en Comú emerged from the desire to form a new political actor beyond tradi-
tional political party lines, an actor with a radically new approach to institutional politics. 
The aim was to build a socio-political movement with a significant level of citizen partici-
pation (and not a traditional political party) that could function as a lever to access city 
government, a vehicle reflecting the majority’s will, responsive to the needs of the 
people and the mobilizations. The platform wants to secure a majority – it was origi-
nally named “Guanyem Barcelona”, which means “Let’s win Barcelona” – to be able to 
reverse policies that fail to guarantee basic rights; it wants to do politics differently and 
democratize political representation. But so far, the point was not to enter institutions 
to be able to better represent the majority’s rights (an improved copy of the structure of 
traditional parties), but to open up government to the citizens.
The idea was not to form a “more progressive” party that would reform the city on 
behalf of its citizens, but to “place power in the hands of the people” by transforming 
the way politics is done as such. From its beginnings, Barcelona en Comú fueled the 
~ 196 ~
hopes and dreams of many people who organized in local assemblies, gave financial 
support, or simply embraced the emergence of a new formation.
Then, the first challenges appeared. The question was how to create a democratic 
mass organization and a new type of party structure. This was a question that earlier 
social movements in Spain, being much more familiar with small-scale projects, did 
not face, although there is an alternative left municipal tradition in the country with the 
CUP (the Popular Unity Candidacy, an anti-capitalist, pro-Catalan independence political 
party active in the Catalan Countries). And, to make matters even more complicated, 
the platform had only a few months to create a solidly structured organization formally 
capable of standing for election (in terms of its decision-making, election of representa-
tives, accountability, and collective finance).5
The distrust of parties, or the idea of non-representation – one of 15M’s legacies – 
explains in part both the need to avoid traditional party structures and the necessity 
to create something different that is driven strongly by social actors and citizens and 
rejects the old mode of doing politics. But how can a democratic structure and a new 
way of decision-making be organized to incorporate the idea of “governing by obeying”, 
i.e. the idea of establishing an institutionalized hierarchy between the representatives 
and the base?
In practice, there have been real innovations regarding central elements of the organiza-
tional structure (decision-making processes, the census, the election of representatives, 
accountability, collective finance, etc.). Among other things, there is the organizational 
form based on assemblies, with committees, meetings, assemblies and plenaries. 
Despite its integration of some traditional parties, the organization operates on the basis of 
a very horizontal and open structure, managing to integrate into its multiple commissions 
people who previously have not been active in organizations. Barcelona en Comú’s Internal 
Organization (Barcelona En Comú, 2014) comprises 15 neighborhood groups organized 
as self-managed assemblies open to anyone willing to participate (although newcomers’ 
responsibilities and their capacity to make decisions are initially limited), several thematic 
groups linking activists and institutions (focused on issues including urbanism and housing, 
citizen participation, health, feminisms), as well as several technical commissions that 
manage essential day-to-day tasks (content, communications, logistics and financing, 
organization, and convergence with political forces). There is also an executive council that 
coordinates and oversees the entire process, as well as a plenary, the assembly open to 
anyone involved, where the most important issues are discussed and decided on, where 
mandates are generated, and where accountability is anchored (Mir Garcia, 2016).
5 The International Commission of Barcelona en Comú has published a guide on how to build a political movement 
in the city titled “How to win back the city en comú” (BComú Global, 2015) which explains the origins, 
philosophy, and strategies of the new municipalist movement in Spain to urban activists around the world.
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After the elections and winning city hall, this structure has partly been maintained, 
although important changes have been made to adapt the “machine” to the new 
scenario, and draw a clear division between “the party”6 and its organizational spaces 
on the one hand, and those working in government on the other. For example, the 
neighborhood groups – some of which are more active than others – have now been 
given the mandate to be more of a kind of external counterpower and oversee the 
implementation of policies, remain sensitive to new demands, and broaden the coali-
tion’s voter base.
A Code of Political Ethics has also been drafted and approved to define the party’s basic 
compromises concerning political representation, auditing and accountability, financing, 
transparency, professionalization, and corruption (Barcelona En Comú, 2015). This 
Ethics Code subjects its “representatives” to a series of checks and controls, and is an 
interesting experiment in electoral democracy. It also strives to promote the necessary 
legal instruments and mechanisms to make its ethical principles a mandatory norm for 
all members of the municipal administration.
The Ethics Code includes practical mechanisms to make funding and accountability 
transparent (“information should always be presented as usable open data”), measures 
to tackle corruption (“the obligation for elected representatives to make public their 
agendas and all their income sources, wealth, and capital gains”) or “to close revolving 
doors” and “dissolve clientelistic networks” through non-collaboration with active busi-
nesses should the representative have exercised his work for at least five years after 
leaving the position. It also excludes bonuses, and calls on members not to commit 
tax fraud, or accept gifts. It also allows mandates to be revoked in order to limit the 
autonomy of the leadership, and “limit the time in office to two consecutive legisla-
tive periods”. This code caps the average salary of political representatives at €2,200 
(excess earnings go the social projects in the city), which is not low, but still less than 
what many senior executives earn.
This popular enthusiasm has also been drawn on to fund the electoral campaign and the 
party (headquarters, full-time members, etc). It is important to remember that Barce-
lona en Comú was launched without a euro. But the point was not only to seek citizen 
involvement in financing the movement. The move was also a response to an increasing 
number of popular calls to end systemic corruption and find a way to do things differ-
ently than the major parties with their established policies and practices, also in financial 
terms. In this context, in order to put an end to illegal “mafia” financing practices and 
the favorable treatment of political leaders by financial institutions, it was necessary to 
find new ways to fund political parties. It was thought that the major parties had mort-
6 Although Barcelona en Comú is defined as a citizen platform, it has had to register as a party to be able to 
participate in the elections once dismissed the formula of grouping of voters (agrupación de electores)
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gaged their proposals by relying only on the financial sector, which has been one of the 
main causes of the crisis. This meant that the movement only had one option to guar-
antee the candidature’s political independence: it had to establish collective approaches 
to funding and explicitly accept support only from ethical banks and donations from 
individuals, avoiding large contributions and building on “small” but “numerous” dona-
tions from “ordinary” people.
In practice, this meant that funding for the election campaign came mainly from four 
sources: contributions (basically via the movement’s website), crowdfunding (online 
micro-sponsorships or micro-lending), merchandise sold via an online store, and the assets 
of one of the left-wing parties that joined the coalition. As there are no traditional party 
members or people affiliated with the party, there are no fees needed to cover expenses. 
Instead, there are regular or occasional voluntary donations and loans. Also, there is a 
limit on the maximum amount that can be donated, and it is stricter than the regulations 
laid down by Spanish law. Crowdfunding – both an innovative and participative financing 
tool inspired by the values of the collaborative economy and a widespread financing prac-
tice among social movements – was used at a certain stage in the campaign to finance 
specific projects and initiatives (such as certain actions). Last but not least, it is important 
to stress the significance of the funding that came in via the public subsidies that one of 
the parties of the coalition (ICV – EUiA) receives on the basis of its past election results. 
This funding was crucial to cover election campaign expenses such as advertising, for 
example, which makes up the bulk of campaign spending.
On the other hand, efforts were and are still being made to promote access to economic 
information as an essential tool for democratic control and accountability. Transparent 
financial accounting (the party’s total income and expenses, campaign budget, donors, 
invoices and vouchers can all be accessed online) is seen as a return to the supporters 
and to society in general, and as a way to tackle corruption and opaque party financing.
Another interesting element in this context is the way in which this transparency is 
achieved. In the wake of pro-transparency movements and the open data community 
in Spain, the process followed a number of crucial principles. These set out that the 
published data has to be relevant (offer complete accounting), visible (by making trans-
parent the platform’s expenses and revenues via its website) and conform to Open Data 
standards (in that they have to be understandable and accessible to all in an open data 
format). In this sense, the promotion of access to information, transparency, and open 
data allows citizens to follow, monitor, and comment on the party and the administration’s 
actions, all of which encourages the participation of the “the vigilant people”, who are 
a symbol of “counter-democracy” according to Pierre Rosanvallon (Rosanvallon, 2008).
The process through which the movement’s ethical code was elaborated also reflected 
a new way of constructing a radical democratic organization. The different documents 
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that had to be formulated functioned as the open space for the debate between the 
movement’s different political actors of the confluence. Later on, these documents 
or agreements were then made accessible and discussed with all interested citizens, 
in both digital and face-to-face encounters. A seminar titled “Governing by obeying – 
Ethical Code Days to build the confluence” was organized, where hundreds of people 
attended the training, discussion, and proposal sessions. From these sessions there 
emerged a much more specific and consensus-based text that was later enriched by 
online discussions in order to incorporate proposals that were broadly supported. The 
final document was put to the vote, and received a majority support.
The preparation of open primaries and the process of nominating candidates were also 
interesting aspects. There were intense and heated debates on establishing the criteria 
that would govern the creation of lists and the voting system, that is, the question of 
how votes should be counted. Even though there were other methods being consid-
ered, such as the Borda Count and Dowdall rules – which are more proportional election 
systems that favor plurality7 – the chosen voting method was the “iron list”, where 
sympathizers were able to vote for the head-of-list with his/her team, and for a repre-
sentative from their district who would join the winning list. The complexities of the 
negotiations between parties during the process of “confluence” and the necessity to 
maintain internal balances account for the choice of this election method. Ultimately, it 
was Ada Colau who emerged as the final candidate.
It is also worth drawing attention to the collaborative and participatory development of 
the electoral program, which strove to integrate the central demands voiced by move-
ments in recent decades. The program was open to proposals gathered at meetings in 
public squares across the city, by technical and policy committees, and through exten-
sive online consultations.
To sum up: Open primaries, crowdfunding, strict ethical codes, collaborative programs, 
and the sectoral and territorial expansion of the organization have made the process of 
creating Barcelona en Comú an interesting experiment in electoral democracy. From the 
outset, it was built on the basis of ordinary people’s engagement.
7 Other methodologies have been developed to eliminate the drag effect that can produce very strong leaderships 
when the “iron lists” method is used, for example the Dowdall method, which is employed in Galicia or Madrid. 
It establishes a system of proportion according to which the vote received by a candidate is divided based on the 
place he occupies on the list. Thus, the top-most candidate receives one point, whereas if the fifth is elected, 
he or she will receive a fifth of that vote. Votes are weighed by order of preference in such a way that the vote 
that each candidate on the list receives reflects the proportion of votes obtained by the list in the primaries.
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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN CONTROL OF THE 
INSTITUTIONS
The electoral success of the citizen platforms is astonishing. Less than a year after their 
launch in 2014, their candidates, most of whom had no previous experience in electoral 
politics, took office in most of the country’s main cities with an explicitly anti-austerity, 
feminist, environmentalist, and democratizing agenda. Barcelona en Comú stood for 
election, calling for a “democratic rebellion” and the “reappropriation of the institu-
tions for the people”, and sooner than expected, they found themselves in a position 
to take institutional action. But there have, of course, been setbacks. After two years 
in the institutions, which are the main policy changes that BeC has tried to introduce, 
and what are the main challenges it faces? Which challenges is the movement having 
to tackle on its path to becoming part of the institutions? How does the complex move-
ment-institution relationship work in practice? 8
THE HOUSING AND TOURIST BUBBLES
Prior to the elections, the city’s various social movements all arrived at the same 
conclusion: Barcelona, they found, was exposed to the same typical problems as other 
so-called Global Cities: gentrification, and the financialization of housing, tourism, 
and other sectors – developments that have become visible across the centers of 
Manhattan, London, or Paris. They saw Barcelona as a global city that has over the 
last decades come to feel the impact of the real estate market, state entrepreneuri-
alism, and urban policies that have favored capital accumulation over people (López 
& Rodríguez E; 2011).
A city that has experienced the impact of the housing and debt crisis on vulnerable 
groups is now facing a double and interrelated bubble, on housing (rent) and tourism. 
The traditional neoliberal urban model that functioned on the basis of the logic of the 
commodification of land and its financialization has been updated by a new element: 
a large part of the financial investment strategies have been transferred to the rental 
market, second-hand housing, and tourist accommodation, which has given rise to 
speculation and a housing bubble in the inner city.
Ada Colau recently outlined the tourism boom in an interview: “When we took office, 
we found economic activity out of control (…) For instance, tourist accommodation 
increased by over 18 percent in just five years. It was uncontrolled, extremely fast 
growth at the rate of a bubble, which is dangerous not only for the city but also for 
economic activity itself” (Al Jazeera, 2017).
8 Recently, the same debate has arisen within Podemos, a debate on whether Podemos should focus on its 
institutional work or whether, on the contrary, it should revive its capacity to mobilize and strengthen its street-
level presence.
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In this sense, one of the main lines of action has been to implement important meas-
ures to address the problem of mass tourism and its impacts on the quality of life of 
the city’s inhabitants, considering that in certain areas of the city the carrying capacity 
has been exceeded. This has been one of the central demands coming from the social 
movements that have been able to shape the political agenda and reframe tourism 
not as a “manna from heaven”, but as a problem.9 The first measures, controversially 
discussed, were a moratorium on the granting of licenses for tourist accommodations, 
hotels, hostels, and apartments throughout the city, and the suspension of new licenses 
to open public audience premises (bars, discotheques, restaurants) in the city’s tourist 
districts.
Another central measure has been the adoption of a Special Tourist Accommodation 
Plan- PEUAT (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2016). It establishes a zero-growth policy for 
tourist accommodation and a balanced distribution of such accommodation across 
the city. The City Council is also cracking down on illegal tourist apartments and plat-
forms that advertise unlicensed tourist apartments by sanctioning the various platforms 
(Airbnb, Homeaway, etc.) that are considered to have contributed to the rise in rents 
and to processes of gentrification and touristification; the maximum penalty amounts to 
600,000 euros. For a long time, it seemed that these measures had little effect given 
the huge profits of these companies, yet in June 2017 Airbnb announced it would stop 
listing illegal tourist apartments in Barcelona – an unprecedented move, although it still 
needs to be followed up with specific action.
The government’s second focus has been on housing and confronting the housing 
shortage triggered by the financial crisis (evictions, broad segments of society are 
unable to pay for their rents, increasing gentrification, etc.). It is important to highlight 
that the city, like other European cities, is facing a growing housing crisis caused by 
a combination of factors, including demographics, the nature of mortgage markets, 
and the absence of investment opportunities in the “real economy”, which have led 
to an explosion of rent prices until they hit record levels during the real estate bubble 
in 2007.10 In the city, there seems to be a growing consensus (in the media, among 
tenants and non-tenants) that the increase in rents and the massive displacement are a 
problem of the highest order.
Given this situation – and considering the crucial role of movements such as the PAH 
in the field of housing rights – working groups have been established bringing together 
9 According to the 2015 Municipal Services Survey (Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2015) , developed by the town 
council, tourism is the fourth most serious problem in Barcelona, behind unemployment and working conditions, 
insecurity, and cleanliness
10 Idealist, a real estate development specialist, estimates the average rent per square meter 
in Barcelona reached 17.9 euros in 2016, a 16.5 percent increase in two years.
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different collectives and social movements (not only the PAH) to draft public housing 
policies, and many proposals have been submitted, the majority of which are reflected 
in the Plan for the Right to Housing 2016–2025.
This plan increases municipal spending on housing by an average 77 percent each year. 
It also includes programs that provide strong and direct financial support for tenants, 
or make available unlet property for low-income families by subsidizing renovations or 
negotiating with financial institutions that own empty houses. Other measures include 
the mediation unit (Unidad Contra la Exclusión Residencial), a specialized service that 
tries to locate, prevent, and solve evictions through negotiations with owners, or by 
providing financial assistance or other solutions.11 “What we are doing right now is 
ensuring that in every case that we are able to follow, no one ends up out on the street. 
There are solutions, temporary or permanent, better or worse, of more or less quality, 
but that is what we guarantee”, says Javier Burón, the city’s housing manager.
Also, there are plans to implement longer-term solutions, such as public housing 
schemes, or legislative changes. To confront the city’s historic public housing shortage 
(1 percent compared with an average 15 percent across Europe), there is a plan to 
construct around 1,000–1,200 homes per year. And following the example of cities 
such as Paris or Berlin, the council is working on introducing a rent index that will define 
reasonable rent prices and curb speculation.
Yet the paradox is that after two years of left-wing policies pushed by a government 
that emerged from social movements, the housing crisis is possibly worse than ever. 
The current rental bubble is not about to burst, and pressure from tourism is continuing 
to inflate prices.
STREET VENDORS:  
A COMPLEX INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
The question of informal economy, and specifically the management of irregular street 
vending (the “top manta”) in the city’s tourist districts is one of the most controver-
sial aspects for the current municipal government. It has increased tensions between 
Barcelona en Comú and the city’s social movements, and has also generated tensions 
across the bases of Barcelona en Comú.
The City Council has realized that increasing police presence will not solve the problem. 
Instead, it has now adopted a more “social” and integral approach. It argues that “top 
manta” should not be considered an issue of public security, but a social problem that 
calls for creative solutions – the social and professional integration of immigrants, for 
11 The Unit handled 1,092 cases. In 59 percent of these, it was able to stop or postpone foreclosure, 
while 38 percent were resolved through the emergency table, with social rentals or rent aids.
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instance.12 The City Council has therefore proposed extended “occupancy plans”13 
covering 12 months instead of six in order to help those without a residence permit 
and encourage street vendors in establishing cooperatives. The first cooperative, Diom-
Coop, was formed in early March 2017, and will allow 15 formerly unlicensed street 
vendors to legalize their businesses, and offer them alternatives selling crafts and fair 
trade products legally at street markets and fairs. But the government also acknowl-
edges that “obviously, DiomCoop won’t solve a complex problem like unlicensed street 
vending” as mayor Colau said on a facebook post (Colau, 2017). It is a reality that has 
evolved into a huge political problem.
As I will explain later, the government has now reached its formal limits in attempting 
to solve this complex phenomenon. There is a combination of factors at work here. 
On the one hand, it is an issue defined to a large extent by Spanish immigration 
laws, from the Penal Code – which criminalizes street vending as a crime and not as 
an administrative failure14 – to the Law on the Rights and Freedoms of Foreigners in 
Spain (Ley de extranjería) that makes people illegal. On the other hand, there are the 
12 Opposing the police pressure put on street vendors, local activists have organized a support group called “Tras la 
Manta” (Behind the Blanket). Later, some vendors collectively founded the “Sindicato Popular de Manteros” (Popular 
Union of Street Vendors) in order to organize structured negotiations with the City Council and convey their proposals.
13 Occupancy plans are programs designed to promote the hiring of unemployed 
persons to carry out temporary activities of general and social interest.
14 Article 274.3 of the Criminal Code, which punishes what is known as “Top manta””, that is, the retail sale of 
products protected by industrial and intellectual property laws, with penalties from 6 months to 2 years in prison.
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media and certain lobbies in the city (merchants, the local police) that are opposing 
the “contradictory and confused discourse of the town council” and the “increasing 
permissiveness”, which they fear sends out a “wrong message” and creates a pull 
effect. Third, activists and human rights groups regret that the city of Barcelona en 
Comú has opted for a response that continues to criminalize street vendors. Last, 
there is the problem of electoral geometry: There is in power a minority government 
that has difficulties pursuing its policies because it needs to seek the consensus of 
other political forces. I will return to these issues later.
The debate on street vending reveals the intricate balances the local government has 
to maintain. A supposedly “small” problem has become a city-wide issue, and it makes 
evident the forms in which the city operates and the collision of institutional, electoral, 
media-based, and political powers. It also highlights a fundamental dilemma faced 
by a citizen platform that now constitutes the local government: the impossibility of 
“governing for all”, and the need to side with the vulnerable, even if siding with them is 
bound to come with electoral or political costs.
THE MANDATE OF “LEADING BY OBEYING”
“To govern with the people” and “lead by obeying”15 were and still are slogans that 
synthesize the challenge of the new policy brought to the institutions. By entering the 
institutions, the movement not only sought to “solve the most pressing problems”, it 
aimed for an entirely different approach to governance – different in terms of greater 
citizen participation and control of public decision-making processes, and with a sensi-
tivity for autonomous forms of urban self-government and the will to redistribute 
urban power, which traditionally lies in the hands of large corporations. Even though 
the candidacy of Barcelona en Comú was not seen as representing the full spectrum 
of movements (among other reasons, because the radical left was considering other 
political options), the program was nourished ideologically by demands and proposals 
voiced by the city’s social movements, organizations, platforms, and the diverse strug-
gles they were engaged in.
From the onset, the new government held meetings and events on a regular basis. 
Open assemblies were convened by the various district boards, which were regularly 
attended by hundreds of people. Until today, interest in participation has not dropped. 
Triggered by the City Council’s approach to radical democracy, the existing participatory 
organs are being reformed, and their legal frameworks are being reviewed. New forms 
of participatory decision-making processes are being developed (especially citizens’ 
15 These are the words of the Zapatista indigenous movement in Chiapas, México, which has condensed many 
of its principles into easily understandable phrases that convey big ideas about an alternative approach to 
leadership and building power.
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initiatives and consultations), and new strategic plans for the city and each district were 
adopted in 2016 through a massive participatory process that included online participa-
tion (submitting proposals and voting for other people’s proposals), and hundreds of 
offline meetings.
The dynamics of offline interaction and personal encounters has been combined with 
an intense and systematic use of technologies across different platforms. In line with 
the protest movement’s original idea of promoting inclusion, openness, and participa-
tion, digital participation has also been one of the main features of the electoral cycle. 
Technology has provided the tools (for censuses, online voting systems, and digital 
discussion platforms) to facilitate internal democracy within the party, and open up 
discussions to citizens and movements.16 The platform Decidim Barcelona is one such 
tool. It provides a new public digital infrastructure for democracy – one that embraces 
the ideals of open source and “technological sovereignty”17 and enables citizens to 
co-create public policies. It was initially used to elaborate the city’s Municipal Action 
Plan 2016–2019, which is the municipal government’s roadmap for this term, but nowa-
days it is the platform used to follow all participatory processes in the city, such as the 
participatory budgetary pilot schemes launched by various districts.
At the level of the internal organizational model of “the party” open decision spaces 
have been established to collectively construct certain elements, especially when 
important decisions need to be taken, such as on whether the Socialist Party (the 
party that ruled the city in the past) should be allowed to join the government.18 BeC, 
however, had no external structures in place to provide space for political discussions or 
collectivized government decisions, or tobuild links between its institutionalized inside 
16 Each technology has its own set of functions that BeC has made use of in specific ways. Twitter, for example, 
has been used to set up agendas, question the opinions held by political opponents, and position itself in public 
debates and in real time. It has also been used to build a network, a broad community, to spread opinions and 
generate multiple points of view. In fact, the BeC community has been very influential on Twitter. Many activists 
have participated very actively, and the communications working group has provided narratives, content, and 
design. During the election campaign, for instance, BeC trended 50 topics at state level, and 100 at the local 
level, while other parties only managed to trend two. Retweets were between 4:1 and 5:1 in relation to other 
parties. On Facebook, BeC has a popular profile counting more than 43,000 followers, and especially its 
leader, Ada Colau, has a significant impact, with twice as many followers as the two leaders of the two largest 
parties in Spain. But it is not only about numbers. Each technology and channel has a specificity, and each 
channel requires an individual strategy. Facebook, for example, has proven to be a very cost-efficient tool for 
campaigning: Spending only 3,000 euros on advertising, BeC used it to define for itself a “micro-target” during 
the election campaign to reach more than 380,000 people.
17 Technological sovereignty and open source were a part of the DNA of Barcelona’s municipalist candidacy. All 
the infrastructure that they had to create, such as the web or the systems facilitating participation, voting, and 
collaborative discussion ran on the movement’s own servers, allowing it to remain in control and ensure the 
privacy of the data of registered users in the “party”.
18 The internal processes over the past months have showed worrying participation figures The bases of Barcelona 
en Comú have supported the pact, although there was considerable opposition. Of a total of 2,559 voters, 62.5 
percent (1,625 votes) voted in favor of governing with the Socialists, while 32.82 percent (853 votes) voted 
against the alliance.
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and an “aligned” outside formed by movements, collectives, and other organizations.
There has not been much progress in organizing and constructing a mobilized and organ-
ized citizenry. It has proven difficult to facilitate organizational efforts when they are not 
immediately linked to the party’s established structures, especially in those spaces where 
BeC enjoys strong voter support, which are working-class areas. Its social implantation – 
and therefore its capacity for mobilization – depends not so much on local organizational 
structures or on Barcelona en Comú’s presence, but on social movements that are aligned 
– movements with distinct positions on issues ranging from the exercise of power from 
the outside, by criticizing, pressing, and generating conflict and debate, to more pragmatic 
collaborations where movements “use” the institution as an “instrumental” element to 
multiply their transformative impact or co-implement or co-produce measures.
Institutionalization was accompanied by fears of a general process of demobilization 
and decapitalization. Activists were worried the movements might disintegrate because 
they might be perceived as concentrating their efforts on constructing an “electoral 
machine”. One has to bear in mind that in practical terms BeC’s entering into govern-
ment required between 100 and 200 people – including some of its leaders – to make 
the transition from their movements into the institutions, which caused a certain degree 
of disorientation. However, the good news is that there has been an interesting relay 
process which has produced a new leadership, and we are now witnessing a new cycle 
of housing struggles in the city.19
The party has also made attempts to adopt tools that promote mobilization and social 
organizing, such as “La Comuna” (The Commune), a political self-formation school for 
party activists and all interested citizens. The school’s aim is to train the organization’s 
activists and sharpen their critical thinking, and provide a training ground and tools to 
strengthen organizational and political activism. It also wants to be a space in which all 
manner of issues are debated, a space inviting all citizens to “reflect and debate with 
everybody about the organization’s commitments to the city model”.
Another experiment has been the “filadora”(the spinner), a new fund that will support 
social projects in the city. It is financed by the excess salaries of the elected public 
officers of Barcelona en Comú. The 216,000-euro surplus accumulated due to the 
ethical code’s salary cap have been earmarked for target-based funds to strengthen 
civil society associations without generating dependency or clientelism.
19 There is a new wave of groups fighting to strengthen the right to housing. See for instance the map at https://
noensfaranfora.com/qui-som/, which gives an overview of the vast number of collectives across the city: 
On the one hand, there are neighborhood-based groups defending the social fabric and opposing evictions, 
gentrification, and touristification. On the other, there is the newly formed Tenants Union, which did not 
previously exist in Barcelona or Spain; it believes that the organization of tenants and the production of a 
collective subject can start to change things.
~ 207 ~SPAIN
These funds are made available to three different kinds of projects. The first are city 
projects that deal with legal issues, environmental sustainability, or the impact of 
tourism, and aim at building “a city for the common good”. The second type are local 
projects that are sensitive to the needs and priorities of each neighborhood. Projects of 
the third type want to promote actions and campaigns to mobilize institutions and social 
movements that are in line with the political project of Barcelona en Comú. The whole 
process, from the selection of proposals to project implementation, is subject to the 
principles of transparency and accountability. There are clear selection criteria, an Evalu-
ation Committee, and winner projects are determined via an online voting system to 
ensure the process is open to participation, independent, transparent, and not subject 
to clientelism.
THE BECOMING COMMON OF THE PUBLIC
One key element in the worldview of Barcelona en Comú is the idea of the commons, 
and of the common good (Ostrom, 1990; Midnightnotes Collective, 1990). It is a notion 
that was at the center of the political discourse during the election campaign, and it is 
actually reflected in the name of the platform: “en comú” means “in common”. The 
idea of the commons challenges the long-standing distinction between the public and 
the private, and suggests that rights and responsibilities should be shared among insti-
tutions and citizens, and also among citizens. In this sense, the generation of innovative 
organizational patterns that try to motivate institutions to move beyond their established 
boundaries and create new ways of relating with the sphere of the commons – that is, 
the cooperative sector, or certain social organizations that manage collective resources 
– has produced a number of innovative approaches linked to the municipalist hypothesis 
(Castro & Martí-Costa, 2017).
One of them is a working group pushing for the legal recognition of self-governing 
areas and the communitarian management of some council properties or assets that 
the community sees as “common property” for collective and/or recreational use, such 
as social centers or community gardens. Building on the concept of “Citizen Heritage” 
(Castro & Fresnillo; 2016) , they are trying to promote the idea that certain public goods 
can eventually be assimilated into the category of common goods by recognizing the 
value of their social and communitarian use. The interesting element here is that legally, 
these are not typical assignment agreements, but contracts that recognize community 
use and the community’s ability to govern itself by defining for itself a set of rules.
Another important element has been to appoint a Commissioner for Cooperative, Social, 
and Solidarity-Based Economy and Consumption, a new department of the local devel-
opment agency, Barcelona Activa, which aims to encourage alternative economies, and 
promote and make visible the benefits of solidarity-based, social economy (Ajuntament de 
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Barcelona, 2017a). This commissioner has been working collaboratively within the sector 
and with its main actors, strengthening what the citizens have already created, in a city that 
already boasts 4,500 social economy initiatives that represent more than 53,000 people. 
They make up 8 percent of total employment and contribute 7 percent to the city’s GDP.20
Building on this momentum, the city has developed a plan to provide a political 
response to the socio-economic initiatives working according to social and solidarity-
based economic criteria. Public contracts now contain clauses that oblige companies to 
deliver “social benefits” by promoting the participation of cooperatives or social busi-
nesses in public procurement (Ajuntament de Barcelona (2016c). The objective is also 
to guarantee basic equality, environmental standards, and labor rights. The implementa-
tion of these legal and administrative tools has been a long-standing demand voiced by 
social businesses to push back strictly mercantilist criteria in externalization processes. 
The new social procurement guide is therefore a tool to limit the dominance of big busi-
ness, considering that in the past lucrative municipal contracts were awarded mainly to 
a handful of large private companies.21
There have also been moves to reinforce the cooperative fabric in the medium or long 
term using public institutions as privileged partners. For example, there has been a bid 
for the creation of cooperatives in advanced sectors in need of greater investment, such 
as Coopolis, an economic promotion network that supports and consults social economy 
projects. It will provide a wide range of open services to the economic sector, including 
funding, consulting, business model development, or space (the same services offered by 
Barcelona Activa, the public organization responsible for implementing the City Council’s 
economic development policies), and also will act as an incubator for social businesses.
Another opportunity to build institutions from below, arising from the intersection between 
the common and the public, is by (re-)municipalizing public services. After decades of 
privatization and outsourcing, the new municipal governments have now decided to 
re-municipalize a number of institutions, including three privately run kindergartens, as 
well as the city’s care and support centers for women (PIADs) and for victims of gender-
based violence (SARA).22 There is also an important struggle over water management, a 
process driven by Aigua és vida, a platform of citizens, workers, and environmentalists 
that has the transformative potential to address issues of social and environmental justice.
20 In 2016, financed by the Commissioner, Anna Fernàndez and Ivan Miró published a report on 
the state of Barcelona’s social and solidarity-based economy (Fernàndez & Miró, 2016).
21 These companies have been FCC, Ferrovial, ACS, and Comsa (urban waste management); Agbar, a multinational 
corporation (water supply); Endesa (electrical distribution); Abertis (Wi-Fi infrastructure communication).
22 PIADs are local municipal services that provide information, care, and advice on all matters of interest to women, 
and also give access to various municipal resources. SARA is a municipal service that offers specific ambulatory 
care to victims of gender-based violence (women, children, and adolescents), and people from their immediate 
environment directly affected by such violence.
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The responsibilities surrounding these public services such as water management has 
triggered an interesting debate about the commons at a very practical level. It opens up 
opportunities to transfer their management to a cooperative, or to make the different 
stages in the provision of these services more participatory (general orientation, plan-
ning, programming, management, supervision), or even to introduce forms of direct 
participation or self-government for citizens and workers.
LIMITS OF THE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
Entering the institutions was driven by a shared diagnosis: Having exhausted all ways 
to influence legislation and facing an institutional deadlock, disposing of the existing 
political class and cleaning up politics was a prerequisite for any political transforma-
tion. The question is whether this “institutional blockage” has in part been overcome. 
As we have already seen, despite the different policies and proposals, new challenges 
have emerged. For example, in the fields of housing or tourism, which are both central 
drivers of the urban economy and of the process of dispossession, the constraints of 
municipal politics have become evident. Following the discussion of the relationship 
between movements and governance, this section aims to focus on the limitations of 
public institutions themselves to transform or revolutionize society.
CONCRETE LIMITS: INERTIAS, ECONOMIC POWERS,  
AND COMPETENCES
From early on, the process was driven by an idea shared by the majority of Barcelona en 
Comú activists. It concerned the question of what it means for a municipal movement to 
win. The answer to this question is that “winning” does not mean “winning elections”. 
Institutions are only one part of what makes change possible, and in this sense, munici-
palism neither begins nor ends in public institutions. Occupying institutional power by 
itself does not really amount to “taking power”, or guarantee a capacity to bring about 
change. What guarantees social rights is not the state, but the correlation of social forces. 
The power to act results from a combination of institutional and street-level power, from 
social movements that organize and provide social force and exercise pressure.
Take, for example, the right to housing, which is an “emergency problem” and one of 
the movement’s central demands. It is possible to adopt reforms and measures – to 
increase the public housing stock, limit rents, transfer urban resources to housing coop-
eratives, halt evictions, fine banks that leave properties empty, or regulate the tourist 
accommodation market. But social force is needed to implement these measures in 
order to be able to demand additional resources to stop evictions. Supra-municipal alli-
ances that move beyond the responsibilities and the scope of action of local institutions 
are also necessary. All this is a huge organizational challenge. And more importantly, it 
makes people aware of the material limits of formal government.
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A SERIES OF ASPECTS CONDITIONING  
CURRENT GOVERNMENT ACTION:
Firstly, there is institutional inertia and easements, or institutional “path dependency”. 
This includes routines that are difficult to change, the rigidities of local bureaucracy, and 
the inherently conservative character of an institution clearly oriented toward managing 
the status quo. As Ada Colau explained recently in an interview, “the nature of the insti-
tution is not associated with the possibility of rupture”. In this regard, we can highlight 
the “governing” logic, or the need to “govern for all”, a pragmatic position referring to 
the challenges of “realpolitik” where any possibility of “taking political action at a real 
and useful level” is absorbed by institutional apparatuses.
Secondly, there is the role played by influential economic “shadow powers”, and the 
lobbies and coalitions of local elites capable of imposing their agendas on the local 
government. As I have pointed out in the case of the established political parties, the 
media and economic groups act as a real counter-movement. Even the civil service itself 
occasionally pursues its own objectives. This influence of private elites and corporations 
on public decisions is reflected institutionally in administrative and juridical configura-
tions, such as public-private partnerships, mixed capital companies or, for example, the 
Port Authority of the Port of Barcelona, which puts the majority of decisions concerning 
one of the city’s key urban resources in private hands.
Thirdly, another important limitation stems from budget problems and the lack of key 
competencies in areas including tourism, housing, employment, energy, and public 
procurement. In Spain, local governments are the financially weakest level of admin-
istrative power, and recently the Spanish Government has adopted a number of 
re-centralization measures, further limiting local government powers.
Fourthly, an important factor to bear in mind when considering the limits faced by the 
new, but inexperienced government is that it lacks a broad majority in the City Council – 
Barcelona en Comú holds only 11 of the Council’s 41 seats, with the previous governing 
party holding 10 – which forces it into political agreements with the opposition forces to 
adopt important measures such as municipal budgets. This situation has led Barcelona 
en Comú to reach an agreement with the Catalan Socialist Party, the party that ruled the 
city between 1979 and 2010. This government coalition has been strongly criticized by 
some of BeC’s more militant supporters.23
Last but not least, there is the question of the social composition of the protagonist 
subject, or to put it another way: the limits of the political subject constructed across 
the cycle, a hegemonically middle-class cycle. In terms of their social composition, 
23 Still, it is important to highlight that the decision to enter into a coalition with the 
PSC was supported by the bases through a consultation process.
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Barcelona en Comú’s 2015 election results show a strong transversality, with a concen-
tration of votes in traditionally left-leaning neighborhoods (the old workers’ peripheries), 
and also majorities in city-center neighborhoods or neighborhoods such as Sants that 
are home to a higher proportion of young precarious and left-behind voters. Still, it is 
obvious that this political cycle has been linked mainly to the white urban middle classes. 
The future, as some authors have described, passes through the alliance between a 
decaying middle class and proletarian social strata (Rodriguez, 2017).
All these factors and limitations underline how crucial it is for the active movements and 
platforms to forge alliances. Such coalitions and collaborations are in fact imperative for 
the municipalist movement.
Another important element is to keep pushing for long-needed institutional changes, 
while explaining and sharing what cannot be changed, that is, explaining to the people 
how institutions work, and where internal blockages originate from. Also, it is impor-
tant to turn strategic discussions into public debates, and that if there are differences 
between government members, that these differences are discussed in public, and not 
resolved in closed-door negotiations.
BEYOND LOCAL COMPETENCES:  
DEALING WITH THE CENTRAL STATE
Over the last few years, the Spanish government has been enforcing a strong centraliza-
tion strategy, which is gradually reducing the power of local governments. In 2013, the 
Spanish finance minister submitted a legal proposal to the Spanish Parliament to modify 
certain elements in the organization of local governments, and the Montoro Law (which 
owes its name to the minister) was adopted at the end of that year. Its main aim was 
to cut public expenses as a response to the requirements set down by the European 
Union, and it entered into force following a reform of the Spanish Constitution that reset 
the limit of the structural deficit of the state and the regional governments.
In practice, the Montoro Law gravely weakened municipalities by reducing their compe-
tences and cutting their budgets. Among other things, this piece of legislation requires 
them to have a balanced budget (unlike the state and regional governments), and it 
established enormous obstacles for hiring staff. The law has drastically reduced the 
capacity of municipalities to develop new policies, and in many cases to continue 
pursuing existing ones. In some cases, this has culminated in the privatization of certain 
public services and a budgetary focus on repaying debts that makes it impossible to 
address basic needs.
In order to understand the relationship between the government of Barcelona and the 
state, it is important to mention the shared and exclusive formal competences. The 
city can decide autonomously on issues of transportation, urban planning, public facili-
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ties (sport centers, social housing, day-care centers, libraries, etc.), municipal taxes, 
management of public space, and it controls the local police. It also shares compe-
tences with other administrations in areas including health, education, and other social 
services.
This combination – having local governments in charge of an important portion of social 
policy throughout the state, but limiting their economic and legal power to take action 
– has maneuvered them into a difficult situation, although this varies with each city’s 
actual budgetary restrictions. Fortunately, in the case of Barcelona, the budgetary 
restrictions have not caused serious headaches for the government of Barcelona en 
Comú, given the current public surplus. It has been able to reverse the privatization of 
certain services, such as home care services and a number of nurseries. It has also sent 
out an important signal by announcing the construction of new schools, nurseries, and 
social housing projects. The proportion of the city’s budget for social projects increased 
by 5,5 percent in 2016 and another 4,7 percent in 2017.
But there are other issues where Spain’s local governments lack competences, and/or 
where they have traditionally not been an actor. Here, creativity has allowed the govern-
ment to make an impact despite its lack of formal power to change relevant legislation, 
and in some cases the leading role of the Barcelona government in promoting inter-
ventions has triggered a wave of active citizen support in other cities across the state. 
Two examples illustrate this momentum: they have to do with refugees, the immigrant 
internment centers, and evictions.
When the refugee crisis started, the Spanish government agreed after negotiations 
with the European Union that it would accept 1,500 refugees. In 2016, the city govern-
ment announced that Barcelona alone would be willing to accept such a number of 
refugees. Then other cities began to make similar announcements. As a consequence, 
the Spanish government has been forced to increase the number of refugees it was 
willing to accept from 1,500 to 17,000. In February 2017, approximately 600 people 
arrived legally (many more have been arriving via existing illegal networks). Due to the 
political pressure exerted by local governments, the European Union sanctioned Spain 
for not respecting its compromise.
Regarding the detention centers for illegal immigrants, the city of Barcelona (like any 
city in Spain) is not the decision-making authority. For many years there has been a high 
level of mobilization against these centers. In July 2016, the city of Barcelona decided to 
close down the center due to problems with the license to function (which is a compe-
tence of the local government). Many other cities followed suit, which launched an open 
legal battle between cities and the central government. This battle is still being fought, 
but the prospects are much better than in the past.
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POSSIBILITIES OF OVERCOMING THE 
INSTITUTIONAL BLOCKADE
The obstacles making it difficult for the “municipalist strategy” to challenge the estab-
lished order, the established institutions, to shift the constellation of forces, and to 
deliver on its promises of change are strikingly obvious. All these factors and limitations 
have generated tensions between the movements and the “new politics”, underlining 
how imperative it is to build alliances with social movements and develop international 
networks. As Barcelona en Comú is becoming more and more institutionalized as it 
settles into the institutions, it needs the movements to keep moving. The main chal-
lenge Barcelona en Comú is now facing is the question how to evolve into a political 
organization that keeps alive its capacity for social mobilization, and remains dynamic 
enough to join forces with other groups to exercise urban power. Another strategy has 
been to forge supramunicipal alliances with other cities in an attempt to overcome 
the limits of authority and undermine the influence of the state (and the other political 
levels).
FORGING ALLIANCES WITH SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
From the beginning, the process was driven by an idea shared by the majority of Barce-
lona en Comú activists: the attempt to overcome the exclusionary disjunction between 
state-centric politics and a politics of autonomy, and to move beyond the simplistic 
binary logic of the street and the state, of “inside” and “outside”. The choice is not 
between autonomy or institutional inclusion. The shared goal was to “seize the institu-
tions”.
This is the reason why municipalism has been framed as a movement that democrati-
cally transforms the realm of politics: It takes hold of the institutions, but at the same 
time moves beyond them. To overcome its limitations, municipalism has to include the 
“social movement” dimension that is capable of setting up counter-power mechanisms 
to subordinate some aspects of the institutional agenda and counteract local oligarchies. 
In this sense, the decentralization of power and the experience of neighborhood democ-
racy can act as effective counter-powers that limit and control institutional power.24
As reality has proved, when there is an extensive process of mobilization, it is more 
feasible to extend the limits of the possible and rally support for otherwise marginal 
measures. There have been lots of examples proving how difficult it is especially for 
24 Currently, we are forced to chose between two distinct paths, reflected clearly in the new wave of housing 
movements emerging across the city. On the one hand, there is a view that sees party and movements as 
two separate spheres: the latter with a more autonomous/libertarian approach to the self-defense of rights, 
with no trust whatsoever in the capacity of the state to implement progressive change. On the other, with a 
municipalist perspective, there are those who envision a potential party-movement front, with movements 
capable of putting pressure on institutions and forging alliances with them in some cases – a true social force 
capable of surpassing state and supra-state power.
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political and social minorities to build a new urban model when there are no organized 
social forces ready to demand and include measures that do not have City Council 
backing. Barcelona en Comú has for example been able to defend its budget, which 
prioritizes social measures such as building new nurseries, combating energy poverty, 
and making available resources for the city’s poorest neighborhoods, thanks to the 
extensive and ongoing process of participation that it has encouraged.
In this sense, Barcelona en Comú, or the municipalist movement, is forging a policy of 
open alliances that are capable of accompanying and fighting the main conflicts that 
exist at the local level: these include opposing the budgetary stability law – the Montoro 
Law –, the housing emergency, the citizen debt audit,25 and pushing for the re-munici-
palization of privatized services such as water supply, or the creation of new municipal 
services such as electricity providers.
As is clear by now, achievements have been profound when pushed by alliances that 
successfully managed to mobilize citizens and drive exchanges between street-level 
and institutional power. This is true “dual power” at work, with each power playing 
its role: On the one hand, the dynamics and the popular participation of social move-
ments capable of setting the political agenda, of mobilizing and organizing conflict, 
and of promoting certain solutions; on the other, the efficiency and the transformative 
capacity of political parties, the government, and its tools (law, policy, resources, etc.). 
The two most recent cases in the district of Ciutat Vella provide vivid illustrations of this 
interplay. The district’s historic center has been affected by gentrification, tourism, and 
limited access to housing, but there are strong social movements and a Councilor (Gala 
Pin) who emerged from the neighborhood movement. Recently, thanks to the joint (and 
independent) cooperation between the social movement, the inhabitants of Ciutat Vella, 
and the City Hall, an abandoned building of more than 11,000 square meters owned by 
the city has been devoted to public rental habitats (160 houses) and small businesses 
in an attempt to address the housing emergency and gentrification. In a different case, 
legal irregularities have helped this “dual power” to prevent the opening of a luxury 
hotel, construction of which had already been planned and approved.
There have been also cases in which the role of social organizations has been applauded 
and encouraged. Take, for instance, Ada Colau’s reply to a PAH letter, in which she criti-
cizes that the Barcelona City Council has not done what is necessary to fully implement 
Law 24/20152: “first of all, thank you for your letter. For me, it shows that the PAH is 
still vigilant (…) doing what it has to do and what it was born for: demanding solutions to 
25 The Citizen Debt Audit Platform (PACD) is a citizen platform founded by 15M activists. It is part of the 
International Citizen Audit Network (ICAN). Through citizen motions it has been declared an illegitimate part of 
the public debt of some municipalities. They have created the Municipal Citizen Observatory tool to export the 
model to all municipalities in Spain.
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the violation of a basic right such as the right to housing. For this there are no excuses, 
there are no justifications, it is not worth hiding behind the complexity of the problem. 
I have said it many times, and I repeat it now with more force than ever: without an 
organized and demanding citizenship, there will be no real change, nor a democracy 
worthy of that name. (…) You are our strength. We need you. We need your push, your 
demands (…)”(Colau,2015).
Another factor is the creation of hegemony as a crucial element that defines how 
profound and lasting the change is that the municipalist process can produce. The 
city has witnessed Barcelona en Comú’s ability to construct a new cultural hegemony 
together with social movements outside the institutions, and give the city a new 
“awareness” regarding its values and priorities, and the ways in which democracy 
should work. This has clearly been felt throughout the tourism sector, which used to 
be seen as an apolitical, unambiguous good for the city; today it is a major issue in city 
policy, and with a growing consensus that it needs to be strictly regulated in the interest 
of local communities. According to a recent survey by the City Council, for the first time 
since 2009 unemployment has been relegated from the top of the city’s list of problems 
and has been replaced by tourism, the effects of which have recently been prompting 
heated debates among Barcelona’s inhabitants (Suñé, R, 2017).
AN INTERNATIONALIST RESPONSE
From the moment it was launched in June 2014, Barcelona en Comú had an explicitly 
internationalist understanding and awareness of how global factors impact local strug-
gles, and vice versa. In its manifesto it stated that “a democratic rebellion in Barcelona 
would not just be a local phenomenon. It would connect with many related grassroots 
initiatives which aim to break away from the current political and financial system, 
starting from below. In Catalonia, in Spain as a whole, in Europe and beyond”.
After the election, Barcelona en Comú began to develop two parallel but complementary 
international strategies; one was aimed at the institutional level, the other at building a 
political movement. Both focus on developing and harnessing international networks of 
local actors to face common challenges.
Both the institutional and extra-institutional strategies are based on the hypothesis that 
the local level is a privileged site of action, resistance, and transformation in the current 
global context. There is a particular emphasis on the failure of states and national govern-
ments to deal with key challenges (climate change, the migration crisis, international 
housing speculation, growing inequalities, corruption, etc.), and on the leadership role 
being taken on at the local level by organized citizens and local governments. Barcelona 
en Comú puts a particular emphasis on reclaiming popular sovereignties at the local 
rather than national level as a way to challenge the rise of discriminatory and xenophobic 
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discourses on sovereignty by the far right. Its thesis is that popular discontent with the 
economic and political status quo must be harnessed locally and networked globally to 
enable genuine transformation.
This international municipalism draws on David Harvey’s ideas on the role of cities as 
the frontline in the battle against global capitalism (Harvey, 2012), as well as the theo-
ries of Murray Bookchin (Bookchin, 2006), and Abdullah Ocalan (Ocalan, 2015) on the 
potential of democratic confederalism to supercede the nation-state.
At the institutional level, Barcelona en Comú has focused on building pragmatic alliances 
based on concrete shared goals with other municipal governments. This has been neces-
sary in part due to the lack of governments with well-aligned policy programs outside the 
Spanish state. However, on specific issues Barcelona en Comú has been able to define 
common causes with municipal governments of all political stripes. Barcelona took on a 
leading role in the network of local and regional governments against the TTIP and CETA 
trade agreements in Europe, declaring itself a “TTIP-free zone” (Bárcena Menéndez, 
2015) and hosting an international conference of local governments and social move-
ments in April 2016 to debate the proposed deals’ local implications (Pina García, 2016).
Following the summer of 2015, during which thousands of migrants drowned in the 
Mediterranean sea, and countries in the south of Europe struggled to cope with those 
who did survive the perilous journey, the Barcelona en Comú government put great 
emphasis on the role of cities in the refugee crisis. In September 2015, Barcelona 
declared itself a “refugee city”,26 willing and able to take in refugees, and in March 2016 
the city signed a cooperation agreement to support Lesbos and Lampedusa in refugee 
reception. Ada Colau has been a vocal advocate for the willingness of cities to take in 
refugees on the international stage, most notably at the conference of mayors organized 
at the Vatican in December 2016.
Barcelona en Comú also took a strong stance against the immigration policies of the 
Trump administration, approving an institutional declaration condemning the racist 
and xenophobic policies of the Trump administration and giving support to America’s 
“Sanctuary Cities” which limit their cooperation with the Federal government in order 
to protect undocumented immigrants.
In parallel to this institutional activity, the extra-institutional party-movement of Barce-
lona en Comú has developed its own international strategy, focused on building a 
network of politically aligned municipalist movements in towns and cities across the 
world. The Barcelona en Comú International Committee leads this process. It divides 
municipal movements around the world into three categories: those in government, 
26 Barcelona city plan Ciutat Refugi or ‘City of Refuge’. More on: http://ciutatrefugi.barcelona/en/
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those standing for election or acting as local opposition parties, and those who work 
from outside the institutions, called contra-municipalist.
The International Committee’s strategy is summed up in an article titled “Why the 
municipal movement must be internationalist”, published in December 2016: “We must 
create a political space so that we can work with others to challenge, with greater 
strength and from more areas, the democratic deficit imposed by states and markets.” 
(Shea, Bárcena, Ferrer & Roth (2016). The article recognizes that “Given that we face 
adversaries who cross borders, our response must also be transnational. We must be 
aware that our ability to restrain the excesses of gigantic multinationals like Airbnb in 
Barcelona will depend on the success of struggles for the right to housing in San Fran-
cisco, Amsterdam, New York and Berlin”.
In terms of action, the International Committee has four main work areas: 1) Strength-
ening the idea of municipalism and its potential through communication and training 
(articles, translations, workshops); 2) mapping and growing the municipalist network 
(identifying new initiatives, contacting them, providing mutual support); 3) exchange of 
ideas and solutions on key municipal policy areas, for example re-municipalization, the 
right to housing, public space; and 4) providing mutual political support in key moments 
(e.g. endorsements in elections, declarations of support, joint campaigns).
Even though there have been meetings and efforts to consolidate an inter-municipal 
network to build a confederal and internationalist “networked municipalism”, progress 
remains slow, and there are frustrations and limitations (technical, human, and financial) 
in moving forward.
CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this text has not been to evaluate in detail the process of “seizing the 
institutions” in Barcelona, but to discuss the limitations and opportunities of munici-
palism as a political hypothesis. After years of intense mobilizations, and after the 
movement’s evolution into different autonomous organizations (PAH, neighborhood 
assemblies, Mareas, etc.), the so-called institutional assault was seen as one possible 
way to overcome the political impasse and seize the opportunity in order to translate the 
demands of the 15M into a movement aimed at conquering institutional power.
The desire to change the way politics is rather operated than lived found its first chal-
lenge when the need arose to create a mass democratic organization that would 
redefine the traditional political “party-form” and run for election. As mentioned above, 
this led to an interesting experiment in electoral democracy, and set the course for an 
ongoing learning process for the movement, which initially resisted the politics of repre-
sentation, but then sought to transform it (through a democratic and assemblearian 
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structure, an ethical code, Filadora, etc.). In this sense, I believe Barcelona en Comú has 
become a model of how to build an open and participatory approach to electoral and 
institutional politics.
However, despite winning elections and its attempt to produce a new political subject 
or a party-movement organization, the institutional blockages persist. Currently, we are 
seeing the limits of municipal power vis-à-vis foreign investment funds, big corpora-
tions, big media corporations, or the constant blockage of higher-level administrations.
There have been several achievements or emblematic experiences during these two 
years in government in Barcelona in fields such as tourism, housing, basic urban 
services (nurseries, health, etc.), the feminization of politics, public procurement, coop-
erative economy, and a new, more community-oriented urban development agenda 
that includes “neighborhood plans” (Plan de barrios), all of which reflect an ambitious 
agenda focused on redistribution, ending social and urban segregation, and fighting 
inequalities.
However, despite having more than doubled social investments (in the social, educa-
tion, and health sectors) in these two years, these inequalities have increased during a 
period of economic growth, and unemployment levels remain static. Although it was a 
programmatic priority and one of the strategic areas in the struggle against a historical 
trajectory marked by neoliberal government, it has proven difficult to reverse privatiza-
tion processes and take back control over community resources such as water and 
electricity. There have been problems regarding the re-municipalization of water supply 
and sanitation services at the municipal level because they require the implementation 
of changes in the Metropolitan Area of Barcelona, a supra-regional level of government. 
There are also legal problems in terminating current contracts with big corporations for 
urban cleaning services and electricity. Moreover, the opposition has blocked the estab-
lishment of new urban services, such as the public funeral parlor, which aims to reduce 
the costs of dealing with death, as BeC is in a minority government. 
The limitations have become most visible precisely in those policy areas that the new 
government had made its priority: housing and tourism. The city council has stopped 
issuing licenses in the neighborhoods most heavily affected by tourism, and it is 
currently trying to crack down on illegal unlicensed apartments, and attempting to reor-
ganize tourist flows in order to preserve the city’s inhabitants’ right to the city. However, 
it has proved very difficult to close down irregular tourist accommodations, and this 
summer tourist numbers are expected to hit a new record high. 
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Barcelona’s government is among those that have most clearly fought to ensure the right 
to housing. Municipal investment in this area is now four times higher than it used to be, 
evictions in 2016 decreased by 8 percent, and a public emergency unit has been created 
in order to actively stop evictions and prevent homelessness. However, this has not been 
enough to counter the housing crisis. Rents have increased exponentially (they are at an 
all-time high), as speculative investment has increasingly shifted to the rental market, 
and 83 percent of evictions are currently a result of this problem. Housing is the main 
challenge facing the city of Barcelona and other metropolitan councils. But housing is 
the exclusive domain of the Generalitat of Catalonia. Moreover, rent control policies are 
subject to state laws. And the Spanish state is not only ruled by a right-wing government, 
but also by the European Union’s neoliberal directives. We need a multi-scalar revolution, 
and a federal municipalist movement is a welcome/necessary first step.
To be able to address the housing crisis, one of the key elements for cities is to have 
sizable public rental housing assets that transform them into market players that are in a 
position to influence prices, or at least to create the necessary housing stock to secure 
housing for those who will never be able to pay market prices. But generating a public 
supply of 100,000 rental homes at below-market prices requires more money and more 
time (cities such as Vienna have been building public housing for a century). Yet as 
the PAH has criticized, new public housing projects are making very little headway. 
Moreover, the purchase of empty housing, currently in the hands of banks, has been 
insufficient. It has quickly become apparent that the market will need to be regulated, 
Tourists, Plaça de Sant Jaume, Barcelona
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but that formulating respective regulations falls within the ambit of the state.27 The 
issue has become even more complex due to a recent state law pushing for fiscal 
“rationalization” (the Montoro Law), which aims for a re-centralization of power and 
diminishes the investment capacities of municipalities.
A further problem is related to the local government’s attempts to integrate different 
communities into the active process of guaranteeing rights (for example by setting 
up housing cooperatives) and encourage family networks to assume a wider role in 
sustaining the increasingly precarious lives of their members. While this seems a positive 
initiative, often the outcome is that these communitarian networks take on more burdens 
and responsibilities without actually seeing an increase in their executive or self-govern-
ment capacities. This development towards “passive subsidiarity” has caught hold of 
many South European cities (see the social researcher Yuri Kazepov’s extensive analysis 
for details), and it can be explained as follows: Despite lacking the proper capacity and 
competence, local governments in unconsolidated or decomposing welfare states are 
forced to pursue social policies by promoting solutions that, in part, overburden communi-
ties and social networks. They thus risk reproducing inequalities and failing to implement 
social policies (on housing, for instance) for the entire population.
This deadlock persists due to the lack of competence, power, and resources at the local 
government level, but also because of the relationship between the government and the 
movements, which tends to be more of a provider-client affiliation rather than an alliance 
that helps organize and scale up the conflict. It might therefore be productive to test a 
“party-movement form” where the government’s relationship with organized communi-
ties is more sophisticated than in a clientelistic network or along a supply chain.
Luckily, this is not the only idea currently being developed. Among them is an initiative 
to create an alliance of “municipalities of change” ready and willing to practice disobedi-
ence against the state together with movements and territories (regarding public debt, 
for example) in order to construct networks and establish social legitimacy in opposition 
to centralized and capitalist legislation. This also involves an ongoing effort to test the 
“party-movement form” that recuperates the initial organizational hypothesis (networks 
that operate autonomously as commissions along thematic axes, independent obser-
vatories, etc.). This would reinvigorate instituent practices: mechanisms of participation 
and deliberation to ensure the party’s democratic management, alliances with social 
and solidarity-based business movements, and re-municipalizations. These are all ways 
not to nationalize, but to democratize basic services, etc.
27 The main goals of the newly created Tenants’ Union (Sindicato de Inquilinos e Inquilinas) are precisely to push for 
new legislation to regulate and limit rents in the city, modify the LAU Spain’s Tenancy Act to reverse the current 
bubble, and to develop the public housing stock. The majority of these issues, however, are not regulated by 
municipal legislation.
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These efforts rest on strengthening the main idea of the municipalist hypothesis: 
primarily, that “seizing the institutions” was not so much a question of “taking over the 
state”, but of re-establishing power and creating a new type of institutionality capable 
of developing into a new type of state that can expand the dynamics of civil self-organ-
ization. As a poster on one of the walls in the mayor’s office reads: “let’s never forget 
who we are, where we come from, and why we are here”.
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THE CITY PLAZA IMMIGRANTS’  
HOUSING PROJECT IN ATHENS AND  
THE SOCIAL SOLIDARITY MEDICAL CENTER 
OF THESSALONIKI. 
Greece was hit hard by the current economic crisis in 2010, the year that global dynamics 
translated into a crisis of sovereign debt which was followed by the implementation of 
austerity measures. The implementation of the austerity agenda in the country was 
followed by the propagation of the old Thatcherite slogan of “There Is No Alternative 
– TINA.” In parallel, since then, with the onset of the increased migration of refugees 
to Europe (and in particular to countries of the Mediterranean such as Greece and Italy) 
in 2015, the country has also become the epicenter of this journey for those in search 
of safer/better lives. Additionally, the last seven years have seen numerous demonstra-
tions, partial and general strikes, accompanied by the “Outraged” movement of the 
squares in 2011, all of which attest to the elevation of social conflict. The intensification 
of social protest was followed by the rise of grassroots social solidarity movements, one 
of the most important forms of resistance and people’s self-organization to emerge. 
In this framework, solidarity from below has emerged as a counter-austerity narrative 
and praxis aiming to empower the disempowered in the face of growing xenophobia, 
charity, and philanthropic ideas and practices.
We aim, in this framework, to shed light on a new reality of social, economic, and political 
processes that is emerging in Greece and has direct relations with and effects on other 
Self-organization and solidarity movements in Greece
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such examples around the world. By recognizing the permanence and repetition of crisis 
in capitalism, we understand the current social, political, and economic conjuncture as 
a constant crisis, stretching over a long period of time, and as a new normality that has 
developed in relation to the intensification of social repression in Greece and abroad. 
Since 2011, in response to these dynamics, a common pattern of popular protest has 
arisen across the world, focused on radical democracy and the accountability of represen-
tation that calls for some explanation. Many of these protests have occurred in cities and 
while in each instance the source was specific, there seem to be some commonalities 
among these diverse irruptions of popular discontent. For instance, solidarity initiatives 
have emerged in several cities in the form of networks of localized struggles in and across 
urban spaces. The most important of these are located in Athens while many of them are 
spread across Thessaloniki, Volos, Heraklion, Patras, and other major cities (mainly around 
solidarity food provision, healthcare, education, and social/alternative economy). More-
over, agriculture solidarity networks (e.g. the no-middlemen-agriculture movement) have 
developed in rural areas, mainly in Thessaly (central Greece), Macedonia (northern), and 
Crete (southern). These forms of popular discontent are constructed as political communi-
ties focused not only on addressing the current concrete situated needs of the people in 
need but also on developing a transformative praxis. 
Understanding the social initiatives as both political communities and transformative 
projects serves a twofold scope. On the one hand, by analyzing the political community, 
we try to shed light on processes of participation, democratization, and decision-making 
whereby internal power relations are collectively identified and tackled and there is an 
ongoing experimentation/knowledge-making on the basis of old and new forms of 
democracy. On the other hand, by researching the transformations generated we draw 
attention to the introduction of more equitable social relations, the transformation of 
discriminatory/racist inter-ethnic and intercultural relations, the transformation of the 
base of knowledge and experience that is considered suitable for pushing forward a 
social process, as well as the de-patriarchalization of gender relations.
This paper pays attention to two social solidarity initiatives from below, namely the City 
Plaza immigrants’ housing project in Athens and the Social Solidarity Medical Center 
of Thessaloniki. Both movements emerged not only as practical responses to social 
needs within the ongoing societal crisis but also as new political communities under 
construction (in fact, they have fostered spaces for political struggle) that seek to form 
a counterexample of doing politics, to transform social relations, and make the changes 
generated durable. We therefore investigate the above-mentioned solidarity-from-
below initiatives and consider their internal practices as an attempt to bring forward 
alternatives to capitalist/modern/western models for the material and symbolic repro-
duction of life. 
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We chose these cases because they a) complement each other; b) deal with basic 
aspects of the current Greek societal crisis: i.e. the lack of social policies for immigrants 
coming to Greece, housing and health issues; c) are significant examples of the strug-
gles in the post-Occupy era of Greek social movements; and d) are vivid examples 
of the above-mentioned processes of urban re-commoning. To conduct our analysis 
we address questions regarding the initiatives’ methodologies, “instituent practices,” 
sources, internal and external relations, and (alternative) worldviews. This approach 
provides pathways for understanding how crisis and austerity shape the dynamics of 
social conflicts and mobilizations and offers insights into how social movement actors 
(the subaltern more broadly) both fight for and attempt to forge political, social, and 
economic alternatives.
Methodologically, our analysis draws on qualitative research, ethnographic fieldwork, and 
data collection on the two solidarity initiatives conducted between January and March 
2017. Participant observation, field notes, archival research, and short (semi-constructed) 
personal interviews were the main data collection methods for both writers. Following 
both initiatives’ assemblies, meetings, public events, and demonstrations allowed us to 
gain in-depth knowledge of what their actual resistance and struggle consist of.
With regard to a theoretical background, we agree with Tsavdaroglou et al. (2017) when 
they argue that we should pay thorough attention to “how the emergence of social 
struggle is related to a permanent crisis of capital” (p. 4). We therefore investigate the 
way in which the circulation of social conflict – that is the communication and intersec-
tion of class, cultural, gender, ecological, and political struggles (see again Tsavdaroglou 
et al., 2017) – interrupts the circulation of capital.
In addition, as recent scholarship has stressed (Hadjimichalis & Hudson, 2014; Aram-
patzi, 2016), in order to analyze the Greek crisis in depth and understand the new 
political and social situation, we should shift our focus from the macroeconomic causes 
of the crisis, and its variegated effects across various geographical contexts, to the 
ways and means by which grassroots movements disrupt, contest, and subvert crisis 
“from below.” Thus, we should pay more attention to emergent forms of contestation 
of austerity politics as “actually existing resistances to context-specific neoliberalism(s)” 
(Huke et al., 2015: p. 18) and discuss their potential for producing “resistive agency” 
(Arampatzi, 2016).
These emergent patterns of struggle help us reconceptualize “place,” the “articula-
tion of local, inter-local and global dimensions,” and “radical socio-spatial practices” 
in a radical manner. The terms “open localization” and “geographies of solidarity” are 
helpful in our analysis. The former describes new experiments in community building, 
radical politics, and democratization processes, and, more specifically, the “develop-
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ment of an emergent bottom-up democratic politics in everyday life contexts, across 
neighbourhoods” (Arampatzi, 2016). The latter explains how political communities are 
constructed not merely on ideological terrain but through spatial practices, identities, 
the exchange of knowledge and experiences, and subaltern alternative politics. By 
creating a different kind of social relationship between people, by fostering participation 
and real democracy, and by practicing self-management in various areas of social and 
economic life, the solidarity movement has managed to become one of the most impor-
tant, innovative, and hopeful outcomes of the peoples’ mobilization and resistance.
However, we should leave behind politically simplistic accounts that seek to romanticize 
such solidarity movements and initiatives. We thus need to always bear in mind and 
stress their tensions, limitations, and complexities as well as their “localities.” Social 
solidarity initiatives should be analyzed as phenomena in motion that are constantly 
transforming their practices, methodologies, and internal relations. Therefore, in order 
to unravel them, we should also examine the relationships between performativity and 
subject formation. These relationships are nonlinear and complex, depend on conscious 
and active political intervention, and must necessarily concern political objectives and 
outcomes – which lead us directly to issues of agency, strategy, and the struggle for 
social and political power (Calvario et al., 2016: p. 16).
The paper is structured as follows: The current section (introduction) provides initial 
thoughts as well as the theoretical background and the research methodology of the 
case studies. The second section gives an overview of the current economic, political, 
and social situation of Greece and the development of new forms of expression of 
popular discontent. The same section analyzes in somewhat more depth the social initi-
atives from below as part of the new forms of social protest and self-organization. Then 
we present the two case studies, namely the City Plaza immigrants’ housing project 
in Athens and the Social Solidarity Medical Center of Thessaloniki. The sections that 
follow provide a discussion of the two case studies with regard to questions of internal 
relations, organization, political project(s), and transformative potential. The paper ends 
with some conclusions, remarks, and points for further thought.
FROM THE SYNTAGMA SQUARE  
UPRISING TO LOCALIZED STRUGGLES 
As part of the global recession, Greece entered a severe economic, social, and political 
crisis in 2010. The crisis initially affected three highly correlated sectors: banks, real 
estate (including land and houses), and public debt. The crisis had a sobering effect, 
with skittish investors downgrading Greece’s risk rating and withdrawing from further 
refinancing, causing the constant renewal of the (public debt) crisis. As a result, the IMF, 
EU, and ECB, known popularly as the Troika, intervened in order to refinance Greece’s 
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public debt and to restructure the Greek economy according to the neoliberal ortho-
doxy. Overall, as Bekridaki and Broumas (2016: p. 7) argue, three strategic aims were 
effectively pursued through the bailout programs: a) the removal of all barriers to the 
exploitation of labor by capital, b) the disintegration of the already feeble welfare struc-
tures of the Greek state, and c) the privatization of public institutions and the enclosure 
of the country’s commons.
In January 2015, five years after the first bailout program (May 2010), SYRIZA, a coali-
tion of the radical left in Greece, took power and formed a coalition government with 
ANEL (a center-right party) on the basis of its promise to implement a sustainable plan 
for managing the debt crisis and overcoming austerity. SYRIZA was formed as a coali-
tion of the radical left that adopted a strategy of being open to social movements as 
a model for both its survival and development. Social movement activists and organi-
zations within SYRIZA have offered their experience in organizing in the field, and in 
providing new and innovative organizational and mobilization practices, which have 
been particularly useful in the times of Greece’s social upheaval (Spourdalakis, 2013: 
p. 109). Since 2012, the party has gained national recognition and support by promising 
that “there is an alternative” to the austerity measures.
However, in the end, and despite the large “No” vote against the new bailout program 
in the referendum of July 2015, the government struck a new loan agreement that 
perpetuated previous austerity packages, including promoting privatization schemes for 
public land and infrastructures; wage cuts; divestment of the pension system; and the 
deepening of external, EU supervision of all state policies. So far, two major outcomes 
of this new phase have emerged for Greece. First, the SYRIZA party, however inad-
vertently, has become part of the Greek political mainstream and has – more or less 
reluctantly – acknowledged the need to accept stringent reform requirements (“prior 
actions”) in exchange for multi-year financial assistance. Second, it seems that the TINA 
ideology in Greece and Europe has been strengthened rather than defeated. ‘SYRIZA’s 
capitulation’ to domestic and European elites undermines the many social movements 
that have emerged in the country during the crisis period to confront austerity policies. 
Furthermore, it undermines anti-capitalist ideologies and alternative, left-wing politics, 
since a left-wing party found itself the champion of policies it was elected to oppose 
(see also Velegrakis et al., 2015). As regards the social uprising(s), the events of summer 
2015 have pushed Greece in a direction that threatens to demobilize the social move-
ments and generate widespread resignation. As Karyotis argues (2016), “It is evident 
now in Greece that the neoliberal left and the neoliberal right are two variations of the 
same project — a project that requires a disciplined, atomized, obedient population, 
preoccupied with maximizing individual benefit, having relinquished any kind of collec-
tive action to change society.”
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Greece should not be understood as an exceptional or unique case. Although the Greek 
crisis has been portrayed in the mass media across the world as “a national and moral 
problem rather than a global and systemic one” (Mylonas, 2014: p. 305), the roots of the 
crisis should (controversially) be searched for in the “recipes for recovery.” The imple-
mentation of extra austerity measures, including extensive privatizations, an increase 
in sales taxes, wage cuts in the public and private sectors, and reductions to pensions 
has resulted over the last 7 years (2010-2017) in the constant renewal of the crisis. 
In addition, as many scholars have pointed out (see, among others, Krugman, 2009; 
Blyth, 2013; Peck et al., 2013; Hadjimichalis, 2014; Harvey, 2014), austerity is nothing 
more than a class politics aimed at re-engineering society and privately appropriating 
the commons. Therefore, under the conditions of crisis, austerity measures accentuate 
rather than repair socio-economic problems.
In parallel, since 2015, substantially higher numbers of refugees have arrived in Greece, 
making the country a major stopover on the journey of people seeking a better and 
safer life. Thousands of immigrants from Syria, Kurdistan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and other 
war zones have abandoned their homeland in search of a new home, where their life 
and freedom are not compromised. Unfortunately, the EU and Greek governments have 
been unable (and largely unwilling) to respond to the issue. Instead of providing safety 
and solidarity to war victims, they signed a (rather shameful) agreement with Turkey on 
March 18, 20161 with the aim of “managing refugee flows” and further securitizing the 
“forbidden” European borders. As a result, thousands of refugees are currently trapped 
in Greece, cramped inside detention centers and camps, away from the public eye.
The implementation of anti-popular austerity measures in the country together with the 
higher number of refugee arrivals has led to an increase in social discontent (demon-
strated mainly during the summer of 2011 with the Outrageous social movement), 
political and social organizing, and the development of solidarity structures all over the 
country. 
After the 2011 Greek Occupy movement subsided, many groups of local activists 
kick-started solidarity structures all over the country, organizing resistance around 
the concrete, situated needs of local communities. As a result, by the beginning of 
2012 many solidarity groups had already been formed. In September 2012 there were 
about 80-200 self-organized solidarity structures in Greece, compared with almost 
400 today. Solidarity structures are active in the areas of health, food, education and 
culture, housing and debt, legal support, the social and alternative economy, workers 
and immigrants’ solidarity, and international solidarity. Their practices include restoring 
1 The agreement between Turkey and the EU was signed on March 20, 2016. Since then, refugees 
and immigrants have been trapped either in Turkey or on the Greek islands since no official 
process to accommodate them in different European countries has been developed.
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electricity provision to poor households, the “no middlemen” distribution of agricultural 
products, solidarity healthcare clinics, solidarity tutoring programs, and other mutual aid 
schemes that respond to local needs. This period ignited the grassroots social solidarity 
movement in its current form. All of the initiatives are organized and formed as “open 
assemblies” with horizontal decision-making processes. Thanks to these characteris-
tics, the solidarity movements have emerged from the ruins of the crisis as a powerful 
social experiment. They have outlined a political culture which creates the conditions for 
addressing social needs through the establishment of a material and social commons 
(Bekridaki & Broumas, 2016: p. 7).
At the same time, the social response to the refugee movement has been confronted 
with two of the basic aspects of the current Greek situation: first, the lack of financial 
resources and social security infrastructure due to the politics of austerity, and second, 
the strong social solidarity legacy built up during the crisis years. A new space and 
“era” of solidarity, namely solidarity with immigrants, has emerged. In times when both 
immigrants and locals have been (and are being) de-valuated by implemented policies, 
solidarity initiatives for immigrants have become the alternative paradigm for a shared 
existence and struggle as well as open spaces of experimentation and the creation of 
alternatives.
Within this framework, solidarity initiatives play a vital role in the current period of social 
movements in Greece, for several reasons. First, they have emerged over the last years 
as a counter-austerity narrative and praxis aiming to empower the disempowered in face 
of growing xenophobia, but also charity and philanthropic ideas and practices. Second, 
they have forged mutual support and share survival strategies in the ongoing crisis 
of social reproduction. Third, they have fostered spaces for political struggle. Fourth, 
they have developed alternative modes of social and economic conduct. Fifth, they are 
an (indirect) outcome of the Occupy period as the activists’ methods, practices, and 
discourses used during the Syntagma Square occupation (2011) have been localized 
to engender and strengthen all these initiatives (from 2011 until today). While several 
of the initiatives date back to the pre-crisis period, they only gained support, national 
recognition, and international attention after the mass protests of 2011. Sixth, although 
this is quite recent, the solidarity initiatives have achieved durability through the trans-
formations they have generated. By persisting in everyday practices, networking all over 
Greece, and building strong alliances with other social movements (e.g. environmental 
movements, movements against house evictions etc.), they have created a “solid terrain 
of solidarity” that continues to grow despite the political and social difficulties they face.
Moreover, the bottom-up solidarity initiatives grounded in local neighborhoods as key 
sites of struggle have created a great network of localized struggles, social movements, 
and initiatives in and across urban space. Therefore, the social movements in the big 
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urban sites of Greece (mainly in Athens and Thessaloniki, but also in several other cities 
in the country’s periphery) have emerged not only as practical responses to social 
needs within the ongoing societal crisis, but also as clear acts of urban re-commoning 
that establish alternatives. Starting from protests in favor of its particular interests, each 
movement soon transcended its locality in its search for broader alliances and networks 
with other movements. Each movement itself and the alliance-building with other 
movements has contributed to the “dynamic geographies of subaltern political activity 
and the generative character of political struggle” (Featherstone, 2013: p. 66). They 
have initiated processes of experimentation and learning from below, showing how 
relations can be organized differently in everyday life (and mainly in the urban context), 
beyond the limits of existing forms of social and political power. Subsequently, they 
have actively questioned the austerity-driven neoliberal patterns of development and 
their direct outcomes on environment, everyday life, and social relations. 
On the central political scene, as far as the social solidarity initiatives are concerned, 
SYRIZA continues, albeit reluctantly, the project of previous – clearly neoliberal – 
governments that sought to criminalize solidarity. There is no doubt that the practices of 
grassroots solidarity movements are on a collision course with the government’s current 
project as well as with the EU’s current integration attempts. The working classes and 
immigrants are conceived only as a reserve army of labor in perpetual competition and 
with no rights. The strict international division of labor together with the huge project 
of capital accumulation leads to the constant exclusion of social needs from public – 
domestic and international – policies and discourse. Capital and goods continue to take 
priority over human bodies and their concrete, situated needs from the local to the 
global scale. 
What is even more interesting is the discourse a so-called progressive government is 
following to justify its actions against social solidarity from below. Over the last two 
years SYRIZA has condemned sections of the social-solidarity movement as “initiatives 
that run contrary to the principles and values of the left” (Karyotis, 2016). On several 
occasions – e.g. in the summer of 2016, when police evicted two refugee squats in Thes-
saloniki – government officials spoke of “unjustified occupations that merely present a 
poor imitation of social struggle and an illusion of freedom.” Thus, the government 
has shown little tolerance to those initiatives which are not in line with the interests 
of the state and its current policies. At the same time, ironically enough, the party 
and the government of SYRIZA continue to insist on “a mass popular movement” that 
will “monitor the government’s actions in a peaceful democratic way.” However, this 
so-called movement should be in line – or at least be willing to compromise – with the 
state. Actions that cannot be embodied by state institutions in one way or another are 
heavily attacked and suppressed, and criticized publicly for being “piecemeal efforts” 
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that offer help to a small number of people, in contrast to the organized efforts of the 
state. The government thus corroborates the idea that “social struggles that are not 
mediated by the state are either infantile or a threat to social peace — probably both” 
(Karyotis, 2016).
THE CITY PLAZA IN ATHENS: REFUGEE 
ACCOMMODATION AND A SOLIDARITY 
SPACE 
The movement of hundreds of thousands of political and economic refugees not only 
from Syria, but also from Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere, to Europe, and especially 
to Greece, has been on the increase since 2015. It came at a rather “hopeless” or a 
“hope-draining” moment for the country, right after the signing of the third memo-
randum in July-August 2015. The government’s shift to “Realpolitik” resulted in the 
continuation of neoliberal austerity, quick and severe de-regulation, and the withdrawal 
of the state from providing social security.
The City Plaza, a seven-story hotel at the core of Athens’ historical center that has 
been abandoned since 2010, “reopened” on April 22, 2016, welcoming hundreds 
of immigrants – among them single-parent families, children, and people with disa-
bilities. The initiative, undertaken by a coalition of antiracist, left-wing groups and 
individuals, aimed to re-use the empty building as a way of addressing the urgent 
need for refugee accommodation. People working in solidarity have thus managed 
to create in the “here and now” a model of dignified housing inside the city, thereby 
breaking with the reality of detention camps that the EU and the Greek government 
proposed as a solution for refugee accommodation. According to the first official 
document of the initiative, “City Plaza is a project of self-organization and solidarity, 
a centre of struggle against racism and exclusion, for the right to free movement, 
decent living conditions and equal rights” (Solidarity Initiative for Economic and 
Political Refugees, 2016d).
The City Plaza has become home to approximately 100 refugee families, as well as 
unaccompanied minors. Each family lives in a separate room and is responsible for 
cleaning and taking care of it. At the same time, activists together with refugees 
have been working collectively for the cleaning, repair, and organization of common 
spaces. In this way, locals and immigrants are trying to build new social relations and 
multicultural forms of coexistence, and to bring into being a living example of self-
organization.
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THE NINE SELF-ORGANIZED  
WORKING GROUPS WITHIN THE INITIATIVE:
> Education and child-care: its aim is to organize lessons in the children’s mother 
tongues, in Greek and in English, as well as creative activities. At the same time, it 
organizes the struggle for refugees’ access to public education.
> Language classes: several groups of teachers provide Greek language lessons for 
children, English language lessons for adults and children, German language lessons 
for adults and children2.
> Healthcare: the doctors and nurses which make up the healthcare team run the 
medical center at City Plaza on a daily basis and coordinate communication with 
public hospitals if needed.
> Kitchen: approximately 1,000 cooked meals are prepared in the kitchen daily, in addi-
tion to breakfast – by teams made up of refugees and people working in solidarity.
> Security: throughout the day and night there are teams in place for guarding the 
building against possible racist attacks3. 
> Cafe/Bar: the team runs the bar daily, offering coffee, tea, and soft drinks, thereby 
generating financial support for the initiative. 
> Economics: a self-organized group takes care of the donations and spending (mainly for 
everyday goods). It provides regular reports on the financial sustainability of the initiative. 
> Storage and cleaning: the main group is responsible for cleaning, repairing, and 
organizing the place.
> Communications: a group of “amateur journalists” who work on the dissemination 
activities of the initiative by organizing public events, discussions, small festivals as 
well as developing and providing press releases for the public media and the web.
City Plaza relies exclusively on political solidarity and on material support from the soli-
darity community in Greece and abroad. Financial and political support and, especially, 
people’s service in the working groups are not only the initiative’s sole protection against 
attempts to repress the initiative, but also a guarantee for its continued daily operation. 
For this reason, City Plaza has, since day one, attempted to serve as a wider center of 
struggle for the solidarity movement. It endeavors to show that there are alternatives to 
2 There are several international activist-volunteers in the City Plaza initiative coming 
mainly from Italy, Spain, France, Germany, Poland, Denmark, and USA. German activist-
volunteers have organized German language classes for the refugees.
3 The City Plaza Hotel is located in the Victoria / Agios Panteleimonas neighborhood in 
the center of Athens, a highly dilapidated area that was one of the areas where the 
neo-Nazi party Golden Dawn operated during the period of 2011-2013.
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the terrible government camps, accommodation that allows people to live in cities and 
in which living conditions are dignified and relationships are equal. These are spaces in 
which, despite their localization or material constraints, the wish to “live together” is 
turned into reality. The aim is to achieve a conception of everyday life that will empower 
people “from below,” ultimately leading to the creation of a “space of freedom” (Soli-
darity Initiative for Economic and Political Refugees, 2017).
The focal point of the refugee crisis, the City Plaza also works against a spiteful scare 
campaign organized by the mass media against grassroots solidarity efforts, blaming 
them for everything that went wrong in the places where thousands of people were 
kept away from the public eye under inhuman conditions as a direct result of Euro-
pean immigration laws. In turn, these attacks were used to justify the exclusion of 
social movements from the “provisional” refugee camps set up by the state in former 
industrial areas on the periphery of Greek towns. Special controlled zones were created 
where only “accredited” aid workers were allowed, and efforts to interact and collabo-
rate with the refugees were suppressed (Karyotis, 2016).
In addition, the important socio-spatial aspects of the City Plaza initiative have acquired 
considerable political significance. During recent years, there have been several regional 
and other attempts to segregate this Athenian neighborhood (Victoria Square, Acharnon 
Street, Agios Panteleimonas Square etc.). Notably, in the early spring of 20164 the Munici-
pality of Athens, under the auspices of the city’s Mayor, attempted to evict Victoria Square, 
placing barriers all around it, in order to prevent refugees and migrants from setting up a self-
organized camp. Thanks to the activation of social groups and the solidarity movement, the 
attempt failed to lead to an eviction. That is to say, the square preserved its open character 
and remained a meeting point for the migrant communities living in Athens. 
The Solidarity Initiative for Economic and Political Refugees played a central part in 
this struggle, organizing daily food distributions and other initiatives, in order to thwart 
“the efforts to create “apartheid” areas, without the presence of refugees.” Due to its 
location – only five minutes away from Victoria Square – as well as to the presence of 
members of the Solidarity Initiative for Economic and Political Refugees, the City Plaza 
was strongly bound up in the “life of the Square.” Until this day, the square is consid-
ered a place of visibility for the migrant communities of Athens, and a protest against 
the gentrifying practices that reinforce the multiple forms of social exclusion5. Further-
more, the preservation of the square’s open character is now aiding the development of 
a collective “safeguarding” of migrants from racist attacks.
4 Police forces attempted the eviction of Victoria Square on March 7, 2016.
5 The City Plaza organized a public concert in Victoria Square on June 19, 2016 that eventually became a major 
cultural and social event for the neighborhood (Solidarity Initiative for Economic and Political Refugees, 2016a).
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THE SOCIAL SOLIDARITY MEDICAL CENTER 
OF THESSALONIKI 
Cuts in public expenditure have strongly affected the quality of, and access to, health 
services in Greece. According to the OECD, between 2009 and 2011 the ‘per capita 
expenditure’ for health was reduced by 11.1 percent, and, according to the ILO World 
Social Protection Report 2014/15, public spending on health dropped by 3.7 percent 
between 2007 and 2011. Public spending for medicine reimbursement dropped by 56 
percent, from 5.1 billion euros in 2009 to 2.2 billion in 2012, a development that led to an 
increase of up to 70 percent in payment contributions for medicines for patients covered 
by social security (Solidarity4All, 2014). 
The savage cuts to, and wholesale restructuring of, the public health-care system 
have led to the closure of entire hospitals and clinics, the loss of medical staff, and 
nationwide medicine shortages. These changes have considerably restricted the 
capacity of public health providers to deliver services at a time when demand for 
them has risen, due to the worsening of the general population’s financial standing. 
The most severe problem is the exclusion of more than 3.3 million people from the 
public health-care system. According to EOPPY (National Organization of Health 
Care Services) official data, more than 300,000 people have dropped off the social 
security register, due to their inability to keep up with payment contributions, or 
because they lost their jobs, closed their companies, or were unemployed for more 
Social Solidarity Medical Center, Thessaloniki
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than a year, as mentioned above. This means that one third (33.2 percent) of the 
population of Greece is without social insurance, to which should also be added the 
hundreds of thousands of undocumented immigrants and refugees (Solidarity4All, 
2014).
The Social Solidarity Medical Center of Thessaloniki (SSMC) was set up in December 
2010 and it has operated since then as a social healthcare collective that provides 
primary medical and pharmaceutical treatment to all the uninsured residents of the 
city of Thessaloniki. It started with a group of activists and doctors willing to provide 
health support to immigrants6 and locals excluded from the National Health Care 
System. The initiative then called for support from various health bodies and people 
willing to show their solidarity. A few weeks later, the SSMC started with the estab-
lishment of a pathology, pediatric, neurology, psychiatric, and dental department, as 
well as a pharmacy (from where every non-insured person could obtain his or her 
medical prescription).
After five months of efforts, Thessaloniki Labor Center offered the SSMC an entire floor 
of its premises in the city center. After one month of volunteer labor, the space was 
in a proper state to host the clinic. Since then, the SSMC has offered various medical 
services such as dental treatment, internal medicine, pediatrics, psychiatry, neurology, 
dermatology, otorhinolaryngology, cardiology, and obstetrics. 
Besides the health bodies that offer their services to the SSMC daily, many private 
doctors from various specialties have agreed to examine a number of patients every 
month in their consulting offices for free. Furthermore, private labs have offered to do 
some basic examinations and tests. With the assistance of the secretarial services in 
the SSMC, several patients have also been able to visit hospital doctors under special 
appointments without paying.
The SSMC is autonomous and self-managed. In regular meetings, the various health 
departments discuss and decide on everyday administrative issues. There is also an 
open SSMC general meeting which takes care of the overall operation and development 
of the initiative (e.g. financial sustainability and aids, external activities, alliances with 
other social movements, relations to the statutory bodies). 
Between late 2011 and 2016, the SSMC received more than 5,000 visits from 
fellow Greek and immigrant citizens, while over a hundred health bodies offered 
their services. Furthermore, it became a model for other initiatives in several Greek 
cities. With only three clinics in September 2012 (besides the SSMC there was 
one in Athens and one in Rethimnon, Crete), today there are more than forty-five 
6 For more details regarding the health support to immigrants, see the next section.
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functioning all over Greece. Activists, people working in solidarity and doctors have 
managed to create (…) a clinic that will offer on regular basis and without any financial 
burden to visitors, a primary healthcare. A primary healthcare accessed by everyone 
without any exceptions; we welcome non-insured and socially excluded Greeks and 
foreigners. Moreover, we aim to give birth to a social initiative that will try to put a lot of 
pressure to the state in order to ensure free and necessary case-by-case secondary and 
tertiary care, hospitalization and rehabilitation for everyone. (SSMC, 2015a)
The SSMC’s scope, in the participants’ own words, is “The promotion of health as a 
public social good: Fighting for society’s right to free public healthcare while acknowl-
edging that health is an issue that concerns each individual separately and society as a 
whole” (SSMC, 2015b). 
In practice, they achieve their objectives not only by providing medication to the 
official public health-care system, but also by organizing protests and actions in 
collaboration with health-workers’ unions, in hospitals, neighborhoods, and state 
institutions, demanding health care for all. At the same time, the SSMC has created 
meeting places that are open to wider communities, at the same time as striving 
to mobilize patients, and to create information campaigns about medication and 
health services as common goods. The clinic also hosts cultural and socio-political 
events and establishes synergies and solidarity bonds with other local/peripheral 
social movements7.
In order to respond to their growing needs and increase their effectiveness, and also 
to stave off attacks from the state, private business interests, and fascists, the SSMC, 
together with other initiatives, have started forming more stable networks. This has 
been done either on the basis of common fields of action, such as the solidarity clinics 
coordination that operates nationally, or through connections with regional networks, 
and by activating localized networks (in the metropolitan area of Thessaloniki). The 
presence of such networks of solidarity, and their contribution to the creation of new 
social bonds when unemployment and deprivation are destroying the social fabric, have 
acted as an effective deterrent against racism and fascism, and have become fields of 
common action by and for all.
7 For a more detailed description of all healthcare initiatives in Greece, see also Broumas & Bekridaki (2016).
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BUILDING ALTERNATIVES WHILE 
RESISTING
TOGETHER WE STAND, DIVIDED WE FALL8
It seems that the societal experience in itself – organization and resistance – has served to 
create a “positive space,” averting social panic and racism. Within this context, the building 
of solidarity networks has served the purpose of providing relief to thousands of refugees, 
and it was also the impetus for the remobilization of hundreds of frustrated social activists. 
These rich societal, cultural, and political experiences strengthened the anti-racism 
and anti-austerity movement in Greece, providing new sources of learning potential, 
reinforcing national and international networks, and promoting originality and creativity. 
While the dominant institutional housing model builds refugee camps on the city’s 
outskirts, dividing the EU’s refugee-policy funds across several Non-Governmental 
Organizations (NGOs), the accommodation of refugees in Greece appears to be the 
impetus for a new social housing paradigm. The occupation of empty buildings in the 
center of Athens emerged as a practical response to the disastrous living conditions of 
thousands of homeless refugees in the cities and of those staying – for no one knows 
how long – in the huge state-run camps.
The City Plaza, as well as other refugee squats, exists under the constant threat of 
eviction. In the summer of 2016, the police, following government orders, evacu-
ated two refugee squats in Thessaloniki. Then, in spring 2017, police evacuated 
one more in Athens city center, very close to the City Plaza. The evacuations were 
ordered by the government but were supported by both the owners of the premises 
and the local authorities (municipality of Thessaloniki and Athens). 
City Plaza activists reacted to these evacuations by expressing their solidarity with the 
other initiatives and accommodating the refugees that had been put out on the streets. In 
their own words: We are certain that the planned attack against refugee housing squats 
is part of exactly this anti-refugee and anti-migration policy. It is neither an exception nor a 
diversion. It is completely logical that a government policy that presents refugees as being 
an enemy within is now adopting a policy of hostility to any example of dignified living 
and housing. This is, of course, a continuation of the broader anti-grass roots government 
policies. (Solidarity Initiative for Economic and Political Refugees, 2017) 
That is to say, housing initiatives in Greece have brought a certain dimension of resist-
ance to the process of building an alternative. Whilst they have taken action as an 
immediate response to an urgent social need, namely the accommodation of those in 
need, they have also mobilized alternative discourses and practices against xenophobia 
or against merely philanthropist accounts of the subaltern. 
8 Pink Floyd, Hey you. The Wall (1979).
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Nonetheless, to this day – and probably for the foreseeable future – the risk of a possible 
eviction of the City Plaza and of other smaller squats has not been eliminated. Whilst 
the current government, like the previous ones, seems unwilling to tolerate the squats 
any further, the opposition continues to objectify the squatting movement, producing an 
ultra-conservative discourse regarding squatting practices, and putting some pressure 
on the government to evict all squats9.
However, the initiatives very soon transcended the “locality” of the struggle in their 
endeavor to create an alternative space of living and struggling together. They have 
become a field of innovative activities and experimentation around these terms. The 
organization of everyday life challenges the dominant patterns of the material and 
symbolic reproduction of life in terms of the division of labor and care, decision-making 
processes, and participation. 
As the City Plaza’s first political administrative assembly stated in April 2016: By squat-
ting an unused hotel, we wanted to be paradigmatic, we wanted to stress – as an 
example – how the social movements and society from below are able to improve the 
living conditions of the refugees and thus improve the livelihood of all (…). We wanted to 
create and develop spaces of freedom and of common struggles of locals and refugees. 
(Solidarity Initiative for Economic and Political Refugees, 2016b)
The City Plaza initiative tries not to promote dependence, but to encourage people 
to become independent and to look after themselves. It therefore provides the tools 
and platforms for people to think and act for themselves and understand their own 
personal and political situation and status. Drawing on the knowledge, specialized 
skills, interests, and professional experience of everyone – both refugees and locals 
– is the starting point. As Anastasia, a female activist, explains “We are not ‘giving’ 
solidarity, we are saying ‘we are here as support but we cannot do everything for you.’ 
This is really the challenge, to achieve a real sense of collaboration, independence, and 
freedom for everyone here.” 
As such, for activists in the movement, the initiative is not only a response to the social 
hardship of anti-immigrant politics. Rather, they are also part of the process of forging 
an alternative worldview on humanism, solidarity, and social relations more broadly.
Thus, again at the City Plaza’s first political administrative assembly in April 2016, it was 
declared: We are convinced that the balance of power can be shifted in concrete prac-
tices rather than through general humanitarian appeals. In these practices the renewed 
version of the mantra of T.I.N.A. (There is no Alternative) of repressive migration poli-
9 More than two New Democracy MPs (a right-wing party) questioned the Government regarding 
City Plaza in the context of the parliamentary questioning procedure. The questions were directed 
to the Minister of Citizen Protection and they demanded the direct evacuation of the place.
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cies can be disputed and space can be gained against the far-right; City Plaza made 
itself a place of solidarity and resistance in a neighbourhood that was claimed for years 
by the extreme right and the neo-Nazi party of Golden Dawn. (Solidarity Initiative for 
Political and Economic Refugees, 2016c)
They subsequently understand their movement as a political struggle. They aim to 
construct a politics of hope that gives the material and subjective conditions for subor-
dinated social groups to “claim our [their] rights, to claim society, to claim democracy,” 
as Kostas, one of the activists, argues.
This political struggle, according to the activists, is also a struggle against the state and 
the Greek state’s (and the EU’s) implementation of anti-immigrant policies. Therefore, 
they do not address their demands exclusively to the minister of refugee policies or 
different state institutions but to the Greek state and the EU as a whole. As Nikos, a 
pensioner and activist at the City Plaza, explains these demands are not “humanitarian 
but political.” Thus, activists demand the annulment of the agreement between the EU 
and Turkey; the opening of borders and a safe passage for refugees; the full legaliza-
tion of all refugees; no deportations to Turkey or elsewhere; the provision of decent 
housing and living conditions for all refugees within cities; the closure of all detention 
centers and camps; the provision of free access to healthcare services and education 
for immigrants.
City Plaza Squad, Athens
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As we can see from their own words, the City Plaza’s activists understand the political 
aspect of their struggle as well as their limitations.
We do not, of course, believe that the problem can be solved merely through squat-
ting, as the provision of shelter is a fundamental obligation of the state and the 
local authorities; we do, however, believe that squats can act not only as a means 
for claiming rights but also as a factual exercising of rights precisely by those who 
are deprived of rights: the illegalized and excluded economic and political refugees.
City Plaza sees itself as part of the European and international solidarity movement 
which challenges the militarization of borders and the externalization of asylum policies 
and which claims the freedom of movement and the right to stay. (Solidarity Initiative 
for Political and Economic Refugees, 2016c, emphasis added)
SOLITAIRE OU SOLIDAIRE?10 
With its optimistic take on the title of Albert Camus’ biography, the film on the SSMC 
explores the collective experience of the building of an alternative in the sector of 
health and social care. The narrative goes back to the birth date of the Social Clinic 
as an initiative by health professionals who stood in solidarity with the hunger strike 
by fifty immigrant workers in Thessaloniki in December 2010. The fifty immigrants, 
together with more than 250 in Athens, declared a hunger strike against Greek migra-
tion policies, opening up the agenda of resistance against the austerity measures 
imposed by the Troika and the government to issues that had not previously been 
debated in public. Some of the workers were undocumented, but the majority had 
lost their working permits due to the unemployment caused by the crisis. All of them, 
however, had worked for years in construction, agriculture, and tourism services; 
some had families and the loss of their legal employment status made them subject 
to deportation (see Lafazani, 2012). 
Within this context, the movement began as an initiative of resistance against the 
exclusion of immigrants from the national health-care system. Under the circum-
stances of the social crisis produced by the implementation of austerity measures, 
the Social Clinic developed as “a social care collective that provides primary medical 
and pharmaceutical treatment to all the uninsured residents without any distinctions 
and discriminations in terms of ethnicity, race, religious affiliation, gender, sexual 
orientation” (SSMC, 2015a). 
10 “Solitaire ou Solidaire?”, A film on the Social Clinic of Solidarity of Thessaloniki, 2016, by Eirini Karagkiozidou, 
Theofilos Kalaitzidis, Akis Kersanidis, Aimilia Kougioumtzoglou, Kiki Moustakidou, Stavroula Poulimeni, Chryssa 
Tzelepi. Trailer available at: https://vimeo.com/157417827.
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The SSMC’S activists draw attention to the fact that, in the context of the restrictive 
fiscal policy and the commercialization of health, government expenditures in health-
care have been dramatically reduced. As Giorgos, a doctor working in solidarity with 
the SSMC, argues, 
The state is shirking its responsibility to cover even the most basic health needs for 
a large proportion of people in the country. For a poor, an unemployed, person, or 
someone with a serious and long-term illness, this means the completion of his/her 
social exclusion, the rapid deterioration of his/her health situation, his/her total misery, 
and eventually his/ early death.
From the very beginning, the SSMC appealed to all the social and cultural bodies and 
labor unions of Thessaloniki, as well as all the  municipal councils  and elected local 
authorities,  asking for their moral and material support. Material support included a) 
donations, b) financial aid on a regular basis for the payment of the medical premises 
and its property expenses, c) medical equipment and pharmaceutical supplies and d) 
everyday solidarity work. The campaign was successful as the activists managed to 
generate steady financial support for the initiative mainly from donations and (unpaid) 
solidarity work. Furthermore, the activists were inspired and encouraged by relevant 
initiatives in other cities of Greece (e.g. the Metropolitan Clinic of Helliniko in Athens) 
and many of them had experiences of smaller-scale solidarity actions in the area of 
primary healthcare.
“We trust in our ability to bring change; united, we aim to put an end to these barbaric 
policies that leave people bereft of medical care,” explains Fani, an activist participating 
in the SSMC during one of the initiative’s numerous protests. The protest was held in 
front of the University General Hospital of Thessaloniki – AHEPA – and demanded that 
public hospitals (hence the state) address the social needs of thousands of citizens 
(both locals and immigrants) excluded from the welfare state due to austerity meas-
ures. The activist’s words accurately describe both the philosophical framework and the 
motivation of activists participating in the building of this alternative welfare structure. 
Regarding its day-to-day work, the SSMC strives to create relations that lie outside of or 
oppose dominant social relations in the health sector. Some examples: Medical care at 
the SSMC is provided free of charge; all the participants carry out the planning, organiza-
tion, and delivery of the “work” in a cooperative and equitable way; all of the members 
participate in decision-making and the development of the struggle. 
One of the official documents of the initiative states: No one is more important than 
the other. We place special emphasis on the transformation of the relationship between 
doctor and patient, between those delivering and those receiving treatment and care. 
This is so because, in the particular context of our community, it would be impossible 
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not to reflect on our medical practice and on the role of the attending doctor. We are 
pursuing a holistic approach to health, ‘patient’ involvement and emancipation, as well 
as community medicine. (SSMC, 2015c)
The SSMC, together with other social clinics all over the country, have subscribed to the 
“Charter of Common Principles of the Solidarity Clinics,” which was adopted at their 
nationwide meeting in November 2013 and led to a nationwide Cooperation of Solidarity 
Clinics and Pharmacies. In their charter the solidarity health centers clearly claim that 
they are open to everyone living in Greece; they do not aim to substitute the public 
health services that the state has decided to ditch, and they are fighting for the reversal 
of the people’s exclusion from public health services and for an end to neoliberal health 
policies.
Since the solidarity clinics pushed for unhindered access to public health services for 
all from the very first moment of their existence, it was also expected that they would 
take action in this direction during the tenure of the new SYRIZA government in 2015. 
In this context, they have participated in the public debate by releasing their own state-
ments, attended meetings with the Ministry, and have freely expressed their points of 
agreement whilst continuing to raise issues that have not been satisfactorily addressed 
by the state. 
Nevertheless, the SSMC, as well as other related initiatives, do not wish to replace 
welfare-state structures. Although there are different political orientations amongst the 
activists at the SSMC, most of them define their struggle not as a replacement of the 
welfare state with a network of “solidarity from below,” nor as a mere return to the 
“old” welfare state. As a result, solidarity health clinics continue to be structures of the 
wider social movements, which have their own distinct and autonomous political func-
tions and aims vis-à-vis the state and the incumbent political parties.
“To my mind, this transformative potential in everyday practice forms the common back-
ground of all the current grassroots social initiatives,” points out Irini, one of the activists 
at the SSMC. At the same time, activists are aware of the limitations of the solidarity 
initiatives in healthcare. They know that the day-to-day work is exhausting but never 
enough since the demands are constantly increasing. Furthermore, they are aware that 
today the progressive dialectics between the SYRIZA coalition government (the state in 
general) and the social movements in healthcare have dissolved. As Petros, one of the 
activists at the SSMC, argues, “SYRIZA’s failure to include (even inadequately) all parts 
of society (such as us) within alternative methods for fulfilling people’s needs made its 
defeat heavier and left social movements with new political questions.”
For this reason, SSMC activists, together with other social movements in the health 
sector, try to exert “pressure on political society to ensure/secure universal, free of 
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charge, secondary and tertiary medical care, hospitalization and rehabilitation” (SSMC, 
2015d), partaking in the social struggle for a universal, free, and public health system in 
Greece. Eleni, a young solidarity activist in the initiative, explains that.
We have neither the intention nor the illusion that there is the possibility of a solidarity 
initiative that subrogates the state and takes on all responsibilities of healthcare for 
the residents. We have full knowledge of the limits and possibilities of solidarity in the 
area of healthcare. Nevertheless, we have a firm belief that solidarity and the defense 
of rights, beyond declarative speech, require some specific actions. That is what we 
are doing here. We are taking action for the fulfillment of our concrete, situated needs 
regarding health services. 
Many other solidarity structures, e.g. food structures, or the “no middlemen” initia-
tives, collect medicines that they hand in to their local solidarity clinic. This medicine 
collection campaign has become so successful that in quite a few cases the solidarity 
pharmacies have provided medicine to public hospitals facing shortages. In a similar 
manner, that is, through appeals to the public and the solidarity movement in Greece 
and abroad, the solidarity health centers have managed to find donated premises for 
their clinics and to equip and furnish them with cardiographs, dentist chairs, etc. Where 
this was not possible, the solidarity clinics pressured the local town council to provide 
them with the unused premises it owns and in a few cases, they have been forced to 
rent space.
While the movement tries to avoid the use of money, there is a need to cover utility bills 
and medical products for everyday use and for this reason solidarity funds have been 
created next door to the social clinics to collect financial donations and utilize them 
according to the clinics’ needs. What should be underlined is the invaluable international 
financial and moral solidarity that many health solidarity structures receive from soli-
darity initiatives, trade unions, and individuals outside Greece. There is not one model 
for these solidarity clinics; each one is unique, and the same goes for all the solidarity 
structures. While all solidarity health centers are self-organized, some are linked with 
local doctors’ associations and trade unions, some with local political groups, or cultural 
centers etc. 
ASPECTS OF A SOCIAL  
TRANSFORMATIVE PRAXIS
DURABLE AND TRANSFORMATIVE EVERYDAY PRACTICES
The durability11 of the initiatives is at the same time an outcome as well as a “continuous 
impetus.” This applies to the important role undertaken by the City Plaza in the provision 
11 On April 22, 2017 the City Plaza turned one year old. The SSMC has been operating since the winter of 2011.
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of decent housing to the refugees as an alternative to the state-run detention centers 
and camps. Moreover, the international solidarity network and the original and creative 
communication of the initiative has resulted in (and stemmed from) a widespread soli-
darity culture in Greek and European society. The creation of a heritage of experience 
through its everyday practices has also significantly strengthened the SSMC. Hence, 
both initiatives can be considered as prefigurative societal examples also in terms of 
the organization and multiple functions of their internal operations. For instance, both 
in the City Plaza and the SSMC the creation of a daily routine of short shifts widens the 
possibilities of participation in ways that are quantitative (numerous activists have the 
possibility of taking part in the internal life of the initiatives) and qualitative (all the activ-
ists, together with the immigrants, make decisions on the everyday practices and the 
future of the initiative). In this way, activists with care duties can also participate equally 
in the initiative. This model challenges a male-dominated structure by “introducing” 
other groups rather than the expected solidarity actors.
The perseverance and the uninterrupted continuity of both initiatives have resulted in 
an extensive international network and a major capital of knowledge. Regarding the 
latter, one can argue that the ongoing everyday experiences of the initiatives have led 
to a better understanding of the social and psychological impact of the societal crisis in 
Greece and of the experiences of war and migration. At the same time, the initiatives 
have also raised public awareness of these issues and their approach promotes active 
involvement so that people can work towards solutions and alternatives. 
In this context, a volunteer working in the secretariat of the SSMC underlines the 
emotional aspects of her everyday experiences and the importance of empathy: “In the 
beginning I realized that the patients I visited, besides their need for medical care and 
medicines, were also in great need of a sympathetic ear.” 
Sokol, a 48-year-old activist-volunteer at the City Plaza adds: I feel good at the end of 
each day that I’m doing something that really helps. I know that I do things every day 
for the people who live here that make a difference. Feeling fulfilled is important to me. 
I can say to my children ‘I’m doing something good with my time.’ I think many people 
working at the City Plaza feel a sense of pride in the home that we have created. 25 
years ago, I was a refugee. Ok, I was not a political refugee. However, I was alone 
when I arrived in Greece, I did not speak the language. I am able to feel what they feel 
in many ways.
Likewise, the editorial group behind the blog “A day in the life of City Plaza”12 notes 
that: The most important idea behind the A Day in the Life at City Plaza project is that it 
presents portraits of human beings with pasts as well as futures. This project supports 
12 https://adayinthelifeatcityplaza.wordpress.com/2017/02/15/this-project-a-call-for-the-future/.
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the idea that people forcibly displaced from their countries through war deserve more 
recognition than being labeled only as ‘refugees’ or ‘victims.’ It is our responsibility to 
humanize the people behind the numbers and the headlines.
In other words, the fulfillment of everyday tasks, including volunteer shift work, produces 
a culture of collaboration based on mutual understanding. Yet what are the challenges to 
organizing a way of common living? 
A Greek female activist at the City Plaza, Olga, tries to answer the question: The basic 
thing is that we live in a world which is becoming more and more individualistic. It is a 
question of political emancipation. For many people, working and living in this collective 
way is out of their comfort zone, to begin with (…). There are many women in particular 
who arrive at City Plaza and have never been part of a meeting where all decisions 
are taken. They have never been involved in a space where they are able to partici-
pate equally in day-to-day life. After a few months, these women have gradually taken 
more and more initiative and responsibility. A self-organized space fights oppression 
and enables empowerment for all involved.
In addition, the organization of everyday life in both initiatives has been a major project. 
For example, the preparation of the three daily meals offered in the City Plaza Hotel is 
a huge operation. As Shero, one of the three chefs cooking in the City Plaza kitchen, 
describes, “(…) there are 400 people living at City Plaza and there are three meals 
daily, so that’s 1200 a day. It is a big operation. We use what we have as best we can.” 
The cooking of a decent meal for 400 people presupposes commitment and collective 
discipline. Shero notes, “In the kitchen everyone is equal. No matter where you’re from 
or which language you speak, in the City Plaza kitchen you are equal; we do everything 
as one team.” 
Whilst the horizontal organization and the collective work that needs to be done every 
day both in the City Plaza and the SSMC challenges racial prejudice and also domi-
nant gender stereotypes in the division of labor, they also serve the communization/
commoning of a very important aspect of everyday life. Regarding the latter, “the use 
of what we have as best we can,” in Shero’s words, reflects a first-degree redistribution 
process which is in operation in the Plaza’s kitchen, one which saves time and reduces 
raw material costs. Cooking in the Plaza is a communizing act, whilst it actually creates 
something common.
Another example of the transformative aspect of the everyday Plaza life experience 
comes from the clothing distribution process. The distribution of clothing happens three 
times a week in the Plaza. The majority of clothing donations comes from the distribu-
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tion center in Elliniko Airport Refugee Camp13, but there is also a smaller quantity of 
donations offered by locals. In parallel, a significant part of the clothing items are often 
sent to other squats or is redistributed in nearby Victoria Square to other immigrants and 
low-income people. 
As Vittoria (Turrin) and Carles (Barcelona), volunteers responsible for the distribution 
of clothing, explain: It is not an easy job to work out how to distribute the clothes and 
organize the space. It is always a challenge. We have to make sure that the first people 
to arrive do not take all the best clothes. We have to keep things fair and accessible. 
After each distribution it feels like we have to reorganize the chaos. 
Both initiatives’ perseverance at building bridges and alliances between social actors 
has succeeded in institutionalizing a large network of antiracist, solidarity initiatives from 
below that has had a great social impact14.
POTENTIAL FOR DE-PATRIARCHALIZATION OF GENDER 
A crucial aspect of the reproduction of daily life in the City Plaza is related to the divi-
sion of labor taking place there. The methodology of the division of labor implemented 
in the City Plaza challenges the patriarchal division of labor, challenging gender stereo-
types and gender roles. Cooking, safeguarding, clothes distribution, cleaning, reception, 
mini-bar are all posts in which Plaza residents and volunteers are involved without any 
discrimination against gender, race, or age.
The same process of the de-patriarchalization of gender relations becomes visible in 
the field of every day work in the City Plaza. A practical rejection of a dominant division 
between the private and the public is key, while the organization of the reproduction 
of life – cooking, cleaning, taking care of children and the elderly – is de-individual-
ized, making it a shared duty, the responsibility of the community. This shift from the 
dominant discourse and praxis on this issue has a strong transformative impact on 
the political culture shared by residents and locals as well as their subjectivities. The 
“ungendered” care labor has contributed to the feminization of the collective culture 
inside the initiative in radical terms.
Jamila, 56 years old, from Syria, and mother of three daughters, is residing in the City 
Plaza. She and her family have been in the squat since the beginning of the initiative. 
Jamila participates very actively in every sector of the place’s internal life. With her 
13 At Elliniko Airport Refugee Camp (one of the official state refugee camps that is about to 
close in the next months), a volunteer clothing distribution center operates daily (https://
firsthandblog.wordpress.com/2016/06/17/clothing-distribution-at-elliniko-airport-camp/).
14 To this day, no less than 1,500 have found a shelter and a home at the City Plaza. Furthermore, the initiative’s 
social impact is reflected in the surprising response of people to the Plaza’s solidarity calls as well as in the 
amount of food, clothing, and other material donations that are received daily.
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experience as a professional cook, she has contributed to the re-organization of the 
kitchen. She regularly takes on a chef role. For the past two months she has been living 
separated from her husband Sami and she recently got a job in a hairdresser business 
two blocks away from the Plaza. Jamila is a role model for her three teenage daughters, 
who are taking language classes and preparing themselves for the continuation of their 
studies once their resident status becomes more permanent15.
This ongoing radicalization of gender relations has become one of the most important 
aspects of the everyday City Plaza experience. Within this context, the community has 
treated a few domestic violence incidents that occurred during the squatting period as a 
collective problem. Thus, the struggle against gender violence is communized in the squat.
Additionally, both the City Plaza and the SSMC have produced new forms of symbolism 
in the field of gender and racial relationships. The SSMC, for instance, has organized 
campaigns criticizing the dominant political discourse on health issues. The case of 
twelve women alleged to be HIV-positive has become the epicenter of a huge campaign 
against racist and sexist ideas in the dominant discourse and in the state’s practices. 
These women were detained by the Greek police, forcibly tested, charged with a felony, 
imprisoned, and publicly exposed in the run-up to the country’s 2012 national elections. 
The SSMC immediately responded to this racist challenge by the former Minister of 
Health16 by initiating a solidarity campaign built on the manifesto: “The twelve women’s 
bodies are our bodies. Struggling against this discourse equals struggling against 
fascism.”
A COUNTEREXAMPLE OF DOING POLITICS
For decades, the leftist movement in Greece has held a great share, and has accumu-
lated a lot of experience, in social struggles, especially in the cities. In this sense, there 
has been an active involvement by left-wing and anarchist activists in all the struggles of 
the most recent period (since 2010), who have drawn on older urban militant traditions 
and expanded them into anti-capitalist issues. The materiality of the crisis’ brutal effects 
that forced people onto the streets has been connected to wider political and class 
issues through the raising of crucial questions such as “what will we do afterwards?” 
This was particularly the case with the Syntagma Square occupation (2011), and it has 
persisted in localized solidarity movements since then. For instance, the focus of the 
antiracist leftist movement (even in the pre-crisis period) has always been directed 
15 Every time a family resolves its residence status, this makes space for another one in need of housing. Moreover, 
it is important to underline the fact that the majority of the families have a long-term uncertain residence status 
because of the asylum policies that are being implemented.
16 The Minister actually claimed that the twelve falsely detained women were “a threat to the Greek family while 
they could transfer diseases through unprotected sex.”
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against the state, the government, and international institutions through its campaigns 
for migrants’ social and political rights, and its parallel activities such as Greek language 
schools or antiracist festivals. Within this context, the Greek social activist community 
could be described as a politically engaged community orientated towards left-wing 
politics. 
At the same time, aspects of the political culture of the traditional left, such as centralism 
and bureaucracy, have been challenged through the emblematic and horizontal expe-
riences of solidarity-in-the-making, open assemblies, or even squatting. Most of the 
collectives raised in the post-Occupy period try to function on the basis of a wide and 
complex social network partially independent of political organizations and to create 
assembly-based forms of organization where the assembly’s decisions are binding and 
have the highest authority (see Petropoulou, 2013).
Therefore, we understand both the City Plaza initiative and the SSMC as urban political 
communities under construction. This processual logic shapes their overall functioning, 
their methodologies, their internal relations as well as those with “external actors” 
(such as state institutions or NGOs), and mainly their decision-making processes. For 
example, squatting is a very demanding process in terms of everyday life and there are 
a lot of practical tasks to be fulfilled regarding both everyday tasks (cooking, cleaning, 
safeguarding etc.) and the future of the initiative (assemblies, campaigns, relations with 
other movements, etc.). In this respect, political debate and discourse often seem to be 
drowning in a “sea” of urgent material needs such as alimentation, first-grade medical 
care, organization of everyday life, etc. Nevertheless, the horizontal structure of deci-
sion-making processes through the initiatives’ political assemblies serves to transform 
the dominant political culture by tackling the reproduction of internal hierarchies. This 
of course does not mean that all male-dominated patterns are completely extinguished 
in the decision-making processes, but they are indeed challenged. Correspondingly, 
democratization is understood and practiced as an ongoing process without necessarily 
an end to it.
Moreover, our analysis of the two case studies shows that the movements raise broader 
structural questions and devise alternative forms of production and reproduction based 
upon their fulfillment of basic collective needs. Alternatives rooted in “solidarity” 
emerge from a praxis that seeks to counteract hegemonic constructions of common 
sense, promotes forms of self-organization, and turns subordinate subjects into political 
subjects. These forms of solidarity action merge different temporalities: from providing 
for immediate social needs, confronting the austerity state, to engaging in long-term 
processes of learning and experimentation. They combine, therefore, social and political 
struggles and are not about anti-politics. They are a counterexample of doing (radical 
anti-systemic) politics.
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This process of constituting a collective subjectivity does not necessarily induce the 
construction of new, unified social bodies. It is rather about new forms of coordination and 
interaction based on common practices and which are in conflict with dominant policies 
(Stavrides, 2011: p. 180). Thus, the connections that are formed are not based on solidarity 
alone, but on concrete common interests, demands, and practices of protest. The notion 
of “community” plays a decisive role in the shaping of these movements. This kind of 
activism, strongly mediated by spatial practices, urban issues, and forms of local organiza-
tion, has led to the development of specific unifying processes. Mutual objectives coalesce 
among residents from different areas of the city, due to the tangible nature of local issues. 
Addressing these common issues draws diverse actors into common interactions, rein-
forcing feelings of trust and emotional solidarity. In turn, this also reduces the feelings of 
individual insecurity about risks and helps people to overcome the problems of collective 
action. Further, solidarity counters facets of escalating social competition, and allows the 
actors to engage in increasingly risky conflicts. Such practice and experimentation thus 
becomes a way for people to acquire the basic skills of political agency and knowledge.
These radical counterexamples also involve elements of a radical internationalism. For 
instance, solidarity networks formed as a practical response to the needs of the immi-
grants’ movement in Greece and Europe have shed light on the necessity of reinforcing the 
international antiracist and migrant social movement. “We live together, we fight together, 
Solidarity will win” is the motto shared by both the SSMC and the City Plaza initiative. Both 
projects have also managed to hold larger political events, demonstrations, and struggles. 
Solidarity Space City Plaza, Athens
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For instance, on March 18, 2017, the one-year anniversary of the signing of the 
EU-Turkey agreement, the City Plaza initiative called for a European Day of Action. 
The call resulted in the activation of a large-scale antiracist and solidarity network in 
Greece and in Europe. In Athens, the initiative led to the biggest antiracist protest of 
the past few years. The picture in cities across the country was similar. Over nineteen 
demonstrations took place in the rest of Greece, on islands and cities, where refugees 
and locals created big events that resonated throughout the country. The Panhellenic 
Network of Antiracist and Migrant Organizations contributed significantly to making this 
a nationwide event. 
At the same time, from Rome to London, from Berlin to the Basque Country, the streets 
were filled with people protesting against racism and austerity. 
As Sandro Mezzadra (2017) notes in an article written within the framework of the 
preparation of the International Day of Action against the EU-Turkey agreement (18M): 
For a moment, soon after the Troika had smashed the resistance of the Greek left 
government, a different Europe – constituted around the principles of freedom, equality, 
and solidarity – seemed again possible due to the push of people fleeing from wars in 
which Europe itself is deeply involved.
This is an important internationalist precedent, not only because it highlighted the fact 
that the issue of refugees is not cut off from other forms of oppression and discipline 
affecting the people, but also because it can serve as a reference point for a systematic 
networking of European social movements. Furthermore, it also constitutes an attempt 
to form a social response to the upsurge of anti-refugee violence, anti-refugee parties, 
and anti-refugee state politics. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
By analyzing two grassroots social solidarity initiatives in an urban context, this paper 
sheds light on a new reality of social, economic, and political processes that is emerging 
in Greece in the post-Occupy (2011) period. The Refugee Accommodation and Solidarity 
Space City Plaza in Athens and the Social Solidarity Medical Center of Thessaloniki are 
two vivid examples of social solidarity from below which initially emerged as practical 
responses to social needs within the ongoing societal crisis. At the same time, they 
have come to stand as counterexamples of doing politics; they foster spaces for political 
struggles and put forward alternatives while trying to make sure the (small but signifi-
cant) transformations they generate will last. 
To this end, we could describe them in terms of what Kaika and Karaliotas (2014) call 
a “bottom-up democratic politics” in an urban space. This is not only practiced as 
horizontal participation, or an open decision-making process, but also as a practical 
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transformation of everyday life. Indeed, these forms of solidarity practice mix different 
temporalities: from providing for immediate social needs, confronting the austerity 
state, to engaging in long-term processes of learning and experimentation, and cultural 
change in urban life. Furthermore, they have also promoted changes in the subjectivities 
of both migrants and of locals working in solidarity, encouraging a shift towards more 
autonomy, more collective solution-seeking, solidarity as a political praxis, and so on.
At the same time, they are also political communities under construction through their 
combining of social and political struggles. They engage with a variety of methodolo-
gies, discourses, and tactics, and in a broader sense try to empower the disempowered 
whilst at the same time aspiring to political change. They question power relations and 
practice democratization as an open-end process. They thereby seek to forge mutual 
support and encourage survival in an ongoing crisis of social reproduction while fostering 
spaces for political struggle.
One of the most interesting elements of the social solidarity initiatives is their unifica-
tion and their transformation into something more than an aggregation of resistances: 
these mobilizations have become highly active in the sense of a new mode of politici-
zation. Amid the rapid disintegration of mainstream political forces, broad sectors of 
society have started looking for new forms of practicing politics, separate from, and 
in certain cases in opposition to, traditional ones. These forms express the need for a 
re-appropriation of politics, a need for collective participation, for the creation of public 
spaces, spaces of social experimentation, of alternative counter-institutions. What is at 
stake here is the need for a “move to the political,” but not in mainstream or institutional 
terms; this is a move to politics outside its traditional forms of exercise, with street 
politics a strong component. This new impulse opens up the possibility to reflect anew 
upon the political beyond, and in contrast with, the focus of conventional politics which 
operates solely in the legal and institutional sphere. This also presupposes a completely 
new type of political practice, rather than a mere intervention into existing mechanisms.
These movements have re-established the feeling amongst ordinary people that they 
can participate in political life and contribute to the exercise of politics in a new way. This 
is a rather revolutionary conception of politics, in which movements function as social 
laboratories, creating space for social interaction, experimentation with new ideas, and 
innovative social norms and codes, through real contact with creative and collective 
processes. Such experiments and structures of popular self-action and inventiveness, 
of collective will, of labor organization, of antifascist-antiracist action, and solidarity have 
the potential to function as constituent forms, and thus as structures of emancipation 
and consciousness transformation, for the people. Such active or hidden networks of 
support may have powerful transforming effects on working people and their social 
relations, empowering them, posing ultimate issues to do with ‘control’, and providing 
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a different route to politicization. In other words, and speaking in Gramscian terms, 
this effort of unification through organizational forms in the sense of ‘unity in diversity’ 
requires creating the roots, here and now, of another way of organizing society, not as 
islets of communism inside capitalism accepting the partial as such, but as the material 
base of change, the articulation of the partial with the whole, the material challenge of 
capitalist hegemony (Gaitanou, 2016: p. 239).
To conclude, the continuation of neoliberal austerity in Greece together with the contin-
uing rise of the “immigrant issue” has resulted (and will continue to result) in a myriad 
of tensions in all aspects of social, economic, and political life; solidarity initiatives, 
working movements, antiracist and antifascist movements, as well as socio-environ-
mental movements continue to emerge. In the huge gap of social (re)production in 
Greece imposed by the neoliberal restructuring policies of the Troika, we have encoun-
tered, throughout the country, communities of struggle that have been formed. These 
communities tend to employ instituent practices and permanent characteristics as a 
way of collectively addressing unmet social needs / desires and ensuring their collective 
survival. We hope that these tensions will continue to lead to social and political move-
ments (in Greece and abroad) that challenge the system that produces the tensions in 
the first place.
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The present text is the result of a collective process of analysis, dialogue, and editing 
based on the second meeting of the Global Working Group Beyond Development in 
the Ecuadorian capital, Quito, and in Nabón County, in Azuay province, in May 2017. It 
represents an effort to understand the historical moment our world is living through, 
its patterns of domination and the tendencies, prospects, and challenges of a multi-
dimensional transformation. Our discussions have been deeply rooted in our localized 
experiences of struggle and alternatives, with their particular histories, strategies, 
advances, and challenges, and in the search for global connections, translations, and 
lessons between our experiences. 
The perspective of the Global Working Group Beyond Development has been the idea 
of multidimensional social transformation, as was explained in the introduction. At the 
very least, the following five key processes of social change are required to strengthen 




> the dismantling of patriarchy; 
> the transformation of predatory relations with Nature. 
The group shares the conviction that radical change, understood as a transformation 
originating from the roots of our society, economy, and politics, is imperative if we wish 
to put a halt to the current socio-ecological destruction wreaked by our civilization in 
crisis. Several members of the group felt that spirituality and cosmovision1 are another 
crucial dimension of this transformation.
Our discussions were informed by five case studies on the construction of multidimensional 
alternatives in different regions of the world: the self-determination of the local people of 
the village of Mendha Lekha in Maharashtra, India; the community resistance against oil 
extractivism and the closely associated post-colonial State in the Niger Delta in Nigeria; the 
current building of an alternative municipalism in Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain; the building of 
radical solidarity alternatives in the midst of the economic crisis in Greece; and the process 
of the Bolivarian revolution, later labeled as “21st-Century Socialism,” in Venezuela. 
A crucial element that facilitated and enriched dialogue was the Global Group’s visit to 
the municipality of Nabón, which was aimed at learning from the experience of building 
1 Cosmovision is our way of seeing and being in the world according to indigenous communities and movements. 
The word is used to distinguish the indigenous consciousness of the unity of all living things from the modern 
consciousness that separates Nature and humanity, the present from the past and future, and the individual from 
the community.
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Sumak Kawsay or Buen Vivir2. In Nabón, this indigenous vision has been translated 
into a mode of local governance practiced by communities and associations with the 
support of the local government, which was led over four successive terms of govern-
ment by two female mayors from the indigenous and intercultural Pachakutik political 
movement, as is described in chapter on Nabón. 
Our discussions were inspired by multiple global debates and emancipatory perspectives, 
such as those associated with eco-feminism, the commons, socio-ecological change, post-
extractivism, the rights of Nature, degrowth, transition thinking, and others. Often these 
debates have been more effective in showing the directions in which social change needs 
to go than in providing the practical strategies of transformation. At the same time, our 
group integrates researchers, popular educators, and activists who are deeply engaged 
with processes related to social movements and the politics of transformation, and who 
deal with the very concrete and practical challenges of social change on a daily basis. 
Our main objective for the Ecuador meeting was the analysis of practices of multidimen-
sional social transformation. We engaged with questions such as: What strategies do we 
need? How can we do this in ways that do not remain marginal, but spread throughout 
our societies? How do we engage with the dilemma of the urgency of stopping acceler-
ated socio-ecological destruction versus the usual slowness of deep cultural change? 
How can we ensure that transformation takes place in democratic, emancipatory ways? 
And what kind of institutions can sustain these processes of change?
Of course, these are big questions considering not only the complexity of contemporary 
societies, but also the particular character of our group, made up of people from so 
many different realities with their own particularities. 
We focused on four central questions which will constitute the central parts of this article:
> How to democratize democracy or deepen democracy in the context of the growing 
diversion of democratic tools for the benefit of political and economic elites, taking 
into account the authoritarian practices of previous emancipatory projects?
> How does multidimensional transformation deal with the State? Or what is the role 
of the State in such a transformation? 
> How to make use of or handle the legacy of the left? What does the left need to 
rethink or transform in order to deepen its emancipatory potential?
> What kind of internationalist relations and solidarities are necessary for multidimen-
sional transformation?
2 Sumak Kawsay (in Kichwa) and Buen Vivir (in Spanish) translate as “living well” in English. The concept refers to 
the possibility of living with dignity, prosperity, and in harmony with all living creatures, and is very much based on 
indigenous spirituality and communitarian practices.
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As was analyzed in the introductory chapter, these questions relate to a particular histor-
ical moment of profound changes and new challenges. The paradox of our historical 
moment might be that radical transformation is imperative and urgent, but at the same 
time it seems further away than in recent decades. All of this means that we need to be 
mindful of two different temporalities: short-term actions and campaigns that can put 
an end to socio-ecological destruction now, and long-term strategies for building deep-
rooted alternatives that secure our collective future. We could also state this in terms 
of the defensive struggles that protect rights, institutions, bodies, and territories from 
predatory capitalism, and the offensive struggles that create other worlds through new 
subjectivities, social relations, modes of production, and institutions. 
One of the lessons of the past historical cycle might be that politics as we know it is 
not enough for the kind of transformation the world needs; neither has armed struggle 
proved to be a path in the right direction. At the same time, most of the political lega-
cies, instruments, and analytical horizons of the global left also seem to be insufficient 
for meeting the contemporary challenges as they were developed to overcome a very 
different form of capitalism in the 19th and 20th centuries. We have seen that the variety 
of organizational structures and practices that were used and developed in social move-
ments throughout the long 20th century have reached their limits over the last two 
decades. New ways of doing politics are being invented in processes of mobilization 
around the world, but they lack a shared political horizon and instruments for structural 
articulation. 
Global Working Group Beyond Development during the fieldtrip in Nabón, May 2017
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Prior to outlining the four sections on each of these issues we have dedicated a section 
to the particularities and embeddedness of our dialogues, and the ways in which we 
relate to colonial legacies and presents, as well as to patriarchy and gender. 
After the four thematic sections, we will try to wrap up our ideas on the implications of 
these debates for political strategy. 
We decided to produce a collective text that reflects our conversation, and we have 
therefore not included references and citations for the concrete members of our group 
in the text, nor have we included extensive bibliographical references. We are very 
aware there are many differences between our perspectives and thoughts, based on 
theoretical or political differences, but also regarding the concrete necessities of the 
contexts in which we are living. However, we feel the dialogue between our differ-
ences enriched all of us, and produced new knowledge and thinking that goes beyond 
our individual positions. In a sense, this final document is like a tapestry in which the 
words and feelings of all of us have been woven together. We have tried to represent 
our discrepancies faithfully and to open up debates and new questions because we feel 
that the right questions are as important as relative certainties. 
PRELIMINARY NOTES ON DIALOGUE, 
HISTORY, AND COLONIAL DIFFERENCE
In our meeting, we intended to develop a global discussion rooted in personal and 
collective localized histories and experiences. “The global” and “the local” are not sepa-
rate spheres, but co-constitutive dimensions of realities around the world. Our world is 
shaped by place-based actors and actions in complex, interdependent, and continuous 
ways. For example, the resistance of farmer, campesino3, or indigenous communities 
to mega-mining operations can affect global stock markets and bilateral governmental 
negotiations. At the same time, the rise of global prices of minerals due to the boom 
in the Chinese construction sector can intensify the strategies of mining companies for 
advancing their projects even when they are resisted. 
The global is present in the local, and vice-versa. Therefore, in our meeting we tried to 
understand ongoing global processes as they are constituted in concrete places around 
the world. We also tried to understand why similar political phenomena, like the emer-
gence of new social movements highly critical of traditional politics and representative 
democracy, are taking place in very different societies at the same time. 
Therefore the challenges of our discussions have been simultaneously methodological, 
political, and theoretical. 
3 Campesino is the Spanish word for peasant but goes beyond this meaning as it includes 
a differentiated social and cultural identity within Latin American contexts.
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Throughout this experiment we have agreed to think and learn together as a group 
through the exchange of our experiences, but also through the recognition of our differ-
ences, in order to: 
> deepen and clarify debates on and analysis of concepts, criteria, political contexts in 
relation to alternatives beyond the development imperative; 
> contribute to the strengthening of strategies of emancipatory resistance and the 
building of alternatives; 
> strengthen articulations, weave alliances, and build support networks for future 
actions; 
> and to create ways of communicating our ideas and debates within and beyond 
academia.
Our analyses are informed by our personal histories, locations, and trajectories of 
struggle, transformation, experiences of pain, joy, victories, and injustices. They are also 
embedded in very different historical experiences, societies, and movements, which 
produce diverse semantics and significations. Although we all share a commitment to 
similar political perspectives, and participate in the politics of social movements, we 
are not the same in terms of sociocultural background, education, political identities, 
spiritual beliefs, and geographical belongings. Therefore, in our discussions we often 
included information on our class, territorial, and political belongings and becoming in 
order to make our situated knowledges explicit. 
This rootedness allowed us to talk from positions of complexity and diversity while 
on the other hand it also implied challenges in terms of dialogue. We saw that words 
like crisis, identity, the State, the left, solidarity, Nature, alternatives and many others 
turned out to mean very different things in different contexts. Although, of course, 
we never intended to find universal or univocal meanings, we did strive towards the 
identification of connections and equivalences that allow shared political horizons and 
comprehension of how global patterns of domination are at the same time connected 
and specific in each geo-historical context. Our discussion therefore required us to both 
find translations between languages, as well as to recognize the differences between 
ourselves. Several of these will be analyzed further in the text, but at least three are so 
fundamental that they should be made explicit right from the start.
Firstly, our group could easily be seen as homogeneous in ideological or political terms, 
but this would be a false conclusion. Although leftist political identities and histories are 
present in many of us, we recognized that not all of us come from the left, nor do all of 
us see the left as our principal political identity. Some identify with Gandhian political 
thought or orientations, and others in our group would see themselves primarily in social 
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movement terms, as part of indigenous, feminist, or environmentalist struggles. This 
diagnostic allowed us to understand that our group identity and debates go beyond the 
left, engaging with a far broader horizon of emancipatory traditions. Much more on this 
will be discussed in the section on the left. 
Secondly, as we come from different parts of the world, we come from very different 
historical conversations and embeddedness. We need to take history into account, in a 
complex and differentiated way. In particular, our debates and situated knowledges are 
deeply influenced by colonial difference4 that has deeply marked our bodies, territories, 
societies, States, and knowledges, affecting in very different ways colonized and colo-
nizing peoples and societies. 
Although this is still rarely acknowledged in the Global North, colonial difference has 
shaped power structures within and between our societies, as well as economic 
processes and networks, with deep implications that still exist today. Africa was distrib-
uted to the colonial powers in a way that guaranteed their access to lakes and rivers, 
determining reality until today. African, Asian, and South American cities and rural areas 
were connected to allow the exportation of agricultural products, minerals, and precious 
metals to Europe in specific ways still present today. And European societies integrated 
colonized peoples within their societies as second-class citizens for their own economic 
gain, naturalizing racist practices. The coloniality of knowledge privileged western, 
modern, and academic knowledge over other forms of knowledge rooted in indigenous, 
afro-descendant, peasant, female, and popular experiences. 
As we sought the political and practical effectiveness of ideas and perspectives over 
academic sophistication, we had to avoid the academic shut-down of certain discus-
sions, and ensure a connection with concrete experiences and movements. But it also 
required us to see what words would be relevant for what contexts, or what words 
could allow translation between these. For example, the word crisis has a very different 
conceptual meaning in different cultures; it is sometimes seen as a threat, sometimes 
as an opportunity for change. But it also refers to very different historical experiences. 
For indigenous Guatemalans and African-Americans in the United States, it is not so 
obvious that the current crisis significantly differs from their longer historical experi-
ences. It was remarked that for them, life has always been a crisis, with the implication 
that the current crisis could be seen more as a crisis for the dominant groups in their 
societies. 
4 The notion of colonial difference states that the division between colonizers and colonized peoples, who were 
seen as inferior beings, has been institutionalized and naturalized as a fundamental divide that persists in our 
societies, distinguishing the people who are seen and treated as subjects with rights from the people who are 
treated as objects of domination and exploitation, and consequently do not enjoy real citizenship, until today. 
This notion has been worked on in Africa, Asia, and South America in discussions on Subaltern Studies, Post- 
and De-coloniality. 
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In a similar way, the language of alternatives – understood as post-capitalist institutions 
and practices – might make invisible other practices that have always existed and still 
sustain the lives of millions of peoples around the globe today, such as, for example, the 
practices of indigenous peoples. Many contemporary alternative practices related to the 
commons reflect, reconstruct, or restore modes of living that existed before contempo-
rary forms of domination. In other cases, alternatives are to be found in the contemporary 
practices of peoples in the Global South deeply rooted in their ancestral history and current 
livelihoods, but denigrated as primitive, backward, underdeveloped, or poor.
Finally, knowledge and dialogue are also gendered and embodied. All people regardless 
of their gender have participated in differentiated ways in knowledge production, and 
their ways of knowing and perspectives have received very unequal attention and value 
in our societies. Simultaneously, knowledge is always embodied: we know through our 
bodies and their ways of being part of society. So women will produce other perspec-
tives and emancipatory knowledges than men, whilst among women themselves, the 
experiences of indigenous, dalith5, and black women will again produce other mean-
ings. In our own group, we identified one silence that should be addressed in the future: 
the perspectives of LGTBQ people and struggles were not explicitly incorporated into 
the Group’s discussion.
All of this means that our dialogues and discussions did not take place in a homoge-
neous space and community, as is never the case. The choice of words or elaboration 
of lists and categories always reflects a certain geopolitics of knowledge that we need 
to take into account in our interactions. For example, western language, terminology, 
and theory remains hegemonic in many of the analyses of global processes, whilst at 
the same time Europe and Latin America may be predominant in the global debates on 
alternatives and social movements. Therefore we need to reach out and open up the 
debate to other geographies of emancipation in Africa, North America, and Asia – as the 
Global Group explicitly tries to do. 
We also need a critical awareness of the implications of the choice of our words. For 
example, the modern, liberal, and western grammars of democracy and human rights 
can be seen as weak grammars for self-determination and dignity. They certainly are 
useful and even very necessary in some contexts, but limited in others. It is necessary 
to cross cultural boundaries and subvert or transform colonial difference, both in terms 
of language and political theory, and by not always taking modern and Western concepts 
and analytical tools as points of departure for our discussions. For example, we could 
easily start from the indigenous concept of reciprocity, instead of the modern concept of 
solidarity, to talk about walking together and alliances between struggles and peoples. 
5 Socially marginalized caste in India, literally meaning the oppressed.
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Thirdly, we need to see words through their historical embeddedness, reconstructing the 
long-term conversations of which they are part. For example, many of the issues that are on 
the table today were talked about a century ago by DuBois in the conference on pan-Afri-
canism, or in historical debates within the pluralities of the left. Finally, a crucial methodological 
question is whether all of this complexity can be processed only through spoken language. 
Some of us stated that dialogues with other languages, through our bodies, emotions, artistic 
expressions, and spirituality, are crucial for our mutual understanding, for breaking through the 
limits of our rational analysis, and the strengthening of our relations. In a sense, this happened 
through the field visit and shared days in Quito and Nabón.
Most definitely, it is precisely all of this complexity that enriched our discussions, and 
allowed us to get a real grip on the processes evolving in our shared world. 
DEMOCRATIZING DEMOCRACY
The first central theme of our collective discussion was the notion of democracy. 
Contemporary liberal democracies have become distorted and weakened due to the 
extreme concentration of wealth and mediatic and political power in national and global 
elites, the emergence of right-wing populism, the corporate capture of the State and 
the intensification of the state-led criminalization of dissidence. This has produced soci-
eties that are merely democratic in form, but increasingly authoritarian and elitist in 
substance. As experiences of social change have, for the most part, also bred authori-
tarian regimes – in the Soviet Bloc or more recently with progressive governments in 
South America – the question of democracy becomes fundamental.
LESSONS ON DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
We understand democracy in its original sense of self-governance, of people deciding 
their individual and collective futures. Consequently, democracy is not a state of govern-
ment, but a continuous and multidimensional process that seeks to democratize unequal 
power relations through political action, enhancing liberties, justice, and the capacity for 
individual and collective self-determination. As such, the building of a just and demo-
cratic society depends on the transformation of all – mutually embedded – systems of 
domination through the interrelated processes of the dismantling of patriarchy, decolo-
nization, anti-racism, anti-capitalism, and the transformation of predatory relations with 
Nature. Our case studies showed the diverse and complex faces of these democratiza-
tions, far beyond liberal conceptions of democracy.
A first logic of democratization is the transformation of existing institutions and their 
powerful tendencies towards bureaucratization and their reproduction of the inequali-
ties present in society. In the Ecuadorian county of Nabón, the means of formal liberal 
local democracy have been stretched and reinterpreted in a participatory and communi-
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tarian way, through participatory budgeting and dialogues between the municipality and 
indigenous communities and productive cooperatives. The municipalism of Barcelona 
en comú seeks to open and strengthen spaces for self-determination beyond repre-
sentative democracy and the division of public and private spheres, thereby enhancing 
the capacity of society to control the reproduction of life. 
In both cases, local municipal politics are reclaiming power in relation to the central 
State through the intensification of popular participation, organization, and mobilization. 
Evidently, this has created tensions, for example in Nabón, regarding mining projects 
supported by the national government versus the protection of highland ecosystems 
and forests promoted by the municipality.
Other case studies also show that democratization can happen beyond the exclusive realm 
of the State, through the building of other collective proceedings or institutions to resolve 
the problems communities and peoples face. In Greece, practices of collective control over 
the reproduction of life emerged precisely where the democratically chosen government 
failed to live up to its promises and people started to organize themselves around the needs 
of local communities in areas like health care and support for refugees. In Mendha-Lekha, 
drawing on the generation of independent and shared knowledge in numerous study 
groups on issues that affect the community, genuinely local decision-making processes 
were implemented in order to recapture power from the State. The village adapted the 
temporalities of change to the needs of the process, as the villagers believe that the quality 
and strength of decisions can only be guaranteed through consensus, based upon equal 
opportunities for participation and the collective generation of knowledge. 
Thirdly, and importantly, democratization also requires profound changes in established 
political cultures around the world. These changes address patriarchal, colonial, clientelist, 
and verticalist biases which are deeply inscribed not only in existing institutions, but also 
in the ways many people currently understand and imagine politics. A good example is 
the notion of the feminization of politics in Barcelona, which goes far beyond just having 
a female mayor or the equal representation of women in all institutional bodies. Instead, it 
proposes the building of a new political ethics/practice/process which breaks with classic 
power patterns, promoting relations of care, diversity, and consensus-building over those 
patterns of confrontation, competition, and masculinist power. 
Democratization is also about the (re)distribution of control over the means of (re)produc-
tion – for example the redistribution of the access to land and seeds, in order to make food 
sovereignty possible on different scales. Here, the case studies show that there are very 
different ways to redistribute that have significant consequences for the democratizing 
or emancipatory effects they produce. While Venezuela’s rentist and extractivist model 
has produced a form of redistribution, it is centered on the executive power of the central 
State, which has led to a strong concentration of power and manifold dependencies. 
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On the contrary, the experiences of Nabón or Mendha-Lekha show that, on a smaller scale, 
and if operated from below, redistribution can also happen in ways that, by contrast, dissem-
inate power and contribute to individual and collective emancipation. The question of scale, 
and how different regulations shape the relations between local and higher scales, giving 
or taking away competences or budgets, is crucial and should be directly addressed by our 
struggles. For now, whilst there are positive examples of democracy on smaller scales, their 
translation into higher levels of coordination, like the national level, is unsatisfactory.
CONDITIONS FOR DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION
All of these paths of democratization depend on dynamic relations between political 
institutions and organized society. Democracy is always a net result of people appropri-
ating decision-making from below in the context of social struggles, which creates new 
spaces and practices for deliberation and political renovation. New institutions arise, but 
soon become sclerotic and infected by power struggles and vested interests. Democ-
racy thus requires a constant and conscious process of appropriation from below in 
order to remain dynamic and profound. Drafted institutions may look excellent on the 
sketch board, but will only remain democratic if they can be constantly re-invented.
In the case of the Spanish State, the last wave of democratization started with the 
occupation of the squares (the 15M movement) that questioned the “old regime” and 
practices of representative democracy. This was a constitutive moment, in which people 
in the streets and the squares started doing politics in a different way, creating horizontal 
places for decision-making around the country. Barcelona en comú is a movement which 
attempts to translate this grass roots democracy into the spaces of institutional politics 
by “seizing the institutions,” further explained in the chapter on Barcelona. Now in power, 
the municipalist movement seeks to implement strategies to promote a new ecosystem 
of movements and institutional experiments – a new institutional structure – which at the 
same time would preserve the autonomous agenda of the movement. 
In Mendha-Lekha, democratization started from people’s understanding that their 
weakness within the Indian State was the consequence of the delegation of their 
decision-making and power to higher levels and the more distant State through their 
representatives. So their first struggle was to re-appropriate direct decision-making and 
establish systems for the generation of knowledge. On the other hand, in Venezuela it 
was precisely the increasing control exercised by the governing party over communitarian 
and social movement practices that limited the emancipatory potential of the process.
Thus, democracy is not primarily a question of institutions, formalities, and elections, 
but a self-determined historical process of the construction and renovation of the best 
conditions for the people to decide over their own futures, based on dynamic relations 
between society and formal institutions. 
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SOME PRECONDITIONS FOR REAL DEMOCRACY: 
> Democracy should be understood as an on-going process of democratization within 
our communities, movements, societies, and States, instead of as a series of tech-
nical instruments or mechanisms that can be implemented;
> Democracy as self-governance has to encompass all aspects of life, including issues 
of gender, care, production, consumption, distribution, reproduction, and economic 
organization;
> Democracy starts from the recognition of the fundamental right to participate in 
decision-making about the issues that affect and concern us, which implies the right 
to actively take part in informal or formal, institutional or legal spaces far beyond the 
very limited act of voting;
> Democracy also requires the recognition and inclusion of different kinds of knowl-
edge beyond the western/scientific canon, as well as access to sufficient knowledge, 
skills, and information in order to be able to make complex and informed decisions;
> Democracy needs the creation of meaningful forums, mechanisms, and 
processes for deliberation and decision-making, including referendums, consul-
tations, citizens assemblies, but also more creative forms like sortation6 and the 
use of digital forums and media, where this is possible, in an inclusive way. The 
precise forms and practices of democracy will be embedded in local histories, 
cultures, and practices, and will therefore be profoundly plural and in many socie-
ties plurinational; 
6 Sortation is a lottery for a political post.
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> The recognition of political rights, the access to information and capacities, and 
the actual functioning of meaningful democratic forums and processes depend 
on people’s individual and collective political self-awareness for these conditions 
actively realized by its subjects. Since in many societies the institutions that should 
contribute to the building of political awareness and democratic culture (the media, 
educational systems, and political parties) tend to promote depoliticization, popular 
education, alternative communication, and communitarian practices are crucial alter-
natives to formal political education; 
> It is imperative that the State does not have the power to institutionalize certain 
forms of “permissible” participation and delegitimize others, but that the realm of 
deliberation is a lively space which is constantly in motion, and determined by the 
people themselves and their organizations;
> Another important condition is the maturity and wisdom of democratic processes, 
which implies that majorities do not simply impose their decisions on minorities, 
but understand that weaker positions are an important contribution and should have 
greater access to decision-making; 
> Finally, in the face of the ecological crisis, we want a democracy that embraces 
all forms of life, including the different beings and forms of existence commonly 
referred to as Nature. Some of us use the term earth democracy to describe the 
democracy we are looking for, in which the rights, voices, and roles of all beings 
must be considered in the decisions on our collective future.
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Some of us think that bottom-up democracy, and the building of confederationalist alli-
ances between spaces of self-governance, might have the biggest democratic potential, 
constructing new spaces of decision-making which are not centered on the structure of 
the Nation-State. At the same time, others insist that the struggle for democracy must 
also be fought within existing national and global structures, as urgent issues like the 
ecological crisis need to be dealt with on these higher levels. 
Diverse political communities are crucial for imagining alternative democracies. These 
not only include the evident indigenous and farmer communities, but also urban 
communities, productive associations, even communities in virtual/digital spaces. We 
are aware that communities should not be idealized, and are themselves spaces for 
political constructions of justice, dignity, and democracy. Consequently, overcoming 
oppressive practices and discourses (for example: in terms of patriarchy) implies the 
building of democratic culture within those communities, the empowerment and organi-
zation of minority subjects, and dialogues between different political communities about 
broader political processes. For example, when the people of Mendha assessed their 
weaknesses, they not only included their powerlessness before the Nation-State, but 
also weaknesses created by gender inequity within their village society, and the former 
could not be addressed successfully without addressing the latter.
It is clear that such a perspective on democracy goes beyond the liberal notions of 
democracy that have been hegemonic since World War II. In the short term, in the face 
of the current right-wing populist offensive it might be necessary to also use and defend 
the grammars and institutions of democracy and human rights in liberal terms, although 
in the long term, these will need to be expanded or radicalized by other perspectives on 
self-determination and dignity. 
One of the remaining crucial challenges ahead has to do with the institutional forms of 
these radical democracies: How do they work beyond local communitarian spaces? How 
can the consistent weakening of transformative local spaces through actions taken at higher 
levels be avoided? Is it even necessary to go beyond a certain level and how can this be 
thought about in ways that maybe transcend the local/national/global logic? How can these 
democracies be sustained? These questions lead us to reflect about the role of the State.
REFOUNDING AND OVERCOMING THE STATE
The State has always been the main object of political theory, where it has been 
analyzed both as a problem and as a solution. The “conquest” of the State has been 
– and remains for many – the recurring slogan of leftist movements, which postulates 
that through the control of the State, dominant relations of power and (re)production can 
be transformed. In revolutionary times, rather than being abolished, the State has been 
reimagined, redesigned, and refocused – with rather contradictory results. What is the 
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State today? To what extent can or should the State have a central role in processes of 
emancipation? In which way do we need to revolutionize institutions themselves? Can 
we imagine a State that guarantees the common good, or is the best State the one that 
illuminates its own dissolution?
The State was one of the most controversial subjects of our group discussion, with 
positions ranging from anti-statism (see below) to arguments in favor of rebuilding a 
functioning Welfare State. So, in this section we try to shed light on the shades between 
these two poles. We all would agree that all currently existing State configurations – be 
they more presidentialist, more parliamentarian, post-colonial or not, post-socialist or 
not, etc. – are rather limited in their transformative potential, at least at the national 
level. At the same time, it is also true that emancipatory social movements have often 
found allies in staterun bodies and individuals within the State who have supported their 
struggles. We therefore need to be more precise in our assessment of its emancipatory 
or anti-emancipatory potential. 
ASSESSING THE EMANCIPATORY POTENTIAL OF THE 
STATE: SOME EXAMPLES
A serious evaluation of the emancipatory potential of the State should start by recog-
nizing that the State is a complex landscape of interrelated institutions (local, provincial, 
or departmental and national-level, executive, legislative and judicial, authorities, public 
health and education systems, state-owned companies, and other state-bodies). It 
interacts with society in many ways: the State as provider, as regulator, as mediator, as 
expression of certain interests and power relations, as repressor, etc. The State should 
therefore be understood as an articulation of different bodies, methods, discourses, 
roles, and persons, on different geographical scales. However, one of the main objec-
tives and functions of the State is ensuring stable conditions for capital accumulation, 
building new equilibria in the face of new situations and new challenges to corporate 
power and interests.
Although the State currently tends to be more a part of the problem than of the solution, 
certain specific historical constellations show its potential for contributing to positive 
change as well, particularly when it comes to defensive struggles that aim to stop 
ecological or social destruction. In Peru, Colombia, and Argentina, local governments 
participated in the organization of referenda on mining that made the popular rejection 
of mining projects in their territories evident, and strengthened grassroots struggles. 
The experiences of Nabón and Barcelona show the possibility of social transformation 
through, in, and of the State itself, through participatory politics and commoning experi-
ences on a local level. More than 200 cities around the world have taken back municipal 
control over public services, as a result of concrete struggles and campaigns against 
privatization by social movements. 
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On a national level, feminist and LGTBQ movements have advanced the recognition of 
sexual and reproductive rights, particularly in Europe and Latin America, by combining 
popular mobilization, legal strategies, and political participation. And affirmative action 
policies have opened up education and government services to those otherwise 
excluded on the basis of class, race/ethnicity, or gender. 
In Germany, a strong movement against nuclear power catalyzed the creation of the 
Green Party, which went on to participate in coalition governments. New alliances 
between parliamentarians, the ongoing social protest movement, and alternative-
energy start-ups, which combined resistance, legislation on renewable energies, 
and experimentation at the practical, technological, and local levels, converged into a 
majoritarian cultural awareness of the need for a different energy paradigm. In the end, 
this cultural shift generated new effects on public policies and the economic model, 
which led to 30 percent of the energy produced in Germany today being renewable.
We also have seen how constitutional processes, for example in Ecuador and Bolivia, but 
also in South Africa and Tunisia, allowed the incorporation of new rights, like the rights of 
Nature, into national legal and political spheres. In Colombia, the Constitutional Court has 
been extremely important in defending human rights and democracy in a country torn 
apart by civil war and subject to increased political control by paramilitaries. Among its 
important decisions was the annulment of the so-called Strategic Mining Areas in twenty 
departments in the country, and the recognition of the right of local governments to 
reject mining projects by means of referenda, even if these are supported by the national 
government. Finally, the recent recognition of the rights of rivers in India, New Zealand, 
and Colombia seems to open new possibilities for their protection.
On the international level, the ILO Convention 1697 and the UN Declaration on Indigenous 
Rights provided indigenous peoples with new arguments for the defense of their territories 
and cultures. New juridical figures can offer interesting opportunities for emancipatory poli-
tics, although their concrete implementation can be difficult and problematic, and advances 
in the law are often undone by the initiatives of political adversaries afterwards. 
These examples show that state-owned entities and local governments can support 
grassroots innovation and significant efforts aimed at sustainability, the deepening 
of democracy, and the realization of human rights. However, these examples tend to 
reflect isolated advances in terms of specific rights or policies for determined groups, 
and not integral processes of the social transformation of all of society. Therefore, the 
evaluation of the cycle of progressive governments in Latin America allows a deeper 
understanding of the potentials and limitations of the State as an agent of social change. 
7 The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 is an International Labour Organization Convention, also 
known as ILO-convention 169, or C169. It is the major binding international convention concerning indigenous 
peoples, and a forerunner of the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
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After approximately two decades of intense social movement mobilizations in a series 
of Latin American countries, first against dictatorships and later against neoliberal poli-
cies, political forces of the left finally acceded to government at the beginning of the 21st 
century. A unique opportunity had emerged in which a whole world region could choose 
an alternative path for regional integration and a relative decoupling from neoliberal 
globalization, led by progressive governments and backed by strong social movements.
These governments have been quite effective in marking their distance from neolib-
eral macroeconomics, re-instituting the State’s regulatory power, and building a new 
regional discourse centered on sovereignty against US influence, while at the same time 
deepening economic relations and dependencies with China. They have implemented 
a certain redistribution of the extractivist rent through a series of social programs that 
have diminished statistical poverty significantly. In some cases, they have improved 
health and education policies by extending the outreach of those public services and 
giving them better infrastructure. 
On the other hand, economic, productive, and wealth structures have remained 
largely untouched, with the richest getting richer while the poorest became a little 
less poor. At the same time, consumer culture and modernization have expanded and 
left their imprints on subjectivities that until that moment had not been completely 
shaped by capitalist imaginaries. This peculiar model of transformation seems to 
have relied on a cycle of high commodity prices, and is currently being reversed in 
many dimensions. 
At the same time, Nation-State structures and logics have proven largely resilient to 
transformation, as the most emancipatory goals of introducing plurinationality and 
dismantling patriarchy in the State have not gone beyond rhetoric. Instead of deepening 
democracy, most countries experienced a concentration of power in the executive and 
a backlash regarding autonomous social organization.
Buen vivir, as a new guiding principle which seeks to re-integrate production with repro-
duction and human society with Nature, has been re-signified by State institutions, 
transforming their development plans and indicators into a term synonymous with 
“development.” But most importantly for the debate to which we seek to contribute 
in this section, the new governments understood the State as having a central role 
to play in transformative processes. Instead of opening up the existing institutions to 
plurinationality and wide participation, they increasingly fell into authoritarianism and 
criminalization, seeing a threat in social movements, NGOs, and organized society as 
autonomous forces, and creating their own parallel loyal organizations in order to under-
mine their representativity. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE POLITICS IN THE SHORT TERM
The examples we discussed in our meeting suggest that the State can play an impor-
tant role in affirmative political action and in limiting socio-ecological destruction in 
the short term. In general, this can only happen if active and strong grassroots actors 
push State agencies or even individual representatives to bear their responsibility for 
enforcing human rights in practice – as changes within the State always reflect changes 
in power relations within society. It is only after popular mobilization, the development 
of proposals for change, and strategic litigation that different parts of the State begin to 
act, often in contradiction with other State actors. 
Particularly at the local level, as the Nabón and Barcelona experiences show, wider 
margins for emancipatory politics seem to exist, due to the direct relations of grass-
roots organizations with local governments, and the possibilities for them to exert 
pressure on and participate in local politics. However, this emancipatory potential 
requires the transformation of the institutions themselves, with their inherent logics 
and procedures, to be a consistent part of the strategy of change. But again, the 
limits of transformation at the local level are also shaped by national and transnational 
dynamics.
The transformation reached by state-led progressisms in Latin America remained way 
below the expectations of the protagonists of the previous cycle of social struggles, and 
it is even often described as a mere modernization and re-legitimization of capitalism, 
which, during the neoliberal cycle, had reached an impasse in the region. Many of us 
agree that this reflects the structural limits and problems of the neokeynesian left, but 
also of the populist right, both of which gained terrain with an aggressive discourse 
against the consequences of neoliberal globalization, but ended up implementing insuf-
ficient policy responses that seek to empower traditional State structures without 
fundamentally changing its relation with capitalist markets.
The modern State has been a principal agent of “development,” creating megaprojects 
within infrastructure, industries, and resource extraction, and in recent years this has 
happened all the same under socialist, progressive as well as under neoliberal regimes 
worldwide. The intensification of the grip of extractivism on many countries especially 
in the Global South, but in recent times also in the semi-peripheries of the Global North, 
leads to a particular kind of low-intensity democracy. The control and distribution of the 
share of the rent that governments can retain leads to strongly centralized State configu-
rations prone to corruption. At the same time extractivism promotes mass consumption 
as compensation for other kinds of needs. 
National governments around the world are under elite control, which enables corpo-
rate power and increasingly creates configurations where the State shares or concedes 
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sovereignty to private companies, like special economic zones and economic corridors. 
In the contemporary global economy, States are competing for investment sites in 
global economic value chains, and more and more decisions regarding our societies 
are made by extra-territorial actors, including other States, corporations, or multilateral 
bodies. The German or US governments might have more influence on other countries 
than the people of these countries have themselves, as could be clearly seen in Greece 
in 2015.8 Consequently, in particular the post-colonial States in the Global South – as 
well as some in the North – remain strong in terms of supporting repression and backing 
the economic interests of national elites, but weak in terms of channeling the interests, 
demands, and agendas of the people, or of opening spaces for self-determination. 
So, we should see the modern liberal Nation-State as a particular historical construct, 
configured by capitalism and colonialism, as well as by social struggles. Many of its 
flaws are a consequence of the fact that the State was built upon (or within) the capitalist 
system, and is founded upon this mode of production. At the same time, contemporary 
social rights were institutionalized on the basis of social conquests, and participatory 
and affirmative politics were the result of social struggles. 
For the last few decades the State has been going through a process of transformation 
as a result of a neoliberal restructuring which seeks to undo the gains of social struggles 
that have been institutionalized in previous decades, as well as its growing internation-
alization in the face of global challenges. One of our short-term goals in dealing with the 
State is to deprivatize power and decommodify the State, promote transparency, fight 
corruption, and strengthen citizen surveillance of the State and corporate actions. 
Another central problem with the State is its use of force and violence. Increasingly, 
State and parastatal actors are involved in the imposition of extractive projects on indig-
enous and peasant territories. In countries like Peru, the police can be contracted by 
mining companies to organize their security, whilst in India the military is increasingly 
involved in enforcing extractivism. Around the world, the police also reinforces existing 
practices of discrimination and exclusion, as we can see in the ethnic profiling and police 
violence in the United States particularly against people of African descent, or in the 
8 After the government debt crisis (also known as the Greek Depression) faced by Greece in the aftermath of 
the financial crisis of 2007-08, the country required bailout loans in 2010, 2012, and 2015 from the International 
Monetary Fund, the Eurogroup, and the European Central Bank. The Eurogroup, led by Germany, demanded 
extreme austerity measures that prioritized meeting loan payments over effective measures to dynamize the 
economy, with grave consequences for social security in Greek society. This austerity program was firstly imposed 
by the government of the social democratic party PASOK in 2010 and continued by a coalition government 
between PASOK, a right-wing party (ND), and center-left party (DIMAR) in 2012-2015. In January 2015, five 
years after the first bailout program, SYRIZA, a coalition of the radical left in Greece, took power and formed 
a coalition government with ANEL (a center-right party) by promising a sustainable plan for managing the debt 
crisis and overcoming austerity. However, in the end, and despite mass opposition expressed by the people in 
the referendum of July 2015, the government struck a new loan agreement in July/August 2015 that perpetuated 
previous austerity packages, promoting privatization schemes for public land and infrastructure; wage cuts; 
divestment of the pension system; and a deepening of external, EU supervision of all State policies. 
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extremely violent wars on drugs in the Philippines, Mexico, and Colombia that particu-
larly affect poor people and populations of color, and especially women and children. 
So, another crucial issue in the short term has to do with the demilitarization of our 
States, and with the deprivatization of their security apparatus. 
Finally, there is an urgent need for reflection about what we mean by “social inclusion,” 
as most state-led social programs of monetary assistance create dependency and pater-
nalism, and encourage participation in capitalist markets and consumption instead of 
strengthening autonomy and alternatives modes of living. Due to their abandonment and 
discrimination by the State, in the past many indigenous peoples, tribal and dalith commu-
nities, people of African origins, and other marginalized groups have maintained their 
solidarity and autonomous capacity for organizing daily life in the face of many threats. 
This capacity of the excluded to resist adverse conditions should be recognized as a 
great strength that also contains many seeds for transformation, as their very exclusion 
from dominant logics has opened up spaces for different logics of (re)production at the 
margins. Therefore, we should not frame them as needy, poor, and without skills, but 
find ways to strengthen those groups at the margins within their own sociocultural and 
spiritual logics, without exposing them to market forces or making them dependent on 
paternalistic State subsidies.
THE WELFARE STATE
One of the most intense debates of our meeting concerned the relevance of the Welfare 
State as a horizon of transformation and the possibilities for radically democratic policies 
in the context of the crisis of the Welfare State.
In this regard the Greek experience shows an important dilemma. Many of the promoters 
of autonomous spaces in Greece insist that they do not intend to replace the State. 
Whilst they want to assure social rights through their autonomous initiatives on health 
care, housing, and other services, in response to the State’s neoliberal withdrawal, at 
the same time, these efforts demand that the Greek State assume its responsibilities 
for ensuring social inclusion and as a guarantor of rights. 
Of course, other autonomous and anarchist perspectives are also present within the 
Greek experience, but the crucial question posed here also found echoes in other reali-
ties like the United States or France. To what extent can our movements and struggles 
resolve the concrete daily problems of people who cannot do this themselves in a 
sustainable way? Is it realistic to think of a communitarian prefigurative politics of care 
that would sustain society as a whole? It was noted that we cannot expect people to 
engage in endless struggle and conflict, as we also want to defend their right to leisure 
and enjoyment of life. While mainly people from countries of the North expressed their 
doubts about whether such a strategy really could involve popular sectors, or would 
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end up instead as initiatives that mainly benefit the middle class, in southern countries 
which have never experienced an integral Welfare State, the commoning of certain 
aspects of care was often driven by the popular sectors themselves, simply out of need.
We found it necessary to historicize the current reality of Welfare States in Europe. 
Across most of the continent, these were not simply initiated by the State, but built up 
from below through welfare initiatives, social struggle, and collective negotiations by 
trade unions and the civil society. It was, again, these prefigurative policies that were 
later institutionalized by the State. Some members of our group, mostly from countries 
where Welfare States have existed, argue that as the Welfare State is the result of a 
people’s conquest of their rights, it should be defended.
The opposite perspective present in the meeting was one critical of the Welfare State 
as a relevant political project for several reasons. According to this view, one problem 
is that transformative actors often limit their own autonomous politics to small experi-
ments because they are waiting for the State to take over, in the context of the “illusion 
of the Welfare State.” The imaginary of the Welfare State locates the responsibility 
for solving citizens’ problems within the State. But welfare programs orchestrated 
by the State usually implement national modern standards which homogenize all 
cultural differences and define needs from above, mostly prioritizing access to money, 
goods, and services. This not only makes invisible other relational or cultural needs, 
which communitarian welfare could easily address. It also turns State welfare into a 
way of dispossessing people of their diverse and contextualized abilities, capacities, 
knowledges, and practices of self-determination. State welfare often weakens local 
resistances and movements as it creates dependencies and deepens clientelism. From 
this perspective, the Welfare State can be seen more as an instrument for the salvation 
of capitalism in crisis than as a horizon of transformation.
Also, the idea of the Welfare State as a political ideal reinforces the idealization of Europe 
as the result of the path towards “development” and progress, which all peoples and 
societies should follow. A more precise historical analysis shows that the Welfare State 
has been a historical exception in geographical and chronological terms, which applied 
only for a few decades to a very small part of the world. Its possibility depended on 
the historical international division of labor and Nature, through which the necessary 
resources were transferred to the North. It is this historical exception that spread across 
the whole world (post-colonial societies) through the promise of “development.” 
Finally, the viability of the Welfare State was called into question in our debates. The 
geopolitical conditions that allowed its creation have changed dramatically over the last 
decades. 
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The Welfare State was possible due to:
> the massive transfer of wealth from the South to populations in the North; 
> the abundance of very cheap energy; 
> a predatory relationship with Nature focused on continuous growth, in an era in 
which there seemed to be no limits to its exploitation; 
> the fact that, as long as “the others” were elsewhere (the colonized people stayed 
in their own countries, the claim of universalized rights was possible, as it concerned 
only a few privileged people. Both globalization and massive migration have changed 
this situation, as many “others” are now demanding to be included as well; and finally,
> the challenge of Soviet-bloc socialism and the experience of war made social reform 
necessary in capitalist countries, in order to undercut the fierce social struggles for 
radical change in their own countries. 
According to this reasoning, the Welfare State is no longer even possible in Europe, so 
we should seek out other paths for securing social rights in both the Global South and 
North that lead in the direction of commoning them, while asking of the State only to 
ensure favorable conditions for this. 
The dialogue between these two positions on the Welfare State allowed the emergence 
of other perspectives. In general, it was agreed that in the short term, local contexts 
will vary, and will require diverse State operations and attitudes that might resemble 
social welfare policies against poverty and inequality. However, radical reformist State 
politics implies both the enforcement of social rights for its citizens, and the promotion 
of autonomy and participation. New ways of organizing are necessary, and the perspec-
tive of the commons opens up a window in this direction. 
In the short term, of course, the State will be the main institutionalizing mechanism, 
but in the long term we do need other, more flexible and diverse ways to institutionalize 
the commons which guarantee elements of welfare as an alternative to the centralizing, 
rigid, bureaucratic, homogenizing, and paternalistic State. So the question we need to 
answer is: what would our institutionalized commons look like? And how could the 
localized commons that are emerging throughout the world coordinate and connect to 
address complex issues like energy sovereignty on inter-local or other levels?
Also, in the context of financialization and automatization, new debates beyond the 
Welfare State emerge. Crucial questions are: how do we share available employment 
opportunities since there will be less formal paid work available? How do we value – 
both in terms of financial retribution, as well as recognition of its crucial importance 
– necessary work in all its forms, including care work, subsistence work, and commu-
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nity work? And how do we distribute wealth in all its dimensions? How do we even 
understand wealth beyond its material dimensions? It is necessary to go beyond the 
historical relationship between wages, rights, and participation. Some of us regard the 
idea of a basic income as an alternative worth discussing, as it recognizes autonomously 
productive and caring subjects who are not linked to wages. This, however, is an open 
debate for the future as it could also be coopted for capitalist interests. And it has to be 
assessed from a critical North/South perspective, as most experiments in this respect 
have taken place in the North. 
IMAGINING OTHER INSTITUTIONS, ARTICULATIONS, 
AND AUTHORITIES: PREFIGURATIVE POLITICS, 
POLYCENTRICITY, AND PLURINATIONALITY
There are fundamental ambivalences in how processes of multidimensional transfor-
mation relate to the State. The subjects of social change experience State power as 
expropriating, repressive, promoting new enclosures and processes of privatization, but 
at the same time, they are less vulnerable to corporate power if the State regulates 
and intervenes in their favour. We have seen how in the short term the State can be 
helpful in defending rights and limiting socio-ecological destruction, and how the neces-
sity and urgency of globally coordinated answers to the ecological crisis cannot wait 
for new political institutions to emerge. However, as a group we would agree that in 
the long term a deep transformation of State institutions will be necessary to address 
the challenges the world is facing. We therefore discussed how political action against 
socio-ecological destruction in the short term can be combined with strategies aimed 
at transforming State institutions along the way.
Considering the potentials and differentiated realities of the State for social transforma-
tion, but also the difficulties and failures of state-led transformation in the past, we 
propose to demystify the centrality of the State for multidimensional transformation, 
a basic attitude that some of us call anti-Statism. This does not mean that we reject 
the incorporation of the State into transformatory strategies, but we do reject the idea 
that it would be the most important actor of change. We also reject the centralizing, 
homogenizing, and bureaucratizing tendencies present in state-centred politics and the 
concentration of power in all its forms (men over women, human beings over Nature, 
but also State over society). A critical attitude towards State mystification also rejects 
the securitization, militarization, and criminalization of dissidence, and should open hori-
zons of political imagination beyond existing forms of governance and authority that 
have been severely infringed in contemporary political history and in certain strands of 
left-wing ideology.
Moving beyond state-centred politics creates visibility and support for thousands of 
alternatives around the world, relating to issues such as health, education, food produc-
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tion, and consumption. The term “institution” should therefore not be understood 
only in terms of State politics. Throughout history, institutions have also been created 
from below, by the people, to resolve problems with and challenges to their existence. 
Popular kitchens were founded to fight hunger throughout Latin America and Europe; 
women’s organizations have created numerous modes of mutual care, support, and 
protection around the globe; indigenous communities around the world now manage 
common goods like forests or water through ancestral rules and procedures; and auton-
omous councils have been established to organize popular neighbourhoods in order to 
guarantee access to water in urban contexts or to bring security and social protection in 
many global metropoles. 
So our discussion also considers the rules and procedures people and social movements 
create themselves, for example, when governing a commons. This form of institu-
tionality, in opposition to the one which is part of the State, is often much more fluid 
and can adapt to local circumstances, cultural practices, and problems on the basis of 
collective agreements. The process of Mendha Lekha village, for example, shows such 
oral-based, non-rigid institutionality. At the same time, it is also necessary to see that 
State institutions themselves are not given and permanent, but in a constant process of 
readjustment which precisely reflects social struggles and the influence of autonomous 
institutions from below. The case of Nabón shows that the transition between both can 
be continuous. 
Global Working Group at a meeting with indigenous leader Juana Morocho, Nabón, Ecuador
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These prefigurative practices open a window towards a society that does not depend on 
the modern Nation-State to resolve its problems and issues, and allows us to imagine 
a bottom-up strategy for social change. Still, we face the huge challenge of imagining 
a kind of institutionality that is able to provide the necessary social coordination and is 
not as useful to existing power relations and capital accumulation as the modern liberal 
Nation-State. One important perspective for the transformation of the existing Nation-
State remains plurinationality. We saw that in spite of the difficulties and structural 
contradictions it encountered in Latin America, plurinationality evokes a prospect of 
change which is relevant to the whole post-colonial world. 
The struggles of the Ogoni and Ijaw communities against corporate power and 
corruption demonstrated that social transformation would only be possible through a 
constituent process which rewrites the rules of engagement between the different 
peoples of Nigeria and the State, on the basis of the self-determination of the people. 
In spite of the pluriculturality of most of our societies, in most cases the State is organ-
ized as a monocultural Nation-State based on the institutions and political practices of 
one dominant culture, producing colonial subjects and destroying autonomous cultural 
practices. Plurinationality is an idea that allows us to challenge and subvert the colonial 
matrix of power. 
Two countries have confronted the issue of the Nation-State in Latin America 
(Bolivia and Ecuador). In both cases, monocultural States had been imposed on 
pluricultural societies through a particular political system that colonized society. 
The rules, mechanisms, and subjects of participation were defined in colonial 
terms. After two decades of intense indigenous mobilization, the constitutional 
processes in Bolivia and Ecuador decreed the subversion of this colonial monocul-
tural State through moves toward the construction of a plurinational State where 
pre-existing communitarian and participatory democracy, but also plural justice, 
education, and health systems, would be recognized and coexist with representa-
tive democracy and its institutions. This was a big challenge, because the limits of 
the State itself were not questioned. Geopolitics did not allow the experiment to 
go any further than this. 
The practical efforts of transformation have not been successful – in Ecuador the 
modernization project of the Citizen Revolution led to the strengthening of the western-
shaped Nation-State, whilst in Bolivia, a huge network of clientelism absorbed much 
of the existing social tissue and bound it to the central government and ruling party. 
However, it is also true that the recognition of plurinationality opened up local spaces 
for politics in another way, as we saw in Nabón, and similar processes exist in other 
places like Cotacachi in Ecuador or Charagua Iyambae in Bolivia. These processes 
consist of continuous experimentation and creativity, and face fundamental tensions 
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with the national economy and government, but they maintain an aspiration towards 
the realization of plurinationality. 
Another crucial question has to do with scales and the articulation of local alter-
natives: how can we make local experiences of alternatives more influential in 
broader society? Can they end up replacing hegemonic economic and political prac-
tices by linking up with each other? In India, within social movements the phrase 
“scaling out” is used as an alternative to the western and corporate “scaling up,” 
evoking the Gandhian idea of oceanic circles.9 This implies that similar and simulta-
neous processes seek to spread horizontally and create links, which in turn creates 
better opportunities for effecting change on higher and more structural levels. The 
same idea resonates in Kurdish democratic confederationalism, and in the political 
perspectives of the Zapatistas.
Such a perspective could redraw State organization in the long term, opposing notions 
of polycentricity to both centralized Nation-States and the more (post-)modern tenden-
cies towards the decentralization of the State. Even the decentralized State is pyramidal 
and has a top that coordinates and concentrates power, and regional and local instances 
which respond to the national government. Polycentricity works from a local level, clus-
tering different local experiences of alternatives, involving horizontal dissemination and 
weaving. 
In contemporary urbanized, technicized, and globalized societies, local alternatives 
require capital to strengthen their economies and inclusiveness; information and tech-
nology for sustainability and communication; exchange and alternative markets for their 
products and for responding to their needs. But why should this be done by the State? 
Through polycentricity, this could be done in a more horizontal, communal way that 
reinforces resilience and relative self-sufficiency, but also creates relations of solidarity, 
mutual exchange, and markets in a more just and localized way. But how can this be 
powerful enough to bring about at least a partial decoupling from broader economic 
processes? How can the appetites of transnational corporations, which increasingly rely 
on private security or paramilitary forces to secure their grip on territories, whilst at the 
same time implementing sophisticated strategies for the co-optation of communities, 
be resisted?
9 The oceanic circle describes Gandhi’s vision of social organization. Gandhi believed that for a non-violent society 
to achieve lasting peace, it must be organized in a decentralized way. In Gandhi’s words: “Independence must 
begin at the bottom. Thus, every village will be a republic or panchayat having full powers. It follows, therefore, 
that every village has to be self-sustained and capable of managing its affairs even to the extent of defending 
itself against the whole world. (...) In this structure composed of innumerable villages, there will be ever-
widening, never-ascending circles. Life will not be a pyramid with the apex sustained by the bottom. But it will 
be an oceanic circle whose centre will be the individual always ready to perish for the village, the latter ready to 
perish for the circle of villages, till at last the whole becomes one life composed of individuals, never aggressive 
in their arrogance, but ever humble, sharing the majesty of the oceanic circle of which they are integral units.” 
http://mettacenter.org/definitions/gloss-concepts/oceanic-circle/.
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These bottom-up processes of restructuring society and weaving new relations will 
inevitably question existing boundaries imposed by the state-building process. In India, 
there is an example of the retaking of power over a river basin10; in other societies, 
eco-regions based on shared eco-systems, histories, and cultures have also been the 
basis of political organization, subverting artificial political borders within and between 
countries. This prompts us to look more closely at biocultural governance systems and 
practices. It might not be about “taking” the Nation-State as currently formulated, but 
about giving it less importance in our processes as a first step, widening spaces of 
autonomy and self-determination, and in a second step transforming it de facto from 
below, once the balance of power has shifted on the ground. 
Within our group, diverse positions co-existed on how to combine these short- and 
long-term strategies aimed at the State, as well as on the probability and difficulties 
relating to the construction of a truly alternative way of organizing society. However, we 
did agree that this should be one of the central debates for the reinvention of left-wing 
politics, as we will see in the next section.
10 See: http://edepot.wur.nl/95014.
Members of the Global Working Group during the internal meeting in Puembo, Ecuador
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REINVENTING THE LEFT
All previous discussions present questions on political subjects and actors. What kind 
of agency can be at the basis of multidimensional transformation? What political actors 
can reconfigure the liberal modern State? And what political subjects can articulate the 
commons? 
Historically, left-wing political organizing played a central role in connecting struggles 
and providing them with shared utopian horizons. However, its role in emancipa-
tory politics has grown increasingly ambivalent, due to its difficulties in overcoming 
state- and class-centered, productivist, and “economicist” politics and vanguardist 
practices. At the same time, the global left remains the principal reference point 
for the organization and action against capitalism in the world, so that its refounda-
tion on new grounds seems necessary for multidimensional transformation. We 
therefore wanted to assess and discuss the role of the left(s) in global emancipatory 
politics.
WHAT’S LEFT?
We had started our meeting by acknowledging that any discussion on emancipatory 
politics should go beyond the left, as emancipations and revolutions have been realized 
by a plurality of actors, of which many are not necessarily part of the organized left. 
At the same time, our discussions revealed that in the social processes in which we 
have participated, in general there has been some kind of presence of left-wing organ-
izing and discourse, and all of us have maintained relationships with left-wing politics 
throughout our lives and engagements, so that the “othering” of the left(s) would be 
problematic as well. 
Secondly, we saw that there are many different contexts in which the left emerged 
in many parts of the globe. In Greece, the whole spectrum of emancipatory poli-
tics – including social movements – is related in one way or another (theoretical, 
by tradition/heritage, or for practical reasons) to left-wing political organizations. 
In India, a deep divide exists between social movements which tend to have 
Gandhian orientations, the “political left” that mostly acts through party and insti-
tutionalized politics, and the Maoists who still engage in armed struggle. In Spain, 
the left has become outflanked by the waves of the “indignados” who have raised 
the question of whether left-wing discourses, organizational practices, and polit-
ical instruments are still able to represent what was called the struggle against the 
“political caste.” 
The analysis of multiple local processes allows us to understand how the left is 
being reinvented in concrete places and histories throughout the world. Roughly, 
a divide can be identified between those parts of the left still very much rooted in 
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classical Marxist thinking, with its focus on class analysis, anti-imperialism, and 
the male wage labor subject at its center, and those more deeply influenced by 
critiques of capitalism’s race, gender, and Nature relations, and are consequently 
supportive of indigenous, black, environmentalist, and feminist struggles. This 
division between a traditional and new (post-1968) left has been analyzed exten-
sively in academia, and should not be regarded as absolute. New left formations, 
of course, tend to take into account class analysis and imperialism, whilst the 
traditional left has also been influenced by feminism and indigenous struggles. 
On the other hand, the debate on the situation in Venezuela in 2017 – particularly 
within the Latin American left – shows how real and deeply polarizing this divisive 
line can become.11 
A plural understanding of “the left” is also necessary for overcoming historical 
reductionism, which understands the left only through its contemporary hegemonic 
currents. Leninist and Maoist lefts are dominant in many societies, particularly in 
Latin America, Europe, and Asia. However, both political history and theory of the 
left are far more heterogeneous than these currents. For example, the anarchist left 
was very influential in the decades before and after 1900, but was finally defeated 
in its efforts to build alternative societies. The left all over the world was inspired 
by the perspectives of Antonio Gramsci and Rosa Luxemburg, who were in many 
senses critical of hegemonic Leninist thought, and many parts of the non-Western 
left were inspired by interpretations of Marxist thought according to local realities 
(like José Carlos Mariátegui and the dependence theorists in Latin America or Frantz 
Fanon and Amílcar Cabral in Africa). 
These subalternized traditions have been far more aware of the challenges posed by 
contemporary social movements to the institutionalized left around gender, culture and 
ethnicity, power and development. And they were far closer to the political perspectives 
of autonomy, self-determination, and the commons that have gained terrain in eman-
cipatory politics in recent decades. Therefore it is imperative to recuperate the plural 
history of the left, and to recognize that there is such a thing as a broad “left culture” 
that inspires critical grassroots political action and discourse around the globe, beyond 
left-wing political parties. This left culture can be far more appealing than the politics 
based on narrow and rigid left-wing identities and political parties and other organiza-
tions.
Taking these refinements into account, the first crucial question would be whether 
the left/right divide is still relevant in the contemporary world. We would say that 
this divide remains useful in different contexts and issues, particularly in relation to 
11 This dossier composed by TNI and CLACSO gives a clear insight into the different leftist perspectives 
on the crisis in Venezuela: https://www.tni.org/files/publication-downloads/venezuela-en1.pdf.
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inequality, social rights, imperial geopolitics, and the assessment of the impact of 
capitalism. However, many of us would state that on other issues, left versus right 
is not the fundamental dividing category, and can even create divisions and difficul-
ties for concrete struggles. Although this might vary according to different realities, 
on environmental issues, indigenous rights, gender justice, and engagement with 
democracy, leftist currents can adopt very conservative positions. 
AN ASSESSMENT OF THE LEFT
Throughout its history, the left has created different ways of doing politics, both within 
institutions and through its huge influence on social movements, struggles for inde-
pendence, and local processes of self-determination, with both positive and negative 
results. 
Without left-wing discourses and organizations pushing for democracy and social 
justice, the world would be far worse off, as numerous examples of left-wing 
contributions to emancipation show. Cooperativism, participatory budgeting, and 
worker-ownership were created from below as alternative modes of production or 
decision-making. Popular education and communication provided peoples around 
the world with instruments and information that allowed them to shape or influence 
their futures. 
Global Working Group, conversation with Nabón’s mayor Magali Quezada 
and representatives of local authorities, May 2017
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The conquest of social rights by people in Europe and North America allowed the 
construction of the Welfare State; the support of the emancipation of indigenous 
peoples in Latin America contributed to victories in the form of land reforms and 
new constitutions; and the participation in liberation movements in Africa and Asia 
contributed to former colonial States’ independence from the imperial powers. 
Nowadays, we can identify multiple crises of the left. Left-wing parties have moderated 
their discourses and programs significantly, whilst their militancy and even electoral 
support have decreased over the last decades (although of course in specific electoral 
conjunctures, the opposite of this general tendency can occur). Some of us argued 
that most currents of the left are fighting capitalism on its own battlefield, for example 
when social change is narrowly framed around money and the redistribution of material 
wealth – making other values and dimensions of the symbolic and material reproduction 
of life invisible. Or when the lefts emulate capitalist tactics and strategies, like charis-
matic unipersonal leadership, or media and electoral politics, and in doing so prioritize 
recognition by the political establishment over radical politics from below. 
The different elements of the organized left have had difficulties connecting with 
emerging political cultures and processes related to autonomy, horizontalism, and self-
organization, a struggle which led directly to the massive protests at specific historical 
moments around the globe in recent years. And finally, as seen before, other polit-
ical groups, including right-wing conservatives, have co-opted parts of the “natural” 
left-wing agenda, electorate, and, in some cases, even parts of its utopian outlook or 
language of change. 
Of course, it is true that left-wing organizations and emancipatory processes have been 
undermined, repressed, criminalized, and attacked by national elites and international 
agendas, and that active campaigns to discredit left-wing culture, language, and organi-
zations have taken place – often effectively – around the world. However, this historical 
crisis of the lefts is also very much the result of their own historical and contemporary 
limitations and contradictions, present of course in different intensities and variations 
within the plurality of processes. 
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ELEMENTS OF THE CRISIS OF THE LEFT: 
> Political theory and utopian outlook   
The left has often failed to truly incorporate all dimensions of domination in their 
critique of society and political strategies, maintaining their original agenda based 
on class and anti-imperialist struggle. As such, it has failed to challenge the deeper 
patterns of western capitalist civilization, which is founded on patriarchy, colonialism, 
racism, and predatory relations with Nature. Simultaneously, a state-centric and 
developmentalist utopian horizon has maintained hegemony in a large part of leftist 
discourse, creating a preference for electoral politics and a positive attitude towards 
economic growth and the over-exploitation of Nature for the sake of economic redis-
tribution. This failure to challenge the epistemological framework established by 
capitalist modernity, for example the binary division between Nature and culture, or 
the reliance on modern science and technology, has limited the scope of the left’s 
utopia severely. 
> Other dimensions of politics  
Consequently, the left has had difficulties in understanding and incorporating other 
dimensions of knowledge, struggle, and politics, like religion and spirituality, culture 
and identity, emotions, the dimension of subjective or personal change, as well as 
joy and celebration. It is precisely these elements that have been crucial to many of 
the youth, indigenous, women, LGTBQ, and other struggles around the world;
> Alliances and social movements  
The left has often maintained instrumental relations with social movements. Instead 
of supporting grassroots struggles and incorporating their demands and proposals 
into a left-wing agenda, they have tried to direct these struggles towards the “real” 
political agenda for change. Such vanguardist practices have slowed down the 
incorporation of environmentalist, indigenous, and feminist struggles in the left’s 
agendas, and these issues usually still remain secondary to issues of economic 
justice;
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> Political culture  
Within the left, ideology and “ideological identity politics” centered on having the 
“right political conscience” (e.g. Trotskyist, Maoist, etc.) remain an overwhelming 
and divisive reality which often absorbs existing social energies for the effective 
transformation of sociocultural reality. There is a tradition in the left in which differ-
ences are inflated on the inside, whilst from the outside the lefts are seen as a 
homogeneous but conflictive bloc. Ideological conflicts are mixed with a culture of 
power disputes, which both favor fragmentation and division, as well as an intoler-
ance towards plurality, dissidence, or genuinely open debate; 
> Learning  
Particularly over recent decades the left has had great difficulty in learning from 
its own practices, as well as from other struggles. Their focus on the capture of 
the State, either through military organizations or through elections, has inspired 
a vanguardist, vertical political culture which tends to give pre-fabricated answers 
instead of asking new questions. This has resulted in huge problems in terms of 
learning and innovation;
> Governing for radical reform  
The left has often succeeded in bringing about social transformation and radical 
reform more effectively while in opposition than in government. A series of historical 
experiences in different parts of the world has shown that once the left acceded to 
government, the desire to be accepted politically as a serious option, as well as the 
underestimation of the intrinsic logics and dynamics of State institutions, led to the 
postponement of more radical change. In other cases, the left was prepared to win 
elections, but not to govern. The most successful experiences of left-wing govern-
ments usually took place at a local level.
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REFOUNDATIONS IN PRACTICE
The crisis of the lefts has led to different processes relating to the reinvention of eman-
cipatory politics, within and beyond the left. The Spanish case allows an interesting 
illustration of this point. 
The mobilizations of 15M didn’t only reject the government and its neoliberal policies, 
but also questioned the traditional left and its collaboration with neoliberal reform. To 
many people on the street, leftist culture seemed alienating, and new movements were 
seen as more attractive because of their horizontalism, their practices of direct democ-
racy, and their dynamism. The municipalism of Barcelona en Comú and other projects 
emerged as an attempt to take this energy to the arena of institutionalized and electoral 
politics (which has proved difficult). At the same time, left-wing experiences, organiza-
tions, and cadres have played crucial roles in these new processes of mobilization, and 
in the (re-)invention of the strategy to “seize the institutions” in cities like Barcelona, 
since many people originated from different left-wing processes. On a national level, 
Podemos also sought to talk to the people beyond the languages and spaces of the left, 
in a different vocabulary, following the example of the Latin American populist move-
ments in Venezuela, Ecuador, and Argentina.
We discussed the advantages and threats of this “post-ideology frame” as a basis for 
the refoundation of emancipatory politics. On the one hand, both grassroots move-
ments (like the Indignados or Occupy) and new institutional politics (Barcelona en 
Comú or Podemos) were capable of creating new languages, identities, and political 
movements that appealed to bigger proportions of the population than the historical 
base of the left. They questioned both the concentration of wealth and power in the 
one percent, but also reject traditional left-wing politics and representative democ-
racy, engaging new people who were skeptical of the role of left-wing parties in 
emancipatory politics.
At the same time, these “leftist” or progressive populisms, like Podemos in Spain, 
Kirchnerismo in Argentina, or the “citizen’s revolution” led by Correa in Ecuador, 
resonate with right-wing populisms, such as that of Trump in the US, Duterte in 
the Philippines, Modi in India, or Wilders in the Netherlands. Both kinds of populist 
discourses share certain anti-emancipatory characteristics, in terms of the issues 
and feelings of discontent they mobilize, the personalism present in their political 
strategy, and in the lack of answers to the underlying structural processes that made 
them emerge: communities being torn down by capitalist restructruring, rising indi-
vidualism and consumerism as dominant cultural practices, as well as the deep 
transformations in democratic deliberation which are caused by the massive use of 
social media. 
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Both types of populist formations are successful in mobilizing crowds, but this is 
insufficient for effecting the changes the world needs. Significant multidimensional 
transformation requires the construction of counterpower capable of implementing 
change, as is more proper to the left-wing strategy of the building of cadres, organiza-
tions, and movements with a shared utopian vision. In many parts around the world, 
the left remains the only force that really seeks to confront capitalism and its disastrous 
effects in a continuous and strategic way, but to be really effective it has to do so differ-
ently, and open up to the multiplicity of struggles taking place. 
IS THERE A FUTURE LEFT? 
Our discussion on the left is part of the bigger discussion on what political subjects 
correspond to the theories of change we have been presenting. What kind of political 
actors or relations can implement differentiated strategies for the short and long term, 
work in and outside of institutions, connect alternatives with resistances, and act on 
local, national, and global levels? Evidently, our discussion does not lead us to one new 
privileged, homogeneous, and unique political subject as its representation or vanguard, 
in the way that the working class male was for the left.
Instead, we see multiple and heterogeneous political subjects, capable of connecting 
different struggles with each other and acting in different scenarios at the same 
time. We frame these subjects as eco-systems of different types of actors who 
share emancipatory horizons. Within such eco-systems of change, the presence of 
a powerful organized and renovated left is important, as it acts as a bulwark against 
right-wing economics and policies, and against the “machines of social and ecolog-
ical destruction” in the short term, and might contribute to deeper transformations 
in the long term. This is especially true if we go beyond the discredited left-wing 
political parties, giving credit to the presence of a plural and broad leftist culture 
and values that inspire grassroots organizations and struggles in the contemporary 
world. 
We have also seen that the left is being reinvented in many places simultaneously, 
based on local histories and situated conditions. Broadly, these refoundations require 
the recuperation of the left’s own plural histories, and also its engagement in critical 
dialogue, learning processes, and constructive alliances with indigenous, feminist, 
Gandhian, and other emancipatory movements that have often maintained differences 
with the left. 
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SOME ELEMENTS FOR THE REINVENTION OF THE LEFTS INCLUDE:
> Political culture – A rupture inside the left is necessary in terms of political culture, as 
emergent movements merge with other political practices. Authoritarianism, vertical 
political practices, and masculinist (and sometimes even militarist) political culture 
should be transformed and overcome. Diversity, decentralization (or polycentricity), 
rotation, horizontalism, and the feminization of politics should be part of the renovation 
of political culture. Indigenous political practices based on assembly-logics, comple-
mentarity, reciprocity, relationality, and correspondence can be a good inspiration;
> Alliances and social movements – The left-wing principles and central ideas 
of profound social change itself, solidarity, equality, and others, remain crucial in 
the current context, and are an adequate base for participating in and relating with 
emergent emancipatory struggles and movements. The support for concrete local 
or thematic struggles, beyond the left / right divide, can allow a reconnection with 
new movements and agendas. Yet the participation in these movements should not 
be motivated by a conviction that we already know all the answers based on some 
narrow ideologically determined toolkit, as often has been the case, but by the will to 
learn and discover new paths together;
> Political theory and utopianism – Marx’s theories are still very relevant as a tool 
for the analysis of some dimensions of contemporary capitalism. They have been – 
and continue to be – updated and complemented by other kinds of cultural analysis, 
political ecology, feminist critical theory, anti-racism, and decoloniality. Non-Marxist 
progressive theories are relevant as well and have positively influenced struggles. We 
need to overcome Eurocentric thinking and polarizing theories and practices that rein-
force a Cartesian and binary world view (humanity vs. Nature, man vs. woman, friend 
vs. enemy, self vs. other). A multidimensional perspective on transformation requires 
a far more complex theory of change than the state-centered strategic perspective 
that remains hegemonic in a large part of the left. Cultural change, the building of self-
determination, and knowledge about processes for extending the commons should 
be crucial elements of a refounded left-wing political theory.
> Learning – The left needs to reengage with its own histories to learn from them, and 
recuperate the diverse lefts among different cultures through the building of historical 
balances within different countries or regions. For those of us who identify as left, we 
need to learn from both our own experience and from other struggles. This requires 
learning from complexity and from the contradictions in our struggles (instead of 
seeking to eliminate or do away with those contradictions). It also means patience and 
the commitment to long-term struggles, as the changes we seek are complex and 
need time. 
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These processes that are part of the refoundation of the left also present dilemmas. 
Although we see the necessity of intercultural dialogue regarding the grammars of 
social transformation, we discussed to what extent concepts and discourses from 
outside of a certain cultural space can be useful for emancipatory politics within this 
space. Can the idea of Buen Vivir – which is actively promoted as a South American 
source of inspiration for European movements nowadays – be relevant for the refounda-
tion of the European left? But also: to what extent can European concepts serve as the 
foundation of a new left in the Global South, or become the basis for a global dialogue 
on emancipatory politics? 
In a general sense, we would say that the recuperation of the plural and local histories 
of the left, but also the recognition of social struggles beyond the left, are crucial 
elements for the strengthening of a plural emancipatory politics. Secondly, we would 
say that intercultural dialogue can enrich our political grammars and strategies. For 
example, a dialogue between theories, notions, and practices of the commons in 
different places of the world and indigenous community thinking seems relevant. Of 
course, we should not seek to blindly apply any external recipe, but we do need to 
learn from the advancements of other cultures and movements, through the creative 
appropriation and translation of external concepts into our own contexts. Finally, it is 
also imperative to decolonize the global debate on emancipation and social transfor-
mation, as it still is principally held in European and modern languages and through 
European conceptual frameworks. It is worthwhile analyzing the world, and devel-
oping agendas and utopian perspectives, through the lenses and grammars offered 
by non-western struggles.
GLOBAL SOLIDARITY AND RECIPROCITY
Finally, responding to the purpose of a global working group, our debates addressed 
the need for a rethinking of the concepts and traditions of solidarity and internation-
alism. Solidarity and internationalist relations have been central to leftist thinking and 
action throughout history, as class struggle was an internationalist endeavor. Solidarity 
between workers’ and independence movements have been fundamental for emanci-
patory politics, while at the same time solidarity was conditioned during the 20th century 
by the complex geopolitical alignment logic of the Cold War. The historiography of soli-
darity – at least what is understood under this term – is as Eurocentric as the dominant 
history of the left itself, and the geopolitics of solidarian relationships have drawn a map 
in which Europe and Latin America are overrepresented, with few exceptions, such as 
the Middle East, Southern Africa or Vietnam in the late 1960s/1970s.
In the age of globalization, political and economic processes are becoming more inter-
dependent and global than ever before, whilst the ecological crisis implies a global 
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threat to humankind as a whole. Thus, multidimensional transformation and strategies 
for social change also need to be more global than ever before. While the colonial inter-
national division of labor and Nature is still at work, the terms Global North and Global 
South are obviously a simplification. The imperial mode of living has already spread from 
the classic capitalist centers to the elites and middle classes of the so-called emerging 
economies and many so-called developing countries as well. On the other hand, social 
exclusion, poverty, and even the effects of extractivism are also present in countries 
of the Global North. Examples of this include fracking, or mountain-top removal in the 
United States. We basically use these terms (Global North and Global South) to describe 
the gap opened up by colonial difference. 
Within this context, at the beginning of the new millennium, the World Social Forum 
(WSF) and its slogan “Another world is possible” emerged as a unique space for 
solidarity and networking between different struggles and geographies, contributing 
enormously to the building of shared perspectives on change for at least one generation 
of activists and social movements. By becoming an open space for self-organization and 
the convergence of all struggles, the WSF also questioned traditional internationalist 
practices, which were often shaped by hierarchical organizations and class-centered 
politics. Over the last few years, however, the WSF has lost its dynamism and centrality 
in international social movements. Reasons for this include the problem that it did not 
produce sufficient action or agreements, that it did not manage to remain independent 
from its functionalization by left-wing governments in Latin America, and that it became 
more of a space for a transnational activist elite with little grassroots participation. 
However, in our meeting, several participants stated that their local processes, for 
example, in Venezuela and Tunisia, benefited enormously from the WSF, as the versions 
of the Forum in their countries allowed new alliances, introduced new political perspec-
tives, and inspired local struggles.
Within this context, we wanted to revise the current realities of solidarity and interna-
tionalism.
AID AND COOPERATION
Since World War Two, the reorganization of international relations along the dividing 
line between development and underdevelopment that replaced the former colonial 
worldview of civilized vs. uncivilized worlds has shaped a hegemonic sense of soli-
darity around cooperation and aid, basically organized through thousands of projects 
that have mobilized millions of dollars. Generally, these were supposed to meet certain 
“development” goals formulated by western experts, who also “scientifically” define 
the “needs” of receptor populations. Other projects were also aimed at humanitarian 
relief in contexts of hunger or natural disaster. 
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Without a doubt, there is a broad range of practices and political perspectives within the 
sector of development cooperation. These include technocratic cooperation through 
State agencies and international institutions, as well as a certain technical civil society 
cooperation which has concentrated on the modernization of agriculture and the intro-
duction of capitalist modes of production in the postcolonial world, as in the context 
of the so-called “Green Revolution.” Other strands of the sector, which emanated 
for example from trade-union movements in the North, have gone much further in 
building real political solidarity with revolutionary processes in the Global South (like 
with Nicaragua), supporting the indigenous and women’s movements, the struggle 
against apartheid, or local processes of resistance against extractivism. Although these 
processes were supported through State funding, as well as by direct donations from 
their social constituencies in the Global North, these organizations sought to extend the 
boundaries of what “development cooperation” allowed them to do. And finally, there 
has been a direct solidarity cooperation which understood itself more in political terms 
than in terms of development cooperation, driven as it was by all sorts of collectives, 
and political and social organizations.
In the context of economic financialization and of the foreign debt crisis of many 
southern countries in the 1980s, a structural shift took place. Many processes, even 
those relating to social movements and resistance, began to revolve around donor 
money, its timely “delivery” in projects, its transparent management, etc. This led to 
the transformation of many social movements into clusters of thematic NGOs, which 
then competed with one another for funds instead of being allies. Those NGOs provided 
formal employment for activists, but also grew increasingly donor dependent, vertically 
structured, and bureaucratized by “project logics” – a process of alienation that has had 
a huge impact on the emancipatory potential of those actors and on the strategies of 
solidarity and internationalism. 
In the last few decades, we have seen new tendencies towards the homogenization of 
the diverse world of international NGOs and development cooperation schemes within 
a neoliberal and technocratic framework. This has meant a shift away from support for 
grassroots processes of social organization and transformation to support for projects that 
seek technical solutions to problems like climate change and food insecurity. By applying 
pre-determined recipes and strategies, often driven by international trends instead of the 
contextualized agendas and perspectives of grassroots movements, the view of “devel-
opment” as the dominant political perspective for Global South societies was reinforced. 
As such, donor agencies with their own agendas reproduced the asymmetrical relations 
between Global North and Global South civil societies, following the patterns of colonial 
geopolitics. Such patterns can also be found within the Global South, as the example of 
the Brazilian state-owned firm PetroBras financing indigenous organizations or the World 
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Social Forum shows. In the aid sector this was even more problematic as enormous cash 
flows moved through the agendas and institutions of the Global North, with little vision 
of structural change that would enable transformative grassroots social movements and 
foster their autonomous capacities for the reproduction of life after disaster.
We therefore propose a very critical angle that questions international cooperation 
from a perspective of emancipatory solidarity or even reciprocity, and distinguishes 
between development cooperation and political solidarity. Relations framed through 
development cooperation have to be transformed, overcoming paternalistic relations 
and perspectives that insist on the necessity of the Global North “helping” the Global 
South by transferring certain skills, knowledges, and resources. Instead, horizontal and 
reciprocal alliances between actors and agendas for social change in the North and 
South should be constructed to promote structural transformation around the world. 
Within these alliances, grassroots communities and organizations should be the central 
actors in strategy definition, incorporating where possible local government and univer-
sities, instead of international institutions which impose technocratic methods. We 
recognize that several solidarity organizations are going through such processes of 
transformation, but this still remains a minority within the sector.
CAMPAIGNS AND NETWORKS 
The many international campaigns and networks concerned with concrete cases or 
issues constitute a second group of solidarity and internationalist actors. Nigerian activ-
ists needed Dutch and English counterparts to implement legal strategies against the 
companies that affected their livelihoods in their home country. The struggles against 
apartheid or the World Trade Organization allowed the building of long-lasting collabo-
rations, whilst alliances built around global value chains of production (e.g. the Clean 
Clothes Campaign) or the impact of mining companies (Networks on Vale and Glencore 
Xstrata) are examples of processes of action that have had positive outcomes. 
Here, solidarities have been built between very different people and organizations 
around shared goals, or people from different parts of the world affected by similar 
phenomena have been brought together. However, within these processes and 
networks, the languages and strategic perspectives emanating from the Global North 
are often still dominant. Also, struggles can be appropriated by bigger, more visible 
global campaigns whose interests can conflict with the needs of grassroots processes. 
For example, when global campaigns need a face or story of one person in order to be 
able to campaign on complex issues and collective processes, this introduces a new 
logic of individualism, creating tensions and conflicts at the grassroots level.
Within environmentalist networks, struggles have taken place to include the languages 
and perspectives of the Global South, particularly in relation to indigenous movements 
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on Nature, knowledges, and spiritualities. For example, the growing leadership of Global 
South actors, in particular of the group Acción Ecologica from Ecuador, introduced a 
change of perspective into Friends of the Earth International. Other networks based on 
South-South cooperation, like Oilwatch, emerged, with strong leadership from Ecuador 
and Nigeria, to overcome the limitations of Global North leadership. Therefore, the 
capacity to produce knowledge in an autonomous and independent way as a basis for 
political action, and to engage in a real dialogue between different kinds of knowledge, 
is crucial to real solidarity and internationalism.
CONNECTING OUR PRACTICES AND STRUGGLES 
Solidarity as part of emancipatory politics requires the revision of our everyday practices 
in the places where we live. It is obvious that in the face of the civilizational crisis and its 
ecological expressions, an important reduction in consumption, in the matter we trans-
port across the planet, and in the energy we require, is mandatory. Nevertheless, the 
social and ecological costs that are inscribed in a certain product that has gone through 
a global production chain are invisible to the consumer. It is important to acknowledge 
that our everyday habits, routines, and decisions to a great extent have effects else-
where in the world – for example the destruction of livelihoods through extractivism. 
Consequently, the ethics of social change that obliges us to self-reflect on our practices 
and to find individual and collective ways to change our reproduction of patterns of 
domination is a crucial dimension of internationalism today. We need to ask ourselves 
necessary questions such as: how are we embedded in the imperial way of living? 
According to what axis of domination are we privileged and where not; what is our point 
of departure in the struggle? What power patterns do we reproduce in our own lives? 
What material structures sustain our struggles and forms of knowledge and what can 
be done about this? Where do we contribute to sustaining global value chains, corpo-
rations, and finance? To what extent are we open to learning from other cultures and 
grammars of emancipation?
In the context of a globalized economy, our struggles are more interdependent than ever 
before. This means that transformation in the Global South often depends on effec-
tive social transformation in the North, and vice versa. To offer a simple example: If 
there was no demand for the newest generation of technological gadgets, mining in the 
South would be significantly less lucrative. But also if the expansion of extractivism was 
not so dramatic in the South, there would be much less migration towards the North, 
and maybe right-wing populism would have less grounds to expand. 
Particularly in the Global North, it has often been easier or more satisfying to support the 
struggles of distant others in the Global South than to engage with or promote eman-
cipatory struggles back home, partly because these might be full of contradictions and 
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present difficult choices, whilst helping a distant struggle of the materially “poor” can 
easily be idealized. This idealization of struggles in the South may have enabled uncritical 
solidarities. The Venezuelan process could be the best example of this in recent times, as 
the degeneration of the process described by Edgardo Lander in this book was justified 
and even reinforced by the unconditional support from outside of the country.
The main problems and challenges for contemporary human society might be 
embedded in geopolitical and colonial difference, but they are also very much rooted 
in global interdependency. The extreme concentration of power and wealth in the 
world, or the consequences of ecological destruction and climate change, are global 
phenomena rooted in global processes. Therefore, conceptual frameworks like the 
imperial mode of living, transition thinking, and the Degrowth movement might allow 
us to revise our own role, place, and responsibilities in global processes. In this sense, 
real solidarity requires an engagement with social transformation in our own societies 
first, not only to act on the structure of the current world system, but also as a basis 
to strengthen alliances and solidarity in a horizontal way between struggles around 
the globe. 
SURPRISING SOLIDARITIES: SOUTH-SOUTH,  
SOUTH-NORTH, TRANSLOCAL AND TRANSLATION
Beyond these more structured and visible forms of solidarity and internationalism, many 
other forms are taking place in invisible and even unexpected ways. The emergence 
of simultaneous political phenomena, languages, and cultures need to be explained 
through the travelling of ideas and strategies through the digital world, personal 
encounters, travelling, and reading. It was noted how, for example, the ideas of Gandhi 
still inspire strategies of civil disobedience in many places. In the last few years, the 
discourses and practices of horizontalism, the questioning of traditional representative 
democracy, as well as left-wing organizing, have emerged from Senegal to the United 
States, and from Peru to the Philippines, as our discussion showed. So inter-people 
learning, sharing, and building often occurs outside the formal frame of institutionalized 
cooperation or even movements. 
Nowadays, solidarities between local processes, without interference from national 
movements, NGOs, or international institutions are taking place. They configure trans-
local solidarities between struggles that recognize themselves in each other. This 
happened between Cajamarca in Peru and Intag in Ecuador, for example. South-South 
internationalisms remain hard to sustain and are even logistically complicated by the 
scarcity of air routes connecting the distant parts of the South. South-North solidarity 
has also been taking place, such as when Latin American indigenous organizations 
expressed solidarity with the Standing Rock struggle in the United States, or through 
the support from the Venezuelan, Brazilian, and Chinese governments for the African-
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American movement. Venezuela even opened a diplomatic mission in New Orleans to 
be in direct contact with African-American social movements.
This diversification of solidarities brings us to issues of translation and learning. In Nabón 
we talked to the veteran indigenous leader Juana Morocho who plainly refused to talk 
about development. Possibly, she preferred her life not to be framed in those terms, 
because her territory and culture go beyond this word, whose very use she might well 
have considered a form of dispossession. In Ecuador, the construction of the idea of the 
rights of Nature was originally rejected by the indigenous movement which felt alien to 
the framework of ordinary justice, but after a process of dialogue and political construc-
tion, they decided to accept it as a strategic translation. Of course, there remains a 
tension between the non-western idea of Nature being endowed with agency and its 
enshrinement within the Western discourse of rights. 
But this is not the same as saying that things get lost in translation. Nor is it the 
same as saying that translation inevitably implies that something gets lost, as we will 
never be able to translate our realities in ways that allow complete understanding. 
In reality, nothing is ever lost in translation, because there is nothing to lose. That 
is, there are no fixed meanings in separate societies waiting to be lost when they 
are transported across boundaries. Rather, meanings are created in translation itself. 
The question is what the politics of that translation process consist of. By the same 
token, the “complete understanding” of others is not an intelligible goal of dialogue. 
Understandings are continuously created in encounters, not transmitted from fixed 
“cultures” or “identities.” This underlines the emancipatory importance of paying 
more careful attention than social movements often do to the slow process through 
which concrete struggles learn about others and themselves through mutual encoun-
ters and mutual translation. 
REINVENTING INTERNATIONALISMS
Our revision of the idea of inter-people solidarities allowed for some evident but 
still necessary critiques. Emancipatory internationalism requires us to overcome the 
money-centered, donor-driven, technocratic, bureaucratic, and paternalistic logic of aid 
and cooperation. It also requires us to overcome the trends and formulas embraced by 
international institutions. Consequently, very relevant political perspectives like Buen 
Vivir or Plurinational State are not well known in Africa or Asia, and Latin Americans 
know little about struggles on those continents, and even less about the emancipatory 
theories that have emanated from those struggles. 
Within processes of exchange and solidarity, inequality also exists. A kind of trans-
national elite has emerged that attends conferences and monopolizes international 
dialogue and representation, often without close connections to the struggles back 
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home. This politics of representation reflects class or status differences within strug-
gles that are not openly discussed. It is also favored by the big agencies of development 
cooperation promoting “their favorite” leaders, who end up losing a structural connec-
tion to the grassroots level.
Uncritical or unconditional solidarity is more harmful than useful, as it reinforces nega-
tive (e.g., authoritarian) evolutions within processes, as we have seen in Venezuela or 
Ecuador. A binary, black and white “cold war” approach (i.e., “the enemy of our enemy 
is our friend”) creates obstacles for transformative processes elsewhere as learning 
from errors becomes difficult. This confirms the image of the left as hypocritical and 
authoritarian, leading to a kind of immunity against socialism and any other kind of 
progressive politics in large parts of the population, as happened in many Eastern Euro-
pean countries. 
The reinvention of internationalism and solidarity is taking place in practice, for example 
through translocal solidarities between territory-based struggles. This reinvention 
should be understood through notions of internationalism that go beyond simplistic 
binary understandings of the Global South and Global North as homogeneous and 
separate entities. The language of intercultural or inter-movement solidarities seems 
to suggest that these are interactions between two relatively fixed blocs or entities, 
whilst talking about the local and the global suggests the idea of separated scales. 
However, the real world is far more complex and interdependent. Many, if not all, 
phenomena are local and global at the same time, dominations and social struggles 
are intersected, and the multidimensional social transformation we seek needs at the 
same time to be personal, collective, symbolic and structural, local and global to be 
effective. 
So solidarity means building our struggles together, in reciprocity, as part of a 
common struggle. We see solidarity in terms of sharing, caring, and learning between 
our struggles, instead of giving and receiving. As all our struggles are incomplete, 
since they all confront some dimensions of the structures of power, all are in need 
of support wherever they take place; we need to connect them to build more articu-
lated and integrated perspectives and strategies. This also implies that collaboration 
and cooperation should be built from below through long-term engagements; fighting 
together means leaving the people engaged in struggles with the power to define 
their struggle. Finally, we see big challenges for internationalism and solidarity as 
consequences of the expansive processes of surveillance, securitization, and crimi-
nalization that threaten activists in their own contexts and seek to delegitimize and 
attack solidarity itself.
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FINAL THOUGHTS ON STRATEGY
Our journey ends with a final reflection on strategies. We have seen how radical 
multidimensional transformation is imperative to assure a just and democratic future 
for humankind. At the same time, the preconditions for such a change are very diffi-
cult. Power and resources are concentrated more than ever before in global elites and 
economic groups, and collective imaginaries of development, consumerism, and indi-
vidualism are deeply rooted in the subjectivities of the majority of the world population. 
Militarism, the spread of corporate technology (and technological solutions), and the 
mass media are enabling factors for these negative conditionalities.
At the same time, we have seen how different logics of struggle and emancipatory 
politics are occurring throughout the world. 
AT THE VERY LEAST, SIX DIFFERENT LOGICS OF STRUGGLE ARE PRESENT: 
> prefigurative politics at local levels, in which populations construct or defend self-
determination autonomously, such as in Mendha-Lekha or in the process of the 
Zapatistas in Mexico, but also in many economic initiatives; 
> multiple social movements that seek cultural and political change through different 
strategies, including mobilization, as is the case in feminist, LGTBI, environmen-
talist, anti-racist, and indigenous movements; 
> the appropriation and transformation of some parts of the State through processes 
of greater communal activity from below, as in the cases of Nabón and Barcelona, 
where local government enables society to direct itself into more democratic, equi-
table, and sustainable futures; 
> political parties, movements, and instruments that seek to change society through 
the capturing of the State or participation in the institutional political process, as was 
found in the cases of Venezuela and Ecuador, as well as in those of Syriza in Greece 
and Podemos in Spain. In contrast to radical municipalism, these processes tend to 
focus on the national level, and do not necessarily question the reality of the State. 
Nevertheless, they can help promote processes of transformative constitutionalism 
when existing social power relations allow them; 
> alter-globalization networks, campaigns, and movements that seek to influence and 
transform the politics of globalization; 
> and lastly, but equally importantly, we have to remember that the private is also 
political, and that our own personal practices of consumption, of building relation-
ships, and raising children, of relating to each other and to Nature, all matter a great 
deal. Transformation has to target the cultural dimension of subjectivities shaped by 
modern capitalist civilization, including desires, habits, and routines. 
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Of course, in practice, these different strategies can also overlap and connect with one 
another in many ways. However, they can also contradict one another and conflict with 
one another, as has been the case between progressive governments and indigenous 
and feminist movements in Latin America.
Our discussion showed that in spite of differences in our stances towards these different 
strategies, we agree that the current historical moment implies different temporalities 
of transformation which are best met by different, eventually complementary political 
strategies. In the short term, there is the need to stop the accelerated ecological, polit-
ical, and social processes of destruction and dispossession, through defensive struggles 
which also protect the conquests of social movements in previous cycles of struggle. 
Spaces of autonomy, self-organization, and the extension of the commons need to be 
defended actively, as they are the building stones for deeper change. 
Strong social movements of resistance at all levels, local, regional, national, continental, 
and global, are necessary and such struggles will require a multitude of strategies, 
including the politics of left-wing political movements or parties which dispute the 
legal and institutional conditions for transformation within the framework of the State. 
Different transition initiatives need to be promoted and supported from within and 
outside of State institutions, and bridges should be built between territorial and practical 
approaches which prefigure alternative modes of living and approaches that are aimed 
more at institutional politics. And, in the context of right-wing populism and a conserva-
tive offensive, we will also need to defend the liberal languages and institutions of 
representative democracy, environmentalism, and human rights, as well as the right 
to dissidence itself. In the face of extended surveillance, securitization, and militarism, 
solidarity is crucial for the protection of defenders of territories, the environment, and 
human rights.
This long-term multidimensional transformation will require other, offensive political 
struggles capable of creating new ways of being and consciousness, new institu-
tions, new modes of production, practices of distribution, and consumption habits. The 
required political imaginary needs to go far beyond the realities of the Nation-State, 
the language of human rights, and the current processes and practices of production, 
consumption, and distribution, to be able to respond fully to the civilizational and ecolog-
ical crisis we are facing. Such a radically different society is already being born and even 
practiced historically, in numerous local processes of prefigurative politics. It is bound to 
specific territories with significant ranges of autonomy from national State institutions, 
and in some cases, also with emancipatory local government, as in the cases of Nabón 
in Ecuador and Spanish municipalism.
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One important task is to recognize these processes as valuable, to make them visible 
to each other and connect them. Building popular power through the preservation of 
the existing commons or by creating new ones, and thereby de-linking communities 
from the commodifying logic of the globalized capitalist world market, emerges as a 
path forward for the deepening of democracy and self-determination, as well as for 
the transformation of relations with Nature, and for the dismantling of patriarchy and 
decolonization. The political perspectives of plurinationality, polycentricity, Buen Vivir, 
or biodemocracy and their concrete practices allow for the possibility of overcoming the 
limitations of both modern liberal and Marxist Eurocentric political thought. Throughout 
our meeting, we saw that this requires deep and significant dialogues between cultures, 
political traditions, and social movements.
The last cycle of struggles shows that maintaining different logics, scales, and cultures 
of struggle simultaneously is both very difficult – some would say: impossible – and 
necessary for radical social change. Without social movements pushing for change in 
the streets, progressive governments will be coopted by institutional logic and possibly 
corruption. Radical protest movements that lack processes for building alternatives 
in terms of (re)production, (re)distribution, and consumption will become reactive or 
dogmatic. Local rural self-governance and alternative production will not be able to stop 
ecological destruction without a transformation towards sustainability in urban contexts 
and without enabling frameworks that have to be created on other scales. And transition 
initiatives and local alternatives that lack articulation and wider political horizons easily 
become self-centered, isolated, and marginal.
Several issues mentioned or touched on at our meeting require more discussion. We 
saw the importance of social control and ownership of technology, but what does 
good and just use of technology actually mean? Secondly, although we’ve stated 
that these contradictions require a politics of multiple temporalities, combining the 
urgency of radical resistance with the slow pace of deep cultural transformation, 
remains a big challenge. Finally, the transformation of our methods and networks of 
production, distribution, and exchange remains a central issue. Of course, several 
elements of economic transformation are clear; they include the strengthening of 
local networks of production and consumption, the promotion of circular econo-
mies (in which energy and materials are circulated continuously in different ways, 
to avoid waste), the promotion of sustainable products, and the definancialization 
of our economies. However, many open questions remain about its articulation on 
higher levels of our economies: how can this work? What kind of economic and 
productive models can sustain this? 
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There will not be one encompassing narrative of change, such as that provided by the 
narrative of socialism during the late 19th and 20th centuries in many parts of the world. 
The necessary strategies will differ according to each local and historical context, but 
the challenge of nurturing relationships between them, of building ecosystems of 
change composed by different actors, strategies, and scales, is crucial. The kinds of 
alliances we need are those that connect resistances and alternative-building, on the 
basis of shared principles that inspire localized practices. For example in India, regarding 
agriculture, we can see grassroots initiatives working on agro-ecological alternatives 
while being connected to national movements fighting GMOs. 
We need horizontal alignments between local alternatives, and vertical alignments with 
the national and international level that can help make these struggles successful or 
sustainable. All of this requires the capacity to reinvent politics as we know it, and 
to find new ways of working together: between peoples, movements, struggles, and 
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Our world is facing a multidimensional crisis arising from the very civiliza-
tional foundations that capitalist modernity is built on: economic growth, 
instrumental and destructive societal relations with Nature, a blind belief in 
science and technology and a rational, profit-maximizing, and individualistic 
understanding of humanity. These bases have not only produced a specific 
set of problems, including an unprecedented level of ecological destruction. 
They also shape the possible solutions that are envisioned and often only 
aggravate the status quo. 
Since World War II, the narrative of development has been a very effective 
instrument in expanding capitalist social and economic relations into the 
postcolonial world. In the name of development and modernization, a broad 
variety of other modes of being in the world and understanding it have been 
labeled as poor, backward, and obsolete. Seeking alternatives beyond devel-
opment therefore means seeking alternatives beyond this civilization that has 
led us into this crisis. 
This book, which is the result of a group effort, intends to contribute to the 
urgently needed collective inquiries taking into view new theoretical and polit-
ical paradigms of social transformation. In six case studies from all over the 
world and one concluding chapter, it seeks to address simultaneously the 
complex relations between class, race, coloniality, gender, and Nature, as it is 
precisely their historical entanglements and interdependencies that configure 
the civilizational bases of the system we face.
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